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Créée dans les années 50 par l'économiste autrichien Joseph Schumpeter, le terme 
"Destruction créatrice" suggère que la compétition émergente des nouvelles technologies 
ferait perdre aux compagnies déjà bien établies, leur position sur le marché ainsi que leur 
avantage  compétitif.  Depuis,  ce  terme et son  concept ont évolué.  Certains  chercheurs 
avancèrent que les technologies disruptives remplaceraient celles existantes, représentant 
ainsi  un  inconvénient aux  entreprises  historiques et leurs fournisseurs.  Cette recherche 
empirique explore le  processus par lequel la construction créatrice (ou  la destruction), 
telle que suggérée par Schumpeter, a eu un effet sur l'industrie des télécommunications et 
la  façon  dont cela a  changé  la  stratégie  corporative des  entreprises  et la  structure  de 
l'industrie dans le domaine des  télécommunications. La relation à l'étude est celle entre 
les activités intensives de fusions et d'acquisitions, celles des entreprises guidées par les 
entrepreneurs et managers en matière de technologies. En outre, cette recherche explique 
tout  en  le  soulignant,  le  lien  entre  les  acquisitions  et  l'entrepreneuriat  innovateur,  la 
création de  nouvelles technologies et le capital-risque, le  tout dans un  système national 
d'innovation servant d'écosystème. De plus, elle explore le processus d'intégration de ces 
technologies  acquises  afin  de  créer  de  nouveaux  services,  applications  et  modèles 
d'affaire convergents. 
Dans  le  cadre  de  cette  recherche  qualitative,  une  méthodologie  mixte  a  été 
employée. Celle-ci est composée principalement de la théorie ancrée (grounded theory) 
qui permettra de construire puis proposer un  modèle théorique et ses propositions, en se 
basant  sur  les  informations  existantes  de  l'industrie  de  la  télécommunication.  Les 
résultats pourront être appliqués à d'autres industries de haute technologie telles que la 
biotechnologie,  l'aérospatial  et  la  nano  technologie.  Il  s'agit  d'une  recherche 
multidisciplinaire suivant les traditions de la stratégie, l' entrepreneuriat et la gestion de la 
technologie et de l'innovation, qui aura des répercussions sur les chercheurs de même que 
les professionnels de l'industrie. XX Il 
ABSTRACT 
The term creative destruction was coined in  the  1950s by the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter, to suggest that sorne established companies would lose their market 
position and competitive advantage due to competition emerging from  new technologies. 
Since then, the term and its concept have evolved and sorne scholars have suggested that 
disruptive technologies would substitute existing technologies, causing a disadvantage to 
incumbent firms  and providers. This empirical research explores  the process by  which 
creative construction (or destruction), as  suggested by Schumpeter, had an impact on the 
telecommunications industry, and how it changed the corporate strategy of the firms and 
the industry structure, in  this industry. It explores the relationship between the intensive 
activities of mergers and acquisitions and the entrepreneurial activities led by technology 
entrepreneurs  and  managers.  Moreover,  it  explains  and  highlights  the  relationship  of 
acquisitions and entrepreneurship with innovation, the creation of new technologies and 
venture  capital,  in  the  context  of a  national  system  of innovation  as  the  ecosystem. 
Furthermore,  it  explores how these acquired technologies are then  integrated,  to  create 
new converged services, applications and business models. 
This  qualitative  research  uses  a  mixed  methodology  using  mainly  grounded 
theory  to  construct and  propose a theoretical  model and  its  propositions,  based on  the 
insights from  the  telecommunications  industry.  The findings  could be  generalized into 
other high technology industries such as biotechnology, aerospace and nano technologies. 
This  is  a  multidisciplinary  research,  in  the  traditions  of business  policy  and  strategy, 
entrepreneurship and technology and innovation management, with implications for both 
scholars and practitioners. 1-INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is  a highly complex process that integrates technological, economical, social 
and psychological aspects. In social sciences, research on innovation could be found mainly at the 
intersections of the areas of business policy and strategy, technology and innovation management 
and entrepreneurship. It draws upon a variety of variables and constructs from these areas and it 
explores  different  inputs,  outcomes,  critical  success  factors,  performance  measurements,  and 
processes, all involved in the creation, management and measurement of innovation. The research 
on innovation covers different levels of analysis, such as the individual, the firm, the industry, the 
society,  the country,  the  region,  etc.  Moreover,  it  covers  all  types  of industries,  from  low  to 
medium to high technology, and from nascent or well established industries to  stable or rapidly 
changing  industries.  However,  the  research  on  innovation  in  rapidly  changing  industries  or 
turbulent and high velocity environments, are much more insightful, because they reveal to us the 
forces and dynamics that are at play and the reasons why certain firms remain competitive, while 
others fail to compete, all this in a complex setting of interacting variables. The information and 
telecommunications  industries  are  good  examples  of  these  turbulent  and  high  velocity 
environments. 
Innovations in the information and telecommunications industries are amongst the most 
important innovations in the last century. Their impacts extend beyond their boundaries, to affect 
our  way  of life,  and  to  reengineer  the  processes  of production,  distribution,  operation  and 
management in companies across the globe.  At the center of all  this,  is  the electronic transistor 
and all  the generations of innovative and  disruptive technologies,  which had  an  impact bigger 
than  any  technology  in  other high  technology  sectors  such  as  biotechnology,  aerospace,  and 
defense . (A. D. Chandler, 1997). 2 
A Long History of Innovations 
The  telecommunications  industry  has  a  long  his  tory  of  sustaining  and  disruptive 
innovations. The industry could be segmented into different sub-segments and historical periods, 
in which sorne faded in time, while others are still active and continue to show a steady growth 
across large periods of time. Sorne of these sub-segments are: 
- The telegraph period; 
- Telephony, networks and switching; 
- Radio and wireless; 
- Television and broadcasting; 
- Microwave and satellite; 
-The digital era; 
- Digital switching and telephony; 
- Mobile and marine communications; 
- Computer networks. 
These technologies gave us sorne interesting innovations that changed our lives such as 
mobility  in  communications,  online  messaging,  the  Internet,  remote  access  to  knowledge 
databases, telemedicine, remote education, video conferencing, online collaboration tools, dating 
services,  social networks, etc.,  in addition to sorne negative aspects such as the Jack of individual 
privacy, email spam, dangerous viruses, and the potential of system hacking. 
Throughout the history of the telecommunications industry, the industry has witnessed a 
major  wave  of  creative  destruction,  with  the  replacement  of  the  telegraph  service  by  the 
telephony service. The  telephony is considered a disruptive technology to  an existing  telegraph 
service. After this period, as illustrated in figure I.l, the industry witnessed a series of sustaining 
technologies  that  enhanced  the  telephony  s  rvices,  whether  by  enhancing  the  quality  of the 
service,  adding  more  capacity  or  upgrading  to  complementary  services.  These  sustaining 
technologies went through embryonic, growth and maturation phases that last for more than 40 
years. However, a second wave of creative destruction was witnessed through the replacement of 
traditional telephony technologies by the data technologies and more advanced networks. This led 3 
to  the  fusion  of  the  telecommunications  and  information  technology  industries,  to  the 
convergence of telephony  voice,  data and  video  and  more  importantly  to  the  convergence of 
business  models  for  the  carrier  service,  the  end-users  application,  the  content  and  the 
entertainment. 
Therefore, the telecommunication industry has witnessed a continuous and intense wave 
of innovation  and  disruptive  technologies,  which  represents  an  illustration  of the  pattern  that 
affected many high technology sectors from  1995  to  2005.  Researching this  pattern throughout 
this  research,  gives  an explanation  to  the  real  reasons  of why  sorne companies survive,  while 
others fail, in the face of such environmental challenges. 
Figure 1.1 
The diffusion of technology and the second wave of creative destruction 
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A Major Shift in the Telecommunications Industry 
The telecommunications industry has been going since the  1990s through a quiet major 
shift. New technologies, products, services and innovations are continuously emerging, with their 
impact changing every aspect of our lives and the way business is  conducted. Sorne of them are 
weil known to the end-user customers such as Wi-Fi, Wi-Max, Skype, Vonage and mobile video. 
Others are not transparent to  the end-user customers due to  their technical nature, such as  voice 
over internet protocol (VoiP), MPLS, optical switching,  IPTV, broadband, triple and quadruple 
play.  Sorne  of them  represent  improvements  to  existing  technologies  and  services  and  are 
categorized as  "sustaining innovations". Others represent a radical change with the potential of 
destroying value for existing technologies  and  services and  creating  value by  introducing new 
technologies  and  services.  Tho  se  "disruptive  technologies  and  innovations"  are  substituting 
existing  technologies  and  services,  posing  a  great  challenge  to  locked-in  incumbent  service · 
providers by eroding competency, market share and boundaries, and facilitating the entry of new 
and  smaller  dependence-free  service  providers,  by  reducing  barriers,  and  providing  more 
competitive advantages based on new services and business models. This major shift is happening 
at different levels and causing a major change in the industry structure of the telecommunications 
industry. It  is  creating a new  "digital ecosystem" in which data,  voice, and  video, wireline and 
wireless, traditional telephony and TV broadcasting, are ali converging, in addition to the entry of 
new players such as the application, content and entertainment service providers. 
The telecommunications  industry  major shift is  in  line  with  the  work of the  Austrian 
economist  Joseph  Schumpeter,  who  in  1950  coined  the  term  "perennial  gale  of creative 
destruction"  where  he  described  how  companies  and  monopolies  are  challenged  by  the 
competition,  not  based  on  priee,  but  on  "competition  from  the  new  commodity,  the  new 
technology ...  competition that strikes not at the margin  of the profit of the  existing firms but at 
their foundations  and their  very  lives "(Schumpeter,  J  950).  This  creative  destruction  and  the 
emergence of the  disruptive  technologies  do  not  start  in  the  service  provider segment  of  the 
telecommunications  industry  or  by  just  being  introduced  to  the  end-user  customer.  It  is 
transfeiTed  to  the  service  provider  segment, as  new services and  business  models, through the 
buyer-supplier  relationship  that  exists  between  the  service  providers  and  the  equipment 
manufacturers  in  the  telecommunication industry. Therefore,  this  convergence of services and 5 
business  models  is  the  end  product  delivered  to  the  service  providers  by  the  equipments 
manufacturers. 
In  the equipment manufacturing  segment,  firms  established  in  this  knowledge  intense 
sector  face  a  variety  of  turbulent  environmental  challenges.  Their  products  are  technically 
complex, in which the embedded knowledge is  tacit in nature, non codified and non transferable 
as  a public good. The complexity of the technology is coupled with a high leve! of uncertainty 
due to  the lack ·Of  dominant  standards  or standard  wars,  the  lack of credible  forecast  for  the 
potential future new products and the lack of specifie requirements to respond to the customers' 
needs. The rate of innovation of new technologies and products is higher than any other industry 
and  the  industry  faces  continuous  waves  of  new  technological  generations  and  disruptive 
technologies,  which  render the products obsolete,  possibly even  before  being  launched  to  the 
market.  The  rate  of obsolescence  is  such  that  products  often  become  obsolete  before  their 
development costs can be recaptured. The new and disruptive technologies emerge either inside 
the firm or in the environmental ecological system, following a pattern of an epidemie technology 
diffusion, mutation and permutation of characteristics.  However, in the literature we  could not 
find  any  research  linking  these  environmental  challenges  to  the  disruptive  technologies,  in  a 
cause/effect relationship. 
Since the 1990 there was a substantial increase in  mergers and acquisitions activities in 
the high  technology industry.  This intensity of acquisition's activities is  motivated by  different 
reasons. Beside traditional motivations of economizing and empire building, high-tech firms used 
acquisitions mainly to acquire externat strategie resources, gain access to valuable human talents, 
reduce  the cost  and  risk of R&D,  expand  their  portfolio  of products,  reduce  product  time  to 
market and provide for an external source of continuous innovation. In  most of the research on 
corporate mergers and acquisitions, they are viewed as strategies for corporate control and empire 
building,  and  they  are  dealt with  using financial  and  economie  pers  pee  ti v  es,  wh ile  neglecting 
their social, strategie and organizational dimensions. The motivations of acquisitions in the high 
tech  industries,  and  specifically  the  telecommunications  industry,  are  different  than  the 
motivations of acquisitions in other industries. Many of the high  tech acquisitions in  the  l990s 
appeared to  be  motivated by  the firms'  need to  obtain critical  technologies  or capabilities,  in 
contrast to acquisitions in other industries, which are motivated by economies of scale, gains in 6 
market share, geographical expansion, empire building or CEO hubris. Despite the importance of 
the intensive acquisition trend within the context of the telecommunications industry, the research 
on acquisitions in  the  literature of strategie management could be categorized as  contradictory, 
incoherent  and  incomplete.  It  is  contradictory  because  the  findings  present  contradictory 
performance outcome related to  acquisitions, even in the same industry sector. It  is  incoherent, 
because  most  of  the  researches  focus  on  the  economie  aspect  of  acquisitions  including 
performance, economi_es of scope and scale, market penetration, growth, position, net gain, etc., 
while  the  others  focus  on  the  strategie  aspect  of  acquisition  including  human  talent,  tacit 
knowledge, strategie resources, strategie fit, organizational culture and core competencies. Each 
approach  neglects  the other, which leads  to  an  incoherent picture of the factors  involved. Each 
approach  gives  a  perspective  to  the  study  of acquisitions,  however the  whole  picture  remain 
fragmented and unclear. Third, it is  incomplete because the literature has not shed enough light 
on  the  factors,  criteria,  conditions,  motivations,  causes  and  consequences  related  to  the 
acquisition formation in high velocity and turbulent environments. 
In  the service providers  segment of the telecommunications industry,  the acquired  and 
then  integrated  technologies  provided  by  the  manufacturers,  give  rise  to  new  disruptive 
innovations  and  the  Gonvergence  of  services  and  business  models.  This  is  creating  a  new 
landscape for  the  telecommunications  indùstry  and changing  the  rules  of the  game that  were 
established decades ego, leading to  a change in  the industry structure of the telecommunications 
industry. The change in  the industry structure refers to  the change in  the competitive dynamics 
and market forces, the change of the incumbent firms'  competitive advantage, the changing and 
blurring of market boundaries, the erosion of market share, the destruction of competency, the 
Jack  and  need  for  a  new  regulatory  environment,  the  cannibalization  of  services  and  the 
subsequent loss of revenues in traditional markets. 
The Research Question 
Consequently,  we  argue  that  there  is  an  intrinsic  relation  between  the  intensive 
emergence of disruptive technologies and innovations in the telecommunications industry and the 
change  in  the  industry  structure  of both  the  equipment  manufacturing  and  service  provider 7 
segments  of the  telecommunication  industry.  Therefore,  this  research  intends  to  explore  and 
understand  this  relationship,  by  firstly  linking the  intensity  of the disruptive  technologies  and 
innovations  in  this  industry  to  the  intensity  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  equipment 
manufacturer segment, and then by linking the integration and convergence of technologies (due 
to  the  emergence  of disruptive  technologies  in  the  equipment  manufacturer  segment)  to  the 
integration  and  convergence  of  services  in  the  service  provider  segment  of  the 
telecommunications  industry.  Moreover,  the  research  will  identify  the  various  disruptive 
technologies  and  their  impacts  on  both  segments  of the  industry;  describe  the  environmental 
context of each  segment  and  the  challenges  faced  by  companies  operating  in  each  segment; 
explain and highlight how did the impact of these technologies lead to the acquisition spree in one 
segment and to the convergence of business models in the other; and describe the impact they had 
on the telecommunications industry. 
The  research  question  1s:  What  is  the  impact  of  the  disruptive  technologies  and 
innovations  on  the  telecommunications  industry  and  how  this  impact  is  manifested  in  the 
manufacturers'  segment and the service providers' segment and on the industry structure of the 
telecommunications  industry.  By  answering  the  what and  how,  the  research  will  unravel  the 
process  of creative construction (or destruction)  in  the  telecommunications  industry  and  more 
specifically,  the  process  through  which  sorne  firms  create  value  and  sustain  competitive 
advantage,  while  the  other  firms  destroy  value  and  Jose  their  long  established  competitive 
positioning. 
Creative Destruction and Creative Construction 
The  term  creative  destruction  was  coined  in  1950  by  Schumpeter  to  refer  to  the 
destruction of value of the established firms by the emerging new technologies. However, it was 
reported that the term was borrowed by Schumpeter and that it was originally coined by Werner 
Sombart in his german language book Krieg und Kapitalismus in  1913 (Sombart, 1913). The term 
disruptive technology refers to this type of technology that would replace an existing technology 
and therefore destroy value for the established firm  using the incumbent technology and create 
value for the new entrant. Moreover, Tushman and Anderson ( 1986) used the terms technological 
discontinuities,  competence destroying  and competence  enhancing  to  refer  to  the creation and 8 
destruction of value.  And for example, Utterback (1994) used example cases form the lake ice 
and  plate  glass  industries  that  were  replaced  by  the  mechanical  refrigeration  and  float  glass 
processes, res pee  ti v  el y. 
To give sorne examples of these types of disruptive technologies, here is a partial list of 
selected technologies in different industries: 
l.  Liquid Crystal Display replacing Cathode Ray Tube 
2.  Word processor replacing typewriter 
3.  CDs, DVDs replacing cassette tapes 
4.  Downloadable digital media replacing CDs, DVDs 
S.  Integrated chips replacing transistors 
6.  Serniconductors replacing vacuum tubes 
7.  High-speed CMOS (Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor) video sensor replacing 
photographie film 
8.  Digital photography replacing film photography 
9.  Computer prin  ting replacing offset prin ting 
1  O.  Refrigerators replacing ice boxes 
11 .  Desktop publishing replacing traditional publishing 
12.  Computer printing replacing offset printing 
13.  Minicomputers replacing mainframes 
14.  Persona! computers replacing minis and workstations 
15.  Telephony replacing telegraph 
16.  Packet switching networks (ATM: Asynchronous Transfer Mode, MPLS: Multiprotocol 
label switching, etc.) replacing circuit switching networks 
17.  Virtual priva  te networks replacing leased !ines 
18.  VoiP (Voice over Internet Protocol) using Skype application replacing incumbent 
international calls service providers 
19.  WiMax (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) Microwave technologies 
replacing incumbent service providers' infrastructure 
20.  Mobile telephony replacing paging services 
21.  Mobile telephony replacing tetTestrial fixed line services 
22.  Routers replacing time and wave division multiplexing 
23.  High bandwidth fiber optics replacing copper wire 
24.  DSL (Digital subscriber line) high-speed Internet access replacing modems 
25.  Private jet replacing supersonic transport 
26.  Electronic organ replacing acoustic organ 
27.  Digital synthesizers replacing electronic organs 
28.  Calculators replacing slide rules 
29.  Open source operating system replacing proprietary operating systems 
30.  Open source applications software replacing proprietary applications software 
31.  Open source databases replacing commercial databases 
32.  Amazon web services replacing bookstores 
33.  Online social networks replacing online messaging services 9 
This partial list suggests that these disruptive technologies replaced existing technologies 
in established industries and firms.  It  also suggests  that this happens through a process  in  which 
disruptive technologies replace old technologies. This process of creative destruction is where the 
value  and  competence  of existing  firms  or  industries  are  destroyed  by  the  incorning  new 
disruptive technologies.  However, this process in many of the cases is obscured and is considered 
as a black box of disruption and destruction, as illustrated in figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2 
The black box of disruption and destruction 
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Therefore, the interesting question would be what is  the process of creative destruction 
(the inside of the black box) through which the established firms and incumbent technologies lose 
their  positioning  to  new  entrants  through  disruptive  technologies?  Alternatively,  and  more 
interestingly,  the question could be  what is  the process of creative  construction by  which new 
entrants and other firms create value and competencies and sustain competitive advantage in the 10 
face of disruptive technologies? Clearly, creative destruction is  one side of the coin,  where the 
other side is creative construction, which is the main topic of this research. 
The Choice of the Telecommunications lndustry 
As  mentioned  before,  the  telecommunications  industry  is  an  important  industry  with 
various  impacts  in  our daily  !ife, economy,  education,  medicine,  defense,  etc.  The penetration 
rates, as shown in figure !.3, shows a steady growth rate across different telecommunications sub-
segments and technologies and over large periods of times.  In  addition, figure 1.4, illustrates the 
importance  of telecommunications  in  our  lives,  by  means  of expenditures  compared  to  other 
services and needs. 
However, research on the telecommunications industries is scarce, compared to research 
on information technologies and software. Moreover, most of the research focuses on  the tip of 
the iceberg, or in  other words,  on the end-user products such as  the computer, the software, the 
television set,  the iPhone, the mobile service, etc, that are seen on the application levels of the 
telecommunications  service  networks.  The  failure  to  look  at  and  explore  the  underlying 
technologies  and  networks  is  mainly  due  to  the  complexities  of these  technologies  and  the 
required  technical  skills  needed  to  navigate  through  the  technical  information  and 
documentations. 
Figure 1.3 
US household penetration rate by percentage (Veronis Suhler Stevenson 2004, Economist) 
- îl:$\tlo  ...,..  Cable  _,_.  V HS  ~  lM>  -- lli1jitalvidw re<w~ 
- lV  deo gilmes:  - Satellite W  - 8ro4Jdband  Satellite r~io 
------~L-----~------------~~~==~~ 
r-----:::10  .......  '"--"~r- 4Q 
- 20 
---------------- - -------Figure 1.4 
Household spending in OECD countries, 1990= 100 (source: OECD, Economist) 
- Communications! 
..... Edu01t.ion 
,.... Recreatî1>n and culture 
....,. Re$taurants and hotels 
. Food and non-alcoholk be\lerages 
- ctoth!og and fuot\~1N1t 
1990  92  \14  96  98  2000  02  04 
Il 
Therefore,  this  research  attempts  to  explore,  document,  and  analyze  these  underlying 
complex  technologies  and  networks,  without  adding  technical  or  engineering  jargon  to  the 
reporting document. For that purpose, the dissertation text is stripped of ali technical and complex 
engineering knowledge, for the purpose of focus, clarity and understanding. 
Basic Theoretical Research 
The purpose of this inquiry and therefore the research question is to do  basic theoretical 
research through an empirical study of the telecommunications industry. The questions emerging 
from  the research question are derived from three traditions in  the business administration and 
management disciplines, as  illustrated in figure 1.5: business  policy and strategy, technology and 
innovation  management  and  entrepreneurship.  The  objective  of this  theoretical  research  is  to 
understand the phenomena under study and explain it. To understand it, the research will include 
•  a fieldwork in  order to get doser to  the  'real  world', in  which the individuals, events,  groups, 
programs,  organizations,  and  industries,  ali  interact  with  each  other  in  an  ecological  system, 12 
which combined with the context, represent and construct the real world. Having gained this in-
depth understanding of the phenomena under study, the research will strive to analyze it with the 
objective  of fruitfully  generating  new  theories  that  will  contribute  to  the  body  of scientific 
knowledge  in  the  respective  disciplines,  and  from  which  emerge  the  research  questions.  As 
Taylor and Bogdan noted:  "Phenomenology has a long history in philosophy and sociology. The 
phenomenologist  is  committed  ta  understanding  social  phenomena  from  the  actor's  own 
perspective.  He  or she  examines how  the  world is  experienced.  The  important reality  is  what 
people perceive it ta be. " (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984 p.  1-2) 
Figure 1.5 
The intersection of strategy, innovation management and entrepreneurship 
Depth versus Breadth 1  Scope 
Using a naturalistic qualitative method of inquiry will allow the research to be conducted 
with the objective of in-depth understanding the phenomena under study in a holistic fashion and 
without neglecting the details, the context, and the intricacies of the inter-relationships that exist 
between the various actors that constitute the ecosystem of this specifie industry. 13 
The research question covers both the manufacturing segment and the service provider 
segment of the telecommunications industry. To understand in-depth the impact of the disruptive 
technologies and innovations on the telecommunications industry, both sectors have to be studied. 
Sacrificing one segment would limit the ability to deeply understand the phenomenon and would 
render the findings incomplete. 
Going deeply into the manufacturing segment will help understanding the impact of the 
disruptive  technologies  on  the  management  of  internai  R&D,  strategie  assets,  dynamic 
capabilities and  the competitiveness of the firms  in  this  sector. It  will  help  understanding how 
these  firms  face  and  react  to  the  environmental  challenges  of  turbulence,  high  velocity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity.  It will identify how sorne firms  survive facing these challenges and 
what do they do to survive, in terms of reorganization, adaptation, adopting new business models, 
and  innovation,  etc.,  white others fail  to  adapt and  despite being in  incumbent positions,  they 
become less competitive and sometime fade or end up being acquired by others. 
These manufacturing firms who face the challenges posed by disruptive technologies and 
still manage to survive and stay competitive, are the ones producing, integrating and converging 
new technologies, innovations, systems, products, and services to the service providers segment. 
Therefore  they  act  as  a  conduit  between  the  environment  that  generate  the  disruptive 
technologies,  and  the  service  providers  who  receive  these  new  disruptive  technologies  and 
innovation in the form of equipments, products and service delivery platforms and modules. 
By going deeply into the service provider segment, this will help understanding why and 
how sorne incumbent service providers survive, adapt and become more competitive, white others 
lag  and  are  challenged  by  new  entrants.  It  will  help  understanding  why,  if true,  these  new 
disruptive technologies,  innovations  and  services,  facilitate  the emergence of new  entrants  by 
reducing entry barriers and  'how' these new entrants are taking advantage of the disruption to 
challenge the  incumbent, gain  market power, and become more and more competitive in  short 
periods of ti me. 14 
Therefore, combining both the manufacturing segment and the service providers segment 
m  the  framework  of  this  naturalistic  qualitative  research  provides  not  only  in-depth 
understanding, but also bread  th by means of the scope covered by the research question. 
Organization of the Document 
This document is organized in a linear fashion,  although it  should have been organized 
according to  the grounded theory prescription, starting by a brief review of the literature, going 
through the methodology and fieldwork,  and then presenting the results of the findings  and the 
proposed theoretical  mode!  that emerged and  was constructed based on  being grounded  in  the 
data. 
In  qualitative  naturalistic  inquiries,  using  inductive  analysis  and  a  methodological 
theoretical tradition such as  grounded theory, the organization of the report and presentation of 
the  findings  and  proposed  theory,  is  different than  the organization used in  hypotheses-testing 
deductive 1 quantitative inquires. The theory is the finding and is the result of the emergence in 
the collected data and  'theoretical sensitivity'. Therefore, the data is  presented as  it is  analyzed 
and the resulting theory is the final contribution of the inquiry:  "ln my own studies,  1 refrained 
from advancing a theory at the beginning of  my grounded theory research,  generated the theory 
through  data  collection  and  analysis,  posed  the  theory  as  a  !agie  diagram,  and  introduced 
contending and contrasting theories with the mode!! gene rate at the end of  my study." (Creswell, 
1998 p. 86) 
However,  for  the  purpose  of  this  document  intended  as  a  doctoral  dissertation,  a 
conceptual framework  with  variations  is  presented at  the start  of the  document (chapter 3)  to 
facilitate the task of introducing the research strategy,  research design and implementation plan 
for the fieldwork. The conceptual framework, therefore, serve as  a guiding lantern in search of a 
grounded theory, to be hopefully, fruitfully achieved at the end of the inquiry. 
Re garding the literature review and methodology sections, Creswell  ( 1998 p.  179) notes 
that:  "The writer includes a literature review, but this review 'neither provides key concepts nor 15 
suggests hypotheses as it does in  hypothetico-deductive research '.  Instead,  this lite rature review 
shows gap or bias in existing knowledge,  thus providing a rationale for a grounded theory study. 
A researcher does not pro  vide a theoretic.al framework in this review in as much as the intent of 
grounded theory is to generate or develop a theory. " 
After  the  research  question  was  identified  and  clearly  defined,  in  the  search  for  a 
methodological  approach,  there  wasn't any  methodological  bias,  predeterrnined  preference  or 
paradigm  of  choice  about  the  value  of  knowledge  in  relation  to  the  representation  and 
interpretation of reality when using a quantitative or qualitative design approach. However, it was 
known and advised before starting, that a quantitative inquiry would be Jess  complicated in term 
of  complexity,  clarity  of  predetermined  and  standardized  procedures  to  follow,  and  time 
consumption.  Needless  to  say,  the  traditional  bias  that  exists  towards  the  hypothesis-testing 1 
deductive approach, believed by many to be the scientific method of inquiry, had led to revisit the 
research question and to look for accomrnodating solution in  the initial long quest for defining a 
research question and thinking about potential strategies for the research design, fieldwork, and 
final  rep01t. However,  the interest and  motivations for  the chosen research question, helped in 
identifying potentials strategie framework for the research design and fieldwork, using one or a 
combination of the  theoretical  traditions  in  the  inductive 1 naturalistic  qualitative paradigm of 
scientific inquiry.  In  the quest to  identify  a  clear and  precise strategy,  most of the  theoretical 
traditions  used  for  qualitative  inquires  were  revisited.  In  his  book  Qualitative  inquiry  and 
research  design:  Choosing  among  five  traditions,  John  Creswell  (1998)  provides  a  good 
description of five theoretical traditions used in qualitative inquiries: Biography; phenomenology; 
grounded theory;  ethnography and case study.  Moreover, Michael Quinn Patton  (2002),  in  his 
book  Qualitative  research  and  evaluation  methods,  presented  and  described  16  theoretical 
traditions used in  qualitative inquiries:  Ethnography; autoethnography; reality testing (positivist 
and  realist  approaches);  constructionisrn/constructivism;  phenomenology;  heuristic  inquiry; 
ethnomethodology; symbolic interaction; serniotics;  hermeneutics; narratology/narrati ve analysis; 
ecological psychology; system theory; chaos theory (nonlinear dynamics); grounded theory; and 
orientational (ferninist inquiry, critical theory, queer theory, among others). 
Finally, it was decided that the strategie framework for the research design, fieldwork and 
reporting, would be based mainly on the use of a combination of (a) inductive analysis composed 16 
of a layered combination of (1) analytical induction, (2) case study, and (3) grounded theory; and 
(b)  deductive  analysis  for  validation  composed  of (l)  theoretical  hypotheses-testing,  and  (2) 
generalization, transferability and confirmation. 
Presentation of the Chapters 
Most  of  the  chapters,  except  the  first  (for  the  methodology)  and  the  last  (for  the 
discussion and conclusion), are presented using a manuscript format. The intention was to break 
up  the holistic theoretical model presented in chapter X, as  the main finding of the research, into 
small pieces or modules,  in which each piece is researched and covered by a chapter targeting this 
particular piece. Furthermore, by using a manuscript format for the chapters, the objective is  to 
provide more  research focus  on  the  modules  of the theoretical  model,  to  provide an  adequate 
theoretical  sensitivity  for  these  modules,  and  hopefully  an  easier  and  structured  reading  and 
understanding. Each of these chapters could be treated as  an independent manuscript, however, 
each chapter builds upon the previous one, and together they gradually lead to the construction of 
the theoretical model at the end of the research, in chapter X. 
Moreover,  the  mam  motivation  of  usmg  this  hybrid  form  for  the  structure  of  the 
disset1ation,  by  which the  dissertation  is  structured in  chapters  and each chapter,  is  formatted 
using  a  manuscript  style,  was  to  avoid  the  disadvantages  of the  two  traditional  dissertations 
forms:  the one based on four to five chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion, and 
the dissertation based on three published papers or publishable manuscripts.  The first does not 
recommend any  structure or style for  the  body of the  chapters,  which  means  that  the  chapter 
could  be  too  short  or  long,  with  no  guidelines  for  the  flows  of ideas,  and  the  lack  of the 
presentation  of a  specifie  research  question.  The  second,  while  providing  a  structure  and  a 
manuscript style format, it lirnits the research potential to three or four papers only. 
Ther fore, this dissertation used an innovative hybrid form, by which nine chapters (from 
chapter II  to  chapter X)  were  presented and structured based  on  a  manuscript  style format,  in 
addition to  the introduction,  the  methodological framework in  chapter 1 and  the discussion and 
conclusion in chapter XI. From these nine manuscripts structured chapters, one was published in 
an  academie journal; six  were published in  peer review conference proceedings; and two were 17 
presented in peer review conferences. Moreover, the three articles presented in chapters VIII, IX 
and X, received the recognition of 'one of top papers', honourable mention paper award, and  the 
best student paper award, respectively. A footnote was added at the first page of each chapter to 
identify  the  name  of the  academie journal,  the  conference  name  and  location  and  the  award 
received, if any.  It is  worth noting that these papers presented in  chapters II  to  X,  were slightly 
modified  to  suite the  global  objectives  of the  dissertation  and  to  provide continuity from  one 
chapter to  the  other.  For example, the  methodology sections  in  sorne  of these empirical papers 
were removed and integrated, without redundancy, to the methodological framework in chapter I, 
as the main section of the dissertation covering ail methodological issues. 
Furthermore, the dissertation was  divided into five parts demarking different streams of 
research and  the chapters were grouped according to  these research  streams.  Part I, covers the 
exploratory study that was conducted at the beginning of the dissertation research, the disruptive 
technology and innovation modules in the theoretical mode! (chapter X)  and it groups chapters II 
and III. Part II, covers the research on acquisitions, the two acquisitions modules in the theoretical 
mode!  and  it  groups  chapters  IV  and  V.  Part  III,  covers  the  research  on  the  alliances  and 
acquisitions, the acquisitions modules in  the theoretical mode!, the proposition of generalization 
of the theoretical mode! into other industries in chapter XI and it groups chapters VI and VIL Part 
IV,  covers  the  research  on  acquisitions,  entrepreneurship  and  the  system  of innovation,  the 
acquisitions and venture capital modules in the theoretical model and it groups chapters VIII and 
IX. Finally, Part V covers the  research findings  in  a holistic integrative constructed theoretical 
model  based on previous chapters, the  closure  with  a discussion  and  conclusion section  and  it 
groups chapters X and XL  Here is a brief introduction to the dissertation chapters: 
Chapter 1 covers the  methodological framework,  starting  with  the paradigm of choice 
and epistemological foundation,  going through a review of the major qualitative methodologies 
which  will  be  used  in  this  inquiry.  Then,  it  describes  in  more  details,  the  research  strategy 
formulation and implementation plan. It covers a description of the sources of data and the tools 
of analysis, as  found in the literature on methodology and how this  would apply  to  the specifie 
design and strategie framework of the inquiry. It identifies the criteria for quality and evaluation. 
Finally, it states a list of ethical considerations for doing qualitative research. 18 
Chapter 2 is part of the exploratory study and it introduces the multiple cases of Cisco 
Systems, Lucent Technologies and Norte) Networks.  It  explores the role of interfirm networks, 
strategie  alliances  and  technology  grafted  acquisitions.  Moreover,  it  highlights  the  role  of 
leadership  in  high  technology  firms  and  it  compares  the  difference  between  emergent  and 
de  li be  rate strate  gy formulation. 
Chapter 3 is  part of the exploratory study  and it covers the definition of the disruptive 
technologies  with  sorne  examples  from  the  telecommunications  industry.  It  explores  the 
manufacturer segment and the service pro  vider segment of the telecommunications industry.  It 
highlights the  current state of the telecommunications industry  and  moreover,  it  introduces the 
first steps towards the construction of a theoretical model, including a conceptual framework. 
Chapter 4 explores the acquisitions  in  the telecommunications  industry  with  the pre-
acquisition and post-acquisition phases, in addition to the effect on the performance of the firms. 
Moreover, it takes us step by step through theory building with a proposition towards a theoretical 
model for understanding acquisitions in the telecommunications industry. 
Chapter  5  introduces  the  concept  of  cognitive  and  conceptual  mappmg  and  the 
methodology used for doing research using this tool, with the objective of identifying the cause 
and  effect  of  acquisitions  in  the  telecommunications  industry.  A  list  of  73  variables  and 
constructs are presented as  either causes or consequences of acquisitions. Moreover, it presents 
the  data findings  and  analysis,  including  the  domain  analysis,  the  centrality  analysis  and  the 
cluster analysis. 
Chapter 6  builds  upon the previous chapter and it covers the  factors  related to  R&D 
performance  and  technical  collaboration  in  the  telecommunications  industry  and  the  high 
technology  industries  in general.  It  explores  the causes  and  motivation,  the  consequences  and 
impact and the critical success factors of technical collaboration. 
Chapter  7  builds  upon  the  prev10us  chapter  and  it  explores  the  different  modes  of 
technical collaboration in  the high technology industries. It presents a theoretical review of three 
established lenses  used  in research on  acquisition and alliance:  Network theory, resource based 19 
view and transaction cost economies. Moreover, it  links  the three theories to  strategie alliances 
and mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, it presents a temporal model for integrating alliances 
and  acquisitions  as  part  of the  strategy  formulation  process  and  it  explores  the  criteria  for 
deciding upon acquisition or alliance. 
Chapter 8  builds  upon  the  previous chapters and  it explores  the  relationship  between 
intensive acquisitions in the  telecommunications  industry  and  the  role  of entrepreneurship and 
venture capital,  ali  within  the  context of a  national  system of innovation,  as  an  ecosystem.  It 
defines  the  difference  between  complementary,  supplementary,  sustaining  and  disruptive 
technologies.  Moreover,  it  presents  a  list  of the  types  of entrepreneurs  and  it  introduces  the 
entrepreneurship activities as  a moderating variable between the intensive acquisition activities, 
the emergence of the acquisition and development model and the continuous emergence of new 
and disruptive technologies. 
Chapter 9 builds upon the previous chapter and it  explores the concept of the national 
system of innovation as  an ecosystem for the research on the telecommunications industry. ln the 
theoretical review section, it defines the terms system, innovation and knowledge, the innovation 
system  and  the  national  system  of  innovation.  Moreover,  it  explores  the  structure  and 
organization  of the  national  system of innovation.  Furthermore,  it  introduces  the  value  chain 
rnodel and the mesh topology, and characteristics and advantages of these models. 
Chapter  10  builds  upon  ali  the  prev10us  chapter  and  concludes  the  research  by 
presenting  the  theoretical  mode!  for  the  process  of  creative  construction  in  the 
telecommunications industry. 
Chapter  11  presents  a  discussion  and  conclusion  of  the  research,  including  the 
contribution, the transferability or generalizability of the research, the limitations, and notes for 
further research. 20 ,-------------
CHAPTERI 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Introduction 
A  qualitative research,  in  contrast to  experiment, is  a "naturalistic inquiry" because it 
investigates  the  real  world  as  it  is  without  trying  to  manipulate  the  data,  the  environment 
surrounding the data or the findings. Patton defines naturalistic inquiry as  "a discovery-oriented 
approach  that  minimizes  investigator  manipulation  of the  study  setting  and places  no  prior 
constraints  on  what  the  outcomes  of the  research  will  be .... Open  ended,  conversation-like 
interviews as aform of  naturalistic inquiry contrast with questionnaires that have predetermined 
response categories.  lt's the  difference betvveen  asking,  'Tell me about your experience  in  the 
program' and 'How satisfactory were you? Very,  somewhat,  little,  not at ali.'" (Patton, 2002 p. 
39). 
Qualitative  naturalistic  research  should  allow  for  the  emergence  of  the  data  and 
encourage flexibility in the research design strategy, which will not be complete before entering 
into  the  fieldwork:  "What these  considerations  add up  to  is  that  the  design of a  naturalistic 
inquiry (whether research  evaluation,  or policy analysis) cannat be  given in  advance;  it must 
emerge,  develop,  unfold  .... The cali for an emergent design by naturalists is  not simply an effort 
on their part to get around the  'hard thinking' that is supposed to precede an inquiry; the desire 
to permits events to unfold is not mere/y a way of  rationalizing what is at bottom 'sloppy inquiry'. 
The  design specifications of the conventional paradigm form a procrustean bed of  such a nature 
as  to  make  it  impossible for the  naturalist to  lie  in  it - not on/y  uncomfortably,  but at al!." 
(Lincoln & Gu ba,  1985b) 22 
In  qualitative  inquiries  "purposeful  sampling"  is  translated  in  selecting  "information-
rich" cases, enabling to understand the phenomena investigated by the research question in much 
greater depth  (Patton,  2002).  Qualitative  data  collected  during  the  fieldwork  of a  naturalistic 
inquiry are a combination of 1)  quotations from open-ended and conversation-like interviews; 2) 
observations made during the fieldwork; 3) notes taken during and after the fieldwork has ended; 
and  4)  excerpts  from  documents.  Documents  could  possibly  be,  but  not  limited  to,  formai 
document  of the  companies  involved  in  the  case  studies  or  beyond;  reports  such  as  plans, 
financial  statements,  sales  forecast  and  outlook;  market  research  studies, company  internai  or 
customer's presentations; minutes of meeting, brochures and publicity materials, existing product 
information  and  prototype;  and  brochures  and  sales  materials.  The documents  could  be  of a 
public or confidential nature, and they could be found locally or internationally. Also, they could 
be  collected  not  only  from  companies,  but  also  from  industrial  and  sectorial  organizations, 
professional  groups  and  associations,  standard  bodies,  "open-sources"  collaborati ve  and 
participative networks, local and international workers' unions. 
The  primary  focus  of qualitative  data  is  the  interpretation,  by  the  researcher,  of the 
experiences of the subjects under investigation, which in turn, are the interpretations of their real 
world as  they see it, live in  it and experience it. In qualitative naturalistic inquiries the researcher 
commitment and  engagement  are  very  important  during  the field  work in  arder to  interact  in 
physical proximity with the  players in  their own environment and comfort, and to  observe their 
reactions,  understand  their  realities  as  interpreted  by  them  and  to  draw  sorne  important 
information that could lead to insightful analysis, valuable conclusion and theoretical contribution 
and  practical implications. However,  this  engagement is  contested  by caUs  for  objectivity and 
neutrality. 
Therefore the  choice  of qualitative  naturalistic  inquiries  and  the  important concept  of 
'objectivity'  are  in  the  center  of a  paradigm  debate  between  critics  who  perceive  qualitative 
research too  'subjective' as  it is tinted  by  the interpretation of the inquirer and  the defenders of 
the qualitative research, who believe that it is  more in  line with  'objectivity', which is the basis 
for the scientific method of inquiry, investigation and research. 
---------------------·-·-23 
1.1.1 Strategies for Qualitative lnquiries 
Patton presents fi ve  analysis strategies for qualitative inquiries: Unique case orientation; 
inductive analysis and creative synthesis; holistic perspective; context sensitivity; and voice and 
perspective reflexivity (Patton, 2002). 1 will describe briefly four of them,  which are concerned 
with  my  naturalistic  inquiry  and  most  pertinent to  the  research  strategy  formulation,  research 
design and implementation. 
Unique case orientation. From purposeful sampling described earlier, the objective in a 
qualitative  naturalistic  inquiry  would  be  to  purposefully  select  a  lirnited  number  of  "rich-
information"  cases  that  would  be  critical  and  crucial  in  understanding  the  phenomena  under 
investigation  in  great  depth,  and  by  means  of direct  physical  proxirnity,  interactions  with  the 
people and their natural environment, and  introspections, leading to  insightful observations, and 
hopefully creative analysis and valuable contribution. 
Inductive  analysis.  Qualitative  inquires  are  largely  based  on  inductive  analysis. 
However, a phase of deductive analysis  may  follow  to  validate the emerging patterns, look for 
more patterns, categories and dimensions, and also to  verify for the existence of "critical cases" 
which  disconfirm  the  emerging  pre-hypotheses  propositions.  This  could  go  back  and  forth 
between inductive and deductive analysis, and between the emerging patterns from the data and 
the  theoretical  assumptions,  reaching  "theoretical  sensitivity"  (Glaser,  1992;  Goulding,  2002; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998), until no further patterns are observed, no further coding is possible, and 
no further  categories  are  achievable;  therefore  concluding  a  certain degree  of emergence  and 
"theoretical saturation".  Patton describes this process as  follows:  "Over a period of inquiry,  an 
investigation may flow from inductive approaches,  to find out what the important questions and 
variables are (  exploratory work), to deductive hypothesis-testing or outcome measurement aimed 
at confirming and 1 or generalizing exploratory findings,  then back again to inductive analysis to 
look for rival  hypotheses and unanticipated or unmeasured factors .... Cross  case  analysis  can 
begin in search of  patterns and themes that eut ac ross individual experiences. The initial foc  us is 
on full understanding of individual cases before those unique cases are combined or aggregated 
thematically. This helps ensure that emergent categories and discovered patterns are 'grounded' 24 
(Glaser,  1992; Goulding,  2002;  Strauss  & Corbin,  1998) in  specifie cases and their contexts." 
(Patton, 2002 p. 57) 
Holistic  perspective.  From  the  theoretical  perspective,  the  field  of  "strategy"  is  a 
complex one.  It includes ali  the functions  of the  top executive,  with  the  underlying divisional 
fields  of marketing,  finance,  etc.  It  is  also  grounded  in  behavioral  science,  political  science., 
anthropology,  sociology, psychology,  economies  and finance. It  combines  different disciplines 
such  as  business  policy  and  strategie  management,  industrial  organization,  organizational 
economies, economies sociology, human behavioral science, organizational theory and  others. It 
use different theories borrowed from distinct areas of social science to interpret and explain the 
issues  under  investigation,  such  as  transaction  cost,  resource-based  view,  network  theory, 
knowledge-based view and market-based view. 
However, the  issues  under investigation are  much  more complex than they seem when 
using  one  or  another  approach  to  explore  them.  As  Hafsi  and  Thomas  (2005  p.  509)  noted, 
"collective  action cannat be understood if it is broken dawn into parts ta be studied separately, 
As  reality  is  complex,. it  is  more  appropriate  ta  study  it in  its  totality.  This  means  not only 
studying  all  the  parts  together  but  also  their  inter-relationships,  even  if the  result  is  an 
incomplete  and imperfect understanding".  Furthermore,  using  the holistic approach alone for 
integrative purposes is  considered to  be outdated and not scientific  and  Jess credible because of 
the  use  of qualitative methods,  while  using the analytical approach alone tend  to  fragment  the 
reality  into  unrelated  (or  less  related  and  integrated)  pieces,  and  tend  to  see  strate gy  as  an 
assemblage of theories and methodologies;  " .. .  The question of  what strategy is.  ft feels like a vast 
array of diverse and uncoordinated detailed observations that are scientifically respectable,  yet 
incoherent in practice." (Hafsi & Thomas, 2005). 
Context sensitivity. Qualitative naturalistic inquires gives high importance to the context 
m  which  the  phenomenon  is  under  investigation,  and  consider  it  a  part  of the  whole,  and  a 
integral  part  of  an  "ecological  system"  that  is  essential  for  the  understanding  of the  actors 
involved, their relationships and interactions (Patton, 2002). 25 
1.1.2 Objectives of the Methodological Framework 
1 have put a big emphasis on the epistemological, research inquiry design, design strategy 
and methodological framework. The reason, besides providing a base for the credibility and the 
rigor  of the  inquiry,  is  that  as  I  started  the  careful  process  of research  strategy,  design  and 
planning, 1 realized that the  methodological approach and the  methodologies of choice require, 
and to  a great extent condition, an  extensive amount of flexibility,  uncertainty,  ambiguity  and 
creativity, to  be reduced only after the start of the fieldwork and the full  immersion in the data. In 
other words: emergence versus forcing. 
Moreover,  the  definitions . of  my  epistemology  and  ontology,  the  described  research 
strategy and design, and the choice of the rnixed qualitative inquiry strategies and techniques, are 
with the intention of 1) justifying my  choice of paradigm and consequently the methodology; 2) 
asking for this prescribed flexibility granted by the naturalistic inquiry; and 3) the acceptance of a 
certain degree of ambiguity and uncertainty, to be reduced after starting the fieldwork. 
Therefore, the emphasis on  the  methodological sections in  this document and intensive 
use of excerpts and quotes, is  with the objective of agreeing upon the framework of the inquiry 
(between the researcher and the evaluators), and providing solid references form the literature on 
methodologies to  document ( 1)  the  thought process of the researcher during the course of the 
inquiry;  (2)  the basis for and the context in  which the  strategie framework and research design 
were  developed;  (3)  the  guidelines  and  considerations  for  data  collection,  analysis  and 
interpretation layered phases; and  fin ally  (  4)  to  serve as  a  roadmap from the  beginning of the 
fieldwork to the final report on the inquiry' s findings. 
1.2 Earl  y Stages of the Research - The Proposai 
At the early stages of brainstorming and in preparation for my  dissertation, 1 followed a 
check list provided by Patton (2002 p. 254) ,in the form  of questions to be asked regarding the 
research strategy and design, with propositions for design issues and options: 26 
1.  "What is  the primary purpose of the  study? Basic research,  applied research,  summative 
evaluation, formative evaluation, action research; 
2.  What is the foc  us of  the study? Breadth versus depth trade-offs; 
3.  What are the  units of  analysis? 1ndividuals,  groups, program components,  whole program, 
organizations, communities, critical incidents, time periods, etc.; 
4.  What  will  be  the  sampling  strategies?  Purposeful  sampling,  probability  sampling. 
Variations in sample size from a single case study to a generalizable sample; 
5.  What types of  data will be collected? Qualitative, quantitative, or bath; 
6.  What  type  and  degree  of control  will  be  exercised?  Naturalistic  inquiry  (no  control), 
experimental design, quasi-experimental; 
7.  What  analytical approach  or approaches  will  be  used?  Inductive,  deductive.  Content  or 
thematic analysis, statistical analysis, combinations; 
8.  How will the  validity of and confidence in findings  be addressed? Triangulation  options, 
multiple data sources, multiple methods, multiple perspectives, 
9.  Time issues: When will study occur? How will the study be sequenced or phased? Long term 
fieldwork,  rapid  reconnaissance,  exploratory  phase  to  confirmatory  phase,  fixed  times 
versus open timelines; 
10.  How will the logistics and practicalities be handled? Gaining entry to  the setting, access to 
people and records, contracts, training, endurance, etc.; 
11.  How ethical issues and matters of  confidentiality be handled? lnformed consent, protection 
of  human subjects, reactivity, presentation of  self,  etc.; 
12.  What  re sources  will  be  available?  What  will  the  study  cast?  Personnel,  supplies,  data 
collection, materials, analysis time and costs, reporting/publishing costs." 
1 tried to answer ali  these questions, and the result is  the product in this document. The 
organization of the document, though, does not follow the same sequence of the questions in this 
list.  Rather, the order of the document takes the reader into the natural flow  of my  cumulative 
thinking,  and  progresses  from  start to  end,  with  the  objective of making  this  research  clear, 
relevant, rigorous, interesting and convincing. 
In  preparing my  dissertation proposai, 1 followed  the  thirteen guidelines and advices 1 
found in  the book Proposais That Works  (Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 2000), which are:  ( 1) 27 
Why  qualitative,  (2)  plan  flexibility,  (3)  build  a  framework,  (4)  articulate  parts,  (5)  plan  for 
validity,  (6)  illustrate  analyses,  (7)  plan  for  records,  (8)  demonstrate  procedures,  (9)  don't 
anticipate findings, (10) quantify correctly, (Il) plan entry and exit, (12) transfer cautiously, and 
( 13)  name  your  perspective.  In  addition,  I  adopted  sorne  of the  ad vices  given  in  the  book 
Practical Research (Leedy,  Newby, &  Ertmer,  1996 p.  127-128), regarding the formatting of a 
research proposai - components and sequencing. 
Furthermore, I adopted the flowchart in figure  1.1  and titled "twenty steps to  a proposai" 
from the same book (Leedy, Newby, & Ertmer,  1996), with sorne modifications,  to represent the 
14 steps process I followed in organizing my thoughts,  going through the tasks of collecting the 
pieces  of puzzle  and  preparing  the dissertation  proposai.  I  thought  it  would  be  interesting to 
document it as part of the report, with the modifications I did to adapt it to my case. · 
1.3 Epistemological Foundation 
The debate between qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry is in the middle of the 
debate between the  methodologies paradigm. The debate concerns the positional difference and 
the  distance  between  objectivity  and  subjectivity  on  a  continuum  of  epistemological  and 
ontological  assumptions.  Positivism  is  seen  as  the  base  for  scientific  research  leading  to 
knowledge generation, and theoretical contribution within the context of trustfulness, credibility, 
authenticity, generalization and transferability. 
Therefore,  there  is  an  epistemological debate about  the  nature of scientific knowledge 
and  its  relationship  to  reality:  "Two  major theoretical perspectives have dominated the  social 
science scene. The first,  'positivism ',  traces its origins in the social sciences to the great theorists 
of the  nineteenth  and early  twentieth  centuries  and especially  to  Auguste  Comte  and Emile 
Durkheim.  The  positivist  seeks  the  '(acts'  or  'causes'  of social  phenomena  apart  from  the 
subjective states of  individuals  .... The second theoretical perspective,  which, following the le ad of 
Deutscher,  we  will  describe  as  'phenomenological',  has  a  long  history  in  philosophy  and 
sociology.  The  phenomenologist  is  committed  to  understanding  social  phenomena from  the 28 
actor's own perspective.  He or she examines how the world is experienced.  The important reality 
is what people perceive it to be." (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984 p. 1-2) 
Figure 1.1 
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A  paradigm,  being  a  worldview  of how  we  see  and  perceive  reality,  the  researcher 
conducting a qualitative naturalistic and holistic inquiry would have to  make five philosophical 
assumptions:  "( 1)  Ontological: What is  the nature of reality? Reality is subjective and multiple, 
as seen by the participants in the study. (2) Epistemological: What is the relationship between the 
researcher and that being researched? Researcher attempts to !essen distance between himself or 
herse if and  that  being  researched.  (  3)  Axiological:  What  is  the  role  of values?  Researcher 
acknowledges that research is value !aden and that biases are present. (4) Rhetorical: What is the 
language of research? Researcher writes  in  a literary,  informai style using  the  persona! voice 
and uses  qualitative  terms  and limited definitions.  (5)  Methodological:  What  is  the process of 
research?  Researcher  uses  inductive  logic,  studies  the  tapie  within  its  context,  and uses  an 
emerging design." (Creswell, 1998 p. 75) 
1.3.1 Positivism vs. Constructivism 
Logical  positivism.  In  the  debate  about  "positivism"  and  referring  to  "Iogical 
positivism", Miles and Huberman (1984) noted that:  "We believe that social phenomena exist not 
only in the mind but also in the objective world- and that there are sorne lawful and reasonably 
stable relationships  to  be found among  them  ... Ci ven  our beliefs in  social regularities,  the re  is 
corollary:  Our task  is  to  express  them  as precise/y as  possible,  attending  to  their range  and 
generality and to the local and historical contingencies under which they.occur.  So,  unlike sorne 
schools  within  social  phenomenology,  we  consider  important  to  evolve  a  set  of valid  and 
verifiable  'methods'  for  capturing  these  social  relationships  and  their  causes.  We  want  to 
interpret and explain these phenomena  'and' have confidence that others, using the same tools, 
would arrive at analogous conclusion." (Miles & Huberman, 1984 p. 94) 
Realism. In a revised study, the same au thors, Miles and Huberman ( 1994), prescribed to 
a  more "realist" view of the world:  "Our aim is to  register and 'transcend' these processes by 
building theories to account for a real world that is bath bounded and perceptually !aden,  and to 
test  the se  theories  in  our  va rio us  disciplines.  Our  tests  do  not  use  'covering  laws'  or  the 
deductive  logic of classical positivism. Rather,  our explanations flow from an  account of how 
dif.fering structures produced the events we observed.  We  aim to account for events, rather than 
simply to document their sequence.  We look for an individual or a social process, a mechanism, a 30 
structure at the core of  events that can be captured to pro  vide 'causal description '_of  the forces at 
work.  Transcendental realism calls bath for causal explanation and for the evidence to show that 
each  entity  or event  is  an  instance  of that  explanation.  So  we  need not only  an  explanatory 
structure but also a grasp of  the particular configuration at hand. " (Miles &  Huberman,  1994 p. 
4) 
Constructivism.  Patton  noted  that  'constructivism'  "begins with  the  premise  that the 
human  world  is  different from  the  natural,  physical  world  and  therefore  must  be  studied 
different/y  (Lincoln  &  Cuba,  1985b  ).  Because  human  beings  have  evolved  the  capacity  to 
interpret  and  'construct'  reality  - indeed,  they  cannat  do  otherwise  - the  world  of human 
perception is not real in an absolute sense." (Patton, 2002 p. 96) 
In  their primary assumptions of constructivism, Guba and  Lincoln  (1985b)  noted  that: 
"'Truth '  is  a  matter  of consensus  among  informed  and  sophisticated  constructors,  not  of 
correspondence  with  objective  realities.  'Facts'  have  no  meaning  except  within  sorne  value 
framework;  hence there cannat be an  'objective' assessment of any proposition.  'Causes' and 
e.ffects do not exist except by imputation. Phenomena can only be understood within the context in 
which  they  are  studied; findings from  one  context-cannot be  generalized to  another;  neither 
problems  nor solutions  can  be  generalized from  one  setting  to  another.  Data  derived from 
constructivist inquiry have neither special status nor legitimation; they represent simply another 
construction to be taken into account in the move toward consensus." (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b p. 
44-45) 
1.3.2 Objectivism vs. Subjectivism 
However, having covered briefly "positivism" and "constructivism" as two extremes on a 
continuum of the  epistemological debate,  I looked  at  the  theories  of methods,  to  see how  the 
authors  relates  specifie  theories  to  either  the  "objectivist"  or  "subjectivist"  paradigm.  For 
"grounded theory" Patton (2002) notes that  "Those social scientist and academies who find some 
value in  the  methods of qualitative inquiry, namely,  in-depth interviewing and observation,  but 
who  eschew  the  philosophical  underpinnings  of constructivism  and  interpretivism  can  [ind 
comfort in the attention paid to objectivity in grounded theory." (Patton, 2002 p.  128) 31 
1.3.3 Grounded Theory within the Positivism and Constructivism Paradigm 
Grounded theory could be related to  the "positi  vist" and the "constructi  vis m" paradigm, 
depending  on  how  the  researchers  use  it  and  how  rigorously  they  follow  the  weil  defined 
systematic-like procedures found in  grounded theory. The majority of grounded theorists follow 
the "objectivist" paradigm. Charmaz (2000) represents and compares two approaches to grounded 
theory;  The  objectivist  grounded  theory  and  the  constructivist  grounded  theory:  "Objectivist 
grounded theory accepts the positivistic assumptions of  an externat world that can be described, 
analyzed,  explained,  and predicted:  truth,  but  with  a  small  't'  .... ft  assumes  that  different 
observers will discover this world and describe it in similar ways.  ln contras!,  in a 'constructivist 
grounded  theory'  causality  is  suggestive,  incomplete,  and  intermediate  .. .. lt  looks  at  how 
'variables' are grounded- given meaning and played out in subjects' lives" (Charmaz, 2000 p. 
524).  Furthermore,  "a  constructivist  grounded  theory  may  remain  at  a  more  intuitive, 
impressionistic leve! than an objectivist approach." (Charmaz, 2000 p. 526) 
Therefore, in comparing the two approaches in relation to grounded theory Patton states 
that  "as  a  matter  of philosophical  distinctness,  grounded  theory  is  best  understood  as 
fundamentally realist and objectivist in orientation, emphasizing disciplined and procedural ways 
of getting  the  researcher's biases out of the  way  but adding  healthy doses  of creativity to  the 
analytical process." (Patton, 2002 p.  128) 
1.3.4 Methodological Appropriateness vs. Methodological Purity 
In  light of this complexity of having to choose between one of the severa! methods and 
approaches  for  conducting  scientific  research  with  the  objective  of  reaching  a  better 
understanding of the "reality" and contributing to  scientific "knowledge", Patton off  ers a more 
pragmatic approach that favors  "methodological appropriateness" over "methodological purity" 
or "methodological orthodoxy":  "Such pragmatism means judging the quality of a study by its 
intended purposes,  available resources,  procedures followed,  and results obtained,  ali within a 
particular context  and for  a  specifie  audience  ....  !  reiterate:  Being  pragmatic  allows  one  to 32 
eschew methodological orthodoxy in favor of  'methodological appropriateness' as the primary 
criterion for judging methodological quality." (Patton, 2002 p. 71-72) 
1.3.5 Mixed Methodology 
On mixing different strategies and  methods,  Patton (2002) notes that:  "Mixing parts of 
different  approaches  is  a  matter  of  philosophical  and  methodological  controversy.  Yet,  the 
practical mandate in evaluation to gather the most relevant possible information for evaluation 
users  outweighs  concerns  about  methodological  purity  based  on  epistemological  and 
philosophical arguments. " (Patton, 2002 p. 252) 
I am taking this advice seriously and I consider it a statement of what I intend to  do  in 
formulating the research strategy, research design and implementation plan, and during the course 
of data  collection,  analysis  and  finally  in  reporting  the  research  findings.  In  doing  so,  my 
epistemological  paradigm  is  swinging  in  the  middle  of  a  continuum  between  "realism"  and 
"constructivism" in the research strategy framework, research design and methodology;  and is 
"objectivist" when dealing with data measurement, procedures, analysis, and  the theorization of 
the findings. In using grounded theory as the main method of research, besides analytic induction 
at  the  exploratory  stage  of  the  research,  I  subscribe  to  the  Strauss  and  Corbin's  version  of 
grounded theory called "structured positivist grounded theory" (Strauss  &  Corbin,  1998),  as 
compared  to  the  other  constructivist-based  grounded  theory  called  "constructivist  grounded 
theory" (Charmaz, 2000). 
1.4 Review of the Theories of Methods Used in this Research 
1.4.1 Analytical Induction 
Analytic  induction  is  a  qualitative  method  of research  usmg  an  inductive  approach, 
however, starting with a deductive analysis by proposing hypotheses and verifying their validity 
by using one or severa! confirming cases and  a  negative case, if needed:  "Analytical induction 
offers a specifie form of inductive analysis that be  gins deductive/y,  by formulating propositions or 33 
hypotheses,  and then examines a particular case  in  depth  to  determine  if the facts of the  case 
support  the  hypothesis.  If  it  fits,  another  case  is  studied,  and  so  forth,  in  search  for 
generalizations.  If a case does  not support the  hypothesis,  that  is,  it  is  a  'negative  case',  the 
hypothesis is  revised.  The  aim is to  explain a phenomenon satisfactorily using qualitative,  case 
based inquiry." (Patton, 2002 p.  94-95). Norman Denzin ( 1978) stated that analytic induction is 
amongst  three  approaches  used  in  building  theories,  besides  experiments  and  multivariate 
analysis. 
On  exarnining  preconceived  hypotheses,  using  multiple  cases,  Patton  encouraged  this 
process  of formulation  of hypotheses,  despite  the  call  in  phenomenological  research  to  start 
without  preconceived  ideas:  "ft  is  as  a  strategy  for  engaging  in  qualitative  inquiry  and 
comparative case analysis that includes examining preconceived hypotheses,  that is,  without the 
pretense of the  mental blank slate advocated in  purer  forms  of phenomenological inquiry and 
grounded theory." (Patton, 2002 p. 493) 
These  hypotheses,  used  at  the  start  of  the  research  in  a  deductive  manner,  are 
characterized by being general or rough and are based on assumptions, intuition or theory:  "These 
hypotheses can be based on hunches,  assumptions,  care(ul examination of research and theory, 
or combinations  . .... Contemporary  researchers  have  de-emphasized universality and causality 
and have emphasized instead the development of descriptive hypotheses that identify patterns of 
behavior, interactions and perceptions  ... called 'modified analytical induction'." (Gilgun, 1999 p. 
268-269) 
1.4.2 Grounded Theory 
On  how  to  develop  theory  and  how  'grounded  theory'  offers  a  set  of procedure  to 
develop theory from the emerging patterns in  the collected data, Strauss and  Corbin state that: 
"Theory  denotes  a  set  of  well-developed  categories  (  e.g.,  the mes,  concepts)  that  are 
systematically interrelated through  statements of relationship  to form a theoretical framework 
that explains sorne  relevant social,  psychological,  educational, nursing,  or other phenomenon. 
The  statements  of relationship  explain  who,  what,  when,  where,  whv,  how,  and  with  what 
consequences an event occurs. Once concepts are related through statements of  relationship into 34 
an explanatory theoretical framework,  the research findings move beyond conceptual ordering to 
the ory  ....  A  the  ory  usually  is  more  than  a  set  of findings;  it  offers  an  explanation  about 
phenomena." (Strauss & Corbin,  1998 p. 22) 
Patton  introduces "grounded  theory"  as  "Grounded theory focuses  on  the  process of 
generating  theory  rather  than  a  particular  theoretical  content.  ft  emphasizes  steps  and 
procedures for connecting  induction and deduction  through  the  constant comparative method, 
comparing  research  sites,  doing  theoretical  sampling,  and  testing  emergent  concepts  with 
additional fieldwork ....  Crounded the ory depends on methods that take the  researcher into and 
close  to  the  real  world so  that the  results and findings  are grounded in  the  empirical world. " 
(Patton, 2002 p.  125) 
Strauss and Corbin present grounded theory as a rigorous process and coding techniques, 
which  lead  to  building  theory.  Following  the  prescribed  procedures  in  a  systematic  way,  is 
essential when processing a large amount of collected data from fieldwork and to ensure rigor and 
validity:  "Analysis is the interplay between researchers and data,  so what grounded theory offers 
as a framework is a set of 'coding procedures' to help pro  vide sorne standardization and rigor to 
the analytical-process. Grounded theory is meant to build theory rather than test theory.  ft strives 
to  provide  researchers  with  analytical tools for handling masses of raw  data.  ft  seeks to  help 
qualitative  analysts  consider  alternative  meanings  of  phenomenon.  ft  emphasizes  being 
systematic and creative simultaneously.  Finally,  it elucidates the concepts that are the building 
blacks of  theory." (Glaser, 1992; Patton, 2002 p.  127; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
Theory generation from the emerging patterns in collected data is constructed through a 
technique of constant comparison between fieldwork and  data,  and between emerging patterns 
and  theoretical concepts fou nd  in  the  literature:  "Theoretical comparisons  are  tools  (a  list of 
properties) for looking  at  something  somewhat objective/y  rather  than  naming  or classifying 
without a  thorough  examination  of the  abject at  the  property  and dimensional  leve/s.  If the 
properties are evident within  the data,  then  we  do  not need to  rely  on these tools." (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998 p. 80-81) 35 
Patton explains  what  'grounded theory'  is  and lists  the characteristics of a  'grounded' 
theorist in the following:  "Grounded the ory ope  rates from a 'correspondence perspective' in that 
it aims  to  generate  explanatory  propositions  that  correspond to  real-world phenomena.  The 
characteristics of a  grounded  theorist,  they posit,  are  these:  ( 1)  the  ability  to  step  back and 
critically analyze situations; (2)  the ability to recognize the tendency toward bias; (  3) the ability 
to think abstractly; (  4) the ability to be flexible and open to helpful criticism; (5) sensitivity to the 
words  and actions  of respondents;  (6)  a  sense  of proportion  and devotion  to  work  process." 
(Patton, 2002 p. 489-490; Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p. 7) 
Grounded theory goes beyond a  descriptive  mode of analysis  into building blocks for 
theory construction through the emergent categories, and their properties, and relationships. Here 
are sorne definitions and terms given by Strauss and Corbin (1998): 
1.4.3 Useful Definitions in Grounded Theory 
Microanalysis.  "The  detailed  line-by-line  analysis  necessary  at  the  beginning  of the 
study  to  generate  initial  categories  (with  their  properties  and  dimensions)  and  to  suggest 
relationships among  categories; a  combination of open and axial coding." (Strauss &  Corbin, 
1998 p.  57) 
Theoretical sampling.  "Sampling on the  basis of the  emerging concepts,  with  the  aim 
being  to  explore  the  dimensional  range  or  varied  conditions  along  which  the  properties  or 
concepts vary." (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p. 73) 
Theoretical saturation. "The point in category development at which no new properties, 
dimensions, or relationships emerge during analysis." (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p.  143) 
Range  of variability.  "The  degree  to  which  a  concept varies dimensionally along  its 
properties,  with  variation  being  built  into  the  theory  by sampling for diversity  and range  of 
properties. " (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p. 143) 36 
Open coding.  "The  analytic process through  which  concepts  are  identified and their 
properties and dimensions are discovered in data." (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p.  101) 
Axial coding.  "The process of relating categories to  their subcategories,  termed 'axial' 
because  coding  occurs  around  the  axis  of the  category,  linking  categories  of the  leve/  of 
properties and dimensions. " (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p.  123) 
Relational  statements.  "We  cali  these  initial  hunches  about  how  concepts  relate 
'hypotheses' because they link two or more concepts,  explaining the what,  why,  where,  and how 
of  phenomena. " (Strauss & Corbin, 1998 p. 135) 
Furthermore, here are sorne other definitions given by Glaser (1992 p. 38): 
Concept. "The underlying,  meaning, uniformity and/or pattern within a set of  descriptive 
incidents. " 
Category. "A type of  concept.  Usually usedfor higher levet of  abstraction." 
Property. "A type of  concept that is a conceptual characteristic of  a category,  thus at a 
fesser leve! of  abstraction than a category. A property is a concept of  a concept." 
Coding.  "Conceptualizing  data  by constant comparison of incident with  incident,  and 
incident with concept ta emerge more categories and their properties." 
Open coding.  "The initial stage of constant comparative analysis,  before delimiting the 
coding to  a  core  category and its properties - or selective  coding.  The  analyst starts  with  no 
preconceived codes- he remains entirely open." 
Theoretical coding. "A  property of  coding and constant comparative analysis that yields 
the conceptual relationship between categories and their properties as they emerge.  Theoretical 
codes are conceptual connectors to be used implicitly and explicitly in the way and style in which 
the analyst writes." 37 
Constant comparative  coding.  "Fimdamental  operation  in  the  constant comparative 
method of analysis.  The  analyst  codes  incidents for  categories  and their  properties  and the 
theoretical codes that connect them. " 
1.4.4 Grounded Theory and the Emergence and Forcing Split/Debate 
It  is  worth  noting  that grounded  theory  was  developed  by  Strauss  and  Glaser ( 1967). 
Their perspective  was "the emergence" of patterns  from  the data.  Later the  two  diverged  into 
different  paths.  Glaser  remained  loyal  to  the  concept  of "emergence"  (Glaser,  1992),  while 
Strauss and Corbin ( 1998) combined the concept of "emergence" with the concept of "forcing": 
" ... the re is the classic by Glaser and Strauss (  1  967);  'The Disco very of  Grounded The ory', which 
lays  dawn  the  reasons  behind the  development of the  method and details  the  procedure for 
applying it.  This  was followed by Glaser's (1978)  'Theoretical Sensitivity',  which elaborated on 
the nature of theory and in particular the issue of !etting theory emerge from the data.  ln 1990, 
Strauss  and  Corbin  published  the  often  quoted  'Basics  of Qualitative  Research:  Grounded 
Theory,  Procedures and Techniques' This  book marked a split between the two original authors 
with regards to the principles associated with the methodology and was vociferously criticized by 
Glaser in  his (1992) publication  'Basics ofGrounded Theory Analysis: Emergence v Forcing'" 
(Goulding, 2002 p. 2) 
Furthermore,  the  version  of Strauss  and  Corbin  ( 1998)  is  called  "structured  positivist 
grounded theorv''. (a  la  Strauss and Corbin). Grounded theory could also follow a constructivist 
approach, therefore called "constructivist grounded theory". (Charmaz, 2000; Patton, 2002). This 
was discussed  in  more detailed in the "epistemological foundation"  section. In  using grounded 
theory as  the main method of research, besides analytic induction at the exploratory stage of the 
research, 1 subscribe to the Strauss and Corbin's version of grounded theory called "structured 
positivist grounded theory" (Strauss &  Corbin,  1998), as compared to the other constructivist-
based grounded theory called "constructivist grounded theory". 38 
1.4.5 Case Study 
As for a definition of what case study is:  "Case study is not a methodological choice but 
a  choice of what is  to  be  studied  . ... We  could study it analytically or holistically,  entirely by 
repeated measures or hermeneutically, organically or culturally, and by mixed methods - but we 
concentrate on the time being, on the case." (Stake, 2000 p. 435) 
Moreover, Patton (2002)  describes  what case study  is,  its  components and  the  process 
involved by the following:  "Case analysis involves organizing the data by specifie cases for in-
depth study and comparison.  Well constructed case studies are  'holistic' and 'context sensitive', 
two primary the mes of  qualitative inquiry  .... Cases can also be critical incidents, stages in the life 
of a persan or pro  gram,  or anything that can be defined as  "speci(ic,  unique,  bounded system" 
(Stake,  2000 p.  436).  Cases are units of  analysis. What constitutes a case,  or unit of  analysis,  is 
usually determined during  the  design  stage and becomes the  basis for purposeful sampling  in 
qualitative inquiry .... The case study approach to qualitative anal  y  sis constitutes a specifie way of 
collecting,  organizing,  and analyzing data;  in  that sense it represents an  'analysis process'. The 
purpose  is  to  gather comprehensive,  systematic,  and in-depth  information  about each  case  of 
interest  ..... Thus, the term case-study can refer to either the process of  anal-v sis or the product of 
analysis, or both  .... The analysis may consist of  three layers of  case studies: individual participant 
case  studies  at project sites  combined to  make  up  project site  case  studies,  project site  case 
studies combined to make up state program case studies, and state program combined to make up 
a national pro  gram case study  .... The  analyst's first and fore most responsibility consists of  doing 
justice to each individual case. All else depend on that  .... The full report may include severa[ case 
studies  that  are  then  compared  and  contrasted,  but  the  basic  unit  of analysis  of such  a 
comparative  study  remains  the  distinct  cases  and  the  credibility  of the  overall findings  will 
depend on the quality of  the individual case studies  .. .. Programs, organizations, and communities 
have  parallel  types  of epiphanies,  through  they're  usually  called  critical  incidents,  crises, 
transitions, or organizationallessons learned. " (Patton, 2002 p. 447-451 ). 
Figure  1.2, which is adopted from (Yin,  2003 p. 40), describes the organization of cases 
with  a  particular  context  and  with  multiple  embedded  unit  of ana1ysis.  The  context  in  this 
research is the turbulent ecosystem of the telecommunications industry and the embedded units of 39 
analysis are the disruptive technologies and acquisitions,  as  events during the period from  1994 
till 2009. 
Figure 1.2 adopted from (Yin, 2003 p. 40) 
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1.5 Formulation of the Research Strategy and Implementation 
Formulating a strategy for the research is an important and  critical task at the beginning 
and  before embarking on  the  fieldwork and  analysis.  Having a fair  knowledge of the  different 
research  methods,  their  assumptions,  epistemological  foundations  and  procedures,  is  equally 
important. This would ensure first choosing the appropriate method for the specifie research at 
hand and then for dealing with the detailed procedural steps required to complete the inquiry with 40 
a  high  leve!  of rigor and credibility:  "Seing pragmatic allows  one  to  eschew methodological 
orthodo.xy  in favor of 'methodological  appropriateness'  as  the  primary  criterion for judging 
methodological  quality,  recognizing  that  different  methods  are  appropriate  for  different 
situations." (Patton, 2002 p.  71-72) 
Moreover,  Patton presented  and  defined  12  themes  of qualitative  inquiry  as  strategie 
ideals:  "( 1)  Real world observation through naturalistic inquiry;  (2)  openness,  responsiveness, 
and  jlexibility through emergent designs; (  3) foc  us through purposeful sampling; (  4) rie/mess and 
depth through qualitative data;  (  5) use of  al! of  one'  s capacities through persona! experience and 
engagement; (6) balancing the critical and creative through a stance of  empathetic neutrality; (7) 
sensitivity to  dynamic processes and systems; (8)  appreciation of idiosyncrasies through unique 
case  orientation;  (9)  insight  and  understanding  through  inductive  analysis;  (JO)  contextual 
sensitivity;  (Il) and a  holistic  perspective;  and (  12)  authenticity  and trustworthiness  through 
ownership  of voice  and perspective.  These  are  not absolute  and  universal  characteristics  of 
qualitative  inquiry,  but  rather  strategie  ideals  that  provide  a  direction  and framework for 
developing  specifie  designs  and  concrete  data  collection  tactics.  ldeally,  a  pure  qualitative 
inquiry strategy includes al! the themes and dimensions identified above." (Patton, 2002 p. 66) 
Therefore the elements of the design bef  ore starting the fieldwork: 
•  Naturalistic: Studying the real word. 
•  Emergent design flexibility:  Design provides initial focus,  plans for observation, and initial 
guiding interview questions. 
•  Purposeful  sampling:  Selecting  information  rich  cases  to  help  understand  the  phenomena 
under study. 
In quantitative research, datais collected using a lirnited number of questions and from a 
large number of subjects (databases, people surveys) then statistically compared and correlated, 
which makes generalization possible under certain rules and conditions. In  qualitative research, 
data is collected from a limited  number of subjects (cases,  interviews)  but  the result  is  a  much 
broader understanding and a more in-depth analysis of the researched subject. 41 
1.5.1 Establishing the Definition of Validity 
The evaluation of validity and rigor is different in quantitative and qualitative research. In 
quantitative research the instrument of measurement is  constructed following specifie rules  and 
procedures, while in qualitative research the instrument of measurement is the researcher with his 
experience,  understanding,  careful  analysis  and  creativity:  "Validity  in  quantitative  research 
depends  on careful instrument construction  to  ensure  that the  instrument measures  what it  is 
supposed to  measure.  The  measure must then  be  administered in  an  appropriate standardized 
manner according to  prescribed procedures.  The focus is  on  the measurement instrument- the 
test items,  survey questions,  or other instruments tools.  In  qualitative inquiry,  the  researcher is 
the instrument.  The  credibility of qualitative methods,  therefore hinges to  a great extent on  the 
skill, competence, and rigor ofthe persan doing the [ieldwork. " (Patton, 2002 p. 14) 
1.5.2 The Iteration between Inductive and Deductive Towards Theoretical Sensitivity 
As  described  earlier,  qualitative  inquires  are  largely  based  on  inductive  analysis. 
However, a phase of deductive analysis  may follow to  validate the emerging patterns,  look for 
more patterns, categories and dimensions, and also to  verify for the existence of "critical cases" 
which  disconfirm  the  emerging  pre-hypotheses  propositions.  This  could  go  back  and  forth 
between inductive and deductive analysis, and between the emerging patterns from the data and 
the  theoretical  assumptions,  reaching  "theoretical  sensitivity"  (Glaser,  1992;  Goulding,  2002; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998), until no further patterns are observed, no further coding is possible, and 
no  further  categories  are  achievable;  therefore  concluding a  certain  degree  of emergence  and 
"theoretical  saturation":  "In  making  this  point,  Cuba  (1978)  has  depicted  the  practice  of 
naturalistic  inquiry  as  a  wave  on  which  the  investigator  maves from  varying  degrees  of a 
"discovery mode" to  varying emphasis of  a "verification mode" in attempting to  understand the 
real  world.  As fieldwork  begins,  the  inquirer  is  open  to  whatever emerges from  the  data,  a 
discovery or inductive approach.  Then,  as the inquiry reveals patterns and major dimensions of 
interest,  the  investigator will  begin  to  focus  on  verifying  and elucidating  what appears to  be 
emerging- a more deductive approach to data collection and analysis. " (Patton, 2002 p. 67) 42 
1.5.3 The Unit of Analysis 
Patton defines the unit of analysis and notes that "Decisions about samples, bath sample 
size and sampling strategies, depend on prior decisions about the appropriate unit of  analysis to 
study  ... Different units of analysis  are  not mutually exclusive.  However,  each unit of analysis 
implies a different kind of data  collection,  a different fonts for the  analysis of the  data,  and a 
different leve! at which statements about findings and conclusions would be made  ... One of the 
strength  of qualitative  analysis  is  looking  at program  units  holistically  .... When  a program,  a 
group,  organization,  or  community  is  the  unit  of  analysis,  qualitative  methods  involve 
observations  and descriptions  focused  direct/y  on  that  unit:  The  program,  organization,  or 
communitv,  not just the  individual  people,  becomes  the  case  study focus  in  those  settings. 
Particular  events,  occurrences,  or incidents  may  also  be  the  fonts  of study  ... Sampling  can 
involve time period strategies, for example,  continuous and ongoing observation  versus fixed-
interval sampling. " (Patton, 2002 p. 228-229) 
Therefore, this qualitative inquiry will use multiple unit of analysis: 
l.  Disruptive technology 
2.  Acquisition 
3.  The telecommunications industry 
4.  Period from 1994-2009 
1.5.4 Purposeful Sampling 
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Random and representative samplings are conditions for generalization in statistical and 
quantitative  inquiries,  by  elirninating  bias.  However,  in  qualitative  research,  what  could  be 
considered as  bias is  in  fact an objective and a strength.  Therefore, purposeful sampling rather 
than random sampling lies in selecting information rich cases for an in-depth study that leads to 
uncovering  the  answers  for  questions  such  as  What  and  How:  "A  random  and statistically 
representative  sample  permits  conjïdent  generalization  from  a  sample  to  a  larger 
population  ... The purpose of  probability random sampling is generalization from the sample to a 
population and control of selectivity errors  ... What  would be  'bias' in statistical sampling, and 43 
therefore a weakness,  becomes intended foc  us in qualitative sampling,  and therefore a strength. 
The logic and power of  purposeful sampling lie in selecting 'information rich-cases' for study in 
depth.  Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of 
central importance to  the purpose if the  inquiry,  thus the term  'purposeful' sampling.  Studying 
information- rich  cases  yields  insights  and  in-depth  understanding  rather  than  empirical 
generalization." (Patton, 2002 p.  230) 
In  achieving  purposeful  sampling,  Patton  (2002)  presents  16  sampling  strategies  for 
purposefully selecting rich-information cases: (1) Extreme or deviant case sampling, (2) intensity 
sampling,  (3)  maximum  variation  sampling,  (4)  homogeneous  sampling,  (5)  typical  case 
sampling, (6) critical case sampling, (7)  snowball or chain sampling, (8)  criterion sampling,  (9) 
theory-based  sampling  (  operational  construct,  theoretical),  (l  0)  confirming  and  disconfirrning 
cases,  (Il)  stratified  purposeful  sampling,  ( 12)  opportunistic  or  emergent  sampling,  ( 13) 
purposeful  random  sampling,  (14)  sampling  politically  important  cases,  (15)  convenience 
sampling, (16) combination or rnixed purposeful sampling. He notes that  "these approaches are 
not mutually exclusive.  Each approach serves a somewhat different purpose.  Because research 
and evaluation often serve multiple purposes, more than one qualitative sampling strategv may be 
necessarv.  ln long  term  fieldwork,  all of these  strategies may be  used at sorne  point." (Patton, 
2002 p. 245) 
In  the strategie framework of my  research design, I selected severa! purposeful sampling 
strategies to  be  used in combination and  in  a layered filter-like approach, until information rich 
cases are identified, with respect to  the research question and the unit of analysis.  Here are  my 
selections and their definitions: 
1.  Extreme or deviant case sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 230-234) 
2.  Intensity sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 234) 
3.  Maximum variation (Patton, 2002 p.  235) 
4.  Homogeneous sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 235) 
5.  Critical case sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 236) 
6.  Snowball or chain sampling (Patton, 2002 p.  237) 
7.  Cri  teri on sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 238) 44 
8.  Theory-based sampling, operational construct sampling, theoretical sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 
238) 
9.  Confirming and disconfirming cases (Patton, 2002 p. 239) 
1  O. Stratified purposeful sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 240) 
Il. Opportunistic or emergent sampling (Patton, 2002 p. 240) 
1.5.5 Sampling Size 
On  the  issue  of sampling  size,  Lincoln  and  Gu ba ( 1985b p.  202),  prescribed  th at  the 
selection  of samples  would  be  completed  by  reaching  the  leve!  of redundancy.  Furthermore, 
Patton (2002)  notes  that  "there are no  rules for sample size in  qualitative inquiry.  Sample size 
depends  on  what you  want to  know,  the  purpose of the  inquiry,  what's at stake,  what will  be 
useful,  what  will  be  have  credibilîty,  and  what  can  be  done  with  available  time  and 
re sources  ....  ln-depth information from small number of  people can be very valuable, especially if 
the  cases  are  information  rich.  . .. The  validity,  meaningfulness,  and  insights  generated from 
qualitative inquiry have more to  do  with the information rie/mess of the  cases selected and the 
observational/analytical capabilities of the  researcher with sample size." (Patton, 2002 p.  244-
246). 
1.5.6 Triangulation 
Denzin  (1989)  identified  four  means  of  triangulation:  (1).  data  triangulation;  (2) 
investigator triangulation; (3)  theory triangulation and (4)  methodological triangulation.  These 
methods of triangulation should be applied to ensure the credibility of the research. 
1.6 The Research Design and Implementation 
"ln  qualitative  inquiry,  the  problem  of design  poses  a  paradox.  The  term  'design' 
suggests  a  very  specifie  blueprint,  but  'design  in  the  naturalistic  sense .... means planning for 
certain broad contingencies without, hmvever,  indicating exact/y what will be done in relation to 
each. " (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b p. 226) 45 
This empirical  research  is  based on a qualitative  method of inquiry  which  allowed the 
research  to  be conducted  with  the  main  objective of 'in-depth  understanding'  the  phenomena 
(Patton, 2002) and to build theory rather than test theory (Glaser,  1992; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
This  qualitative  inquiry  is  based  on  the  constructivist  paradigm  and  the  inductive  approach 
(Burrell  &  Morgan,  1979;  Kuhn,  1962).  The findings  are  translated  into  'rough  and  general 
approximation  hypotheses'  (Gilgun,  1999)  or  propositions  that  would  be  used  as  testable 
propositions for further quantitative analysis. 
1.6.1 Theory Building 
The  theory  building followed  the  building  blocks  prescriptions  described  by  Whetten 
(1989) and avoided the pitfalls described by Sutton & Staw (1995) and Weick (l995b). It started 
by  the  thoughtful  process  of answering  the  following  questions:  'What'  are  the  main  factors 
(concepts,  variables,  constructs)  related  to  the  study  of acquisitions  in  the  high  technology 
industries,  which constituted the boxes in the proposed theoretical mode!. At the beginning, more 
concepts  were  used,  but  later  the  mode!  was  refined,  keeping  only  the  key  and  high  level 
concepts,  with  the  objective  of completeness  and  generalizability  and  judged by  two  criteria 
comprehensiveness and  parsimony.  'How' provided for  the links and relationships between the 
concepts and boxes. It explained how these selected factors are related in a logical setting and by 
connecting the concepts with arrows; the element of causality is  introduced. 'Why'  was used to 
define  the  theory's  assumptions  and  logical  interpretations  by  identifying  the  underlying 
psychological, economie or social dynamics that justify the  selection of factors  and the causal 
relationships between them.  During  the theory building phase,  and in  the absence of empirical 
evidence,  the  use  of logic  and  intuition,  based  on  the  researcher experience,  for  explanation, 
justification and interpretation, is the only basis for evaluating the rational of the proposed theory. 
'Who',  'Where'  and  'When'  define  the  context  of  the  proposed  mode!  (i.e.  the  intensive 
acquisitions in the high technology industries and more specifically the networking industry) and 
the  boundaries  for  its  generalization,  although  the  limitations  would  be  identified  by  further 
empirical research done by others. 46 
The method of "analytic induction" was used in the exploratory phase of the research, to 
gather initial information and  understanding, and  to  explore sorne rough propositions. The main 
qualitative method of inquiry  used is  "grounded theory" and  is  implemented at the start of the 
fieldwork for  data collection,  through the data analysis/interpretation phase, the theorizing and 
final  reporting on the research  major findings  (Creswell,  1998,  2003;  Denzin &  Lincoln, 2003; 
Glaser,  1992; Strauss &  Corbin,  1998). The use of grounded theory as  a method of inquiry was 
preceded by  a review of the  literature to  get an  understanding of the phenomenon investigated 
and  followed  by  another  round  of  literature  review  for  theoretical  sensitivity  and  better 
understanding the identified patterns. 
Following the structured positivist grounded theory process for collecting and organizing 
data (Charmaz, 2000; Lincoln &  Guba,  1985b; Strauss &  Corbin,  1998), the collected data was 
labeled and organized around patterns and themes. Open and axial coding were used to identify 
emerging categories and abducted concepts, through constant comparison, theoretical comparison 
and the identification of variations (Strauss &  Corbin, 1998). The result was outcome processes, 
sensitized concepts and constructed hypothesis. 
During the data collection, the process would be organized using a multiple case study 
approach with embedded units of analysis, to facilitate the collection, organization, categorization 
and  analysis of the expected data.  In  qualitative  inquiries,  there are no  rules  on sampling size, 
rather purposeful sampling and reaching redundancy and saturation. Therefore, the sampling size 
is  initially defined by three case studies, using the 'success case', 'failure case' in  addition to a 
'confirmatory case'. Multiple non-exclusive sampling strategies were used to  identify and target 
"information-rich"  cases for  the case studies in  the networking segment of the high technology 
industries, giving high importance to context sensitivity. 
The research employed an embedded research design, that is, multiple levels of analysis, 
focusing on each case study at three levels: (1 ) the disruptive  technologies, (2)  the acquisitions 
and  (3)  the  convergence of services. Although  an embedded  design is complex,  it  permits the 
induction of rich and reliable models (Yin, 1989). 47 
The research followed the criteria for quality and triangulation (Lincoln & Guba,  1985a; 
Yin,  1989),  to  ensure the dependability,  transferability and trustworthiness of the research and 
findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b; Miles & Huberman, 1984, 1994; Patton, 2002). 
1.6.2 Data Sources 
Both  pnmary  and  secondary  sources  of data  were  used.  Primary  data  consisted  of 
interviews  and  interviews-like  conversations.  Both  were  designed  to  be  conducted  with  top 
executives and middle management in the same sector of the study (the networking segment of 
the  high  technology  industry),  in  addition  to  external  consultants  who  were  involved  the 
acquisition process. 
Sorne of the interviews  were semi-structured,  while the others  were conversations-like 
interviews.  Field  notes  and  observations  were  also  treated  carefully.  The  interviews  were 
composed of a non-directed phase and a directed phase. The non-directed phase was planned to 
last 15  minutes, starting by an introduction. The directed phase of the interviews was planned to 
last from 30 minutes to 45  minutes, depending on the extents of the answers. It also starts by an 
introduction and end by a conclusion. Cognitive and causal mapping was used as an interviewing 
tool  and  for  the  interview' s  analysis,  in  order  to  li mit  cognitive  simplification,  bounded 
rationality,  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  (Ackermann &  Eden,  2005;  Cossette,  2002;  Cossette & 
Lapointe, 1997; Eden & Ackermann, 1998; Eden & Ackermann, 2004). 
Secondary  sources  of data  would  be  formai  company  documents  and  presentations, 
industry reports and market researches. Furthermore, data was gathered using two methodologies. 
First,  we  reviewed  ail  the  available  written  materials.  These included  articles  from  the  tracte 
publications, industry magazines, industry reports, investment firms' case studies and the selected 
companies' web sites. 
Initially,  a  preliminary  reading  was  conducted  across  the high-tech  companies  in  the 
areas of telecommunications/networking, computer hardware and computer software industries, 
in  order  to  identify  potential  companies  that  could  be  suitable  for  the  study  and  serve  as 
"information-rich cases"  (Yin,  2003). The objective was  to identify,  based on  this  preliminary 48 
reading  two  company  cases  with  "successftil"  acquisitions  and  two  company  cases  with 
acquisitions that could be considered "failures". Finally one company was selected, based on the 
extended  reading,  Cisco  Systems,  as  the  company  with  the  most  successful  and  extended 
acquisition record ·and as  a leader in the networking segment. Another company was  selected to 
confirm the  hypotheses  and  later the  mode!,  as  a company with  successful acquisition record, 
Norte! Networks, however lagging in its position Cisco· Systems.  Furthermore, a third company 
was selected as  a negative case (Lincoln &  Gu  ba,  1  985a) to  confirm the mode!, Alcatel-Lucent 
(Lucent Technologies), with a perceived acquisitions failure, based on the reading. 
1.6.3 Data Analysis 
As  soon as the prelirninary analysis was conducted, it was compared and combined with 
the  propositions  following  the  methods  for  building  theory  from  cases  studies  (Eisenhardt, 
l989b). 
The propositions  emerged  by  comparing  the  sirnilarities  and  differences  between  the 
companies investigated and by categorizing the data around variables such as market positioning, 
- product portfolio, product strategy and overall strategy,  etc. The propositions  were revisited by 
reviewing the data and  looking for any  confirrning or disconfirming case.  At the final  stage, a 
new  round  of  literature  review  was  done  to  ensure  theoretical  sensitivity.  The  process  of 
gathering data and analyzing patterns, categories and concepts, was ended by reaching theoretical 
saturation:  No additional  or new  theoretical concept would emerge and the  gathered  data  and 
analysis  is  sufficient  to  confidently  construct  the  theoretical  mode!.  What  emerged  were 
propositions linking motivations, integration, complexity, synergy and autonomy with acquisition 
success and performance. 
1.6.4 Sense Making 
As  for  the  process  theorization  or  "sense-making"  (Langley,  1999),  strategies  were 
considered  based  on  accuracy,  generality  and  simplicity.  Different  strategies  would  produce 
different models,  thus the strategy used have an important impact on the nature of the emerging 
theory.  In  this study, severa! strategies were used in combination, such as  narrative  strategy for 49 
storytelling,  meanings  and  mechanisms;  grounded  theory  strategy  for  finding  meanings  and 
identifying patterns;  visual mapping strategy for identifying patterns  and  better understanding; 
temporal bracketing strategy for studying replications,  repetitions over time and  multiple cases 
with embedded design; and synthetic strategy for induction, hypothesizing and prediction. 
Figure  1.3  illustrates  the  detailed  research  design  usmg  analytic  induction,  grounded 
theory, case study  to  reach  the  research findings.  A final  phase of validation  was  used  before 
starting  the  theorizing  process.  Figure  1.4  illustrates  the  analytical  layered  process,  with 
typologies of methodological approaches and outputs. lt presents a step-by-step process including 
the method used and the expected outcome. 
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1. 7 Data Sources 
Qualitative data collected during the fieldwork of a naturalistic inquiry are a combination 
of 1) quotations from open-ended and interview-like conversations; 2)  observations made during 
the fieldwork; 3)  notes  taken  during  and  after the  fieldwork  has  ended; and  4)  excerpts from 
documents. Documents could possibly be, but not limited to, formai document of the companies 
involved in the case studies or beyond; reports such as plans,  financial statements, sales forecast 
and outlook;  market research studies, company internai or customer's presentations;  minutes of 
meeting,  brochures  and  publicity  materials,  existing  product  information  and  prototypes;  and -- ·--·-----------------
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brochures and  sales  materials. The documents could  be of a public or confidential nature, and 
they  could  be  found  locally  or internationally.  Also,  they  could  be  collected  not  only  from 
companies,  but  also  from  industrial  and  sectorial  organizations,  professional  groups  and 
associations, standard bodies, "open-sources" collaborative and participative networks,  local and 
international workers'  unions.  Patton notes that:  "Case data consist of ail information one has 
about each  case:  Interview data,  observation,  the  documentary data  (  e.g.,  pro  gram records or 
files,  newspaper clippings),  impressions and statements of others about the case,  and contextual 
information - in effect, ali the information one has accumulated about each particular case goes 
into the  case study." (Patton, 2002 p.  449). Therefore, qualitative data collection can be drawn 
from many sources, combining various techniques and methodologies. 
1.7.1 The Exploratory Study and the Resulting Preliminary Field Hypothes.es 
In  an  attempt to  brainstorm on  few  potential  hypotheses  and  before embarking  on the 
fieldwork  research,  sorne  potential  hypotheses  to  be  considered  as  a  "walking  stick"  for  pre-
fieldwork were developed and presented in chapter 3. 
As an outcome of the exploratory case study, identifying and understanding the emerging 
patterns and categories, led to the development of pre-fieldwork concepts and hypotheses. These 
hypotheses are not accurate construct, following the rules of construct validity,  internai validity 
and external validity, as  in traditional inductive methods of analysis;  rather, they are based on the 
basic  and  preliminary  understanding  and  analysis  of  the  exploratory  study  content  and  on 
perception,  hunches  and  intuition.  They  serve  as  a  guiding  tool  in  constructing  a  conceptual 
framework and as a starting point before entering the field and they will be disregarded as soon as 
the inductive analysis process begins. They will be revisited, later on, after sorne initial coding is 
done,  to  compare, cross-analyze, confirm and disconfirm:  "ln analytical induction,  researchers 
develop hypotheses,  sometimes rough and general approximations, prior to  entry in the field or, 
in cases where data already are collected, prior to data analysis.  These hypotheses can be based 
on  hunches,  assumptions,  careful  examination  of  research  and  theory ....  Contemporary 
researchers  have  de-emphasized  universality  and causality  and have  emphasized  instead  the 
development of  descriptive patterns of  behaviors, interactions and perceptions." (Gilgun, 1999 p. 
268-269). 52 
1.7.2 Fieldwork 
The fieldwork consists  of collecting data from  fieldwork,  with  close proximity  to  the 
phenomena under study, and  being sensitive to  the context and  the ecosystem.  Collecting data 
· will be from primary and secondary sources. The micro-case and mini-case approach will be used 
to collect primary and secondary data. 
1.7.3 Mini-Case Approach for Collecting the Data 
The case studies will be used to collect the data in a process-like systematic fashion. The 
primary case study analysis and the cross-case analysis will be the primary data for the grounded 
theory  methodological  process  of open  coding  and  axial  coding,  especially  in  the  inductive 
portion of it.  In the subsequent deductive portion, I will go back to the case studies or if necessary 
to  fieldwork to  confirm or  disconfirm the  emerging patterns  and  categories.  In  this  way,  case 
studies would be more of a process than a product of analysis, as Patton puts it  "The term case 
study refer ta  either the process of  analysis or the product of  analysis, or bath" (Patton, 2002 p. 
447).  Later,  and  after the  conclusions of the inquiry  are  reached,  part  of the  analysis  will  be 
reported  as  specifie  case  studies  on  the  selected  units  of analysis.  Thus,  case  studies  will 
constitute the product of the analysis or at least a patt of it. 
This qualitative inquiry has  one "single-case" with embedded and layered "mini-cases" 
and  "micro-cases".  Each  case  will  have  multiple  embedded  units  of analysis,  concerning  the 
phenomenon under study. 
1.7.4 Sampling Size 
The  study  will  caver  both,  the  manufacturers'  segment  and  the  servtce  providers' 
segment of the telecommunications industry.  Each segment will be studied using a minimum of 
two principal cases. Therefore, a minimum of four cases would be used to cover the industry. It is 
possible  to  add  one  or  two  more  case  in  case  the  inquiry  requires  more  data  collection, 
comparison and analysis.  It is possible to find an  interesting case, after the case study phase was 53 
done.  Naturalistic  qualitative  inquiries  reqUJre  a  certain  amount  of flexibility  m  the  research 
design in case the study needs to go deeper into the data. 
1.7.5 Primary Data 
1.  Semi-structured interviews 1  Open-ended interviews 
2.  Interview-like conversations 
3.  Field observations 
4.  Field notes 
5.  Survey 
Selecting  Stakeholders  for  the  Interviews.  The  interviews  and  interview-like 
conversations are  valuable  sources of data collection in  the qualitative analysis,  as  part of the 
study. Both should caver most of the stakeholders concerned with the research within the context 
the  high-tech  industries,  mainly  the  telecommunications  and  networking  industries.  The 
stakeholders were identified as: 
o  Top and middle management in the companies forming part in the acquisitions: 
o  Planning 
o  Finance 
o  Technology 1  Engineering 
o  Marketing 
o  First level employees in the companies forming part in the acquisitions 
o  Extemal consultants who assisted and participated in the pre-acquisitions formation 
o  Corporate customers who witnessed the acquisitions and its impact 
o  Government regulators who approved the acquisitions 
An  interview  will  be  conducted  with  each  of these  groups  in  the  selected  company 
forming part of the survey. Each interview will be divided into two sessions; a non-directed and a 
directed  session,  starting  with  an  introduction.  A  fi nal  word  or  conclusion  is  left  to  the 
interviewee. The interviews will be recorded and taped if this is accepted by the interviewee and 54 
under  his  condition  (Daunais,  1992).  The  overall  duration  of each  interview  (including  both 
sessions) should not exceed more than one hour. 
The selection of the interviewees will be based on the following general criteria (Huber & 
Power, 1985): 
o  Referrals from the director of research; 
o  Referrals from inside the company, as being the right person having ali the right facts; 
o  Being emotionally detached from the acquisition formation; 
o  Being objective in representing retrospectively the facts. 
Sample  of Interview  Guide.  A  sample  of an  interview  guide  is  being  presented  as 
appendix  A.  Moreover,  appendix  8  represents  a  sample  of an  interview,  with  questions  and 
answers. 
1.7.6 Sampling Strategies 
As  discussed  previously,  the  sampling  strategies  selected  for  this  research  are  the 
following: 
1.  Extreme or deviant case sampling 
2.  Intensity sampling 
3.  Maximum variation 
4.  Homogeneous sampling 
S.  Critical case sampling 
6.  Snowball or chain sampling 
7.  Criterion sampling 
8.  Theory-based sampling, operational construct sampling, theoretical sampling 
9.  Confirming and disconfirming cases 
10.  Stratified purposeful sampling 
11. Opportunistic or emergent sampling 55 
Figure  1.5  presents a graphical depiction of the  positioning of each of these strategies. 
Table 1.1 presents the rational behind the selection of these sampling strategies and the potential 
stakeholders 
Figure 1.5 
An illustration of the sampling strategies 56 
Table 1.1 
Rational of sampling strategies 
Strategies  Potential stakeholders 
Extreme or deviant case  Cisco Systems (More than 114 acquisitions during 7 years, 23 acquisitions in 
sampling:  one year) 
Intensity sampling:  Cisco Systems 
Norte! Networks (Same acquisitions but with Jess intensity than Cisco) 
Maximum variation:  Survey to international service providers using: 
- Geographical variations (North America, South America,  Europe and 
Asia) 
- lndustrial countries, emerging economies and developing markets; 
- Highly competitive  markets and Jess competitive 
(See preliminary list of  potential service providers for the survey) 
Homogeneous sampling:  - Ali  the manufacturers that benefited from the acquisition wave 
- Service providers in Canada (being in one ecosystem, facing the same 
context and environmental challenges) 
Critical case sampling:  Manufacturers:  Lucent Technologies (now Alcatel-Lucent) 
Snowball or chain  Unknown for now 
sampling: 
Criterion sampling:  - Ali  manufacturers who adopted acquisition as a business mode! 
-New entrants (operators)  in the service providers' market 
Theory-based sampling,  - Manufacturers + theoretical constructs: 
operational construct  +Diffusion of innovation 
sampling, theoretical  + RBV and Dynamic capabilities 
sampling:  + Strategie assets, substitution and complimentarily 
+ Network theory and collaborative learning 
+ Strategie alignment and R&D 
(only examples, see the list in section: Literature review 1 Conceptual 
Framework) 
- Service providers + theoretical constructs: 
+ Market based view (barriers to entry, bargaining power, substitute 
products) 
+ Markets, hierarchies and firm boundaries 
+Diversification 
+ Absorptive capacity and internai R&D 
+ Deregulation, regulation, protectionism and Iiberalization 
+ Core competencies and strategie alignment 
+ Resource dependency, Jock-in and economies of scope 
+ Economies of scale and network externalities 
+ Strategie fit and synergy 
+ Complexity, talent recruitment and retention 
+ Cannibalization 
Confirming and  For later stage deductive analysis, confirmation and theory building 
disconfirming cases: 
Stratified purposeful  Only telecommunications companies (manufacturers and service providers) 
sampling:  in the technology/market segment of voice, data, video, multimedia,  triple 
and quadruple play, whether wireline, wireless, or satellite. 
Opportunistic or emergent  On the spot, not know now. 
sampling: 57 
1.7.7 The Survey 
The  survey  could  be  conducted  either  in  the  manufacturers'  segment  or  the  service 
providers'  segment of the  telecommunications  industry.  However,  it  will  be more  useful  and 
pertinent to  use it in the service provider segment,  to  achieve generalizability,  as  the  units  of 
anal  y  sis  in  this  segment  is  ( 1)  the  disruptive  tech nol  ogy  (2)  the  industry  itself.  The units  of 
analysis for the manufacturers' segment will be (1) the acquisition (as a critical event) and (2) the 
disruptive technology (as a critical event). 
The survey, in order to achieve generalizability, should cover different geographie areas, 
other than the one covered by the cases studies  in  the service providers'  segment (two cases). 
Geographie  areas  could  represent  a  variety  of  industrial  nations,  emerging  economies,  and 
developing markets. Also, it could cover a variety of competitive markets (highly competitive and 
less competitive markets), and the other extreme on the continuum; the monopolies. The variation 
could be  represented  also  by  purely  geographie areas  in  an  attempt  to  generalize  the  research 
findings, based on the fact that one of the final block studied, is the impact on the industry. 
The representation of the  survey findings  will  take  the  form of statistical analysis and 
graphical analysis, and will be considered as  a quantitative data, as  part of the qualitative data 
collected. This survey and its results, in addition to the qualitative findings of this inquiry, would 
serve as  the basis for further research in  a new quantitative inquiry, outside of the scope of this 
research proposai. Table 1.2 presents the list of companies selected for the international survey. Table 1.2 
List of companies (service providers) for the international survey: 
Geographie  Country/  lndustrial  Emerging  Developing  Highly 
variations  Company  Nation  Eco no my  Market  Competitive 
Canada 
Tell us  ..;  ..; 
Videotron  ..;  ..; 
United States 
Verizon  ..;  ..; 
Sprint  ..;  ..; 
Vonage  ..;  ..; 
Europe 
British Telecom  ./  ./ 
Telefonica Espana  ./  ..; 
Latin America 
Cod  etel  ..;  ./ 
Wind Telecom  ./ 
Mexico Telemex  ./  ./ 
Asia 
J apan DoCoMo  ./  ./ 
Africa & ME 
Orascom Telecom  ./  ..; 
Etisalat  ./ 
1.7.8 Secondary Data 
Secondary data could make use of the following sources: 
•  Formai document of the companies involved in the case studies or beyond; 
•  Reports: 
o  Plans 
o  Financial statements 
o  Sales forecast and outlook 
58 
Less 
..; 
./ 59 
o  Market research studies 
•  Company internai or customer's presentations 
•  Minutes of meeting 
•  Brochures and publicity materials 
•  Existing product information and prototypes 
•  Sales materials 
•  Blogs on the Internet 
•  Documents from: 
o  Industrial and sectorial organizations 
o  Professional groups and associations 
o  Standard bodies 
o  "Open-sources" collaborative and participative networks 
o  Local and international workers' unions 
Table 1.3 presents a summary of the data sources during the three phases of the research: 
Exploratory study, grounded theory process and the validation phase. 
1.8 Data Analysis 
"We have few agreed-on cannons for qualitative data  analysis,  in  the  sense of 
shared ground  rules for drawing  conclusions  and  verifying  the ir sturdiness" 
(Miles & Huberman, 1984 p.  16). 
In  a naturalistic qualitative in quiry,  the analysis of the collected data does not start at the 
end of the data collection phase. Data collection and data analysis are both an integral part of one 
process which the outcome should be reaching a consensus (among the data) that ali the patterns, 
typologies and categories that emerged have reached "saturation" in a confirrning fashion and that 
there  are  no  more  disconfirrning  cases  for  further  analysis.  Therefore,  the  data  collection 
task/process is overlapped with the data analysis task. This is  especially essential in the case of a 
combination of inductive and deductive approaches, when using "grounded theory" to  generate 
theories from the emerging data and patterns. The inquirer goes back and  forth between the data 60 
and  the  theories,  whether  derived  from  the  literature  or  constructed  based  on  the  emerging 
categories embedded in the collected data. In  any case, each qualitative research is  special and it 
depends  a great deal on the  researcher preparation, knowledge,  intellect and creativity:  "There 
are  no  formulas  for  determining  significance.  No  straightforward  tests  can  be  applied for 
reliability and validity. Each  qualitative study is  unique,  the  analytical approach used will be 
unique  .... Qualitative  analysis  ultimately  depends  on  the  analytical  intellect  and  style  of the 
analyst." (Patton, 2002 p. 432-434) 
Table 1.3 
Summary of data sources during the three phases of the research 
Surveys(1997-2009) 
.c  -The Economist  (,)  ... 
-New York Times  ~ 
~ 
;>:l  -IEEE Spectmmmagazine 
~  ...  - Forbes magazine 
~  ...  - Wired magazine  0  ..... 
- Wall Street Journal  -~  ... 
-Financial Times  0 
-a  - \VashingtonPost 
~ 
~  - Telecommunications magazine 
Intervie\vs ( 6) 
;>,  ... 
0  Interview-like conversations (  3  2)  ~ 
.c  International survey  ·~ 
"0  Industry companies' document (250+) 
~ 
Theoretical review/sensitivity (  500+)  "0 
=  Internetblogs (14+)  =  0  Case studies (  4+)  1... 
v 
=  Academie conference presentations (11) 
0  Papers accepted in conference proceedings (9)  ;:: 
~  Industry conference presentations ( 1)  "0  ·- Doctoral consotiia  presentations (  4)  (ii 
:;..  Interview-like conversations(3) 61 
1.8.1 The Interplay Process of Inductive and Deductive Analysis 
Qualitative inquiries are usually inductive as they do not start by a theoretical model and 
hypotheses testing, like in the case of the deductive process Used quantitative inquiries. However, 
in  the  process  of being  emerged  in  the  data;  patterns,  typologies,  categories,  and  hopefully 
concepts and theories will be identified. To confirmand disconfirm those findings, the qualitative 
inquirer who started by an inductive approach, would move into a more deductive-like approach 
to do just that. This process is described by Patton (2002) as follows:  "Inductive analysis in volves 
'discovering' patterns,  themes,  and categories in one'  s data.  Findings emerge out of the data, 
through the analysts' interactions with the data,  in contrast to deductive analysis where the data 
are analyzed according to an existing framework. Qualitative analysis is typically inductive in the 
early stages, especially when developing a codebookfor content analysis or  figuring out possible 
categories, patterns,  and themes.  This is  often called 'open coding' (Strauss & Corbin,  1998 p. 
223) to emphasize the importance of being open to the data.  'Grounded theory' (Glaser,  1992; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967) emphasizes becoming immersed in the data- being 'grounded' - so that 
embedded meanings and relationships can emerge  ..... Once patterns, themes, and lor categories 
have  been established through  inductive  analysis,  the final,  confirmatory stage of qualitative 
analysis may be deductive in testing and affirming the authenticity and appropriateness of the 
inductive content analysis,  including carefully examining deviate cases or data that don 't fit the 
categories developed. Generating theoretical propositions or format hypotheses after inductive/y 
identifying categories is considered deductive analysis by grounded theorists Strauss and Corbin. 
'Analytical  induction',  in  contrast  to  grounded  theory,  be  gins  with  an  analyst'  deduced 
propositions  or  theory-derived  hypotheses  and  is  a  procedure  for  verifying  theories  or 
propositions  based  on  qualitative  data.  Sometimes,  as  with  analytic  induction,  qualitative 
anal  y sis is first deductive or quasi-deductive and then inductive as when, for example, the analyst 
begins  by  examining  the  data  in  terms  of theory-derived sensitizing  concepts  or applying  a 
theoretical framework developed by someone else.  After or alongside this  deductive  phase of 
analysis, the researcher strives to look at the data afreshfor undiscovered patterns and emergent 
understandings (inductive analysis)." (Patton, 2002 p. 453-454) 62 
1.8.2 The Process of Analysis: An Objectivist-like Procedure and Techniques 
Qualitative research is often criticized for being too  'subjective' and  'interpretative' as it 
relies  on  the  interpretation of the  researcher,  based on  his  understanding,  critical  analysis  and 
creati vit y.  In  fact,  another layer of interpretation lies  in  the  interpretation of the subjects un der 
studied  and  how  they  see  and  'interpret"  their  'real  world'.  This  could  be  true  from  an 
epistemological stance, as  in the  'subjectivist', 'constructivist' and  'phenomenologist' paradigm, 
where  the  actors  and  the  researcher are  not describing  the  world  as  'it is'  out  there,  but they 
interpret it, as they see it with their own experience, emotions and intuition. However, subscribing 
to this paradigm does not, in  my  opinion, lirnit the scientific value of the process of analysis. and 
consequent! y the resulted findings. Qualitative methods of inquiry, such as grounded theory, offer 
a detailed procedure-like approach to analyzing data, with confidence that the theorizing process 
is  based  on  a  comprehensive  approach  and  rigorous  steps,  procedures  and  techniques.  This 
process is composed of the following major steps: 
1.  After the data is  collected, it starts by  identifying general concepts and  labels, whether 
they  are  found  explicitly  in  the  data  (indigenous),  or synthesized  and  labeled  by  the 
researcher,  if they  are  not  found  in  the  data,  but  appear  to  be  emerging  concept  of 
significant leve! of importance. (Patton, 2002 p. 454-458) 
2.  The followlng task is  to identify major patterns, themes, and categories. (Patton, 2002 p. 
458-460) 
3.  Identifying and constructing codes in a codebook. (Patton, 2002 p. 463-465) 
4.  After identifying and  classifying codes, cornes  the  next step is  converting those codes 
into systematic categories. However, this task has to comply with two important rules; (a) 
convergence,  which  is  examined  based  on  'internai  homogeneity'  and  'extemal 
heterogeneity'; and (b) divergence. (Patton, 2002 p. 465-466) 
5.  Logical analysis and abduction to create matrices. (Patton, 2002 p. 469-471) 
Figure  1.4  presents  the  analytical  layered  process,  typologies  of approaches  and  the 
resulting outcomes, used in this research. 63 
1.8.3 Causal 1 Cognitive Mapping for Analyzing and lnterpreting Findings 
The research on acquisitions in the context of the high technology industry is  a complex 
issue and it is  much more complex than it seems, when using one approach.  As  noted by  Hafsi 
and Thomas (2005 p. 509) "collective action cannat be understood if it is broken down into parts 
to  be  studied separately. As reality is  complex,  it is  more appropriate to  study it in  its  totality. 
This means not only studying all the parts together but also their inter-relationships, even if the 
result  is  an  incomplete  and  impeifect  understanding".  Strategy  is  classified  into  divisional 
fonctions  such as  marketing, finance,  operations;  it  is  grounded in  behavioral science, political 
science,  anthropology,  sociology,  psychology,  economies  and  finance,  it  combines  different 
disciplines  such  as  business  policy  and  strategie  management,  industrial  organization, 
organizational  economies,  economies  sociology,  human  behavioral  science,  organizational 
theory, it uses different theories borrowed from distinct areas of social science such as transaction 
cost, resource based view,  network theory, knowledge-based view  and  market-based view.  " ft 
feels like a vast array of  diverse and uncoordinated detailed observations that are scientifically 
respectable,  yet incoherent  in  practice"  (Hafsi  &  Thomas,  2005).  Therefore  the  need  for  an 
integrative and holistic approach that encompasses as much variables as possible, constructing the 
reality  as  observed  by  the  researcher,  and  painting  a  realistic  picture  of the  reality  using  a 
constructivist approach. 
The  complexity  of  the  research  on  acquisitions  has  led  to  the  use  of  cognitive 
simplification by  bath academie researchers and practitioners. Decision makers  use similarities 
and analogies to  similar situation and they overestimate or underestimate the potential impact of 
their decisions due to  the limited number of .factors  used in the analysis (Duhaime &  Schwenk, 
1985).  Cognitive  simplification  is  demonstrated  to  be  widely  used  in  the  process  of decision 
making  and  when  dealing  with  complex  and  interrelated  issues  (Schwenk,  1984).  Bounded 
rationality is  the inability of the human to process more than a limited number of alternatives and 
to  process them all, which limits his ability to. solve complex problems (March &  Simon,  1958; 
Simon, 1976). Under those limitations and facing complex issues, the process of decision making 
was researched in the context of structuring the unstructured (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 
1976), making judgment under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman,  1974), and the psychological 64 
determinants of bounded rationality and its implications for decision making (Taylor,  1975). The 
cognitive complexity in the strategie decision process has been explored by Hi tt and Tyler (1991 ). 
Also  Tyler  and  Steensma  (1995)  explored  the  technological  collaborative  activities  using  a 
cognitive perspective: "The cognitive limitations affect the simplified mental  models or schema 
top executives use to geta grasp of the situation at hand" (Schwenk,  1984; Walsh,  1995) as cited 
by  Tyler and  Steensma (1995).  Finally  Eisen hardt  and  Zbaracki  (1992)  pro vides  a  extensive 
comparison between bounded rationality, power and politics and the garbage can model. 
Cognitive  mappmg  IS  used  to  represent  the  mental  schema  of the  researcher  when 
studying an  issue (Eden & Ackermann,  1998) or as  a representation of the representation of the 
mental schema of a human subject related to a research issue (Cossette & Audet,  1994). They are 
constructed based on a subjectivist approach, by using concepts or variables related to  the issue 
under  investigation  and  links  or  relations  between  the  concepts  reflecting  their  interrelations, 
strength  and  directions.  Cognitive  maps  helps  to  uncover  the  knowledge  structure  and  the 
dominant  logic  within  the  firm  related  to  the  subject  under  investigation  (Bettis  &  Prahalad, 
1995).  It  assist in  giving meaning and  signification, or sense giving,  to  the issues related to  a 
central concept, question, vision or strate  gy (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991 ). 
Cognitive mapping  techniques  have  been  used  in  different areas  of the  administrative 
science  and  for  different  purposes.  Sorne  examples  include:  mapping  conceptual  models  in 
macroeconomie  theory  (Cossette  &  Lapointe,  1997);  analysing  the  thinking  of F.  W.  Taylor 
(Cossette,  2002);  supporting  information  system  development  (Ackermann  &  Eden,  2005); 
analysing  policies  in  the  public  sector  (Eden  &  Ackermann,  2004);  analyzing  retail  location 
decision making (Clarke et al., 2003); analyzing technology driven and mode! driven approaches 
to  group  decision  (Morton,  Ackermann,  &  Belton,  2003);  analyzing  delay  and  disruption 
(Williams, Ackermann, & Eden, 2003); analyzing the institutional influences on managers mental 
models of competition (Daniels, Johnson, & Chernatony, 2002). 
1.8.4 Cognitive 1  Causal Mapping as a Research Tool 
The research  used  the  cognitive  mapping  technique  as  a  qualitative  research  tool  for 
analyzing  qualitative  data.  The  cognitive  mapping  technique  was  used  with  the  aid  of the 65 
software package  'Decision Explorer', which  allows for  the  introduction of the  data collected, 
and the subsequent analysis  based on the  produced output in the form of quantitative data and 
graphie maps. 
The  data  collection  was  based  on  the  literature  on  strategie  management  related  to 
acquisitions.  Using  the  ProQuest  and  JSTOR  databases,  more  than  80  articles  from  top 
management  journal  covering  acquisitions  were  identified  and  carefully  reviewed.  Only  56 
articles,  where  the  main  objective  was  to  study  acquisitions'  motivations,  impact  and  critical 
success  factors,  were  chosen  as  pertinent  to  the  research  subject.  Articles  covered  different 
theories  and  used  different  research  methodologies:  Qualitative  and  quantitative.  They  were 
studied thoroughly in search for concepts related to acquisitions. Sorne articles were elirninated 
because the constructs were poorly defined. The collected data was classified into (l) motivation 
or  trigger  (causes);  (2)  impact  (consequence);  and  (3)  critical  success  factor.  A  total  of 85 
concepts were found.  After preparing a list of concepts, ali  the concepts  were checked against 
each other to elirninate duplication and to ensure that each concept is  unique and well defined on 
its  own term and distinct from another,  which ensures the construct validity  (Lincoln &  Guba, 
1985a). A final number of 74 concepts were selected with their respective links to other concepts 
as described in the literature. 
Each concept was  analyzed using source and theory triangulation methods to ensure the 
validity of the construct and  its  agreement on  the  same definition of the concept, and its  links. 
This  ensures  the  credibility,  internai  validity  and  reliability  if another  researcher  decides  to 
embark on analyzing the same subject. After analyzing each concept, its relationships in term of 
causal  link  or  consequential  link  with  other  concept  were  analyzed.  Direct  and  indirect 
relationships  were  also  analyzed.  No  overlap  between  direct  and  indirect  relationships  was 
allowed, unless specified in the literature explicitly. Triangulation of sources was also used in this 
regard. In  the  list  of concepts  (see  chapter 5), and  for  reliability  and  auditing  purposes,  each 
concept was  provided  with  a  list  of all  citations from  which  it  was  drawn  and  applied  in  the 
mode!. In addition, only links described in the literature were listed, with their citation references. 
Ali citations are included in the bibliography. 66 
1.9 Criteria for Quality and Triangulation 
Analysis Approach and Collected Data Interpretation adopted from (Lincoln & Guba,  1985a; 
Yin,  1989) 
Prior to the data collection phase and fieldwork, a definition of the research designs  will 
be completed. This will serve as  a guide or a research map prior to  the data collection phase,  a 
guide  for  the  process  of collecting,  analyzing  and  interpreting observations.  This  is  a  logical 
mode!  of proof that  will  allow  me  to  draw  inferences  concerning casual  relations  among  the 
acquisitions, the process steps and the critical success factors under investigation. This involved 5 
elements: 
Study question. Defining the what, where, how and why. 
Study propositions. Each proposition will direct attention to  something that should  be 
exarnined within the scope of this study. The proposed propositions could be the condition under 
which  the  acquisitions  is  formed  (what is  the  situation  before  the  acquisitions,  is  there  any 
alternative, how  the  decisions  is  formed  and  the step  taken)  and the  effect it  has  (what is the 
expectations before and  after the acquisitions, how  is  the  company really  performing after the 
acquisitions) 
Unit of analysis. In this research four units of analysis are proposed. 
Linking  data  to  propositions  and  criteria for  the  interpretations  of the  findings. 
"Pattern matching" is whereby severa! pieces of information from the same case maybe related to 
some theoretical proposition, hoping that the different patterns are sufficiently contrasting that the 
findings can be interpreted in terms of comparing at !east two rival propositions. 
Theory development and generalization from case study to theory. My goal is to have 
a theoretical proposition before starting the data collection phase, as  an essential step. According 
to Yin ( 1989), this pro vides strong guidance in deterrnining what data to collect and the strategies 67 
for analyzing  the  data.  In  addition,  if appropriately developed,  the  theory  will  be  the  leve!  at 
which the  generalization of the case  study  will occur. The theory  will  be revisited in  different 
phases and against ali findings, until one will be found that fit the generalization criteria. 
1.9.1 Case Study Design 
The research will be based on a multiple case. However, although it is based on multiple 
cases, most of the emphasis will be on one company as a critical case (Cisco Systems), while the 
other two will serve to reinforce the  mode!, in  which one will serve as the negative case (Lucent 
Technologies).  Furthermore,  rephcations  of acquisitions  within  the  same case  will  be  used  to 
validate the theoretical mode! and  to  reach the desired generalization. The replication tactic will 
be  used  on  the  leve!  of the  acquisitions  (a  unit  of analysis)  by  the  same  company,  while 
attempting to measure its respective performance. Therefore, the research will have an embedded 
design with replication logic and different unit of analysis. 
1.9.2 Criteria for Judging the Quality of the Research Design 
Construct  validity.  De,·eloping  a  sufficiently  operational  set  of  measures  by:  (1) 
respecting the  nomological  validity  (constructs  and  measures  have a  theoretical  base from  the 
literature)  and  trait  validity  (each  construct  is  weil  defined  and  measures  only  the  specifie 
construct); (2) respecting the convergent and discriminate validity of the constructs. 
Internai validity. Through respecting the tactic of pattern matching for the propositions 
and  replications,  by  establishing complete causality  and  effect and  by  using  story  telling for 
ex.planation building. 
External validity.  Maki11g  sure  that the study's findings  are  generalizable beyond  the 
immediate single and multiple case studies, by striving to generalize a particular set of results to 
sorne broader theory and by testing the theory through replications of the findings in a second or 
third unit of analysis (another acquisition and another company within the multiple case) 68 
Reliability.  By  taking  the  necessary  steps  to  document  ail  the  procedures  during  the 
whole process of collecting and analyzing, and  therefore guarantying that if another researcher 
follows the same documented procedures, he would reach the same results. 
1.9.3 Criteria for Evaluating the Trustworthiness of the Research 
Validity and  reliability. To achieve validity, one precondition is  to achieve reliability. 
Furthermore, in the words of Kerlinger (1973, p.422, as  cited by  Lin'coln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G., 
(1985a)),  reliability  is  synonymous  to  (1)  dependability  (2)  stability  (3)  consistency  (  4) 
predictability, and  (5)  accuracy, which will be respected in  the induced hypothesis. One way to 
achieve  reliability  will  be  through  repetitions  or replications,  as  1 intend  to  test  my  induced 
hypothesis and potential theoretical model against ail the replications, represented by the various 
acquisitions the company conducted in  the ti me specified by the research scope of work ( 1994-
2009), in  the  single  case study  and  later by  replicating the  research  on  the  multiple cases  for 
generalization. 
Credibility.  By  engagmg  m  activities  that  increase  the  probability  that  the  findings 
produced will be credible, such as: Prolong engagement; persistent observation; using different 
triangulation methods (methods triangulation, triangulation of sources, theory triangulation); peer 
debriefing (through conferences and journals' peers evaluation and feedback), etc. 
Transferability.  By  respecting  that  the  findings  and  the  theoretical  model  could  be 
transferred and generalized, to  other companies in  the same sector, to  other sectors in  the same 
industry and to other industries, which is the main characteristic of a successful them·y, one that 
could be  applied to  most of the cases,  with  no  or few  exceptions. The rigorous  testing of the 
construct until they fit will do this. 
Dependability. As Gu  ba (1981, as cited by  Lincoln and  Gu ba (l985a)) claimed,  there is 
no validity without  reliability and there is no credibility without dependability. We will  achieve 
dependability by using "overlap methods" (or triangulation) and stepwise replication or otherwise 
known  as  replication  in  all  of the  acquisitions  studied  within ·one  company  and  for  the  three 69 
companies.  Moreover, ail  the documentation required explicitly to  perform an auditing process, 
would be prepared and presented, as part of the process documentation. 
1.9.4 Quality and Limits of the Chosen Methods 
The evaluation of validity and ri gor is different in quantitative and qualitative research. In 
quantitative research the  instrument of measurement is  constructed following specifie rules and 
procedures, while in qualitative research the instrument of measurement is the researcher with his 
experience,  understanding,  careful  analysis  and  creativity:  "Validity  in  quantitative  research 
depends  on  careful  instrument construction  to  ensure  that  the  instrument measures what it  is 
supposed to  measure.  The  measure must then be administered in  an appropriate standardized 
manner according to  prescribed procedures.  The fonts is  on the measurement instrument - the 
test items,  survey questions,  or other instruments tools.  ln qualitative inquiry,  the  researcher is 
the instrument. The  credibility of qualitative methods, therefore hinges to  a great extent on the 
skill,  competence, and rigor of  the persan doing the fieldwork. " (Patton, 2002 p.  14) 
However, the choice of qualitatiYe naturalistic  enquiries  and  the  important concept of 
'objectivity'  are  in  the  center of a  paradigm debate  between  critics  who  perceive  qualitative 
research too  'subjective'  as  it is tinted by the  interpretation of the inquirer and the defenders of 
the qualitative research, who believe that jt is more in line with  'objectivity', which is  the basis 
for the scientific method of inquiry, investigation and research. 
1.9.5 Criteria for the Evaluation 
In qualitative research, findings are evaluated based on their 'substantive significance', in 
contrast  to  the  quantitative  research,  wmch  is  based  on  'statistical  significance.  In  trying  to 
differentiate  between  paradigms,  Patton presented  'alternative  sets  of criteria  for judging  the 
quality and credibility of qualitative inquiry'  (Patton, 2002 p.  544), according to  a typology of 
two different perspectives:  (1) TraditionaL scientific research criteria and (2)  social construction 
and constructivist criteria and notes that 'gmunded theory' lies in the first category: 70 
"Traditional scientific research criteria: 
•  Objectivity of  the inquirer (attempts to minimize bias) 
•  Validity of  the data 
•  Systematic rigor offieldwork procedures 
•  Triangulation (consistency offindings across methods and data sources) 
•  Reliability of  coding and pattern analyses 
•  Correspondence offindings to reality 
•  Generalizability (externat validity) 
•  Strength of  evidence supporting causal hypotheses 
•  Contributions to theory 
Social construction and constructivist criteria: 
•  Subjectivity acknowledged (  discusses and takes into account bias  es) 
•  Trustworthiness 
•  Authenticity 
•  Triangulation (cap turing and respecting multiple perspectives) 
•  Reflexivity 
•  Particularity (  doing justice to the integrity of  unique cases) 
•  Enhanced and deepened understanding (Verstehen) 
•  Contribution to dialogue." (Patton, 2002 p. 544) 
The evaluation of validity and rigor is different in quantitative and qualitative research. In 
quantitative research the instrument of measurement is constructed following specifie rules and 
procedures, white in qualitative research the instrument of measurement is the researcher with his 
experience,  understanding,  careful  analysis  and  creativity:  "Validity  in  quantitative  resea~·ch 
depends  on  careful  instrument construction to  ensure  that the  instrument measures  what it  is 
supposed to  measure.  The measure must then be administered in  an appropriate standardized 
manner according to  prescribed procedures.  The focus  is on the measurement instrument - the 71 
test items,  survey questions,  or other instruments tools.  In  qualitative inquiry,  the  researcher is 
the  instrument.  The  credibility of q!talitative methods,  therefore  hinges to  a great extent on the 
skill,  competence, and rigor of  the pe rson doing the fieldwork." (Patton, 2002 p.  14) 
1.10 Ethical considerations 
There is  a list of ethical considerations, to be an integral part of the research framework, 
scope and objectives. This list co11sist  of giving the participants enough information about the 
study,  the  ability  of  the  partictpant  to  withdraw  without  penalty,  the  elimination  of  ali 
unnecessary risks, treating the participant with respect and dignity and within a safe environment, 
etc. (Glesne, 1992) 72 PARTI 
EXPLORATORYSTUDY 74 CHAPTER II 
STRATEGY FORMULATION: THE CASES OF CISCO SYSTEMS, NORTEL 
NETWORKS & LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 
The high technology industry is not like any other industry. It is 
characterized by  being a high velocity,  turbulent and  uncertain 
environment.  Companies  in  this  important sector of the  global 
economy face unprecedented challenges in keeping up  with this 
unstable environment, which affect the technologies, the product 
and the organizations. In the context of the business policies and 
strategie  management fields,  this  paper explores  the important 
and critical issues involved in the process of the formulation of 
strategies  within  this  industrial sector.  lt covers  issues  such  as 
leadership, competitive ad v  an tage, inter-organizational relations, 
organizational  culture,  environmental  influences,  and 
management of change, leading to  a better understanding of this 
complex  environment  and  how  strategies  are  formulated  to 
sustain competitive advantage and superior performance. 
2.1 Introduction 
The function of strategy is  to position the organization with its environment and industry 
structure,  matching  the  internai  resources  to  external  opportunities,  and  considering  the 
organization's strengths and  weaknesses, with the objective of creating a competitive advantage 
and an efficient economie performance,  whether via an intentional and deliberate strategy or an 
emerging  and  incrementai  strategy,  and  whether  by  the  individual  role  of the  leader  and  the 
leadership board alone or by  the collective active participation of all the organization's actors. 
The strategie  management function  involves  setting  the  objectives  for  the organization  or the 
firm,  developing the policies and plans to achieve those objectives and allocating the necessary 
resources  for  the  implementation  of this  plan  and  the  achievement  of the  objectives.  It  is 76 
performed by the highest level of the managerial activity and it is usually performed by the chief 
executive  officer  or CEO,  who  provides  the  overall  direction  of the  company  is  responsible 
before the stakeholders for achieving those objectives. A distinction must be made between the 
formulation of the strategy and the implementation of the strategy, and also between the process 
of formulation the strategy and the content of the formulated strategy. 
The concept of strategy  derives  from  the  Greek  word  Strategos  or the  leader of the 
troops, as the ancient Greeks understood, it  is  the skills necessary to plan, manage and carry on 
with the task of conducting war. Since then, it has been used in the rnilitary organizations,  in  the 
teaching and practice of warfare. In the business administration acadernia, its foundation is due to 
Selznick (1957), Chandler (1962b), Ansoff ( 1965)and Andrews (1971), in the context of business 
policies, concerned with the study of strategy formulation for top executives. The field of strategy 
has  moved  from  business  policy  to  strategie  management  with  two  dominant  paradigms  the 
industrial  organization  or  the  market-based  view  (Porter,  1980b),  which  refer  the  firm's 
competitive advantage  to  the  firm's  position  within  the  industry  and  the  resource-based  view 
(Prahalad  &  Hamel,  1994)  which  refer  the  competitive  advantage  of the  firm  to  its  internai 
strengths  and  weaknesses  based on  the  efficient  creation,  management  and  utilization  of the 
resources, whether internai or external. 
In the strategie management field, the organization and its strategy are influenced by the 
individual role of its leader, by the organizational environment in  which it operates and by the 
collectivity of the actors or participants of the organizational activities. The influence of each of 
these factors is different from one organization or firm to the other. ln sorne firms, the role of the 
leader is dominant even tyrannical, not allowing for the participation of the management team in 
the  decision-making  process  and  strategy  formulation  (Vries  &  Miller,  1991 ;  Westley  & 
Mintzberg,  1989).  While in  others,  the  management team,  with the collectivity of the  base  is 
active  patticipants  in  the  decision-making  process  and  strategy  formulation,  with  the  leader 
setting the general objectives and providing the structure (Pascale,  1984;  Quinn,  1978). Sorne 
organizations  could  play  a  passive  role  in  reaction  to  the  environmental  influences  (Vries  & 
Miller,  1991 ),  while  others  would  play  a  proactive  role  in  trying  to  shape  and  influence the 
environment or en  acting the environment (Weick, 1984 ). 77 
The environment plays an important role in shaping the strategy of the organization and 
influencing its  actions. Since the prediction of Alvin Toffler (1970;  1980) in  his books "Future 
Shock"  and  "The Third  Wave",  of an  accelerating  pace  of change  due  to  the  technological 
revolution of the information and telecommunication technologies, severa! industries have been 
influenced by this rate of change, among them the telecommunication industry. The change was 
driven by the rise of the computer industry and the data networking industry. From this emerged 
sorne  disruptive  technologies,  as  defined  by  Clayton  Christensen  ( 1997)  in  his  book  "The 
Innovator Dilemma", such as the underlying technologies based on which the Internet is built and 
led  to  the  creation  of  many  other  technologies,  innovations,  the  convergence  of  existing 
technologies and  the emergence of new products in an  accelerated pace  and  a  short period of 
ti me. 
During the  l980s and the 1990s, the technology market was in continuous reshaping with 
the creation of thousands of small technology  companies  known  as  the  high  tech  companies, 
conforming  the  dot  corn  economy,  and  working  in  high  technology  industrial  parks.  The 
emergence of those new technologies, influenced the industry structure, but also created for those 
new emerging companies an environment that is  characterized by  high  velocity,  turbulent and 
with a degree  of uncertainty. The rapid development of new technologies made the technology 
and product !ife cycle shorter than ever before. Technologies became obsolete in short period of 
time, and even in  sorne cases before being applied into a product and launched into the market. 
Knowledge was dispersed over various technology sectors.  The nature of this knowledge, based 
on which the technologies were created was embedded in socially complex and tacit knowledge. 
The innovation rate was intense and diversified over a variety of product categories. The direction 
of the  market and  the  nature  of the  competition,  however intense,  were  uncertain.  However, 
companies  starting-up  or  operating  in  this  sector,  and  faced  by  those  environmental  and 
technological challenges, needed to provide rapid solution to market demands in a timely fashion 
and compete effectively,  where sustaining a competitive advantage is  an  issue of survival, not 
only market share. 
The question is how the companies in the high technology industry competed during this 
period, till  the Nasdaq crash in  2001.  How sorne firms  sustained their competitive advantage, 
while others did not survive? Even large multinational companies, such as Lucent Technologies 78 
and Nortel Networks (Northern Telecom) who had previously a dominant market position, were 
affected  by  this  new  environment and change in  the rules  of competition.  Sorne adapted  and 
others stagnated. 
In the context of strategie management, this paper explores those questions by identifying 
the source of competitive advantage, the importance of inter firms relations and collaboration, the 
role of the leader, the importance of collaborative learning and organizational culture. The paper 
also discusses the decision making process and propose a conclusion on the process of strategy 
formulation. 
To better explain the  interrelation between those  issues and their relationship with the 
process of strate  gy formulation, the paper uses the examples of strategie alliances, di versification 
and acquisitions, as explanatory deviees, to relate theory to practice and to give sorne examples of 
documents cases of success and failure. As the objective of the paper is not to study alliances and 
acquisitions, they will be used only as a reference for further investigation. Three firms from the 
high technology sector will be used as examples: Lucent Technology, Nortel Networks and Cisco 
Systems. 
2.2 Background 
The high technology industry comprises the computer, the software, the biotech and the 
data networking firms. The focus of this paper is  on the data networking firms. Those firms are 
manufacturers of data networking equipments for the telecommunications service providers and 
the corporate customers. Their products  allow  the  access  to  communication networks and the 
transfer of information, voice as in telephony and video. The applications include services such as 
residential  telephony,  e-mail,  long  distance,  Internet  access,  video  conferencing,  and  cable 
television, among others. 
Lucent  Technologies  was  one  of  the  largest  telecommunications  equipment 
manufacturers in North America. It was created from the spin-off of Bell labs and the creation of 
the  operating  bell  companies.  It  had  a  large  market  share  in  the  telecommunication  service 79 
provider market.  However, with the  emergence of the new data telecommunication technology, 
and the convergence of technologies  (data, voice and video), innovated by smaller companies, it 
did not  catch  the wave and  stay behind.  Its  large size,  successful  history,  leadership style and 
internai organization culture,  did not  see the change coming and  had a  strategie  myopia.  Still, 
when  it realized that the industry is  thanging, the competitive rules  are different and  that  the 
customers  are  looking for  the  new  innovative  solutions,  its  routine,  processes,  shared  beliefs 
codified in its organizational paradigm and culture prevented from changing, and it  entered into 
inertia and a stagnation period. Lucent will be used as an example of the large stagnant company. 
Norte! Networks, similar to Lucent in size and in the product and market it serves, did not 
have a  strategie  myopia. It  realized  that the  change is  essential to  maintain  its  position  in  the 
market and adapted to the influences and challenges posed by  the new competitive environment. 
One of their major strategies was to  acquire a small successful firm Bay Networks, belonging to 
the cluster of the high tech firms who  innovate in with the emerging technologies. Bay Networks 
it self was the product of the merger of two firms Synoptics and Wellfleet. Although Norte! was 
much larger than Bay at the time and had a different category of product for a different market, it 
realized and envisioned the future and knew that it did not have the required resources in term of 
skills and R&D capabilities to innovate in this new emerging technologies, within a short period 
of time, as those skills were rare, unique and inimitable and require a long time to be developed. 
In  addition,  it  realized  that  it  did  not  have  the  organizational  culture  in  term  of know-how, 
routine, processes and management experience to  manage the business with respect to  the new 
technology, which require a different set of skills. The acquisition of Bay allowed Norte! to move 
into the future, on the fast Jane  and  to  adapt its culture to  the new environmental influences.  In 
fact, one of the first decisions after  the acquisition of Bay was to retain its CEO and ask him to 
visit ali  the divisions of Norte!,  in arder to champion the new culture, the one Bay had, and  to 
lead the management for change. This was an example of adaptation to  the new environmental 
influences, which included avoiding stretching in the past, avoiding stagnation and inertia due to 
the dominant logic and the organizational paradigm and old myth, and avoiding doing too much 
planning. To the contrary, the firm set a time pacing for a transition period and the emergence of 
a new myth, gained advantage from  their past advantage and regenerated, started to move into the 
future  with  an  accelerated  pace  by  experimenting  into  the  new  technologies  and  the  new 
businesses  it  generates,  and  it  played  the  improvisational  edge  by  improving  into  the  new 80 
tenitory. This leads Nortel to successfully manage the change and transition period in this chaotic 
environment  and  to  capture  on  cross-business  synergies  that  were  creating  by  the  joined 
capabilities of two successful companies. Nortel will be used as an example of the large size firm 
that adapted to the environment and lead a successful change management program. 
Cisco Systems, now the largest finn in the equipment manufacturer category, started as a 
start-up company by  a husband and a wife in Stanford University. Cisco grew to be the giant in 
this  industry  by  changing and  shaping the industry  itself.  At  its  earliest stages,  its  leaders and 
managers envisioned the future of their industry and shaped it to where it should go. Their had the 
clairvoyance of what the future will be like and "imageneered" their way to shaping this future 
and  enacting  their  environment  by  setting  the  new  rules  of the  business  and  developing  the 
leading technology standards that dorninated  the  industry and  forced  the  lagers  to  adopt them. 
The  success  story  of Cisco  is  one  of creating  a  strategie  intent  and  constructing  a  strategie 
architecture based on  the core competencies needed for  the  future  for  a sustained competitive 
advantage  and  a  leading  position  with  the  industry.  This  was  done  by  creating,  developing, 
recycling and maintaining the strategie assets, resources and capabilities that allowed the firm to 
develop a unique position and to create a unique strategy, leading to a strategie positioning. Those 
resources were unique, rare, difficult to  imitate or duplicate and create value for the companies. 
This  was  done  partially on  internai  development,  refening to  R&D  research  and  management 
skills and on extemal resources available in their environment, through an  extensive program of 
mergers and acquisitions of smaller start-up firms and few equally sized firms that were working 
on  related  technologies  and  had  supplementary  and  complementary  resources,  identified  as 
potential  strategie assets.  During a period of se  ven  years  ( 1990-1998), they  had more  than 94 
cases of acquisitions; among them 18 acquisitions in only one year ( 1997). This is a clear case of 
constructi vi sm  and  voluntarism.  Ci seo  will  be  used  as  an  example  for  enactment  of  the 
environment and controlling its destiny by shaping the future of the industry. 
Start-ups  will  be  as  an example to  small entrepreneurial  firms  founded  by  one or two 
entrepreneurs,  and  grew to be either a competitive threat to Cisco or a source of complementary 
strategie  resources,  and  were  acquired  by  the  later.  No  specifie  names  will  be  given,  as  the 
purpose is to explain the strategie context and the different strategies used by Cisco. 81 
Figure  2.1  illustrates  how  the  three companies (Nortel Networks, Lucent Technologies 
and Cisco Systems) engaged in an irrtensive acquisition spree. Due to the emergence of disruptive 
technologies  in  the  telecommunication  manufacturing  segment,  market  segment  boundaries 
collapsed. The demarcation line between  markets segments became  blurring, as  the  telephony, 
wide area networks, network access/edge and local area networks markets merged into one single 
data networking market within the manufacturing segment of the telecommunication/networking 
industry.  Therefore,  as  a  strategie  response,  each  company  tried  to  move  into  the  other 
competitive  market  segments,  than  its  own.  As  an  example,  Nortel  Networks,  while  in  the 
telephony  and  wide  area  netwmks  market  segments,  decided  to  compete  in  the  network 
access/edge  and  the  local  area  networks  market  segments,  by  acquiring  Bay  Network,  a 
competitive  firm  in  this  area.  Another  example,  is  when  Lucent Technologies,  while  in  the 
telephony  market  segment,  decided  to  compete  in  the  wide  area  networks  and  network 
access/edge  market  segments,  by  acquiring  Ascend,  who  itself  had  previously  acquired 
Newbridge.  Lucent  was acquired later on by Alcatel for the same rationality. A final example is 
when Cisco Systems,  while in the network access/edge market segment, decided to compete in all 
other market segments, by acquiring established and startup firms in the three other segments, and 
beyond. 
2.3 Core Competencies: A Source of.Sustained Competitive Advantage 
The  concept  of core  competencies  is  based  on  the  strategie  assets,  resources  and 
capabilities possessed by  the firm, and  which are the source of sustained competitive advantage 
and  unique positioning within  its  industry.  Those strategie assets  could  tangible  or intangible. 
Sorne examples  are the superior technology created and developed by the firm, the research and 
development superior capabilities that are unmatched by the competition, the superior skills and 
talents of its researchers, managers and employees, the knowledge base and know-how embedded 
in  the  organization  culture  that  is  socially  complex  and  tacit  in  nature,  the  experience  and 
expertise of its  managers  in  solving  problem and  decision  making, the  innovative capabilities 
embedded in its culture, the processes of its production, manufacturing and inventory systems, its 
sales force and pre and post sales services, its economie capital, liquidity and access to credit, its 
information systems  that  are  integrated,  credible,  reliable and  which reduce the  asymmetry  of 82 
information between the management team and the rest of the employees for a  better decision 
making, its business practices and quality management systems, and its organizational culture that 
is flexible, adaptable healthy. 
Telephony 
Market 
Figure 2.1 
Strategie acquisitions in the manufacturing segment 
WideArea 
Networ.ks 
Market 
Network 
Access/Edge 
M~arket 
* -- -~ - --~----------~---------------------~ 
eé§.!II(UIU!.M  r•~  ~ 
.  ASCEHO  ~ 
-' -- ~...;- ::. ·-=-..:~- · ----=------=-=-- ""'..::. f,'-
_._,;... _._ .. --------... - ...... -"",..! 
LocaiArea 
Networks 
Market 
. 
To constitute a core competency those assets need to be rare or not commonly available 
to  others, unique or different than the one possessed by the competition by their superior value, 
knowledge content and complexity,  durable or can be maintained, renovated and recycled over a 
long period without loosing  value,  non substitutable or not be replaced by  others for  the same 
advanta:ge,  inimitable,  or  cannot  be  imitated,  replicated  and  copied  by  the  competition,  and 
idiosyncratic  or based  on high  human  or physical  asset  specificity. To be  protected from  the 
competition potential imitation and  replication the firm could  use casual  ambiguity such as  the 83 
competition  not  being  able  to  identify  the  strengths  of the  firm  and  where  the  source  of 
competitive  advantage  does  cornes  from.  Those  traits  in  the  resources  act  as  an  isolating 
mechanism, such as to be invisible to competition like creating innovation, to be complex like in 
R&D research, to be tacit or implicit and embedded in the organizational culture and its memory, 
to be path dependent or based on strategie choice that lock the company into this path based on 
effort and  dedication  and to  be  time  dependent  as  taking  time to  be  created,  maintained  and 
productive. 
2.3.1 SWOT Analysis 
To identify those resources the firm conducts an assessment of the internai environment 
constituting an  identification of the  strengths and weaknesses of the firm,  and an assessment of 
the external environment to identify  the opportunities and threats in the present and in the future. 
The firm should not limit its assessment on the current situation, but to  try to envision the future 
and  imagine  how  it  would  be  and  how  it  should  be.  Following  is  an  elaboration  of a  gap 
assessment  defining  the  current resources  and  needs  of the  firm  and  its  future needs  in  this 
imageneered  future  and  the  portfolio  of resources  need  to  construct  this  future.  This  is  a 
participative  and  collective  process,  in  which  ali  employees  are  involved  with  a  sense  of 
belonging  and  not  a  rational  one,  in  which  they  use  their  emotions,  beliefs,  perception  and 
intuition. The employees are empowered  to  create this  strategie  architecture and  the  decision-
making is top-down and bottom-up. Those resources could be developed internally based on the 
internai capabilities of the firm in  areas such as  research and development could be externalized 
based on strategie alliances with key partners in the same strategie group or vertically integrated 
through corporate mergers and acquisitions, as no one company is able to have ail the resources it 
needs or develop them alone and  internally, specially that most of these technological strategie 
assets  are  time  and  path  dependent,  require  time  and  high  investment,  high  risk  and  a  tacit 
knowledge that  is  scarce and  not transferable through  human  capital  transfer.  In  addition,  the 
steep  learning  curve for developing those skills  and  the  shortened  product !ife cycle  makes  it 
quite impossible to  recover the high investment needed, and  within this uncertain and turbulent 
environment. 84 
2.3.2 Resource Dependency 
The  danger  lies  when  the  firm  becomes  resource  dependent,  whether  on  its  interna! 
current capabilities which prevent it from changing and acquiring the needed and better resources 
or when it becomes dependent on the externat resources of a partner in a strategie alliance, which 
create an interdependence between them. Following the logic of population ecology, the diversity 
of the firm interna! capabilities will enhance its probability for surviving by  the possession of the 
resources needed to cope with an uncertain future. 
2.4 Cisco's Success Story 
In fact, Cisco Systems, in its effort to enact the environment and shaping its future, had a 
very efficient analysis of interna!  needs  and externat opportunities done frequently  on a forma! 
base, once a month, and on an informa! base done regularly through informa! relations with other 
companies and the interaction with the individuals in  its environment, knowledge networks, and 
forma!  relations  through  the  strategie  alliances  and  joint  venture  it  had.  The  divisional 
responsibility of this SWOT analysis lied on two functional areas; the business  units,  each in  its 
own  product  category,  and  the  business  development  department  under  the  leadership  of M. 
Volpi,  vice president for corporate development and corporate acquisitions. The business  units 
focusing  on  the  interna!  side of the  firm,  prepared  on  a  regular  basis  an  assessment of their 
interna! needs based on an evaluation of their existing needs and the future goals and objectives 
set within the strategie architecture. Within this assessment of interna! needs, the products to  be 
developed  to  meet  customer demands  and  projection,  the  technologies  based  on  which  those 
products  would  be  developed  and  the  required  resources  to  develop  those  technologies  and 
products.  The assessment  identifies  the availability  of those strategie resources,  competencies, 
skills, tacit knowledge, R&D capabilities, tools, and if not existent, the possibility of developing 
them  internally  within  acceptable  R&D  capabilities  without  dispersing  the  resources  and  by 
leveraging on  the  operating  resources,  within  an  acceptable  budget that is  financially  feasible 
ensuring a high probability of return on the investment and  within an acceptable time frame to 
meet  market demands, projections  and  be the first  to  market  with  respect to  the  sirnilar effort 
done by the competition. 85 
This  assessment  was  passed  to  the  business  development  and  corporate  acquisitions 
department  who  worked  closely  arrd  interact  on  a  daily  basis  with  the  business  units.  The 
department role is  to scan the environment continuously to identify two potential targets. First are 
potential externat resources in  term of technologies or human asset specificity, which match with 
the internai needs of the firm as iderrtified by the business units, and second to identify potential 
opportunities in term of new technologies, new skills, new ideas, sources of innovation that are 
being developed by  the competition  and are not part of the existing strategie architecture of the 
firm,  however  could  be  an  opportunity  for  diversification  on  related  products,  with 
complementary or supplementary resources. 
As  this externat informatim was gathered, it  was passed and communicated to  the firm 
including the business units for furth.er analysis with respect to their assessment of their needs and 
the match of the external resources,  to the R&D labs  to  valuate the depth and  intensity  of the 
external innovation combined with  their current capabilities to  produce not sirnilar but superior 
results  within an  acceptable time frame  and  budget,  and  finally,  on a  regular basis  but not  as 
frequent  as  the  activities  it  selves,  to  the top  executive  and  the  board  members  to  create  an 
awareness  of  the  competitive  environment,  its  opportunities  and  threats,  matched  with  an 
evaluation of the firm interna! needs, its strength and weaknesses. As the environment is chaotic, 
turbulent, high  velocity,  changing constantly with  a fast  pace,  with  high  degree of uncertainty 
about market demands, competitive positioning, state of current technologies and the probability 
of the  ir  obsolescence,  the  decisions  were  not  taken  from  the  top  executive  but  le ft  to  the 
responsibility of the departmental head of corporate development and acquisitions, M. Volpi, who 
relied  heavily  on  the  managers of his  department,  and  on  the  other hand  on  the  assessment, 
interaction,  and  collaboration  of the  business  units,  which  hierarchaly  belongs  to  the  product 
groups,  each  assigned  a  major product category, such  as  the  "routing"  group,  the  "switching" 
group  and  the  "access" group just to  name  few  examples.  Figure 2.2  illustrates  the  intensive 
acquisition  strategy  lead  by  Cisco  Systems.  From  the  year  1994  to  2006,  it  successfully 
completed 107 acquisitions. Figure 2.2 
Cisco's intensive acquisition strategy 
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This in fact constituted a learning process for the whole company, as the industry was in 
a  state  of emergence,  turbulence,  and  constant  change.  The  information  acquired  was  never 
available before. No one, or company intended or did this before. It  was to everybody involved 
all  new.  However,  they  (the  top  executive,  managers  and  other  pmticipants)  were  actively 
involved  in  shaping  the  future  of their  industry  and  positioning  the  firm  in  a  unique  highly 87 
competitive position. They learn during the process of experimenting and improvisioning. They 
learn form their interaction within the firm and with the external environments through relations 
and links  they  had  within the industry  network.  Decisions  were  taken by  ali  participants on a 
daily basis, white keeping a sense of coherence and consensus. Those decisions were sometimes 
coming from the top executive downward, top-down, and most of the time, were initiated at the 
base ad  the  middle  management leve!  upward  or bottom up.  Those decisions  were sometime 
taken and implemented as actions. Those decisions and actions constituted over time a pattern of 
actions,  which  if seen  retrospectively  constituted  a  strategy.  This  was  not  an  intentional  or 
deliberate strategy.  It  was  an  emergent strategy  developed  by  sub-strategic  systems  over time 
(The  firm  underwent  94  acquisitions  over  seven  years  and  in  one  year  it  completed  18 
acquisitions). It was  incrementai as  starting from  an  initial point,  and  then  experimenting and 
testing as  if muddling through.  Those  actions  were structured to  create an  order to  enable the 
organization to survive. We refer to  the decisions and structured actions as the decisions to form 
strategie alliances and to use corporate acquisitions, in order to complement the existing resources 
and create cross sysnergies,  or to fill  the  gap  in  the existing resources by  relying  on external 
source of innovation and  talents. This  created a myth, a perception of the  world,  in  which the 
company can only survive and  sustain a  competitive advantage and  positioning  if it  relies  not 
only on  internai  sources  of inno-vation,  but  on  externat  ones,  if available  and  matching  their 
current and existing needs. This constituted the dominant logic at Cisco. 
2.5 The Case of Nortel Networks and Lu  cent Technologies 
In the case of Norte!, the strategy formulation process was deliberate, with the planning 
of acquiring Bay Networks. They took over a year to decide and plan for the acquisition and over 
two years  to  integrate it  internally.  However,  it  was  not  a  great  success,  or at least it  did  not 
achieve the desired results, as  the strategie fit was not there, the integration process was not very 
smooth, but most importantly. the internai organization culture of Nortel did not adapt very well 
and fast enough to  the new culture of business that Bay brought. However, one of the reasons to 
acquire Bay, was to champion a radical change into Nortel's organizational culture by  adopting 
the  new  business  culture  of the  dot  corn  economy.  Norte!  had  an  organizational  paradigm 
different than the one of Bay. Their dominant logic with reference to the notion of risk, the short 88 
term and long term and internai processes were different than the one of Bay. In  case of Lucent, 
the firm stayed stagnant, and relied on its past success, which brought failure to their future. Their 
dominant logic  was  to  innovate,  develop,  and  manufacture everything internally,  on  their own 
pace,  as  in  the past they were the innovator in  telephony and the market was stable for a long 
time,  which  created  an  enormous  bureaucracy  and  a  dysfunctional  organizationaf culture that 
could be  labeled  as  the "depressive  organization".  It  did  not  catch  up  with  the  new  wave  of 
externat  innovation,  did  not  have  a  deliberate  or emergent  strategy  on  how  to  face  the  new 
environmental challenges, it did not assess weil its real capabilities and the external opportunities 
and threats and did not intend to introduce a radical or graduai change within its  organizational 
culture. In  fact,  Lucent acquired Ascend communications, an excellent innovator in  the  market, 
but did not have the strategie intent to  use efficiently this acquisition. Rather, it was a move just 
to  follow  the  strategies  deployed  by  other  leaders  in  the  market.  Figure  2.3  illustrates  the 
acquisitions completed by Lucent Technologies and Norte! Network from the year 1993 to 2006. 
Figure 2.3 
Acquisitions completed by Norte! and Lucent from 1993 to 2006 
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2.6 The Important Role of Inter-Firm Networks 
The high  technology  firms  coexist  within  the  perimeters  of industrial  high  tech  parks 
such as  Silicon Valley in San Jose California, the Stanford Research Park in Palo Alto California 
and the Route 128 in Boston Massachusetts. Those high tech parks, beside grouping the high tech 
firms, they provided the cutting technology in term of infrastructure, communication technology, 
conference  halls,  exhibition  centers  and  the  most  important,  they  are  at  close  proxirnity  to 
technology and  business faculties  irr  universities and technical institutes, such as  the California 
institute  of  technology  and  MIT  in  Boston.  This  proxirnity  of  firms,  in  addition  to  the 
infrastructure,  create a  population of firms,  borrowing the  term from  population ecology,  and 
create a social networks consisting of firms as nodes and the interrelations between them as links. 
Thjs creates an influence on the firms, expressed in the desire to learn from each other, share their 
findings  and  irnitate  the  technologies,  innovation  and  products  produced  by  members  of this 
network,  as  in  isomorphism.  The  network grouping  a  variety  of firms  is  also  linked  to  other 
networks with either the same characteristics or distinct one,  which increase heterogeneity and 
expand the knowledge base, from which members and participants of the networks can learn. 
2.6.1 Nodes and Links 
The firm location in the network known as  node, represent the firm's position within the 
whole  network,  which  is  translated in  its  influence of others,  it  capacity  to  be  influenced  by 
others, its source of power, legitimacy, reputation and trust. The firm is  related to other firms, by 
means  of interrelated  connections,  called  links.  Those  links  are  the  medium  through  which 
resources could travel,  be transferred,  exchanged, and  shared  among the interconnected firms, 
known as  relational embeddness, or through  the structure of the  network itself, as  information 
travel through the structure in what  is  known as  structural embeddness. Those resources that are 
transferred, exchanged or shared could be general and specialized information, skills and talents, 
human capital  transfer, capital  and  investments as  in  angel  investments  and  venture capitalist, 
ideas,  innovations,  power,  trust,  and  status.  The firm  could  have  a  central  position  or focal 
position, within the network it belongs, by which it is  interconnected to several participants of the 
network and sorne ti me pla  ys the intermediary role for information and other resources sharing. 90 
Members of this social network of nodes and interrelated links enhance their position by 
influencing the flow of information, capital and power and the interaction of its members increase 
the level of trust among them.  For a firm the sources of power are economie power in  term of 
capital, assets, liquidity, financial position, stability and stock value; expertise and know-how in 
term  of tacit  and  implicit  knowledge  that  is  socially  complex  and  path  and  time  dependent; 
technology that is  superior in term of complexity, intensity,  depth  and  innovation;  skilled  and 
talented  workers in  term of their  learning ~  adaptive capabilities for continuous innovation;  and 
organizational  culture  in  term  of  internai  trust,  dominant  logic,  routine,  processes,  symbols, 
metaphors and myth. 
2.6.2 Interdependence and Resource Sharing 
The firm's relations could  be on the  individual level of its  members,  as  in  friendships 
with  workers  ln  other  firms;  participation  ln  professional  associations  for  learning, 
standardization  or  regulation;  or  participation  m  tracte  fairs,  exhibitions,  conferences  and 
workshops.  Also  it  could  be  through  the  firm's  with  component  suppliers,  subcontractor, 
consultants, others collaboration efforts with other network members in technology task forces 
and standardization bodies. Those relations could be formai and informai, as in collaboration on 
developing a new standard or technology or in negotiation for the formation of strategie alliances 
or joint  ventures.  Those  inter-organizational  relations  create  an  interdependence  and  mutual 
dependence between the participants, which could be beneficiai in term of sharing resources and 
creating cross-synergies, or it could be path dependent as  it locks the participants into the existing 
pattern creating a resource dependency. 
2.6.3 Cisco's Extensive Network of Relations 
Referring  to  the  process  of  assessing  the  internai  needs  of the  firm  and  its  externat 
opportunities and  threats described  in  the  previous section,  this  process is  based  on  the active 
participation  of  the  firm  in  these  social  networks  and  its  extensive  links  or  interrelated 
relationships  with other members of the  network.  Cisco systems,  had  an extensive network of 
relations, both informai and formai, with the objective of constantly scanning the environment in 91 
order to identify its  competitive positioning, the threats that could challenges its  positioning and 
how  to  deal  with  them  and  the  opportunities  available  in  the  environment,  in  term  of 
collaboration,  learning, sharing and  exchanging information and  expertise or simply  acquiring 
those resources if identified as strategie assets, by means of strategie alliances and acquisitions. 
This high number of relations increased its position in the network, and provided the firm 
with the legitimacy among the other firm and trust of the participants. This was enhanced by  it 
sources of power, as economical, technological and skilled human resources, which provided the 
firm with a buying power and a negotiating leverage. This was efficiently utilized for identifying 
opportunities  such  as  highly  skilled  human resource capabilities considered as  strategie assets 
based on the internai assessment of the Cisco's internai business units and R&D labs, described in 
the previous section. For example the firm had an extensive and large data  base for identifying and 
tracking  human  capital  with  superior  expertise  in  the  technologies  or the  management  areas. 
Those  targets  and  potential  high  valuable  resources  were  offered  an  attractive  incentive  and 
compensation to transfer to the firm.  In  other cases, the transfer of sorne human capital was not 
enough as the competitive advantage lied in the embedded culture of the small firm or start up, 
and constituted its  dominant logic, its  routine,  processes and  tacit knowledge which is  unique, 
rare and not transferable. Then either strategie alliances or acquisitions were the right decisions. 
2.7 Strategie Alliances 
As the external strategie resources were identified, a process of exploration, learning and 
negotiation  started.  The  managers  of  the  business  development  and  corporate  acquisitions 
department, lead by vice president M. Volpi, usually initiated this process. The objective was  to 
insure  a  strategie  fit  in  order  to  create  cross-synergies,  to  identify  and  assess  the  leve!  of 
complexity of post acquisition integration and to  valuate the internai information of the potential 
firm subject for acquisition, in  term of its financial  worth, technological edge and human asset 
specificity.  This  is  a  difficult  task  as  this  inside  information  is  proprietary  to  the  firm  and 
protected against leakage and appropriation and also because of the uncertainty in evaluating this 
new technology and its potential worth in the future, if acquired by the company. 92 
The decision of the alliance formation was left to the responsibilities of the managers of 
the business development department with the guidance of M.  Volpi. The top executive did not 
interfere in  the process, as  the  assessment of those decisions was purely based on complex and 
tacit knowledge  and  time  history  dependent expertise.  The decision  and  action  were  taken  in 
collaboration  between the  business  development department and  the  respective business  units 
based on the major product categories and where finally the alliances collaboration and learning 
will take place. Those alliances decisions and actions to form them, were not part of a deliberate 
strategy.  In  fact  the  deliberate  strategy  was  to  rely  on  internai  innovation.  However,  the  ever 
changing competitive field,  the  uncertainty related  to  the technology,  market, and competition, 
and the turbulent environment, lead to  the emergence of these actions or strategy as a pattern of 
actions over a period of time. This emergent strategy was incrementai, and based on learning by 
doing, experimenting, and advancing and  retrograding. The decisions  were not top-down. They 
were the result of the collective interactionism of it's the firm members, internally with each other 
and externally with the environment. 
2.8 Technology Based Acquisitions 
As  in  alliances, acquisitions were  used to acquire external resources that are considered 
strategie  assets  and  complementary  or supplementary  to  the  firm  existing  resources,  with  the 
objective of sustained competitive advantage. The difference with alliances is  that in the case of 
acquisitions, the external resources were identified with a sense of urgency to  the internai needs 
of the acquiring firm, or as a threat to  its  future positioning as  its  technology represent a major 
technological paradigm shift from the existing one and possessed by  the acquirer. Also a major 
factor in deciding on the acquisition if important to the firm, was the immediate identification of 
the  importance  of the  target  due  to  a  lesser  level  of technological  uncertainty  regarding  its 
technology and innovation and also an easier access to  the internai information of the potential 
firm to be acquired, which was usually motivated by  the mutual interest of the small  firm (to be 
acquired) to  identify sources of capital or management expertise. Those small firms were usually 
entrepreneurial in  nature,  and  founded by one or two members, who probably had the technical 
expertise in  a  very  specialized area in  the technology segmentation map, but lacked  either the 
necessary  investments  to  proceed  with  innovation,  sales  and  expansion,  or simply  lacked  the 93 
management expertise  to  develop a large  business  enabling a  sustained growth  and economie 
performance.  For the small  or start-up entrepreneurial firm,  those were the strategie assets  that 
constitute  a  sustained  competitive advantage,  and  without  which  the  firm  and  its  technology 
would not survive.  Because they were lacking those resources internally, and specially that they 
are  time  and  history  dependent,  they  looked  for  externat  sources  to  complement  their  core 
competencies.  An  acquisition  then  was  the  best  fit.  In  their  case,  their  strategie  intent  and 
deliberate strategy was to  be acquired by a larger firm. A lot of those entrepreneurs were in  fact 
highly skilled employees  in  a  specialized technological area,  working for one larger firm,  and 
decided to quit and stmt their own business, with the intention of developing this new innovation 
on their own, getting the credit, attracting the attention of larger firms (sorne time by contacting 
them) and ultimately enhancing their economie power by means of equity shares and stock, when 
their firm is  acquired by  a larger one  with a better financial  position and  a stable  stock in the 
exchange market. 
One important issue is the one of technology selection, based on the population ecology. 
In  reality  the  technology,  although.  identified  and  assessed  by  the  acquirer,  the  basis  of the 
selection  is  sometime  irrational  and  founded  on  the  bounded  rationality  that  characterized 
decision-making. The ability to  review all  the alternative technologies, thoroughly assess them 
and choose the best among them is simply impractical and impossible to achieve in practice. Thus 
the  decision  is  based  on  bounded  rationality  and  the  asymmetry  of information  that  exists 
between  the  acquirer  and  the  acquired,  due  to  the  safeguards  for  protecting  proprietary 
information and against opportunism, leakage and  appropriation. Then it could be said that the 
environmental and institutional forces select the technology of the small firm that is chosen by the 
acquiring  firm, and  will  have  the chance  to  survive this  turbulent environment, as  species are 
selected in  the biological world for survival and future evolution. Therefore, lots of technologies 
do not survive, as the environment does not select them in a deterministic fashion. 
2.9 Leadership Role and the Organizational Culture 
The top executive plays aJJ important role in the firm leadership. His could play this role 
atone  or  allow  for  the  participation  of other  managers  in  the  decision-making  and  strategy 
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formulation process in a collabora  ti ve  learning fashion.  His  importance lies in  the fa ct th at  he 
gi v  es the general direction of the firm,  establish the structure th at embrace growth and  allocate 
the necessary resources for the efficient achievement of the firm's objectives. His power is  based 
on  his  legitimacy,  as  being  selected  or elected  on  ethical  basis;  his  credibility  based  on  his 
reputation,  persona!  history,  good  example,  ethical  and  moral  value;  charisma  as  his  the 
attracti veness of his  character and  personality  and  its  ability  to  influence other to  achieve  his 
objectives; his expertise as a well known expert in technology or a high caliber business manager. 
They rely  on both  intuition and rationality in  dealing with the complex issues involved in  this 
turbulent environment. 
The leader is  characterized by sagacity in dealing with people and influencing them, his 
ability  to  empower  people  and  motivate  them  to  achieve  the  firm's  objectives,  his  talent  in 
gathering consensus to build coherence, and his cognitive mental capacity to understand complex 
issues and  meta-manage complex, interrelated and  diversified businesses.  His personality traits 
influence  and  shape  the  organization  culture  and  strategy  of the  firm.  If  dysfunctional,  his 
pathological  traits  will  negatively  influence  the  strategy  formulation  process  and  the  resulting 
strategy if any. Sorne examples are paranoid, depressive or dramatic leaders who influence their 
firm  strategy  and  the  result  is  a  sense  of continuous  externat  threats,  fight  and  flight,  risk 
aversion, or excessive joint ven turing or simply creating a vague strate  gy. 
In healthier conditions, the top executive could be a visionary leader, who create, manage 
and influence the organizational myth, or the perception of the world, as he see it and he transrnits 
this  world vision to  the organization through the organizational culture and  by  means of using 
symbols, language, rhetoric, metaphor, and myth. In the high technology industry, he could be the 
creator and inventor of the technology as the case in most of the entrepreneurial firms, or he could 
be  proselytizer who  has  the  vision  as foresight  merged  with  imagination and  the  capacity  for 
inspiration.  Those  leaders  are  regarded  in  sorne  cases  as  industry  leaders,  gurus,  with  an 
evangelical zeal which elevate them to an even prophetie level and spiritual (technological) guide 
for his followers, who believe in him and cooperate with him to enact his vision. Those followers 
are  characterized  sorne  time as  living in a utopian society,  where bad  things do no exist, only 
good things from a future still to come, and lead by their leaders 95 
In  order to  enact their vision,  leaders success in  the high tech industry depends on their 
age,  educational  experience,  experience  in  business,  the  level  of  the  executive  within  the 
corporation,  their  cognitive  abilities  and  their  risk  orientation.  Their  relations  with  their 
environment, internai and external, play an important role in strategy formulation. In  the case of 
the alliances and acquisitions,  previously described,  their friendships,  farnily  relationships  and 
industry  relationships  enhance  the ir  firm' s  potential  to  interrelate  with  other  firm,  share 
knowledge,  identify  potential  partrrers  for  alliances  and  acquisitions,  and  negotiate  deals  in 
friendly terms. 
2.9.1 John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems 
One example is John Chambers, the CEO of Cisco Systems, who had the vision and the 
foresight of where the company should go, and in which direction. He did not have a deliberate 
strategy, but an  intentional one.  However,  during his journey with the company situations and 
circumstances  emerged,  and  also emerged  strategies,  that  were  incrementai  and  adopted  as 
learning by  doing, within this turbulent, chaotic and fast changing environment. He empowered 
his  managers,  to  take decision and  actions as  necessary and  within  a  short period of time.  He 
relied on their good judgment and wisdom, as  he was personally involved in selecting them. His 
role was to ensure that the firm was on the right direction, even with the high leve) of uncertainty, 
to allocate the resources needed to achieve the objectives and to  build the structure to ensure the 
survi val of the firm. 
2.9.2 Mike Volpi, Vice President of Cisco 
Another  example  is  M.  Volpi,  the  v1ce  president  of  corporate  development  and 
acquisitions, who was the chief architect behind Cisco's extensive acquisitions, product portfolio 
and superior technological capability. At the age of 34, Volpi was running a multi billion dollars 
business. The strategy for achieving sustained competitive advantage through external sources of 
strategie  assets,  was  developed  as an  emergent strategy.  Cisco  was  dealing  with  a  customer, 
trying to sell its networking products, when the customer mentioned that his preference would be 
Cisco's competitor Cresendo. At this  early time, this was large and significant deal for Cisco and 
could not afford loosing it to the competition. In reality Cresendo had an alternative technology to 96 
the one of Cisco, and by wining this deal over Cisco, it would replace the technology developed 
by  Cisco and position it  as  the  industry standard.  Cisco did  not the internai capability,  nor the 
time  to  develop  a  superior  technology,  and  decided  to  acquire  those  resources  by  acquiring 
Cresendo. 
2.10 Emergent, Deliberate Strategies and Shifting Myths 
This  emerged  based  on  a  real  time  situation,  as  this  was  the  case  for  ali  Cisco's 
acquisitions,  which were based on emerging circumstances,  moving targets and a high  velocity 
environment that did  not  allow for  the  creation of a deliberate  strategy over a  period of time. 
However, this emergent strategy was adopted as a deliberate strategy, until another circumstances 
emerged and the old myth lost its attractiveness and convincing power to influence people. This 
happened, when the firm completed a lot of acquisitions in a short period of time, which created 
incoherence  and  conflicting  synergies  in  the  internai  of the  organization.  Resistance  to  this 
acquisition myth start to develop and grown, fueled by  the persona! interests of the technological 
human resource experts and R&D  labs, who saw  their survivability affected, and predicted that 
the  future  of the  company  will  be negatively  affected,  if following  this  path,  relying  only on 
externat source of innovation. This resistance to change, motivated by  the conflicted interests of 
different internai groups to dominate resources, which are the source of power, resulted in a shift 
from one myth to a new one. The following years Cisco had only one acquisition in one year and 
two in the following year. 
2.11 Discussion 
The environment plays an important role in  shaping the strategy of the organization and 
influencing  its  actions.  The  high  technology  industry  is  characterized  by  high  velocity  and 
turbulent which influence the process of strategy making 
Sorne organizations and  industries relies  more on emerging strategies as  they  are  more 
suited to  their needs.  Emerging strategies are  constituted by  a  pattern  of action  over a certain 97 
period  of time.  Emerging  strategies  are  formulated  by  sub-strategic  systems;  over  time  they 
become the organizational paradigm and represent the dominant logic and  the myth. Over time 
they are adopted as  a deliberate strategy.  Over time, as circumstances change, resistance to  this 
dominant myth  influenced by  the interest of the parties involved start to grow,  and the myth  is 
replaced by a new myth in a discontinuous patterns of successive myths. 
The core competencies of th.e firm are based on their strategie assets and are the source of 
sustained  competitive  advantage. When  those  resources  are  not  available  internally,  external 
resources, which are  supplementary and complementary to  the  internai one,  could be  accessed 
through alliances or acquired through  acquisitions. The network of relations constitutes a source 
of learning  and  sharing knowledge  with  the external environment.  Strategy formulation  is  the 
high  technology  industry  is  characterized  by  the  collectivity  of the  learning  process  and  the 
interaction of its members, in learning by doing fashion. 
The decision making process  is  cyclic, meaning top-down and bottom-up, which allows 
for the  participation and empowerment of ali  participants, leading to  the creation of coherence, 
legitimacy and synergy. The role of the top executive is an  important one, is  setting the general 
direction of the firm, allocating the resources to achieve the objectives and building the structure 
to ensure the survival of the firm. The organizational culture, with its embedded memory, routine, 
shared beliefs; tacit knowledge plays  an important role in the enactment of the environment and 
the adaptation to the high velocity and turbulent industries. 98 CHAPTER III 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVA  TI  ONS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTR  Y 
1 
This  exploratory  study  explores  the  disruptive  innovations  and 
technologies in the telecommunication industry, first by defining 
the  difference  between  sustaining  i~novation s  and  disruptive 
innovations,  using  examples  of past  and  current  technologies 
from  the  telecommunication  industry.  Th  en,  it  describes  the 
context of the manufacturing segment of the telecommunication 
industry and it explains how the disruptive technologies led to an 
intense  wave  of  acquisitions  in  this  segment  and  the 
development of the acquisition and development business mode! 
by  sorne  companies.  Sirnilarly,  it describes  the  context of the 
service provider segment of the telecommunication industry  and 
it explains how the disruptive technologies led to the integration 
and  convergence  of  services  and  the  development  of  new 
business models such as the triple and quadruple play. 
3.1 Introduction 
The  information  technology  and  telecommunication  industries  are  different  than  any 
other industry. Firms established in this knowledge intense sector of the economy face turbulent 
environmental  challenges.  The  information  technology  and  telecommunications  products  are 
technically  complex  and  the  embedded  knowledge  is  tacit  in  nature,  non  codified  and  non 
transferable as a public good. The rate of innovation of new technologies and products is high and 
the industry face continuous waves of new technological generations and disruptive technologies, 
which render the product obsolete, possibly even before being launch to the market and received 
1 This chapter was modified from an article published,  with the same title, in  the proceedings of 
the administrative sciences association of Canada (ASAC)  annual conference 2009, technology 
and innovation management division. Niagara Falls, Canada, June 2009. Vol. 30, No 25. 100 
by the end user customers. In fact the rate of obsolescence is higher the time required to  recover 
the  skyrocketing  investment  needed  in  research  and  development  in  order  to  produce  new 
products and technologies that would built on the core competencies of the company and sustain 
competitive  advantage.  The  complexity  of the  technology  is  coupled  with  a  high  leve!  of 
uncertainty due to a lack of dominant standards,  a lack of credible forecast for the potential new 
product and a lack of specifie requirements from the customers' side. 
Furthermore,  the  telecommunication  industry  has  witnessed  a  continuous  and  intense 
wave  of  innovation  and  disruptive  technologies  (Christensen,  Anthony,  &  Roth,  2004; 
Christensen &  Raynor, 2003), which represents an  illustration of the pattern that affected many 
high technology sectors from  1997 to 2003.  Researching this pattern, give an explanation to the 
real reasons of why sorne companies survive, while others fail, in  the face of such environmental 
challenges. In  addition and as Clayton Christensen (2004) put it, the telecommunication industry 
is a very interesting case study because:  "( l) it is a large and important industry: (2) it has a long 
and  illustrious  history of innovation and is credited with countless groundbreaking innovations 
such as the transistor, the laser, stereophonie and motion picture sound, cellular telephones, and 
high-definition television.  With this  long history of important innovations, telecommunications 
seems  like  a  perfect  environment  to  study  the  forces  of innovation;  and  (3)  the role  of the 
government,  where  telecommunications  represents  an  opportunity  to  apply  the  theories  of 
innovation within an industry characterized by heavily regulated competition." 
The telecommunications industry  is  composed of two major industry  segments: (1) the 
equipment manufacturers segment, where comp~nies conduct research and development (R&D), 
design,  manufacture,  commission  telecommunications  equipments  and  distribute  them  to 
consumers, corporate customers (banks, hospitals, education institutions, etc.), govemment (civil 
and  defense),  utilities  and  service  providers  (telephony,  mobile,  cable operators);  and  (2)  the 
service  providers  segment,  where  companies (public and  private)  provide  telecommunications 
services,  such  as  residential  telephony,  mobile  communications,  satellite  services,  video 
conferencing,  cable  TV  programming,  Internet  and  email  access,  to  consumers,  corporate 
customers and government. 101 
The  telecommunications  equipment  manufacturers  segment  is  subdivided  into  sub-
categories  such  as  transmission  equipment,  satellite,  rnicrowave,  mobile,  internet,  cabling, 
submarine  cabling,  local  area networks,  wide  area networks,  wireless,  etc.  Until  recent years, 
each  of these  sub-categories  was  a  specifie  area of expertise  and  companies  were  limited  to 
working  in  one  or  few  areas  of  those  sub-categories.  However,  due  to  the  intensive  and 
continuous  emergence  .of  disruptive  technologies  and  innovations,  we  are  witnessing  the 
integration, merging, and convergence of those sub categories into fewer technical platforms and 
systems or into a single platform. 
Moreover,  the  telecommunications  service  provider  segment,  until  recently,  was 
subdivided into sub-categories such as residential telephony, mobile or cellular communication, 
cabie  television,  and  Internet  access.  Recently,  and  due  to  the  emergence  of  disruptive 
technologies and innovations and to the integration and convergence of those technologies taking 
place in the telecommunications manufacturer segment, many of those sub-categories of services 
are merging  and  converging  into  bundled and  packaged  services  and  offered  to  the end  user 
customer in  a  variety of modules  and priees.  As  an  example,  traditional incumbent residential 
telephony providers (Bell Canada) now offer mobile telephony and data (Bell mobility), variable 
speed  (dialup  and  ADSL)  internet  and  email  access  (sympatico)  and  cable  television 
programrning through the means of satellite service (ExpressView). On the other band, traditional 
cable  television  service  providers  (Videotron)  offer  very  high  speed  internet  access  (cable 
internet) and residential telephony. 
Consequently, we see an intrinsic relation between the intensive emergence of disruptive 
technologies and innovations in  the telecommunications industry and  the change in the industry 
structure  of  both  the  equipment  manufacturing  and  service  provider  segments  of  the 
telecommunication  industry.  Therefore,  this  exploratory  research  intends  to  explore  this 
relationship, by  firstly linking the intensity of the disruptive technologies and innovations in this 
industry to the intensity of mergers and acquisitions in the equipment manufacturer segment, and 
theo secondly by linking the integration and convergence of technologies due to the emergence of 
disruptive  technologies  in  the  equipment  manufacturer  segment,  to  the  integration  and 
convergence of service in the service provider segment of the telecommunications industry. 102 
As  a  result,  this  research  will  (l) explain the  various  disruptive technologies and  their 
impacts on both segments of the industry; (2) describe the environmental context of each segment 
and the challenges faced by companies operating in each segment; (3) explain and highlight how 
did this lead to the acquisition spree in one segment and to the convergence of business models in 
the other; and (4) describe the impact it had on the telecommunications industry and forecast the 
future of the industry under the current and future potential circumstances. 
To better understand how disruptive technologies and innovation affected the firms in the 
equipment manufacturing segment of the telecommunication industry, three firms from the high 
technology  sector  will  be  used  as  examples:  Lucent Technology,  Norte!  Networks  and  Cisco 
Systems.  For  the  service  provider segment  of the  telecommunications  industry,  no  particular 
example is  given as  a case study,  based on secondary data and extensive field  work is  yet to  be 
conducted in a later phase. 
3.2 Background 
The telecommunications industry has been going since the  1990s through a quiet major 
shift. New technologies, products, services and innovations are continuously emerging, with their 
impact changing every aspect of our lives and the way business  is  conducted. Sorne of them are 
weil known to the end-user customers such as Wi-Fi, Wi-Max, Skype, Vonage and mobile video. 
Others are not transparent to  the end-user customers and  are  Jess  known due to  their technical 
nature, such as  voice over internet protocol (VoiP), MPLS, optical switching, IPTV, broadband, 
triple and quadruple play.  Sorne of them represent improvements  to  existing technologies and 
services,  not radical change, and are categorized as  "sustaining innovations". Others re present  a 
radical change with the potential of destroying value for existing technologies and  services and 
creating  value  by  introducing  new  technologies  and  services  (Christensen,  1997).  Those 
"disruptive  technologies  and  innovations"  are  substituting  existing  technologies  and  services, 
posing a great challenge to locked-in incumbent service providers by eroding competency, market 
share  and  boundaries,  and  facilitating  the  entry  of new  and  smaller  dependence-free  service 
providers,  by  reducing  barriers,  and  providing  more  competitive  advantages  based  on  new 
services  and  business  models  (Christensen,  Anthony,  &  Roth,  2004).  This  major  shift  is 103 
happening  at  different  levels  and  causing  a  major  change  in  the  industry  structure  of the 
telecommunications industry. It is creating a new "digital ecosystem" in  which data, voice, and 
video, wireline and  wireless, traditional  telephony and TV broadcasting, are  ali  converging,  in 
addition to  the entry of new players such as  the application, content and entertainment service 
providers. 
The telecommunications  industry  major shift  is  in  line  with  the  work of the  Austrian 
econornist  Joseph  Schumpeter,  who  in  1950  coined  the  term  "perennial  gale  of creative 
destruction"  where  he  described  how  companies  and  monopolies  are  challenged  by  the 
competition,  not  based  on  priee,  but  on  "competition  from  the  new  commodity,  the  new 
technology  ...  competition that strikes not at the margin of the profit of the existing firms but at 
their foundations and their very lives" (Schumpeter, 1950 p.  84). This "creative destruction" and 
the emergence of the disruptive technologies do not start in  the service pro  vider segment of the 
telecommunications  industry  or  by  just  being  introduced  to  the  end-user  customer.  It  is 
transferred to  the service provider segment, as  new services and  business  models, through the 
buyer-supplier  relationship  that  exists  between  the  service  providers  and  the  equipment 
manufacturers  in  the  telecommunication industry.  Therefore,  this  convergence of services and 
business  models,  are  the  end  products  delivered  to  the  service  providers  by  the  equipments 
manufacturers. 
However, the products deli vered  by  the equipment manufacturers are  the result of the 
system  integration,  and  assembly  of a  variety  of technologies,  which  are  then  produced  in 
modules or a single platform, then packaged and bundled to offer a variety of options and priees. 
Those  technologies  are  either  the  product  of  internai  innovation  through  internai  R&D 
capabilities and strategie assets or external innovation through strategie alliances, joint ventures, 
or acquisitions. Sorne of the technologies are the combination of lower leve! technologies, or the 
permutation of various technologies. Due to  the high  velocity and  intensive emergence of new 
and disruptive technologies in the manufacturers' ecosystem, it is  difficult for the manufacturers 
to  only  rely  on  internai  R&D  capabilities  and  strategie  assets  that  are  built  on  the  core 
competencies of the firm. 104 
Furthermore, the equipment manufacturing firms  established in this  know1edge  intense 
sector face a variety of turbulent environmenta1 challenges (Bahrami &  Evans,  1989; Romanelli, 
1989). Their products are technically comp1ex (Bettis &  Hitt,  1995; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b), in 
which  the  embedded  know1edge  is  tacit  in  nature  (Oliver,  1997),  non  codified  and  non 
transferable as  a public good (Hagedoorn &  Duysters, 2002; Peteraf,  1993). The comp1exity of 
the  technology  is  coup  led  with a  high  leve! of uncertainty (Hoff  man & Schaper-Rinke1, 2001; 
Quelin, 2000) due to  the lack of dominant standards or standard wars  (Besen &  Farrell,  1994; 
Shapiro & Varian, 2003), the lack of credible forecast for the potential future new products and 
the lack of specifie requirements to respond to the customers' needs (Quelin, 2000; Roberts et al., 
2001;  Robertson  &  Gatignon,  1998;  Wa1ker  &  Weber,  1984).  The  rate of innovation of new 
. technologies  and  products is  higher than any  other industry  (Hitt,  Hoskisson, &  Ireland,  1990; 
Hitt et al.,  1991a; Hitt et al.,  1996) and the industry faces continuous waves of new technological 
generations and disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; 
Christensen &  Raynor,  2003;  Utterback &  Acee,  2005b),  which  render the  products  obsolete, 
possibly  even  before  being  launched  to  the  market  (Mayer  &  Kenney,  2004b).  The  rate  of 
obsolescence is  such that products often become obsolete before their development costs can be 
recaptured (Roberts &  Liu, 2001 ).  The new and disruptive technologies emerge either inside the 
firm  or in  the environmental g<::ological  system, following a pattern of an epidemie technology 
diffusion,  mutation  and  permutation of characteristics.  In  the  literature  we could not find  any 
research 1inking these environmental challenges to the disruptive technologies,  in  a cause/effect 
relationship. 
Moreover, one technology does not necessarily constitute a product in itself. It could be a 
computer algorithm, a  network protocol, an encryption code, a specifie technique, a process, a 
class of fiber,  a processing chip, etc. The product is created by assembling and  integrating this 
mosaic  of technological  ecology.  Each  of these  technologies  emerges  in  the  environmental 
ecology of the firm,  in different temporal  brackets, and  not in a sequential pattern that  would 
eventually  lead to  the  creation of one  stand alone product.  In  addition, these technologies are 
created  and  developed  independently,  although  their  innovation  teams  collaborate  informally 
through  persona!  networking  and  the  participation  in  technica1  forums,  presentations,  and 
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Therefore, it is  difficult for  one company to  rely on internai innovation through R&D 
capabilities and existing strategie assets  alone.  Besides,  the integration of technologies and the 
convergence of services we are witnessing in the service providers segment are not the results of 
the system integration, conducted by the service providers, of separate and independent products 
that  were  transferred  from  the  equipment  manufacturers.  It  is  achieved  by  the  equipment 
manufacturers,  through  a  deliberate  strategy  of  an  intensive  wave  of  acquisitions  with  the 
objective of achieving platform leadership among competitors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). This 
imageneering of the future and the enactment of the industry structure and directions, leads to the 
strategically  reengineering of the core competencies of sorne  manufacturing  firms  to  create a 
dominant logic and a sustained competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel,  1994). Thus, the link 
between the emergence of disruptive technologies in the ecosystem to the acquisitions intensity in 
the manufacturer segment, which is not documented in the literature. 
Since the 1990 there was a substantia1 increase in mergers and acquisitions activities in 
the high technology industry. More th an  11 ,000 acquisitions were completed in  1997 for a value 
estimated at over US$ 900 billion (Chaudhuri &  Tabrizi,  1999a). This intensity of acquisition's 
activities Hitt et al.,  1990; Hitt et al.,  1991b) is  motivated by different reasons. Beside traditional· 
motivations of econornizing  and  empire building,  high-tech firms  used  acquisitions  main1y  to 
acquire externat strategie  resources,  gain access to  valuable human talents,  reduce the cost and 
risk of R&D, expand their portfolio of products, reduce product ti me to market and provide for an 
externat source of continuous innovation. 
The networking segment of the telecommunications industry was created by the fusion of 
information technologies  and  traditional  telephony technologies  to  connect computers  to each 
other  using  computer  networks  and  protocols  through  public  telephone  networks.  In  the 
networking  segment,  severa!  firms  have  used  acquisitions  as  their  main  growth  strategy.  For 
example,  Cisco  Systems,  a  Silicon  Valley  based  company  working  in  the  manufacturing  of 
networking and telecommunications equipment and software, acquired more than  107 companies 
during the period from 1993 to 2006.  In the year 1999 alone it acquired 18 companies and in the 
year 2000 it acquired 23 companies, with an average of almost two acquisitions each month, or in 
other words, an acquisition every two weeks. It completed 12 acquisitions in 2004 and another 12 
in 2005. Moreover, Norte! Networks compleied 21  acquisitions in the period between 1996 and 106 
2006 and Lucent Technologies completed 41  acquisitions during the same period.  Lucent was 
later acquired by  Alcatel in  December 2006. Today, Cisco Systems stands as  the leader in  the 
telecommunications  industry  and  as  the company who created this  trend of using  a successful 
aggressive acquisition strategy as its main growth engine. 
This  strategy,  termed  "acquisition and  development" or "A&D", combines acquisition 
activities for externat sources of innovation, white maintaining the internai innovative capacities 
of the firm (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). It starts by identifying the firm's internai needs (resources) 
and  assessing the potential players for acquisitions in  the strategie group within the industry, by 
means  of continuo  us  scanning  of the  competitive environment (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi,  1999a). 
During  this  scanning  of the  environment,  informai  relations  (links)  are  established  with  the 
objective  of identifying  and  evaluating  potential  emergent  new  technologies  and  innovation, 
assessing human assets (resources) involved in those activities and estimating the real economie 
value (cost) of these resources, in terms of technologies and human capital. 
When deciding on an acquisition, the finn would evaluate the potential target's existing 
product line and  portfolio of technologies. Those potential technologies could be  sustaining or 
disruptive.  They  could  be  supplementary  or  complementary  technologies-and  products. 
Supplementary technologies  are sirnilar in  nature  to  the  firm's  existing products portfolio and 
complementary technologies are different products that strategically fit  with the firm's existing 
products' map. In addition to supplementary and complementary products, a firm could choose to 
acquire  a  target  firm  because  of the  competitive  threat  of substitute  products  or  disruptive 
technologies. By acquiring those substitute products, the firm would reduce the competitive threat 
and  produce  new  entry  barriers  to  other  firms  developing  sirnilar  technologies  and  products, 
which  would ensure a better market positioning and  a sustained competitive advantage.  In  the 
post  acquisition  phase,  the  acquired  technologies  and  products  are  system  integrated  into  the 
existing product p01tfolio to create synergy. The integrated technologies are redesigned based on 
modularity or single platforms (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002;  Mayer & Kenney, 2004b; Olleros, 
2006), to provide bundles and solution packages with a variety of priees and options to  meet the 
potential needs of future customers (Stremersch & Tellis, 2002). The integration process is very 
critical,  as  it  provides  the  technical  basis  for  the  convergence  of services,  later  used  by  the 
services providers,  when the products are transferred to  the service providers through the buyer-107 
seller relationship. For a successful post acquisition integration of the acquired company and its 
technologies,  the  integration  complexity,  strategie  fit,  and  potential  synergy,  must  aU  be 
anticipated and evaluated in the pre·acquisition phase and prior to the acquisition decision. 
In  most  of the  research  on  corporate  mergers  and  acquisitions,  they  are  viewed  as 
strategies for corporate control and empire building, and they are dealt with using financial  and 
economie  pers  pee  ti v  es,  while  neglecting  their  social,  strategie  and  organizational  dimensions. 
The  motivations  of  acquisitions  in  the  high  tech  industries,  and  specifically  the 
telecommunications industry, are different than the motivations of acquisitions in other industries. 
Many of the high tech acquisitions in the 1990s appeared to  be motivated by the firms'  need to 
obtain critical technologies or capabilities, in  contrast to  acquisitions in  other industries,  which 
are  motivated  by  economies  of scale,  gains  in  market  share,  geographjcal  expansion,  empire 
building  or CEO hubris.  Despite the importance of the  intensive acquisition  trend  within  the 
context  of the  telecommunications  industry,  the  research  on  acquisitions  in  the  literature  of 
strategie  management could  be  categorized  as  contradictory,  incoherent  and  incomplete.  It  is 
contradictory  because  the  findings  present  contradictory  performance  outcome  related  to 
acquisitions, even in  the same  industry  sector.  It  is  incoherent, because  most of the  researches 
focus  on  the economie aspect of acquisitions  including performance, economies of scope and 
scale, market penetration, growth, position, net gain, etc., while the others focus on the strategie 
aspect of acquisition including human  talent,  tacit knowledge, strategie  resources, strategie fit, 
organizational culture and core competencies. Each approach neglects the other, which leads to 
an incoherent picture of the factors  involved. Each approach gives a perspective to  the study of 
acquisitions, however the whole picture remain fragmented and  unclear. Third, it is  incomplete 
because the literature has not shed  enough light on the factors, criteria, conditions, motivations, 
causes  and  consequences  related to  the  acquisition  formation  in  high  velocity  and  turbulent 
environments.  When  companies  such  as  Cisco  Systems  and  others  participate  in  intensive 
acquisition activities during a small period of time, the critical success factors and the process of 
decision making for the acquisition formation bas not been fully researched, under those extreme 
and intense environmental conditions. 
In  the  service  providers segment  of the  telecommunications  industry,  the  integrated 
technologies  provided  by  the  manufacturers,  give  rise  to  new  disruptive  innovations  and  the 108 
convergence  of  services  and  business  models.  This  is  creating  a  new  landscape  for  the 
telecommunications industry  and changing the rules of the game that were established decades 
ego, leading to a change in the industry structure of the telecommunications industry. The change 
in  the industry structure refers to the change in  the competitive dynamics and market forces, the 
change of the firms'  competitive advantage, the changing and blurring of market, the erosion of 
market share, the destruction of competency, the Jack and need for a new regulatory environment, 
the cannibalization of services and the subsequent Joss of revenues in traditional markets (Evans 
& Schmalensee, Forthcoming; Parker & Alstyne, 2005; Potier, 1980a). 
For example, the  ability  to  have an  overseas  voice conversation on the internet with a 
reasonable quality  of service  (QoS)  using embedded software such  as  Microsoft Messenger or 
unbundled  software  such  as  Skype,  is  sharply  reducing  the  traditional  international  caUs' 
revenues  for  the  telephony  operators.  New  telecommunications  alternative  providers,  such  as 
Vonage and others, offering service providers-like's quality of service with a fraction of the cost, 
are challenging the traditional telephony operators locked-in with long term investment based on 
old technologies and infrastructure, in  the  local  and international business  segments. Enterprise 
voice over internet protocol equipments, or simply VoiP, sold  by  the equipment manufacturers 
directly to  the end-user customers, are bypassing  the telephone operators and sharply reducing 
their PABX (private automatic branch exchange) traditional business. 
On a  larger scale,  the Wi-Max disruptive technology is  decreasing the barriers for new 
investors to  enter the service provider market and provide city-wide coverage of wireless-fixed 
broadband  services,  including  data,  voice,  and  video,  with ·a  fraction  of the  cost  and  lower 
technical  expertise.  Traditional  cable  TV  operators  are  offering  residential  telephony  and 
broadband Internet access, competing directly with traditional telephony operators in  their core 
business.  Telephony  operators  would  be  able  to  offer  TV  programming  services  using  a 
technology called IPTV, competing directly with cable operators in  their core business. The last 
two  examples  are  based  on  the  convergence  new  business  mode!  called  "triple-play".  The 
convergence  of  fixed  and  wireless  broadband,  adds  another  emerging  business  model,  the 
quadruple play. Finally, the entrance of new nontraditional telecommunications players, such  as 
content  and  entertainment  providers  such  as  YouTube,  Google,  AOL,  Microsoft,  NBC  and 
Virgin,  gives  rise  to  a  new  business  model.  In  this  model,  the  industry  change concerns  the 109 
market  boundaries  and  the  ownership  of the  network.  It  is  already  contemplated  that  the 
ownership of the  network  and  services  could  be transferred  to  the  media  giants  who  would 
provide the content in  addition to the traditional telecommunications services, while the network 
would become just a conduit. Ali this is  happening while the regulatory environment is lagging 
behind, with large variations and differences between countries in  industrial markets, emerging 
economies, highly and less competitive markets and geographie areas. 
3.3 Disruptive Technologies and Innovations 
The term disruptive technologies was first coined by Clayton Christensen in his book The 
lnnovator's Di/emma (Christensen, 1997) and then used in the subsequent books The lnnovator's 
Solution (Christensen &  Raynor, 2003) and Seeing  What's Next (Christensen, Anthony, &  Roth, 
2004). The concept behind the new  term 'disruptive technology' and more generally "disruptive 
innovation" could be traced back to  the Austrian scientist Joseph Schumpeter who developed the 
the01·y of creative  destruction  in his  book  Capitalism,  Socialism and Democracy,  published  in 
1950. In his chapter The Process of Creative Destruction, Schumpeter wrote "The opening up of 
new  markets  and  the  organizational  development from  the  craft  shop  and factory  to  such 
concerns as  US Steel illustrate the process of industrial mutation that incessant/y revolutionizes 
the  economie structure from  witlzin,  incessant/y destroying  the  old one,  incessant/y creating a 
new one ...  [The process] must be seen in its raie in the perennial gale of  creative destruction; it 
cannat be understood on the hypothesis that there is a perenniallull." 
Christensen  et  al.  (2004) describe the  disruptive  innovation  theory  in  such  situations 
where  "new organizations and  market  entrants cao use relatively  simple,  convenient, low cost 
innovations to  create growth  and win  over powerful  incumbents and that the theory holds that 
existing companies have a high piobability of beating entrant attackers when the contest is about 
sustaining  innovations,  but established companies  almost always  Jose to  attackers  armed  with 
disruptive innovations." (Introduction, XV) 
Christensen et al. (2004) identify three types of innovations: "(1) Sustaining innovations, 
which move companies along established improvement characteristics, and are improvements to 110 
existing  products  on  dimensions  historically  valued  by  customers.  Disruptive  innovations, 
introduce  a  new  value proposition,  and are either creating  new  markets  or reshaping existing 
markets. There are two types of disruptive innovations:  (2) Low-end disruptive innovations can 
occur when existing products and services are too good and hence overpriced relative to the value 
existing  customers  can  use;  and  (3)  New  market  disruptive · innovations,  can  occur  when 
characteristics of existing products limit the number of potential consumers or force consumption 
to take place in inconvenient, centralized settings." 
The theory  is  related  to  the  Resource  Based  View,  as  it  takes  into  consideration  the 
resources, "which are assets the  company can  build or destroy,  the  processes,  which  establish 
patterns of work to  transform inputs  into  outputs, and values,  which  determine  the  criteria  by 
which the companies allocate the resources." Christensen states that "incumbent firms fail in the 
face of  disruptive innovations because their values will not prioritize disruptive innovations, and 
the firm 's  existing  processes  do  not  help  them  get  do ne  what  they  need  to  get  do ne."  The 
disruptive innovation theory is  also related to the value chain evolution theory as the companies 
have a choice: "They can choose to  integrale, executing most of  the activities themselves, or they 
can  choose  to  specialize  and focus  on  a  narrow  range  of activities,  relying  on  suppliers and 
partners to provide other elements of  value added." 
The book Seeing What's Next (Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004) introduces a process 
mode! for analyzing and predicting industry change based on a three part process: "(!) identifying 
signais  of change,  where  we  can  expect  companies  to  emerge  with  products,  services  and 
business  models  that  look  very  different  from  what  we  have seen in  the  past;  (2)  evaluating 
competitive  battles,  between  companies  classified  as  "attackers"  and  "incumbents";  (3) 
identifying  strategie  choices  that  can  influence  the  outcome  of  the  competitive  battles,  by 
showing what attackers can do to tilt the balance of power in their favor and what incumbents can 
do to withstand attacks." 
In general,  the process of disruptive technologies and innovations can be associated with 
the  destruction  of values  and  the  creation  of value  (Utterback &  Acee,  2005a),  for  both  the 
providers  and the  end-user customers.  For example,  in  figure  3.1,  the  destruction  of value  is 
represented  in  the  loss  of  previously  estimated  revenues  from  the  voice  telephony  in  the Ill 
incumbent telephony service provider, for the new cable operator providing the same  service to 
end-user customer. This new cable telephony service represent a creation of value for the cable 
operator,  and  for  the  end-user,  who  is  offered  alternative  service  breaking  the  monopoly  of 
incumbent operator, and for a better priee. 
Figure 3.1 
Disruptive technology characteristics 
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Packet switching  technology  vs.  circuit switching. The telephony  voice  service  was 
based since its  inception on  a technology  called "circuit switching" where a circuit is reserved 
each time a call is  established between point A and B on a telephone network, even if the cali 
conversation  included  intervals  of  silence.  With  the  emergence  of computing  and  persona( 
computer,  the  need  was  for  connecting  those  computers  through  a  network,  to  exchange 
information such as document, statistics, and database information. As the telephony network and 
its  circuit  switching  technology  where  not  econornically  suitable  for  the  connection  of large 
number of computers, data networks were developed in order to connect computers and transfer 
data  between  them.  Severa!  protocols  were  devised  for  this  purpose  such  as  X.25,  TCP/IP 
(Transport control protocol/Internet protocol),  frame  re lay,  A  TM (  asynchronous trans  fer mode) 112 
and  MPLS  (Multi  protocol  layer  service).  Over time  those  data  networks,  using  data transfer 
protocols to  transfer data mainly, begin to be used to transport voice, as  in  voice telephony, after 
the voice cali is digitized from its analog form and transformed into binary numbers if 1  s and Os 
and after being packetized, or in other words divided into small packets if data and switched over 
the different nodes of the packet switching network. Figure 3.2 illustrates this paradigm shi ft. 
Figure 3.2 
Paradigm shift: Moving from voice to data 
Voice over A  TM (Asynchronous transfer mode) and MPLS (Multi protocol layer 
service). Same as  in Frame Relay, however, the issues of latency, delay, quality of service (QoS), 
and guaranteed service for the voice calls were greatly enhanced. As a result, voice calls could be 
transported between end-users, using an  alternative data network service provider instead of the 
incumbent telephony provider network. In  addition, it provided an efficient and economie mean 
of transporting backbone  traffic  between  central  offices  of traditional  telephony  voice  service 
provider. 
Wi-Fi and Wi-Max.  Wi-Fi provides  a basis  for  a  wireless  local area  network (LAN) 
connecting computer over a localized (limited) area. It's suitable for connection computers in an 
apartment, an office, a coffee shop, a university, a hotel, etc. Wi-Max, however, is an evolution of 113 
the Wi-Fi, and it is capable of providing computer connections over a much larger area, such as a 
city,  a village or a cosmopolitan area.  The technology  is  suitable for the transfer of data,  voice 
and  video. Unlike mobile communication,  it  is  license  free and provide an  alternative for  new 
market entrant for providing alternative services. 
Broadband  access.  Allow  for  the  transmission  of  vo1ce  telephony  and  high  speed 
internet  access  over  the  existing  local  loop  or  last  mile,· running  from  the  central  office 
equipments  to  the  end-user establishment.  High  speed  internet  could  be  suitable  for  down-
strearning video content such as Realmedia, and YouTube, etc. 
Voice  telephony  and Internet over  cable  television.  It  provides  the  existing  cable 
companies  with  the ability  to  transport and switch  voice calls  service and  internet  access  and 
traffic  over  existing  cable  television  infrastructure  in  the  cosmopolitan  area  to  end-user 
subscribers. 
Internet  protocol  television  (IPTV).  It  provides  the  existing  telephony  incumbent 
service providers with the ability to transport, switch, and broadcast television programrning over 
the existing telephone infrastructure, using the Internet protocol television or IPTV. 
3.3.2 Examples of Disruptive Innovations 
Skype. A  free  downloadable application offering  the  possibility of making  voice calls 
between  computers  connected  to  the  internet.  The  transport  technology  uses  the  Internet  for 
transporting data and voice messages and traffic, and  therefore does not constitute any additional 
cost, other than  the subscription to  the  internet service  provider (ISP).  However, the quality of 
service (QoS), latency, delay, noise and guaranteed service, are not resolved. 
Enterprise voice over IP (VoiP). Offer an  alternative for transporting voice traffic over 
a local area network in a localized area such as offices, universities, hospitals, etc. It replaces the 
traditional private branch exchange equipment, offered by the telephony incumbent provider. 114 
Service  provider like  VoiP services  (Vonage).  This  service  offers  the  capability  of 
transporting voice services over the internet, using either a computer connected to the internet or 
simply  a  phone equipment.  Unlike  skype  and  similar innovations,  a  service provider such  as 
Vonage (and others) offer a guaranteed service, with a quality of service (QoS) equivalent to the 
voice-toll service offered by  the incumbent or mobile service provider.  However, the  service is 
not for free, but is offered at a more competitive priee than the incumbent provider. 
3.4 The Telecommunication lndustry: Manufacturing Segment 
3.4.1 Intensive Acquisitions 
In the high technology industries, including information technology, telecommunications, 
biotechnology  and  aerospace,  firms  face  a  challenging environment  including  a  high  leve!  of 
uncertainty,  a  continuous  fast  pace  of change,  the  emergence  of disruptive  technologies,  the 
sh01tening  cycle  of product  development,  the  high  rate  of obsolescence  of technologies  and 
products, the intensity of the research and development required, the volatility of the market and 
the extreme1y high cosLof innovation. In this challenging environment the uncertainty (Bettis & 
Hitt,  1995; Hoffman &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Quelin, 2000; Roberts &  Liu, 2001) is a result of 
technological  uncertainty  (Quelin,  2000;  Roberts  &  Liu,  2001;  Robertson  &  Gatignon,  1998; 
Walker &  Weber,  1984) due to the lack of standards being still under development, competing 
technologies  without  a  clear  potential  winner  and  the  intensive  emergence  of  disruptive 
technologies which render existing products obsolete; demand and  market uncertainty  (Quelin, 
2000; Roberts &  Liu,  2001; Robertson &  Gatignon,  1998) due to  the  lack of credible demand 
forecast  for  competing  and  un der  developed  technologies,  the  ignorance  of the  customers' 
perception of the potential new products;  and product uncertainty (Quelin, 2000; Roberts & Liu, 
200 l) due  to  the  lack of understanding of the  potential customers'  preferences for  the  future 
products' specifications and requirements. 
This  uncertainty  is  amplified  because  of  the  limitations  facing  the  firm  in  this 
environment and in dealing with its challenges.  One of those limitations is the embedded nature 
of the  technical  knowledge required  to  deal  with  uncertainty. This  technical  knowledge  is  not 115 
codified, and has a tacit nature. It  is  in  the mind and experience of the technical engineers and 
scientists and cannot be transferred as a public good without a priee to pay and an effort to make. 
This  tacit knowledge (Oliver,  1997)  could be  in  the technical expertise and  know-how of the 
technical  teams,  the  research  and  development  capabilities,  the  management  practice,  the 
entrepreneurial spirit or the innovation track record. This knowledge cannot be transferred to the 
firm  simply  by  recruiting  or  by  the  free  mobility  of its  agents.  It  is  related  to  a  technical 
idiosyncrasy and specifie assets as  part of the research, development, operations and maintenance 
phases.  The  asset  specificity  (Coff,  1997b;  Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001;  Oliver,  1997; 
Robertson & Gatignon, 1998; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1999) owned by a firm determines 
the potential for it to join in an alliance orto be acquired by a larger firm. 
Those  highly  specialized  assets  could  be  human,  physical,  or  material  and  would 
represent for  the  potential  partner or acquirer  externat  assets  needed  to  maintain  a  sustained 
competitive  advantages.  Those  strategie  assets  (Hagedoom  &  Duysters,  2002;  Oliver,  1997; 
Peteraf, 1993) are characterized by being unique, inimitable, difficult to duplicate and part of the 
core competencies of the firm.  If the firm finds  those assets in  its environment, it  could either 
form an alliance to have access to them or form an acquisition to  acquire them internally, as  an 
external source of innovation. The objective for the acquirer or the allied firm is to build upon the 
core competencies (Hi tt et al.,  1991 b;  Prahalad  &  Hamel,  1990,  1994;  Quelin, 2000;  Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987) of the firm by relying on external sources. 
Facing those environmental challenges, firms established in the information technology 
and telecommunications industries tend to use alliances, acquisitions or both, to survive, enhance 
their  performance,  and  guarantee  their  growth.  Working  together  would  reduce  the  leve!  of 
uncertainty  and  risk  imbedded  in  the  required  high  investments  in  research  and  development. 
Moreover, it would give access to external resources of innovation, which are strategie assets that 
would complement or supplement the firm's  existing  assets.  Sharing the cost of research  and 
development would produce economies of scale and scope and achieve synergetic opportunities, 
producing efficiency and net gain. The formation of an alliance or acquisition would give access 
to new products, reduce the product !ife cycle and penetrate new markets and industry segments, 
which would increase the firm's market position and power. 
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When choosing alliances or acquisitions, the firm would evaluate and target the partner or 
the acquired firm's existing products line and portfolio of technologies. Those potential products 
for alliances and acquisitions could be supplementary or complementary products. Supplementary 
products (Shelton,  1988a; Wernerfelt,  1984) are sirnilar in  nature to the firm' s existing products 
portfolio  and  complementary products  (Mayer &  Kenney,  2004a;  Shelton,  l988a; Wemerfelt, 
1984) are different products that combine weil with the firm's existing products' !ines. The firm 
would choose to have access to those resources through an alliance or acquire them through an 
acquisition,  in  order  to  increase  its  core  competencies  and  improve  its  product  portfolio 
competitiveness (Ferrary, 2003), which would ensure a sustained competitive advantage (Oliver, 
1997; Porter,  1980a; Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). In addition to supplementary and complementary 
products,  a  firm  could  choose  to  acquire  a  target  firm  because  of the  competitive  threat of 
substitute products or technologies (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002), which could result in barriers to 
entry (Wernerfelt,  1984; Yip, 1982) for the acquirer firm.  By acquiring those substitute products, 
the  firm  would  reduce  the  competitive  threat  and  produce  new  entry  barrï"ers  to  other  firms 
developing sirnilar technologies and products,  which would ensure a  better market positioning 
(Gulati,  1999;  Hopkins,  1987;  Walter &  Barney,  1990; Yip,  1982) and a sustained competitive 
ad van  tage. 
3.5 The Telecommunication lndustry: Service Provider Segment 
3.5.1 Integration of Services and Convergence 
In the past, telephony networks were built using the "circuit switching" technology, as 
described  earlier.  With  the  emergence  of a  data  communication  network,  as  a  result  of the 
DARPA  project (Defense advanced research projects  agency)  in  the  1960s,  telephony  service 
providers and newly private companies begin to establish such  networks (independent from the 
voice telephony networks) for the transport of digital data between interconnected computers. At 
first, those data networks using X.25 and TCP/IP protocols were used to transport data only and 
the  telephony  voice  networks  were  used  to  transport  voice  toll  traffic  among  the  network 
subscribers.  With  the  evolution  of data  networks  protocols,  su  ch  as  Frame  Re lay,  ATM  and 
MPLS to name a few,  it  was made possible for the first time to carry voice toll traffic over such 
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networks originally designed to carry data. Therefore, private data network companies started to 
offer  voice  service  by  carrying  voice  traffic  over  their  data  networks  and  competing  with 
telephony voice providers, and te1ephony service providers started to carry their voice toll traffic 
on  larger capacity  data networks,  for  more efficiency,  cost  reduction,  redundancy,  and  better 
network  monitoring  and  management.  With  the  continuous  evolution  of  data  networking 
protocols,  it  was  even  possible  to  start  carrying  video  (  characterized  by  the  need  for  larger 
transport capacity or bandwidth). 
From the other hand the integration of the different technologies, systems and protocols, 
in the equipment manufacturer segment of the telecommunication industry  and  the creation of 
more modular and versatile products,  allowed for the integration of services such as data, voice, 
and video and for the convergence of the voice, data and  video network infrastructure into one 
consolidated network platform able to carry ail type of signais and services. 
As a simplified example to better illustrate to concept, consider the Microsoft application 
MSN or better known as messenger. ln the past, the messenger was designed to connect internet 
users  for  exchanging  online  messages  or chat  messages.  However,  with  the  evolution  of the 
service, it became possible,  not only to write and  exchange text messages, but also voice signais 
by exchanging a voice conversation and video signais by using a webcam and seeing the other 
end's online video. The ex.planation  is  that ali  type of online messages,  whether text, pictures, 
voice or video, are transformed into a digital form or digitized using binary matrixes composed of 
streams of ls and Os,  and theo they are packetized, or divided into small portion of data called 
packets, and transported over the network. 
3.5.2 Implications 
The emergence of th ose disruptive technologies in the telecommunication industry pa  ved 
the  way for the integration of technologies and  the convergence of services and networks.  This 
created disruptive innovations that threatened the incumbent service providers and made it easier 
for  new  entrants to  the ever changing market place. The boundaries between  market segments 
became blurring as the services converges and the companies operating previously in one market 
segment were forced to  rethink their strategy and develop new business  models to sustain their 118 
competitive  advantage,  or  in  sorne  case,  simply  to  survive.  Incumbent  service  providers  are 
seeing  their  revenue streams  shrinking  by  the  cannibalization of sorne  of their services  as  an 
effect  of disruptive  technologies,  or  by  the  competitive  threats  of new  business  models  and 
innovative  services  introduced  by  their  existing  competitors  or  new  market players.  [n  other 
words,  disruptive  technologies  in  the  telecommunication  industry  reduced  and  in  sorne  cases 
elirninated the barriers to entry and decreased the switching cost. Figure 3.3 illustrates the various 
disruptive  technologies  and  innovation  m  the  service  pro  vider' s  segment  of  the 
telecommunication industry, the challenges faced by the incumbent (telephony) service providers 
and its strategie response to those challenges. 
For example,  until  recent  years  the  voice  telephony  service providers  were  lirnited  in 
providing  residential  fixed  voice  telephony,  mobile  communications  and  international  calls 
services  and  the  cable  television  service  providers  were  lirnited  to  offering  cable  television 
programming using their own cable network, whether terrestrial or through digital satellite links 
services.  [n  recent years,  this has changed dramatically. Voice telephony service providers were 
enabled, based on new disruptive technologies, to offer internet access in variable speed (dial up 
and  high  speed  using ADSL technology)  and  most  importantly  video  television programrning 
through the use of their own cable network, or digital satellite services. 
Moreover,  cable  television  service  providers  were  enabled,  based  on  new  disruptive 
technologies, to  offer internet access in  higher speed than the one offered by telephony service 
provider, and most importantly voice telephony fixed-residential services, which was previously a 
monopoly  service  to  incumbent  operators.  The  new  disruptive  technologies  offered  both,  the 
voice telephony and the cable television service providers, the technical capability to compete in 
each other market segment, and to draw new sources of revenues. 
A  voice  telephony  residential  customer,  who  chooses  to  switch  from  his  prefeiTed 
telephony  ervice provider to the  new  service offered by his  cable operators, will  benefit from 
reduced  cost  because  of bundling  and  packaging  of  services  and  a  one  stop  shopping  with  a 
unified bill of service for ali  his communication needs. By doing this,  the customer will increase 
the revenue streams of the cable operator, in a service area previously perceived as not in its core 119 
business competency, and in the same time, decrease the revenue streams of the telephony service 
pro vider in an area of service considered for a very long ti me to be its core business competency. 
Figure 3.3 
Incumbent telephony provider dilemma and solution 
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Another example is  the different applications and disruptive innovations emerging from 
the voice over IP, Frame Relay and ATM disruptive technologies. The first variation, such as the 
one offered by skype and other similar developers, provides the customer with the opportunity to 
place local  or international calls using  its own computer and  pre-paid  internet access,  to  other 
internet connected computers. It's true that  the  quality of the  voice  and  the availability of the 
service  is  not  guaranteed  compared  to  the  traditional  voice  telephony  service,  however,  the 
service being free  of charge  and  user friendly, the  customer usually priee prefers over quality. 
Another  variation  of the  VoiP technology  is  the  one offered by  service  provider-like such as 120 
Vonage, where the customer is  giving an alternative for placing local and  international calls to 
either internet connected computers or just any telephone equipment, with  a guaranteed service 
availability and a  similar toll  voice quality as  in the traditional voice telephony services, for  a 
reduced bill. 
This shift in  market segment, and  the  resulting disruptive innovations, create enormous 
challenges to  ail  the players in  the telecommunication service provider market segment, mainly 
the incumbent telephony service providers,  to come up  with new devised business strategies and 
new  innovative business  models,  in  face  of fierce  competition from  unprecedented sources,  in 
order to  be able to  sustain their competitive advantage or at ]east survive in  this ever changing 
market place. In fact those radical changes caused by the continuous emergence of new disruptive 
technologies and innovations causing a restructuring of the telecommunication industry and are 
forcing  the  incumbents  and  new  players  to  rethink  their  strategies.  Most  incumbent  service 
providers,  facing  those  challenges  are  trying  to  find  answers,  innovative  solutions,  and  new 
business models. 
3.6 The Current State of the Telecommunications lndustry 
Here are sorne  of the trends governing the thinking in the telecommunications industry. 
Those trends support the objectives of the research and shed sorne light on what was previously 
described in this exploratory paper. 
The telecommunication industry has  witnessed a sharp decrease  in  the net revenue per 
minute in the international cali business. This is due to several reasons, among them internai priee 
adjustment  (high  priees  were  fictitious),  the  effect  of the  calling  cards  wholesale  and  retail 
business, but also, the impact of the other technologies such as Internet email, online messaging 
and lately voice calls over the internet or simply voice over IP (VoiP) using applications such as 
Skype. Figure 3.4 illustrates the decline in net retained revenues per minutes for international cali 
in US carriers. 121 
Figure 3.4 
Net retained revenue per minute in dollar, International caUs, US carriers (FCC, Economist) 
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Since its  launch in December 2003, Skype have seen a rapid  growth in  the  worldwide 
subscriber base. There are several  attributes about the application among them the ease of use, 
and the no cost fees. It is expected that more people especiaUy younger generations and computer 
savvy are using this application to place international caUs,  which bas a negative implication on 
the international call business. Figure 3.5 illustrates the subscribers' base of Skype. 
Figure 3.5 
Skype's worldwide subscribers in million (source: Skype, Economist) 
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Another variation of the  voice over IP technology  is  the service provider-like services 
offered by companies such  as  Vonage.  In  this case, customers switch to  this  service from  the 
traditional voice telephony service provider, including cable television operators offering voice 
telephony services (such as  Videotron). The subscriber base to this type of service has witnessed 
an  important growth, which is expected to  continue in  the future  due to  reduced billing fees,  a 
sirnilar quality of service (QoS) to that offered by traditional service providers, the ease of use by 
non-computer savvy, and the possibility of placing calls to non-subscribers.  Figure 3.6 iluustrates 
the growth of voice over IP subscribers. 
Figure 3.6 
Voice over IP subscribers in US, in millions (source: Yankee group, Econornist) 
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The revenues from long distance and local phone calls continue to drop in the near future. 
This is due  to  severa! reasons, chiefly among them the end-users  switch to  the  use  of various 
applications using voice over IP technologies,  whether with the no-fees over the internet variation 
(Skype) or based  on the service provider-like services  offered  by alternative  providers  such  as 123 
Vonage.  Due  to  the  drop  in  voice  calls  revenues  (international  and  local),  the  traditional 
telephony service providers who will  be  most  affected are the one relying on voice services in 
their core business and  revenue streams.  For example,  Vodafone would  be  most affected as  it 
relies in· 80% of their revenues on voice services, while BT would be Jess affected as  it  relies in 
Jess than 20% of their revenues on voice services and more than 80% on data, video, business and 
other services. This shows the need for traditional voice telephony providers to  move into new 
business models and more innovative solutions. Figure 3.7 Illustrates the loss in revenues in long 
distance and local phone, due to voice over IP in the US. 
Figure 3.7 
Long distance and local phone revenues in the US in billion of dollars 
(source: TeleGeography Research, Economist) 
lost 
(e\'~OU\2$ - 2() 
dueto 
_..;..;::o~ r?  __ 
10 
2003 ott  c:S  06  01  œ  oo  10 
As  a  direct  effect  of  disruptive  technologies  in  the  telecommunication  industry, 
technologies  are  being  integrated  and  services· are  converging.  The effect of this  convergence 
would be mostly noted in the voice and data telecom business, followed by  the fixed and mobile 
communication services, then the media and entertainment and finally the IT and computing area 
in general. The convergence between the fixed and mobile services will continue to grow sharp1y 
in the future, especially in the consumer markets.  More and more customer would prefer mobile 124 
communication over fixed  communication !ines. In  the enterprise market  segment, the  mobile 
trend will continue to grow;  however, fixed  tines  communications would remain  the  preferred 
choice, because of the need to access fixed physical resources. Figure 3.8 illustrates the impact of 
types of convergence. 
Figure 3.8 
Impact of types of convergence, percent of telecom executives saying very strong 
(source: Econornist intelligence unit, Economist) 
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The convergence of media and telecommunications (known as Triple-Play as a short for 
voice, data and video) will continue to grow in the near future. In addition to the converged cable 
services (including voice telephony and Internet), the nascent Internet protocol television (IPTV) 
technology offered by telephony service and alternative providers will witness a steady growth, as 
well  as  the  expected  growth  in  online  video-on-demand  using  Internet  online strearning.  The 
convergence of media and  telecommunications  will  continue to  grow,  making  the Triple-Play 
business mode!  and services ( voice, data and video) a main revenue growth area in the future and 
a shift of paradigm towards being the core business competency of traditional telecommunication 
service  providers,  cable  operators,  alternative  providers,  and  content  (and  entertainment) 
providers. Figure 3.9 illustrates the revenues for video-on-demand. Figure 3.9 
Video-on-demand revenues by type of operator in billion of dollars (iSuppli, Economist) 
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The convergence of the telecommunication industry and  the  media (and entertainment) 
industry would continue to  grow in  the future,  giving rise to  a new  innovative business model 
called Quadruple-Play  for  voice,  data,  video  and  content (and  mobile).  This  would encourage 
media and online content providers, such as  NBC, Disney, Virgin, MTV, AOL, Time Warner, 
Microsoft, Google and Y  ou  Tube, to  enter the new realm of the telecommunications and media 
industries. One would expect giant conteut providers to  try to play a major and dominant role in 
the provisioning of the other telecommunication services (data,  voice and  video),  and that it is 
possible that the ownership of the telecommunication and media infrastructure would be acquired 
by  those  giant  and  emerging  content  providers.  Should  this  be  a  potential  future  strategie 
scenario,  the  business  models of both the  telecommunications and  the  media industries  would 
change radically and both industries would go through a major radical restructuring phase. 126 
3. 7 Construction of a Theoretical Model 
Based on this exploratory findings and insights from the telecommunication industry, the 
conceptual  model  in  figure 3. 10  was  developed. The sa  me constructs of this conceptual  model 
could be represented as illustrated in figure 3 .Il, to reflect the di vision of the telecommunication 
industry into two segments:  the manufacturing and the service provider segments. 
Figure 3.10 
Conceptual model of creative construction 
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In  an  attempt to  work on few rough general propositions and  before embarking on the 
field  research  and  investigation,  here  are  sorne  potential  hypotheses . to  be  considered  for 
evaluation, discrimination and future research: 
1.  The intensive emergence of disruptive technologies in the telecommunications industry 
has led equipment manufacturers to resort to externat sources of innovation through the 
mean of mergers and  acquisitions of complementary,  supplementary and substituting 
technologies and products. 
I.A.  New disruptive technologies are radically different than sustaining technologies in the 
telecommunications  industry's  equipment  manufacturing  segment,  as  they  represe11t 127 
substituting technologies or products for existing technologies,  product and dominant 
logic. 
Figure 3.11 
The process of creative construction in the telecommunications industry 
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l.B.  The lock-in effect coupled with the resource dependency on existing tacit knowledge, 
technical talent, strategie assets and incurred investments, in addition to the high risk of 
investment in new emerging technologies and product prototypes, prevent companies 
in  the  equipment  manufacturer's  segment  of  the  telecommunications  industry  of 
effectively countering the continuous emergence of disruptive technologies by relying 
on internai innovation and internai R&D. 128 
l.C.  The intensity,  continuous  and  frequent  emergence of disruptive  technologies  in  the 
telecommunication industry, could not be counter balanced by any single or group of 
companies, relying only on internai sources of innovation. 
2.  In intensive acquisition mode, equipment manufaçturer use a process of acquisition for 
successfully  completing,  integrating  and  managing  acquisitions  and  acquired 
companies. 
2.A.  In  the  pre-acquisition  phase,  it  is  crucial  to  rely  on  a  continuous  scanmng of the 
environment, a  real  and deep assessment of internai  needs, a  network of formai and 
informai alliances and a thorough due diligence. 
2.B.  During the acquisition phase, criteria such as  strategie fit, creating synergy, technology 
and product integration, management of complexity and proxirnity play a crucial role in 
completing a successful acquisition. 
2.C.  In  the  post acquisition phase, the integration of tht5-acquired company while keeping 
certain autonomy for the innovation team, and the talent recruitment and retention, play 
an important role in successfully managing and benefiting from the strategie objectives 
of the acquisition and creating synergy. 
3.  Disruptive technologies in the telecommunications industry and the successful reliance 
on acquisitions as  a source of extemal innovation could lead the company to adopt a 
new  business  mode!  described  as  "acquisition  and  development"  (A&D),  instead of 
research and development (R&D). 
3.A.  In  the  post acquisition phase, the  integration of the acquired company while keeping 
certain autonomy for the innovation team, and the talent recruitment and retention, play 
an important role in successfully managing and benefiting from the strategie objectives 
of the acquisition and creating synergy. 129 
3.B.  While  the  compames  m  the  equipment  manufacturing  segment  of  the 
telecommunications  industry  relies  on  an  "acquisition  and  development"  (A&D) 
business mode!, they keep  a high leve! of internai research and development (R&D), as 
a complementary and supplementary source of internai innovation. 
3.C.  While relying on intensive acquisition for external sources of innovation and adopting 
an "acquisition and development" (A&D) business mode!, internai R&D is  crucial for 
the survivability and growth of the parent company. Strategie assets and internai talents 
are a determinant factor in  the pre-acquisition phase to  scan the environment, assess 
potential  emerging  technologies  and  identifying  internai  needs,  and  in  the  post 
acquisition phase to continue develop internally the acquired technologies and products 
and successfully integrale them into the parent company strategie plan and products' 
road maps. 
4.  The integration of disruptive technologies by companies in the equipment manufacturer 
segment of the telecommunications industry, coup  led by  the emergence of disruptive 
innovations, lead companies in the service provider segment to integrate their services, 
based on integrated and converged technologies 
5.  The integration of services by the service providers in the telecommunications industry, 
lead  to  the  convergence  of services,  bundling  and  packaging  of services,  and  the 
emergence of new business models. 
S.A.  The  convergence  of services  poses  a  threat  to  incumbent  service  providers  in  the 
telecommunications  industry.  It  reduces  the  effect of historie  monopoly,  reduce the 
barriers to entry and reduce the switching cost. 
S.B.  The emergence of new disruptive technologies and innovations in the service provider 
segment of the telecommunications industry, are negatively affecting the core business 
competencies of the incumbent service providers, by  cannibalizing their core business 
products and reducing their revenue streams from those core products. 130 
5.C.  Facing  those  challenges,  incumbent  and  new  entrants  service  providers  in  the 
telecommunications  industry  are forced  to  rethink their strategy,  develop innovative 
business  models,  adopt  new  business  plans  and  enter  into  new  product  and  market 
segment, even outside of their core business competency. 
6.  The convergence of disruptive  technologies  and  services  in  the  telecommunications 
industry and the consequently convergence of the telecommunications and the media 
industries,  have a restructuring effect on  the  telecommunications  industry and  would 
change and reshape the market boundaries, give rise to new business models, and invite 
new entrants from outside those two industries. 
6.A.  Triple-Play  will  be  the  dominant  logic  and  the  new  business  mode!  in  the  service 
providers segment of the telecommunications industry. 
6.B.  It is difficult to predict the effect of the convergence and Triple-Play on the incumbent 
service providers in the telecommunications industry. 
6.C.  New  entrants  such  as  content  and  media  providers  could  start  a  new  wave  of 
restructuring of the telecommunications industry and lead to a new innovative business 
called the Quadruple-Play. 
6.D.  With the entrance of new players such as  content and media providers in a Quadruple-
Play  business  mode!  mode,  it  is  difficult  to  predict  the  ownership  of  the 
telecommunications  infrastructure,  historically  monopolized  by  incumbent  service 
providers. 131 
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CHAPTERIV 
TOW  ARD A NEW THEORY OF ACQUISITION: 
INSIGHTS FROM THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 
2 
The  high  tech  industries  (telecommunications,  computers 
hardware and software) are in an important sector of the global 
economy.  Companies  in  this  sector,  for  different  reasons, 
frequently and increasingly use merger &  acquisitions. What are 
the  motivations  behind  mergers  &  acquisitions,  the  process 
requirements, the critical success factors  and  the impact on  the 
firm  petformance?  This  theoretical  research,  explores  the 
acquisition  experiences  of  three  telecommunications  and 
networking  firms.  Acquisition  strategies  and  decisions  are 
critical for growth in a high velocity environment. A clear vision 
and  objectives  are  important pre-acquisition requisites. Factors 
such  as  comp1exity  management,  integration,  synergy,  change 
management  and  maintaining  autonomy  are  critical  success 
factors.  It  is  difficult  to  link  an  acquisition  to  corporate 
performance,  not  only  because  of  measurement  and  access 
prob1ems, but a1so because the goals may vary. 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the  1990s,  there  was  a  substantial  increase  in  alliances  mergers  and  acquisitions 
activities in the high technology industry. More than  11,000 acquisitions were completed in  1997 
for a value estimated at over US$ 900 billion (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999a; Sarkis, 2009). 
In  the  high  techno1ogy  industries,  several  firms  have  used  acquisitions  as  their  main 
growth  strategy.  In  the  networking  industry,  for  example,  Cisco  Systems,  a  high  technology 
2 This chapter was presented as an article, with the same title, at the administrative sciences 
association of Canada (ASAC) annual conference 2009, strategy division. Niagara Falls, Canada, 
June 2009. 138 
Silicon Valley based company working in the manufacturing of networking, telecommunications 
equipment and  software, completed more  than  107  companies during the  period from  1993 to 
2006.  In  the  year  1999  alone,  it  acquired  18  companies,  in  the  year  2000  it  acquired  23 
companies,  with  an  average of almost  two  acquisitions  each  month,  and  in  2004  and 2005  it 
completed  the  acquisitions  of  24  companies.  Sirnilarly,  Norte!  Networks  completed  21 
acquisitions  during the period between  1996  and 2006 and Lucent Technologies completed 41 
acquisitions during the same period. (Sarkis, 2009) 
The equipment manufacturing firms established in this knowledge intense sector, face a 
variety of turbulent environmental challenges (Bahrarni & Evans,  1989; Romanelli,  1989). Their 
products are technically complex (Bettis &  Hitt,  1995; Jemison & Sitkin,  1986b), in which  the 
embedded knowledge  is  tacit in nature  (Oliver,  1997),  non codified and  non transferable as a 
public good (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Peteraf,  1993). The complexity of the technology is 
cou pied with a high leve! of uncertainty (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001 ; Quelin, 2000) due to 
the  Jack  of dominant  standards  or  standard  wars  (Besen  &  Farrell,  1994;  Shapiro  &  Varian, 
2003), the Jack of credible forecast for the potential future new products and the Jack of specifie 
requirements to respond to the customers' needs (Quelin, 2000; Roberts et al., 2001 ; Robertson & 
Gatignon,  1998;  Walker  &  Weber,  1984).  The  rate  of innovation  of new  technologies  and 
products is higher th an  any other industry (Hi tt, Hoskisson, & Ire! and,  1990; Hi tt  et al.,  1991 a; 
Hi tt et al.,  1996) and the industry faces continuous waves of new technological generations and 
disruptive technologies (Christensen,  1997; Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; Christensen & 
Raynor,  2003;  Utterback  &  Acee,  2005b),  which  render  the  products  obsolete,  possibly  even 
before being launched to the market (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). The rate of obsolescence is such 
that products often become obsolete before their development costs can be recaptured (Roberts & 
liu,  2001).  The  new  and  disruptive  technologies  emerge  either  inside  the  firm  or  in  the 
environmental  ecological  system,  following  a  pattern  of  an  epidemie  technology  diffusion, 
mutation and permutation of characteristics. (Sarkis, 2009) 
ln the context of the high technology industries characterized by turbulence, high velocity 
and high degree of uncertainty, no one company could possess ail the required resources needed 
to  compete and  to  sustain competitive advantage.  The cost of R&D is  very  high, the learning 
curve  very  steep  and  the  technology  and  product !ife  cycle are  very  short  (Duysters  &  Man, 139 
2003b).  This  makes  it  difficult  to  rely  only  on  interna!  R&D  and  innovative  capabilities  for 
sustained competitive ad van tage. 
Mergers  and  acquisitions  have  been  used  intensively  by  information  technology, 
networking and telecommunications firms for different reasons. Beside traditional motivations of 
econornizing  and  empire  building,  firms  in  these  sectors  used  acquisitions  mainly  to  acquire 
externat  strategie  resources,  gain  access  to  valuable  human  talents,  reduce  the  cost of R&D, 
1 
expand its portfolio of products, reduce product time to market and provide for an externat source 
of continuous innovation. 
Cisco  Systems  developed  a  strategy  called  "Acquisition  and  Development"  or A&D, 
which  is  a  combination  of  acquisition  activities  for  externat  sources  of  innovation,  while 
maintaining the  internai innovative capacity of the firm  through  research  and  development or 
R&D (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). Therefore, we assume that the motivations for acquisitions in 
these  sectors  of the high technology  industries  are  different than  the  motivations  in the  other 
industries and the more stable ones. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Furthermore,  most of the  acquisitions,  whether in  the entertainment, financial  or retail 
sectors, except of the high-tech industries, take place in the form of a "large" firm  acquiring a 
"smaller" firm. The acquisition is usually a one to one deal, between the acquirer and the acquired 
and it usually takes place by the acquirer no  more than few times during a reasonably extended 
period of time,  sometime extending for  severa! years.  However, in  the  high-tech industries and 
specifically in  the networking equipment manufacturers sector,  we  have witnessed an  explosion 
of acquisitions occurring over a very small period of time and with higher frequency during the 
same year. Therefore we assume that the nature of acquisitions in the high technology industries 
is  different than  in the other industries  and  the  more  stable ones.  The characteristics of these 
acquisitions  taking place intensively  and  over short periods of time must be different than  the 
characteristics of less frequent acquisitions extending over long periods. 
However, in most of the research on corporate mergers and acquisitions, they are viewed 
as  strategies for corporate control and empire building, and they are dealt with using a financial 
and economie perspectives, white neglecting their social, strategie and organizational dimensions 140 
(Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). The failure to identify the real motivations of acquisitions in the high 
technology  industries  or  the  cognitive  simplification  used  by  assuming  only  their  economie 
dimensions, do not help us  in understanding their dynamics, process, components, characteristics 
and  critical  success  factors.  Rather they  are treated  as  a  black box  where the only  intent is  to 
measure their performance. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Moreover,  as  the  rate  and  speed  of the  acquisitions,  the  nature  of the  industry,  the 
environmental challenges and the acquisitions motivations,  are different in  the high technology 
industries  than  any  other industry,  we  assume  that  the  process  of starting  and  completing  an 
acquisition and the critical success factors  under those conditions, must also be different in  the 
high tech industries compared to the other industries. 
Therefore, this theoretical research intends to fill  the gap, by  exploring the black box of 
acquisitions  in  the  high  technology  industries:  Understanding  their motivations, their different 
phases  and  the  activities  embedded  in  each  phase,  their  critical  success  factors  and  their 
performance  measurement.  The  research  is  organized  around  three  main  areas:  (l)  Pre-
acquisition period: What are the motivation behind mergers and acquisitions, the rational in the 
identification of the target company to be acquired and the due diligence. (2) Acquisition decision 
and integration  periods: What  are  the  critical  success  factors  in  this  period?  Issues  such  as 
complexity,  integration,  retention,  change  and  autonomy,  are  explored,  and  finally ·(3)  Post-
acquisition period: How to determine the success  or failure of an acquisition in  this challenging 
context? In other words, how to link intensive acquisitions to corporate performance and what are 
the measurement components? 
The  research  begins  with  a  short  rev1ew  of the  extended  literature  on  mergers  and 
acquisitions. This is followed by a description of the methodology and the sources of data. Data 
analysis starts by  propositions' building, followed by  the construction of a proposed theoretical 
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4.2 Literature Review 
The  high  tech  industries  are  fundamentally  different  from  other  industries.  Although 
product !ife cycles for ali industries have shortened, high tech products can become obsolete in a 
matter of months. A successful new product may boost market share and profits, but the relentless 
pace of innovation means that any one gain is likely to  be brief. Long-term success depends on 
the  sustained ability to  build on excellent products-to develop or recognize rising  technologies 
and  incorporate  them  into  new  versions  that  satisfy  rapidly  changing  markets  (Chaudhuri  & 
Tabrizi,  1999a).  Over the last decade,  firms  have constantly struggled to  deal  effectively with 
their rapidly  changing environment. The cost of R&D  have  rocketed,  whereas  steep  learning 
curves and ever shortening product and  technology !ife cycles have reduced the time to  recoup 
these costs (Duysters & Man, 2003b; Sarkis, 2009) 
High technology firms  embark on major strategie moves  in the face of a unique set of 
challenges.  Their  products  are  technically  comp1ex  (Bettis  &  Hitt,  1995;  Jemison  &  Sitkin, 
1986b  ), in which the embedded knowledge is tacit in nature (Oliver,  1997), non codified and non 
transferable as  a public good (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Peteraf,  1993). The complexity of 
the technology is cou  pied with  a high  leve!  of uncertainty (Hoffman &  Schaper-Ririkel, 2001; 
Quelin, 2000) due to  the Jack of dominant standards or standard wars  (Besen & Farrell,  1994; 
. Shapiro & Varian, 2003), the  Jack of credible forecast for the potential future new products and 
the lack of specifie requirements to  respond to the customers' needs (Que1in, 2000; Roberts et al., 
2001 ;  Robertson  &  Gatignon,  1998;  Wa1ker  &  Weber,  1984).  The rate  of innovation of new 
technologies and products is  higher than any other industry (Hitt,  Hoskisson, & Ireland,  1990; 
Hi tt et al.,  1991 a; Hi tt et al.,  1996)  and the industry faces continuous waves of new technologica1 
generations and disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; 
Christensen &  Raynor,  2003;  Utterback  &  Acee, 2005b),  which render the  products  obsolete, 
possibly  even  before  being  launched  to  the  market  (Mayer  &  Kenney,  2004b).  The  rate  of 
obsolescence is such that products often become obsolete before their development costs can be 
recaptured (Roberts & Liu, 2001 ). (Sarkis, 2009) 
Effective  strategies  incorporate  offensive  moves,  flexible  postures,  and  a  capacity  for 
continuous  leaming  (Bahrarni  &  Evans,  1989).  Consequent1y,  many  firms  have  adopted 142 
acquisitions as a strategy for growth. In fast changing markets and turbulent industries, firms are 
using acquisitions to gain and sustain competitive advantage (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi,  l999a). 
The research focusing on the high tech industries show that acquisitions are motivated by 
the need to obtain critical resources for the survivability of the firm or for sustaining competitive 
advantage,  instead  of the  conventional  explanation  of gaining  market  share,  expansion  and 
economies of scale (Ranft & Lord, 2000). Those resources include R&D capabilities, innovative 
products, new technologies, skilled human assets, top management and entrepreneurial expertise, 
tacit and specialized knowledge and know-how. 
One  definition  of  acquisition  m  this  context  is  "when  a  larger  firm  combines  its 
capabilities  in  commercialization, manufacturing,  distribution and innovation,  with  the product 
innovation capabilities of smaller entrepreneurial firms" (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2003). Thus 
acquisitions  enhance  the  technological  capabilities  of the  acquirer,  as  those  capabilities  are 
embedded  in  the  tacit  and  socially  complex  knowledge  of the  acquired  firm  (Ranft  &  Lord, 
2000). 
Sorne acquisitions succeed white others fail. As Meyer, A. D. (1999) pointed out: "this is~ 
not a random event, or idiosyncratic to one particular company, but there seems to be a pattern. 
Sorne acquisitions fail be  cause they are a strategie misfit, others probably because they are badly 
implemented". He then  asked  about the conditions  under  which  acquisitions  are  needed?;  the 
phases and the process it follows?; and the conditions or critical success factors for successfully 
managing acquisitions towards fruitful results. 
4.2.1 Pre-Acquisition 
Mayer & Kenney (2004b) noted that the research on acquisitions could be divided into 
two perspectives. The first perspective deals with the attributes within the two firms engaged in 
the  acquisition activity,  the  acquirer and  the  acquired.  Those attributes could  be related  to  the 
organizational structure su ch as  economies of scale or scope (Bain,  1959), the synergies de ri ved 
from  a  "broader product  line"  or  from  "vertical  economies"  (Williamson,  1975).  Scherer,  F. 
( 1980)  explained  how  acquisitions  have  a  positive  impact  on  market  power  due  to  reduced 143 
competition and  greater management involvement in larger acquisitions  has  a better chance of 
success, than in smaller acquisitions(Shelton, 1988b). 
Network theoiy and social networks have been used to highlight the importance of social 
networks, and formai and informai relationships, to the process on target identification within the 
firm's ecosystem and the facilitation of gaining inside information, evaluating the potential for 
acquisition (or alliance), and valuating important attributes such as strategie fit,  common culture, 
tacit  knowledge,  technology  and  product  alignment  (Haunschild,  Henderson,  &  Davis-Blake, 
1998; Palmer et al.,  1995). Cultural sirnilarity between firms engaged in pre-acquisition activities 
was found to be positive! y related to the acquisition potential success rate (Datta,  1991; Larsson 
& Finkelstein, 1999). 
4.2.2 Post-Acquisition 
The second perspective in acquisition research deal with the  "post-transaction" period 
after the  acquisition  decision  is  taken and  the  acquisition is  completed  as  a  transaction.  The 
research in this post-acquisition phase is divided into two categories: The cultural features within 
the two organization with respect to  strategie fit; and the process of the integration of the acquired 
firm with its embedded variables (Mayer &  Kenney, 2004b). As in the pre-acquisition phase in 
which  target  selection  is  a  key  element  of acquisition  success,  in  the  post-acquisition  phase, 
integration is  a Key element in achieving the desired benefits and in having a positive impact on 
the overall firm' s performance. 
Cultural  rnisfit  and  culture clashes have contributed  to  poor acquisition  outcome  and 
acquisition failure (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh,  1988). Poor internai communication, the Jack of a 
common strategie direction and employee resistance, of both the acquirer and the acquired firms, 
have negative contributions to strategie fit and acquisition outcome and performance (Larsson & 
Finkelstein,  1999).  These huma11  relations  issues  have  a  larger impact on  team  building  and 
dynarnics,  organizational  culture,  recruitment  and  retention.  In  the  same  line,  Hambrick  & 
Cannella  (1993)  demonstrated  that  senior  management  turnover  was  negatively  related  to 
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Another line of research in the post-acquisition phase highlighted the importance of the 
methodology used  in completing the  acquisition and  the process  used  in  the integration of the 
acquired firm (Haspelagh & Jernison,  1991; Jernison & Sitkin, 1986b).  Moreover, Zollo & Singh 
(2002)  have explained  that  the  process  codification of acquisitions  have  a  larger influence  on 
acquisition performance, than the accumulation of acquisition knowledge and experience. 
Another stream of research deals  with the relationship between knowledge management 
and  human  resource  recruitment  and  retention.  Knowledge  management  is  an  important 
component of the integration process  in  the post-acquisition phase. The objective would be how 
to  integrate the  knowledge base  of the acquired firm  and how to  transfer the  knowledge path, 
history and dependence, of the acquirer to the acquired firm. The nature of knowledge in the high 
technologies  industries is  tacit (Oliver,  1997)  and embedded in the complex social and  hu man 
capital. It could be in  the technical expertise and know-how of the technical teams,  the research 
and  development  capabilities,  the  management  practice,  the  entrepreneurial  spirit  or  the 
innovation track record. Ranft & Lord (2000) found that the retention of such tacit knowledge and 
talents is highly important during the integration process. 
_However,  the  literature  presents  contradictory  results  on  the  relationship  befWeen 
knowledge transfer and the process of post-acquisition integration. Huysman, Leonard &  Nicolle 
(2002)  found  that  sorne  researchers  propose  a  curvilinear  relationship  between  knowledge 
transfer in the post-acquisition phase and sorne preconditions such as  strategie fit, integration and 
retention of talent, while the other researchers propose a monotonie relationship. They assumed 
that  acquisitions  are  idiosyncratic  in  nature  and  very  specifie  to  their  context,  and  therefore 
concluding that it is difficult to find general causal explanation. 
4.2.3 Effect on Performance 
Although  performance  measurement  is  a  critical  issue  in  evaluating  the  acquisition 
performance and  outcome, Tehrani (2003)  found  contradictory results linking acquisitions and 
superior performance:  Sorne  researches reflect on the positive relationship between acquisitions 
and  performance,  while  others  propose  a  negative  relationship  or  no  relationship  between 145 
acquisition  ac ti viti es  and  firm  performance.  A  third  group  of  researchers  identified  sorne 
mediating and moderating factors in the relationship between acquisitions and firm performance. 
For example, Hayward &  Hambrick ( 1997) and Ravenscraft &  Scherer ( 1989) reported 
insignificant or negative returns as  acquisition outcome on performance. To the contrary, Jensen 
(1984) reported positive returns. In balance, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) concluded that there 
was no consensus on the relationship between acquisition and its effect on firm performance. 
One way to measure the effect of acquisition on firm performance, is to calculate market 
returns before, during and after an acquisition has been announced and the announced acquisition 
completed  (Porrini,  2004).  However,  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  performance of successive 
acquisitions and especially the acquisitions occurring over short periods of time, such as one year. 
This  is  due  to  the  difficulty  in  isolating  the  effect  of  one  acquisition  from  the  series  of 
acquisitions occurring over the same short period of time (Weston, 1999). 
Furthermore,  while  the  mam  stream  research  on  performance  measurement  of 
acquisitions has shifted from a general evaluation of the economie performance, to the evaluation 
of horizontal, vertical and  unrelated acquisitions, performance measurement based on technical 
and technological dimensions has been ignored or neglected (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2000). We 
assume that technological or technical performance is  an  important performance  measurement, 
especially in the technology based industries such as  the high technology industries, where sorne 
acquisitions,  if  not  ali,  could  be  motivated  by  the  need  to  acquire,  integrate  and  build  on 
complementary,  supplementary  or  substitutive  technologies.  The  outcome  could  be  a  better 
technology based product or service, a su peri or technical performance or a new line of products. 
4.3 Theory Building and General Propositions (Hypotheses) 
In  the  high  technology  industries,  severa!  firms  have  used  acquisitions  as  their  main 
growth  strategy.  In  the  networking  industry,  for  example,  Cisco  Systems,  a  high  technology 
Silicon Valley based company working in the manufacturing of networking, telecommunications 
equipment and  software, completed more  than  107  companies during the  period from  1993  to 146 
2006.  In  the  year  1999  alone,  it  acquired  18  companies,  m  the  year  2000  it  acquired  23 
companies,  with  an  average of almost two  acquisitions  each  month,  and  in  2004 and 2005  it 
completed  the  acquisitions  of  24  companies.  Similarly,  Norte!  Networks  completed  21 
acquisitions during the period between  1996 and 2006 and Lucent Technologies completed 41 
acquisitions during the same period. 
"Lucent wants the smartest group of  people in Bell Labs. But ifwe're not good at something, 
we've got Silicon Valley.  lt's our lab" --Don Listwin, Cisco's No. 2 executive. (Goldblatt, 
1999) 
Mergers  and  acquisitions  have  been  used  intensively  by  information  technology, 
networking and telecommunications firms for different reasons. Beside traditiona1 motivations of 
economizing  and  empire building,  firms  in  these  sectors  used  acquisitions  mainly  to  acquire 
externat  strategie  resources,  gain  access  to  valuable  human  talents,  reduce  the  cost of R&D, 
expand its portfolio of products, reduce product time to market and provide for an externat source 
of continuo  us innovation, in a very short period of ti me. 
"Our acquisition strate gy was aimed at acquiring brainpower more than products" 
--John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems (Byrne & Elgin, 2002). 
Cisco  Systems  developed  a  strategy  called  "Acquisition  and  Development"  or A&D, 
which  is  a  combination  of  acquisition  activities  for  externat  sources  of  innovation,  white 
maintaining the internai  innovati ve  capacity of the  finn  through  research  and  development or 
R&D (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). Therefore, we  assume that the motivations for acquisitions in 
these  sectors  of the  high  technology  industries  are  different than  the  motivations  in  the other 
industries and the more stable ones. 147 
"ln general, our philosophy is ta  have about 70 percent of our products come from interna! 
development and 30 percent through acquired companies. About 80 percent of the company's 
technology is developed internally. Despite Cisco's vast resources it is unreasonable ta expect 
the company ta stay on top of  eve1y emerging technology. Acquisitions Jill the void.  We  view it 
as a very efficient process ta de li ver a product ta the customer." 
-- Michelangelo Volpi, Chief acquisition officer, Cisco Systems (Heskett, 1997) 
Acquisitions are a strategie tool to expand the firm capabi1ities, including physical assets 
and tacit knowledge. Acquisitions are engines for growth and sustained competitive advantage. 
"The  more  integrated  Cisco's  router  and switching  hardware  is  with  the  company's  new 
business offerings, the more entrenched Cisco will become in customers' networks.  The more 
entrenched Cisco becomes, the less danger there is of  customers' switching ta other suppliers. 
Cisco is  building walls around its  territory or,  as Chambers euphemistically puts it, keeping 
customers from having ta make a vendor decision." 
-- Michelangelo Volpi, Chief acquisition officer, Cisco Systems (Vogelstein, 2002) 
However, acquisition should not be for the sake of acquisition. It should be based on the 
identification of real internai needs and potential external resources. 
"Sycamore and Juniper are strong competitors. They are goodfor us.  They make us work 
harder. But 1 would not make a defensive acquisition, like buying a Juniper just ta throttle its 
technology." --John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems (Serwer, 2000) 
Furthermore, acquisitions if not well managed and especially in  the case of acquisitions 
for the sake of acquisitions, are not a guarantee to success and could lead to failure. 
"They'  re basic  ally buying everything they don 't have.  M &A works ta some extent, but at 
Cisco, it got out of  hand' --Craig Johnson, principal analyst for market watcher (Heskett, 
1997) 148 
Proposition  1.  Acquisitions  are  sometime  a  critical  factor  for  growth  in  a  high  velocity 
environment.  However, successful  acquisitions  depend on  a  successful  identification of needs, 
capabilities and a target to be acquired. 
On key  element in  the  pre-acquisition  phase in  the continuous scanning  of the  firm's 
ecosystem, coupled with the internai assessment of resources and needs. 
"Once that decision is made, my team consults with business units and customers to find out 
about the ir technological needs.  Customers have a profound influence on Cisco's strategy." 
-- Michelangelo Vol pi, Chief acquisition officer, Cisco Systems (Goldblatt, 1999) 
The continuous scanning of the environment and the assessment of internai needs, allow 
the acquiring company to move fast ahead of the competition. 
"We had interestfrom other companies, but they didn't move as fast as Cisco.  They were still 
considering us when the announcement came out that Cisco had bought us." 
-- Joe Bass, CEO of Monterey (Goldblatt, 1999) 
The assessment of the externat environment allows the firm  to  identify  new  emerging 
technologies that complement or supplement its product line and new disruptive technologies that 
could  substitute  their  product  advantage.  In  this  ever  changing,  turbulent,  high  velocity 
environment with high  degree of certainty, it is important to  identify these new  and disruptive 
technologies in their embryonic stage. 
"If  a market are  a appears to be promising,  Cisco may eventually move to acquire the firm." 
John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems-- (Wuebker et al.,  1998). 
However, the successful selection of targets is a precondition for successful integration in 
the post-acquisition transaction. 149 
"/ don't believe mergers of  equals 1vork." 
John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems -- (Goldblatt, 1999). 
"When Cisco has mistimed its bid  .. .ln the 1996 (the) acquisition of  Granite Systems, a maker 
of  gigabit ethe met switches, didn 't work because Granite's product wasn 't as far along as 
Cisco had believed.  On the other hand, people close to one of  Cisco's largest acquisitions, 
that of  StrataCom in 1996, say it was dijficult because StrataCom was too large and its 
product too developed.  Cisco had trouble integrating elements of  its operating system into 
StrataCom's switches ".  (Goldblatt,  1999) 
Proposition 2.  Identification of the target to  be acquired is  a critical step  in  the pre-acquisition 
period  and  is  the  building  block  for  the  acquisition  process  and  post-acquisition  success.  In 
addition, due diligence is critical inconfirming a strategie fit combined with long-term objectives 
and leads to the acquisition approval and go-ahead. 
Managing  complexity  is  a  key  success  factor  in  the  post-acquisition  transaction  and 
implementation phase. It covers resource capabilities, assessment of needs, competitive analysis, 
existing  and  future  technologies  under  development,  engineering  and  innovation  talents, 
corporate culture,  strategie  fit,  information  technologies  infrastructure,  products  road  map  and 
human capital. 
"Cisco's strategy can be boiled dawn to five things.  We look at a company's vision; its short-
term  success with  customers;  its  long-term  strategy;  the chemistry of the people with ours; 
and its geographie proximity." 
-- Michelangelo Volpi, Chief acquisition officer, Cisco Systems (Goldblatt, 1999) 
Complexity  should  be  evaluated  pnor  to  the  acquisition  transaction  and  should  be 
planned prior to the implementation and integration phase. 
"Acquire a business that's too mature,  and risk soars. If you buy a company with customers, 
product .flows,  and entrenched enterprise resource systems,  you have to move very ginger/y. 
Otherwise,  you  risk  customer dissatisfaction.  Figuring  out  how  to  integrate  this  type  of 
company could take nine months or more." 
-- Michelangelo Volpi, Chief acquisition officer, Cisco Systems (Goldblatt, 1999) 150 
Reducing complexity could be  achieved by  selecting the  right  target  based  on severa! 
criteria, among them proximity. 
"Our fifth  rule  of thumb  was  geographie  proximity  when  doing  large  acquisitions.  We 
combined StrataCom and Cisco in 90 days. " 
-- Michelangelo Vol pi, Chief acquisition officer, Cisco Systems (Wuebker et al.,  1998) 
Culture  fit  and  compatibility  are  important  issues  when  assessmg  and  planning  for 
complexity. 
"Go over the decisions that management made,  and see if  you'd come to the same conclusion. 
If  so,  the company  's execs probably think the way you do and are likely to fit in fine. " 
-- Dan Scheinman, Vice President for legal affairs, Cisco Systems (Goldblatt, 1999) 
Proposition 3.  Complexity is  a critical success  factor in the pre-acquisition and implementation 
periods.  Complexity bas to  be investigated linking the acquirer and  the acquired,  mapped and 
planed for prior to any acquisition. 
Integration  is  a  critical  success  factor  in  the  acquisition  implementation  period. 
Integration involves issues  such  as  employees' retention, management of change,  integration of 
processes  and  information  technology  systems,  technology  infrastructure,  R&D  capabilities, 
product road map, and sales force capabilities. Successful integration relies on the methodology 
used for completing the acquisition and the process  used for the integration of the acquired firm 
in the post-acquisition transaction phase. 
"We're spending $10 billion a year in acquisitions; this is a process that works." 
John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems -- (Goldblatt, 1999). 
The  most  important  element  in  the  integration  process  1s  the  human  capital  and  the 
embedded tacit knowledge of the acquired firm. 151 
"Cisco has an overall goal of getting  the  top  JO%  ta  15% of people in  our industry.  Our 
philosophy is very simple--ifyou get the best people in the industry ta fit into your culture and 
you motivate them properly, then you 're going ta be an industry leader." 
--John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems (Nakache, 1997) 
"And then  there's  Cisco's  acquisition  strategy.  If you  can't hire  talent,  just buy  it.  One of 
Cisco's  core  strategies for  growth  is  acquisition,  and  one  of the  primary  purposes for 
acquisitions is for the engineerùzg  and R&D talent.  In  addition ta  hiring close ta  1,000 new 
employees per year,  Cisco  absorbed  the  employees of the  acquired companies,  including 
1,300 from StrataCom, a supplier of switches used ta speed information delivery  across the 
Internet.  Cisco seeks ta  keep virtually al! the employees of the companies it buys,  sometimes 
by !etting them telecommute. " 
--Barbara Beek, Vice President human resources Cisco Systems (Nakache, 1997) 
The  integration  process  is  a  step  by  step,  carefully  designed  and  meticu1ously 
imp1emented  process.  Accumulating  knowledge  based  on  acquisition  experience  lead  to  the 
refinement and fine tuning of the process. 
"I'm there from the point of ùzception  till you can't identify  the  company as  an acquisition 
anymore.  I jake that l'rn  going to  get companies ta  the  point of do-it-yourself integration, 
where I just send a videotape of  me talking" 
-- Mimi Gigoux, Vice President for Integration Cisco Systems  (Goldblatt, 1999) 
"We closed the deal at 11 p.  m. on a Wednesday.  When I walked in Thursday moming, we all 
had Cisco tags on our doors and a banner on the front of  our building. And they had this huge 
Cisco art thing on the wall in the lobby.  I saw someone in he re putting bottled water in the 
fridge ta replace our coolers. They really don't mess around." --Lori Smith, Human 
Resources directorat Monterey (Goldblatt, 1999) 
Proposition 4.  Integration is  a critical  success  factor  in  the  acquisition  implementation  period. 
Based on the comp1exity map, tbe  integration plan has to be prepared prior to the acquisition and 
implemented immediate]  y after the acquisition transaction. 
Maintaining  autonomy  is  a  critical  success  factor  in  the  integration  phase.  As  the 
integration  of the  acquired  firm  is  critical,  the  autonomy  of sorne  business  units  within  the 152 
acquired  firm  such  as  the  R&D  and  product  management  groups  is  important  in  the  post-
acquisition  transaction  phase.  Autonomy  positively  enhances  the  retention  of  the  acquired 
employees;  the integrity of the R&D teams,  protect the core creative teams from the larger firm 
bureaucracy, continue to bond the teams and to stimulate their creative activities. 
"In general, business units are pretty autonomous here.  It's not stifling at ail. "People like to 
workfor a leader. " 
--Bill Rossi, Executive at Cisco Systems  (Goldblatt, 1999) 
Proposition 5. Maintaining the uniqueness, individuality, and autonomy of sorne areas or groups 
of the acquired company is a critical success factor in  the acquisition implementation and post-
acquisition periods. 
Synergy is critical success factor in the post acquisition transaction and integration phase. 
Synergy is essential in avoiding duplication and it covers talent, products, capabilities, resources, 
objectives and operational plans. Synergy deals with economies of scope and scale and it has a 
direct effect on the overall success of the acquisition and the global cot-porate performance. 
"Cisco's ability to integrate acquired companies is legendary. This creates lots of  synergy. 
Thanks to acquisitions, Cisco's offerings run up and down the entire product hierarchy, giving 
customers one-stop shopping for the  ir networking needs. End to end." --John Chambers, 
CEO of Cisco Systems (Serwer, 2000) 
Synergy  is  an  important  element  Ln  maintaining  the  firm  growth  and  tn  sustaining 
competitive advantage 
"The  more  integrated  Cisco's  router and switching  hardware  is  with  the  company's  new 
business offerings, the more entrenched Cisco will become in customers' networks. The more 
entrenched  Cisco  becomes,  the  less  danger  the re  is  of customers'  switching  to  other 
suppliers.  Cisco is  building walls aroufid its territory o,r,  as Chambers euphemistically puts 
it, keeping customers from having to make a v  endor decision." 
-- Michelangelo Volpi, Chief Acquisition Officer Cisco Systems (Vogelstein, 2002) 153 
Proposition 6.  Creating synergy is a cri  ti cal success factor during the acquisition implementation 
and post acquisition periods. 
Proposition 7.  It  is  difficult to  link a  specifie acquisition to corporate performance, because of 
measurement  and  access  problems.  Acquisitions  may  have  a  direct  or  indirect  effect  on 
performance  and  the  results  may  vary  depending  on  the  specifie  acquisition  situation. 
Performance  evaluation  should  not  be  lirnited  to  economie  value  only,  but  should  take  into 
account  se  veral  other  dimensions  such  as  strategie  objectives,  technological  and  social 
performance. In  addition it should be  evaluated not only in the short-term, but also in  the long-
term. 
4.4 Proposed Theoretical Model 
Figure 4.1  illustrates the proposed theoretical model, constructed based on the  induced 
theoretical propositions. 
Acquisitions are  sometime a critical factor for  growth in  a  high  velocity environment. 
However, successful acquisitions depend on a successful identification of needs, capabilities and 
a target to be acquired. Furthermore, acquisitions if not weil managed and especially in the case 
of acquisitions for the sake of acquisitions, are not a guarantee to success and could lead to failure 
Identification of the target  to  be acquired is  a critical  step in  the pre-acquisition period 
and is the building block for the acquisition process and post-acquisition success. In addition, due 
diligence is critical in confirrning a strategie fit combined with long-term objectives and leads to 
the acquisition approval and go-ahead. Motivation 
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Complexity is a critical success factor in the pre-acquisition and implementation periods. 
Complexity has to be investigated linking the acquirer and the acquired, mapped and planed for 
prior to any acquisition. It covers resource capabilities, assessment of needs, competitive analysis, 
existing  and  future  technologies  under  development,  engineering  and  innovation  talents, 
corporate culture, information technologies infrastructure, products road map and human capital. 
Integration is a critical success factor in the acquisition implementation period. Based on 
the  complexity  map,  the  integration  plan  has  to  be  prepared  prior  to  the  acquisition  and 
implemented immediately after the acquisition agreement has been reached. Integration involves --- --·-------·  -------- - -
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tssues  such  as  employees'  retention,  management  of  change,  integration  of  processes  and 
information technology systems, product road map, and sales force capabilities. 
Maintaining the uniqueness, individuality, and autonomy of sorne areas or groups of the 
acquired  company  is  a  critical  success  factor  in  the  acquisition  implementation  and  post-
acquisition periods. 
Synergy  is  a  critical  success  factor  during  the  acquisition  implementation  and  post 
acquisition  periods.  Synergy is  essential in  avoiding duplication and it covers talent,  products, 
capabilities,  resources,  objectives  and  operational  plans.  It . has  a  direct  effect  on  the  overall 
success of the acquisition and the global corporate performance. 
It  is  difficult  to  link  a  specifie  acquisition  to  corporate  petformance,  because  of 
measurement  and  access  problems.  Acquisitions  may  have  a  direct  or  indirect  effect  on 
performance  and  the  results  may  vary  depending  on  the  specifie  acquisition  situation. 
Performance  evaluation  should  not  be  lirnited  to  economie  value  only,  but  should  take  into 
account  severa!  other  dimensions  such  as  strategie  objectives,  technological  and  social 
performance. In addition it should be evaluated not only in  the short-term, but also in  the long-
term. 156 
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A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE OF DECISION MAKING IN 
THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY USING CAUSAL MAPPING 
3 
This  paper explores  the  strategy  fùrmulation  and  the  concepts 
related to the decision making regarding acquisition formation in 
the information technology industry. Acquisitions, as part of the 
technical  collaboration  between  firms  in  the  information 
technology  industry,  have  been  intensive  since  1990.  The 
complexity  of  the  related  issues,  critical  success  factors, 
conditions,  triggers,  motivations,  causes,  effects  and  their 
interlinked  relationships,  have  not  been  fully  covered  in  the 
literature  of  strategie  management.  In  this  paper,  they  are 
explored  with  a  holistic  approach  to  the  study  of  strategie 
management,  using  a  cause  and  effect  mapping  technique, 
known  as  cognitive  mapping.  The application  of this  research 
tool and the results help us  to understand the importance of each 
concept  (causes  and  consequences)  used,  the  interrelationships 
between  them,  and  the  complexity  of  the  decision  making 
process.  The  paper  is  a  contribution  to  the  field  of strategie 
management and  to  the cognitive approach in  the  management 
science. 
5.1 Introduction 
The  information  technology  industry  is  different  than  any  other  technology  based 
industry. It is characterized by turbulence, high velocity, uncertainty and complexity. This is  due 
partially  to  the  high  rate  of innovation,  obsolescence,  intensity  of  R&D  activities  and  the 
continuous  emergence  of  disruptive  technologies.  The  IT  industry  is  based  cin  knowledge 
intensive content, which is not codified in routines and procedures, tacit in nature, and embedded 
3  This  chapter  was  published  as  an  article,  with  the  same  title,  at  the  proceedings  of the 
administrative sciences association of Canada (ASAC) annual conference 2009, strategy division. 
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in  the  social complexity of the interrelation  between the  agents'  interactions.  Firms  in  the IT 
sector, possess highly technical skills,  intensive R&D capabilities, entrepreneurial  management 
experience,  and  healthy  organizational  structure  and  culture  that  encourage  innovation  and 
creativity, ail of which are considered as  strategie assets which are difficult to  imitate,  unique, 
copy,  duplicate  or  simply  transfer  by  employees  mobility,  recruitment  or  retention.  Those 
strategie assets are built over time, based on choice and path dependency, and constitute the core 
competencies of the firm providing a sustained competitive advantage. (Sarkis, 2009) 
The  information  technology  industry  has  witnessed  intensive  collaborative  activities 
between the firms  in  the sector,  aimed  at  coping  with  the environmental challenges,  need  for 
continuous  innovation  and  scarcity  of  strategie  resources  and  talents.  Those  collaborative 
activities  included  informai  collaboration,  strategie  alliances,  R&D  agreement,  joint-ventures, 
venture capital, angel investment, mergers and acquisitions. Since 1990, mergers and acquisitions 
for example have  been used intensively by  information technology firms  for  different reasons. 
Beside traditional  motivations of economizing and empire building,  IT firms  used  acquisitions 
mainly to  acquire externat strategie resources, gain access to valuable human talents, reduce the 
cost of R&D, expand its portfolio of products,  reduce product time to market and provide for an 
externat  source  of continuous  innovation.  Severa! firms  have  used  acquisitions  as  their  main 
growth strategy.  Cisco systems  for example, a  high  technology Silicon Valley  based company 
working in the  manufacturing of networking and telecommunications equipment and software, 
acquired more than 107 companies during the period from  1993 to 2006. In the year 1999 alone it 
acquired 18  companies and in the year 2000 it acquired 23 companies, with an average of almost 
two  acquisitions each  month.  Today, Cisco  systems  stands  as  a  leader in  the  high  technology 
industry and as  the company who created this trend of using a successful aggressive acquisition 
strategy as its main growth engine; a strategy later called A&D. (Sarkis, 2009) 
However, the importance of this trend within the context of the high technology industry, 
the research  on  acquisitions  in  the  literature  of strategie  management could be  categorized as 
contradictory,  incoherent and  incomplete.  First, it is  contradictory because the findings  present 
contradictory  performance  outcome  related  to  acquisitions,  even  in  the  same  industry  sector. 
Second, it is  incoherent, because sorne researches focus  on the economie aspect of acquisitions 
including performance, economies of scope and scale,  market penetration, growth, position, net -- ------------
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gain, etc.,  while the others focus  on  the strategie aspect of acquisition including human talent, 
tacit  knowledge, strategie resources, strategie fit,  organizational culture and core competencies. 
Each approach neglects the other,  which leads  to  an incoherent picture of the factors  involved. 
The theories used are numerous: transactio11 cost economies, resource based view,  market based 
view, knowledge based  view,  institutional  theory,  network theory,  population ecology,  among 
others.  Each theory gives a perspective to the  study of acquisitions, however the whole picture 
remain fragmented and unclear. Third, it is incomplete because the literature has not shed enough 
light on ali  the factors, criteria, conditions, motivations, causes and consequences related to  the 
acquisition formation.  When a company such  as  Cisco undergo intensive acquisition activities 
during a  small period of time  (two per month), the critical  success  factors  and the process of 
decision making for the acquisition formaüon has not been fully researched, under those extreme 
and intense environmental conditions. In  fact  due to its complexity, most of the factors  and the 
whole  process  is  researched  using  cognitive  simplification  (Duhaime  &  Schwenk,  1985), 
implying also that practitioners use simplification in their decision making. Furthermore, practical 
considerations  li mit  the  research  on  complex  issues.  In  quantitative  research  studying 
acquisitions, the practical limitation on the  number of variables to  be used, limit the research to 
those variables, and does not explain the "why" and "how" related questions. Using industrial and 
commercial  databases  and  conducting  statistical  analysis  using  multiple  techniques,  does  not 
clarify,  nor  explain  the  factors  and  their  interrelations  related  to  acquisitions.  In  qualitative 
acquisitions  research,  the  textual  form  provides  more  clarification  and  explanation,  but  is 
constrained by the limited number of pages  required for publishing a  paper. Moreover,  as  the 
field of strategy and strategie manageme11t  borrows from different disciplines such as  sociology, 
anthropology,  politics,  industrial  economies,  etc.,  acquisitions  research  using  one  or another 
perspective, remain fragmented, does not integrate ali of the factors involved and does not portray 
the complexity of the issue (Hasfi  & Thomas, 2005). 
Therefore,  there  is  a  gap  in  the  strategie  management  literature  with  respect  to  the 
research  on acquisitions in the context of the high technology  industry. This paper provides a 
valuable contribution in  filling  this gap. The paper uses  a  holistic  and  integrative  approach in 
researching  acquisitions  in  the  context  of  the  high  technology  industry,  by  integrating  and 
combining different and distinct perspectives into a larger mode!, while maintaining the depth of 
analysis that could be used in an analytical approach,  without neglecting the details,  coherence 166 
and the relation to  practice. The objective of this research is  to  highlight the concepts related to 
acquisitions in the context of the high technology  industry and their relative importance in  the 
process of decision making leading to the acquisition formation. The concepts have been gathered 
from  the  strategie  management  literature,  classified  according  to  their  respective  theoretical 
approach and  the ir interrelated links examined using triangulation to  ens  ure internai validity. A 
causal mapping technique know as cognitive mapping,  was  used to draw the causal and effect 
relationships between the different concepts and to analyze their interrelated effects on each other 
and their relative importance with a constructivist, holistic and integrative mode!. The constructed 
map eliminates the limitations of the traditional statistical methods used in  quantitative resea1ch 
and the textual methods used in qualitative research, by  providing a visual tool for combining a 
large number of concepts in  one space,  including their intenelated links describing a causal or 
effect relationship.  It  is a representation of cognitive schema based on my  understanding of the 
literature on acquisitions in the strategie management tradition. The research is a contribution to 
the  field  of strategie  management,  to  the  research  on acquisitions  in  the  context of the  high 
technology  industry  and  to  the  application of the cognitive approach in  studying  management 
issues  using  the  cognitive  mapping  as  a  research  tool.  The  research  is  intended  to  both  the 
academia and to the practitioners. 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
The research on acquisitions in the context of the high technology industry is  a complex 
issue and it is  much more complex than it seems, when using one approach.  As  noted by Hafsi 
and Thomas (2005, p 509) "collective action cannat be understood if  it is broken dawn into parts 
ta  be studied separately.  As reality is complex,  it is more appropriate ta  study it in  its totality. 
This means not only studying aiL  the parts together but also the ir inter-relationships, even if the 
result  is  an  incomplete  and  impeifect  understanding".  Strategy  is  classified  into  divisional 
functions  such  as  marketing, finance,  operations; it  is  grounded in  behavioral science, political 
science,  anthropology,  sociology,  psychology,  economies  and  finance,  it  combines  different 
disciplines  such  as  business  policy  and  strategie  management,  industrial  organization, 
organizational  economies,  economies  sociology,  hu man  behavioral  science,  organizationa] 
theory, it uses different theories borrowed from distinct areas of social science such as transaction 167 
cost,  resource based  view, network theory,  knowledge-based view and market-based view.  " ft 
feels  like a vast array of diverse and uncoordinated detailed observations that are scientifically 
respectable,  yet incoherent in practice" (Hasfi &  Thomas, 2005, p 5 11).  Therefore the need for 
an integrative and holistic approach that encompasses as much variables as possible, constructing 
the  reality as  observed by  the researcher, and painting a realistic picture of the reality  using  a 
constructi vist approach. 
The  complexity  of  the  research  on  acquisitions  bas  led  to  the  use  of  cognitive 
simplification by  both academie researchers and practitioners. Decision makers use similarities 
and analogies to similar situation and  they overestimate or underestimate the potential impact of 
their decisions due to the limited 11umber of factors used in the analysis (Duhaime &  Schwenk, 
1985).  Cognitive  simplification is demonstrated to  be  widely  used  in  the  process  of decision 
making  and  when  dealing  with  complex  and  interrelated  issues  (Schwenk,  1984).  Bounded 
rationality is the inability of the human to process more than a limited number of alternatives and 
to process them ali,  which limits his ability to solve complex problems (March &  Simon,  1958; 
Simon, 1976). Under those limitations and facing complex issues, the process of decision making 
was researched in the context of structuring the unstructured (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 
1976), making judgment under uncertainty (Tversky &  Kahneman,  1974), and the psychological 
determinants of bounded rationality and its implications for decision making (Taylor,  1975). The 
cognitive complexity in the strategie decision process bas been explored by Hitt and Tyler (1991). 
Also  Tyler  and  Steensma  (1995)  explored  the  technological  collaborative  activities  using  a 
cognitive perspective: "The cognitive limitations affect the simplified mental models or schema 
top executives use to get a grasp of the situation at band" (Schwenk,  1984; Walsh, 1995) as cited 
by  Tyler and  Steensma  (1995).  Finally  Eisenhardt  and  Zbaracki  (1992)  provides  a  extensive 
comparison between bounded rationality, power and politics and the garbage can model. 
Cognitive  mapping  is  used  to  represent  the  mental  schema  of the  researcher  when 
studying an issue (Eden & Ackermann,  1998) or as  a representation of the representation of the 
mental schema of a human subject related to a research issue (Cossette & Audet, 1994). They are 
constructed based on a subjectivist approach, by using concepts or variables related to the issue 
under investigation  and  links  or  relations  between  the  concepts  reflecting  their  interrelations, 
strength  and  directions.  Cognitive  maps  helps  to  uncover  the  knowledge  structure  and  the 168 
dominant  logic  within  the  firm  related  to  th~ subject  under investigation  (Bettis  &  Prahalad, 
1995).  lt assist in  giving  meaning and  signification, or sense giving,  to  the issues  related  to a 
central concept, question,  vision or strate  gy (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991 ). 
Cognitive  mapping  techniques  have  been  used  in  different  areas  of the  administrative 
science  and  for  different  purposes.  Sorne  examples  include:  mapping  conceptual  models  in 
macroeconomie  theory  (Cassette  &  Lapointe,  1997);  analysing  the  thinking  of F.  W.  Taylor 
(Cassette,  2002);  supporting  information  system  development  (Ackermann  &  Eden,  2005); 
analysing  policies  in  the  public  sector  (Eden  &  Ackermann,  2004);  analyzing  retail  location 
decision making (Clarke et al. , 2003); analyzing technology driven and mode! driven approaches 
to  group  decision  (Morton,  Ackermann,  &  Belton,  2003);  analyzing  delay  and  disruption 
(Williams, Ackermann, & Eden, 2003); analyzing the institutional influences on managers mental 
models of competition (Daniels, Johnson, & Chernatony, 2002). 
5.3 Methodological Framework 
The  research  used  the  cognitive mapping  technique  as  a  qualitative  research  tool  for 
analyzing  qualitative  data.  The  cognitive  mapping  technique  was  used  with  the  aid  of the 
software  package  'Decision Explorer', which allows for the  introduction of the  data collected, 
and  the subsequent  analysis based on the  produced output in  the form of quantitative data  and 
graphie maps. 
The  data  collection  was  based  on  the  literature  on  strategie  management  related  to 
acquisitions.  Using  the  ProQuest  and  JSTOR  databases,  more  than  80  articles  from  top 
management  journal  covering  acquisitions  were  identified  and  carefully  reviewed.  Only  56 
articles,  where  the  main  objective  was  to  study  acquisitions'  motivations,  impact  and  critical 
success  factors,  were  chosen  as  pertinent  to  the  research  subject.  Articles  covered  different 
theories  and  used  different  research  methodologies:  Qualitative  and  quantitative.  They  were 
studied thoroughly  in  search for concepts related to acquisitions. Sorne articles were eliminated 
because the constructs were poorly defined. The collected data was classified into (1) motivation 
or  trigger  (causes);  (2)  impact  (consequence);  and  (3)  critical  success  factor.  A  total  of 85 169 
concepts  were found.  After preparing a list of concepts, all the concepts were checked against 
each other to eliminate duplication and  to ensure that each concept is  unique and well defined on 
its  own  term and distinct from another,  which ensures the construct validity (Lincoln &  Guba, 
1985a). A final  number of 74 concepts were selected with their respective links to other concepts 
as  described in the literature. 
Each concept was analyzed using source and theory triangulation methods to ensure the 
validity of the construct and its  agreement on  the same definition of the concept, and its  links. 
This  ensures  the  credibility,  internai  validity  and  reliability  if another  researcher  decides  to 
embark on analyzing the same subject. After analyzing each concept, its relationships in term of 
causal  link  or  consequential  link  with  other  concept  were  analyzed.  Direct  and  indirect 
relationships  were  also  ana]yzed. No  overlap  between  direct  and  indirect  relationships  was 
allowed, unless specified in the literature explicitly. Triangulation of sources was also used in this 
regard. In  the list of concepts (table 5.1), and for reliability and auditing purposes, each concept 
was provided with a list of all  citations from which it was  drawn and applied in  the mode!.  In 
addition,  only  links  described  in  the  literature  were  listed,  with  their  citation  references.  AU 
citations are included in the bibliography. 
The  map  of concept  and  links  (figure  5.1),  or cognitive  map,  was  drawn  using  the 
software  tool  "Decision  Explorer"  from  Banxia  Software  Company  (ww.banxia.com).  After 
drawing the map,  severa! revisio11s  were made on the relationships between the concepts.  Few 
links  were added,  within the spirit of my  understanding of the literature regarding acquisitions, 
although not found  explicitly in the literature.  The added links  were  verified  against common 
sense and  did  not  contradict the  literature  in  any  way.  Table 5.1  describes  the  list of the 74 
selected concepts, with their references  and  related links that were only found  in  the literature. 
Table 5.2  describes  the  list  of positive  and  negative  links  for  each concept as  drawn  in  the 
cognitive  map,  which  includes the  links  found  in  the  literature  and  the  links  that  were  not 
explicitly found but added for common sense. 170 
Table 5.1 
Concept description, references and related links 
Concept 1  Construct 1  Concept cited by  Related  Link cited by 
Variable  concepts 
1  Competitive advantage  (Porter, 1980a) (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994) 
(Oliver, 1997) 
2  Synergy  (Brush, 1996) (James, Georghiou, &  49, 17,  (Brush, 1996) 
Metcalfe, 1998) (Walter & Barney, 1990)  50, 51,  (James, 
(Chatterjee, 1986) (Lubatkin, 1983)  52,37  Georghiou, & 
(Wemerfelt, 1984)  Metcalfe, 1998) 
3  Market power  (Galbraith & Stiles, 1984)  17,54  (Galbraith & 
Stiles, 1984) 
(Trautwein, 1990) 
4  Complexity  (Jemison & Sitk.in,  1986b) 
5  Barriers to entry  (Yip, 1982) (Wernerfelt, 1984)  58  (Yip, 1982) 
6  Cost  (Walter & Barney, 1990) 
7  Firm's size 
8  Incentives  (Paine & Power, 1984) 
9  Talent retention  (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) (Cannella & 
Hambrick, 1993) (Coff,  1997b) 
10  Absorptive capacity  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
Ll  R&D cost  (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
12  Degree of integration  (James, Georghiou, & Metcalfe, 1998)  51, 17,  (James, 
(Paine & Power, 1984) (Mayer & Kenney,  Georghiou, & 
2004a) (Jemison & Sitk.in, 19_ 86b)_  - -- - - Metcalfe-;-1998) --
------ - (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) 
13  Management control  (Eisenhardt, 1989a)  63  (Hi tt et al., 
199lb) 
14  Increase economies of  (Duysters & Man, 2003b) (Walter &  17 
scale  Barney, 1990) (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 
2001) (Singh & Montgomery, 1987) 
15  Increase economies of  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
sc  ope  (Lubatkin,  1983) (Singh & Montgomery, 
1987) 
16  Jncrease core  (Hitt et al., 1991b) (Prahalad & Hamel,  17  (Ritt et al., 
competencies  1990) (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994) (Quelin,  1991 b) 
2000) (Singh & Montgomery, 1987) 
17  Acquisition formation  (Feeser & Willard, 1990) (Shelton, 1988a)  48, 45,  (Shelton,  1988a) 
(Brush, 1996) (Galbraith & Stiles, 1984)  2, 3, 46,  (Brush, 1996) 
(Hopkins, 1987)  62,60  (Galbraith & 
Stiles, 1984) 
(Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999) 
(Hi  tt et al., 
199lb) 
18  Trust  (Eisenhardt, 1989a) (Williamson,  1975) 
(Jemison & Sitk.in, 1986b) (Williamson, 
1999) 171 
Concept 1  Construct 1  Concept cited by  Related  Link cited by 
Variable  concepts 
19  Danger of  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001)  17 
appropriation 
20  Moral hazard  (Eisenhardt, 1989a) (Hoffman & Schaper-
Rinke1, 2001) (Coff,  1997b) 
21  Degree of opportunism  (Eisenhardt,  1989a) (Williamson, 1975)  28  (Eisen hardt, 
(Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001;  1989a) 
Williamson,  1999) 
22  Bounded rationality  (Eisenhardt,  L989a) (Williamson, 1975) 
(Williamson, 1999) (Coff,  1997b) 
23  Resource dependency  (Pfeffer, 1972)  17  (Pfeffer,  1972) 
24  Asset specificity  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
(Williamson, 1975) (Williamson, 1999) 
(Oliver.1997) (Coff, 1997b) (Robertson & 
Gatignon,  1998) 
25  · Path dependency  (Oliver, 1997) (Singh & Montgomery, 
1987) 
26  Tacit know1edge  (Oliver, 1997) 
27  Technical comp1 exity  (Bettis & Hitt, 1995) 
28  Information  (Eisenhardt, 1989a) (Hoffman & Schaper- 21  (Eisenhardt, 
asymmetry  Rinke1,2001) (Coff, 1997b)  1989a) 
29  U ncertainty  (Quelin, 2000)  (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
(Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) (Bettis 
& Hitt, 1  995) 
30  Technological  (Que1in,  2000) (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
uncertainty  (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998; Walker & 
Weber, 1984) 
31  Market uncertainty  (Que1in,  2000) (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
(Robertson & Gatignon, 1998) 
32  Product uncertainty  (Que1in,  2000) (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
33  Proximity  (Ferrary, 2003) (Mayer &  Kenney, 2004a) 
34  Degree of modu1arity  (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) 
35  Platform leadership  (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) 
36  Econorrùc  (Lubatkin, 1983) (Singh & Montgomery, 
performance  1987) 
37  Technologica1  (James, Georghiou, & Metcalfe, 1998) 
performance 
38  Complementary  (Shelton,  1988a) (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a)  45  (She1ton,  1988a) 
product 1  technology  (Wemerfe1t,  1984) 
39  Supp1ementary  (Shelton, 1988a) (Wernerfe1t,  1984)  45  (She1ton,  1988a) 
product 1 techno1ogy 
40  Substitute product 1  (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002)  58, 
technology 
41  Degree of product  (Feeser & Willard, 1990) (Hopkins, 1987)  48,  17,  (Feeser & 
re1atedness  (James, Georghiou, & Metca1fe,  1998)  58  Willard, 1990) 
(Roberts & Liu, 2001) (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
42  Compatible  (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b) (Mayer & 
organizational culture  Kenney, 2004a) (Datta, 1991) (Nahavandi 
& Malekzadeh, 1988) 172 
Concept 1  Construct 1  Concept cited by  Related  Link cited by 
Variable  concepts 
43  Compatible  (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) 
organizational 
objectives 1  strategy 
44  Leve! of strategie as set  (Hagedoom & Duysters, 2002) (Oliver,  17 
1997) (Peteraf, 1993) 
45  Strategie fit  (Shelton,  1988a) (Paine & Power, 1984)  38, 39,  (Shelton, 1988a) 
(Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) (Jemison &  17 
Sitkin, 1986b) (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
46  Experience in  (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) (Jemison &  17  (Ha1eb1ian & 
Alliances 1  Sitkin, 1986b) (Pennings, Barkema, &  Finkelstein, 1999) 
Acquisitions  Douma, 1994b) 
47  Product time to market 
48  Growth  (Feeser & Willard, 1990) (Walter &  17, 41,  (Feeser & 
Barney, 1990)  55  Willard, 1990) 
(Trautwein, 1990) 
49  Market share  (Brush,  1996; Walter&Barney, 1990)  2  (Brush, 1996) 
(Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) 
50  Financial synergies  (Trautwein, 1990) (Chatterjee, 1986)  2  (Trautwein, 1990) 
(Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
51  Operational synergies  (Trautwein, 1990) (Chatterjee, 1986; James,  2  (Trautwein, 1990) 
Georghiou, & Metcalfe, 1998) 
52  Managerial synergies  (Trautwein, 1990)  2  (Trautwein, 1990) 
53  Net gain  (Trautwein, 1990)  56  (Trautwein, 1990) 
54  Increase monopoly  (Trautwein, 1990)  3  (Trautwein, 1990) 
55  Empire building  (Trautwein, 1990)  3,48  (Trautwein,---1990) 
56~Efficierrcy  (Trautwein, 1990) (Walter & Barney, 1990)  53  (Trautwein, 1990) 
(Williamson, 1999) 
57  CEO's Hubris  (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) 
58  Increase positioning  (Hopkins, 1987) (Walter & Barney, 1990)  17, 41, 
(Yip, 1982) (Gu1ati,  1999)  40,3 
59  R&D intensity  (Hi tt et al., 1991 b) (Hi tt et al.,  1996)  62,61  (Hi tt et al., 
1991b) 
60  Increase acquisition &  (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a)  17,61 
development 
61  Rate of internai  (Hi tt et al.,  1991 b) (Hi tt et al.,  1996) (Hi tt,  59, 60,  (Hi tt et al., 
innovation  Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990)  63,65  1991b)(Hittet 
al., 1996) 
62  R&D investment  (Hitt et al., 199lb)  17, 59,  (Hi tt et al., 
1991 b) 
'  63  Acquisition intensity  (Hitt et al.,  1996) (Hitt, Hoskisson, &  64, 65,  (Hitt et al., 
Ire1 and, 1990)  61, 13  199 1b) 
64  Strategie control  (Hitt et al., 1996) (Hitt, Hoskisson, &  63  (Hitt et al., 1996) 
Ireland, 1990) 
65  Financial control  (Hitt et al., 1996)  63,  61  (Hitt et al., 1996) 
66  Transaction cost  (Teece, 1982) (Williamson, 1986)  17 
(Williamson, 1975) (Borys & Jemison, 
1989) (Eisenhardt, 1989a) (Williamson, 
1999) (Walker & Weber, 1984) 173 
Concept 1  Construct 1  Concept cited by  Related  Link cited by 
Variable  concepts 
67  Risk sharing  (Walter & Barney, 1990) (Roberts & Liu, 
2001) (Lubatkin, 1983) 
68  Learni11g by doing  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 200 1) 
(Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994b) 
69  Resource endowment  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) (Gulati, 
1999) 
70  Target firm relative  (Kusewitt, 1985) (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b)  36 
size  (Datta,  1991) 
71  Degree of portfolio  (Ferrary, 2003) 
competi ti veness 
72  Risk  (Walter & Barney, 1990) (Roberts & Liu, 
2001) 
73  Penetrate new markets  (Walter & Barney, 1990) 
74  Social capital  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997) (Gulati, 
1999) 
Table 5.2 
Concepts and their links as drawn in the cognitive mapping 
Conce  ts and their links (  ositive or ne  ative) to other couee  ts 
1 >+58 +3  16 > +1  31  > +29  46 > +68 +17  62>+11 +59 
2> +15+71 +37  17 > +73 +67 +34 +63 +60- 32 > +29  47 > -1  63 > -13 -61 
+56t49+1  62  +5  +46  +52  +3  +48  -9  +65 -64 
+14 +16+15 +7 +1  +1 2 
3 >-+58 +17  18 > +1 7  33 > +45  48 > +55 +3  64 > +13 
4 >-56  19 > -18  34 > +35  49 >+54 +48  65 > -61 +13 
5 > +58  20 > -18  35 > +54 +37  50> +2  66 > +17 
6 >-56 +53  21  > +19+20  36>+69+3  51> +2  67 > -72 
7> +4  22 > +17  37 > +36  52>+2  68 >+56 
8 >+9 +6  23 > +44  38 > +41  53> +36 +48  69 > +17 
9> +10  24 > +23  39 > +41  54> +3  70 > +7 -45 
10 >+68 -Il  25 > +44  40 >-58 +41  55> +3  71>+37+1 
li> +6  26 > +23 +25  41  > +2+45  56> -47 +53  72 > -36 
12 >+51 +50 +4 +2  27 > +24 +26  42 > +45  57> +17  73 > +49 
13>+4-28  28 > +21 +13 +17  43 > +45  58> +74  74 > +69 
14 > -6  29 > +17  44 > +17  59> +61 
15 > -6  30 > +27 + 11  +29  45 > +17  60 > +61 4
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5.4 Data Finding and Analysis 
Using the software program "Decision Explorer" (Banxia_Software_Ltd., 2005) severa! 
analyses were conducted mainly the "domain analysis" (table 5.3), the "centrality analysis" (table 
5.4), the "cluster analysis" (figures 5.2 and 5.3) and the "loop analysis". 
The "domain  analysis" is  described in  the software manual as  follows:  "The "domain" 
command gives an indication of the complexity of linking around concepts. The rationale behind 
domain analysis is  that people tend to  talk a lot about what they see as  important or key issues, 
and  so  certain  concepts  ch.aracterizing  these "key  issues"  will  be  highly  elaborated  (a  lot  of 
concepts  linking  into  and  out of them).  Highly  elaborated concepts  will  have  a  high  domain 
score." 
The "centrality analysis" is  described in  the software manual as  follows:  "The "central" 
command gives an indication of the influence of a concept in the wider context of the model. This 
analysis  gives  an  initial  indication  of the  importance of the  different  concepts  in  the  mode!. 
Central  analysis  is  complementary  to  domain  analysis.  Central  analysis  looks  beyond  the 
immediate  environment (links)  around  a  concept  and  examines  the  complexity  of links  at  a 
number of levels away from  the  centre. The combined  weighting leads to  an  overall centrality 
score. The higher the score  the more influence the concept has  within the model as  a whole. A 
high scoring concept has a complex network of concepts supporting it, and/or a complex network 
of concepts stemming from  it. The topmost central concept may not in itself be top of the domain 
analysis results, likewise for lower scoring concepts." 
The "cluster analysis" is  described in the software manual as  follows:  "The result of the 
cluster  analysis  suggests  that,  based  on  the  picture  of the  situation  as  it  stands,  an  effective 
solution to  the problem would entail addressing all  aspects that have been acknowledged in  the 
map, and that there are no  areas which can be worked out in isolation. Clustering is  very  useful 
because it  provides a breakdown of the model and becomes  important in  helping to  manipulate 
information in large models". The "loop analysis" is described in the software manual as follows: 
"Loops are caused when  a circle of links is formed, often in a complex chain of argumentation in 176 
large models. A Loop is generally a bad thing (certainly for automated analysis, but it is a matter 
of debate  whether they  are  generally  bad),  as  it causes  chains  of argument  to  become  over-
complicated.  The  LOOP  command,  in  identifying  these  Loops,  allows  the  user  to  decide 
where/whether to break them." 
5.4.1 Domain Analysis 
Table 5.3  provides a  list of the  most important consequences of acquisition formation. 
The  concepts  listed  were  selected  based  on  the  high  number  of inputs  converging  into  one 
concept making it an important consequence. The concept 'acquisition formation'  is  in  itself an 
important consequence resulting from  Il motivations as  represented by the  11  inputs converging 
into it.  Ali those consequences are coherent with the literature on strategie management, and they 
are a combination of both strategizing and economizing: Market power, cost, and  efficiency are 
for  economizing  and  the  rest  for  strategizing.  They  are  borrowed  from  the  transaction  cost 
economies and the  resource based view of the firm. They are  in  line with legitimate corporate 
objectives:  Increase  positioning,  sustaining  competitive  advantage,  reduce  cost  and  increase 
efficiency. Strategie fit is a critical success factor to the formation of acquisition and depends on a 
series  of factors  such  as  proximity  of the  target firm,  its  relative  size,  the  degree  of product 
relatedness between the acquirer and the  acquired in  term of supplementary, complementary or 
substitute products, the compatibility of both firms'  organizational objectives and cultures. The 
rate  of internai  innovation  is  the  product  of the  R&D  intensity,  the  acquisition  intensity,  the 
increase  in  acquisition  and  development  (A&D)  and  the  financial  control.  The  increase  in 
financial  control has a  negative effect on the rate of innovation as  the creative teams feel  less 
autonomous and projects are more controlled. Sustaining competitive advantage is the result of 
building  on  and  increasing  the  core  competencies  of the  firm,  reducing  the  product  time  to 
market,  produced synergies, and  the  increased  level of the  products  portfolio competitiveness. 
Synergy  is  a  result  of operational,  financial  and  managerial  synergies,  the  degree  of product 
relatedness  between  the  acquirer  and  the  acquired  firm  and  the  degree  of integration.  The 
reduction in cost is a product of the decrease in  internai R&D cost, the economies of scale and 
scope and is negatively affected by the increase in incentives given to the management team and 
skilled  human  resources  of  the  acquired  firm.  Market  power  is  the  combined  product  of 
improving economie performance, growth resulting from  an  increased market share, sustaining 177 
competitive advantage  based  on  the  core competencies  of the  firm,  increasing  monopoly  and 
empire building. Increasing market power, sustaining competitive advantage and creating barriers 
to entry for new products, will increase the overall firm position in the market. 
Table 5.3 
Domain analysis 
lm  ortant couse  uences  Inputs  Outputs  Total 
Acquisition formation  li  18  29 
Market power  6  2  8 
Sustained competitive advantage  5  2  7 
Synergy  5  6  Il 
Cost  4  2  6 
Management control  4  2  6 
Strategie fit  5  l  6 
Efficiency  4  2  6 
lncrease positioning  4  l  5 
Rate of internai innovmion  4  0  4 
lm  ortant causes/ex  lanations  Inputs  Outputs  Total 
Acquisition formation  Il  18  29 
Synergy  5  6  Il 
Degree of integration  1  4  5 
Technologicaluncertainty  0  3  3 
Acquisition intensity  1  4  5 
Table 5.3 also provides a list of the important causes/explanations, which were selected 
based on the  high  number of  concepts diverging from  them, as  represented  by  the  number of 
outputs. Synergy is a consequence and a cause. A consequence from the acquisition formation or 
at least a desired consequence and a cause or explanation for a diversity of concept affect by it. 
It's  the  engine  behind  achieving  efficiencies,  sustaining  competitive  advantage,  increasing 
economies of scope,  and  market share, and increasing the degree of portfolio competitiveness. 
The degree of integration defined by the  scope, depth  and quality is  determinant in  producing 
operational  and  financial  synergies,  and  reducing the complexity of integrating the  two  firms. 
Technological uncertainty adds to the overall uncertainty faced by the  f~rm in this high velocity 178 
and  turbulent environment, and  affects  the  R&D cost and  the degree of technical complexity. 
Acquisition  intensity  affects  the  firm's  strategie,  financial  and  management  control,  and  the 
internai rate of innovation. 
5.4.2 Centrality Analysis 
Table 5.4 provides a ranking list of the important concepts based on their centrality to the 
acquisition formation concept. The acquisition formation is clearly the most important concept as 
it is  in  the center of the cognitive map with the highest number of inputs and outputs. From the 
first  10  most important concepts,  market power,  sustained competitive advantage,  strategie fit, 
degree of integration and acquisition intensity are present in  the centrality analysis  list, as  they 
were present in the domain analysis  list, which confirm their highly  relative importance to the 
concept of the acquisition formation. Three other concepts present in this list are strongly related 
to  respective concepts present in  the domain analysis  list:  Increasing the economies of scope is 
related  to  creating  synergy;  growth  is  related  to  market  power; · and  uncertainty  is  related to 
technological uncertainty. The two sets of rnirrored concepts reflect the high importance of those 
concepts to the concept of strategy formation. Finally, the only concept present in this list and not 
in  the  domain  list  is  resource  endowment,  which  is  necessary  to  an  acquisition  formation 
decision. 
Table 5.4 
Centrality analysis 
Rank  lm  ortant conce  ts 
Acquisition formation  48 from 73 concepts. 
2  Market power  33 from 68 concepts. 
3  Sustained competitive advantage  33 from 70 concepts. 
4  Strategie fit  32 from 70 concepts. 
5  Degree of integration  32 from 70 concepts. 
6  Increase economies of scope  31  from 70 concepts. 
7  Acquisition intensity  30 from 66 concepts. 
8  Growth  30 from 68 concepts. 
9  Uncertainty  30 from 68 concepts. 
10  Resource endowment  29 from 68 concepts. 179 
Il  R&D investment  29 from 67 concepts. 
12  Managerial synergies  29 from 70 concepts. 
13  Leve! of strategie asset  29 from 68 concepts. 
14  Synergy  29 from 58 conceQ_ts. 
15  Penetrate new markets  28 from 67 concepts. 
16  Experience in acquisition/alliance  28 from 66 concepts. 
17  Degree of modularity  28  from 66 concepts. 
18  Information asymmetry  28 from 66 concepts. 
19  Increase Core competencies  28 from 68 concepts. 
20  Increase economies of scale  28 from 66 concepts. 
21  Talent retention  28 from 66 concepts. 
22  Firm's size  28 from 66 concepts. 
23  Barrier to entry  28 from 66 conc~ts . 
24  Risk sharing  27  from 66 concepts. 
25  lncrease acquisition & development  27  from 65 concepts. 
26  Trust  27 from 65 concepts. 
27  Transaction cost  26 from 65 concepts. 
28  CEO hubris  26 from 65 concepts. 
29  Bounded rationality  26 from 65 concepts. 
30  Degree of product relatedness  23 from 52 concepts. 
31  Efficiency  22 from 47 concepts. 
32  Net gain  22 from 52 concepts. 
33  Cost  22 from 50 concepts. 
34  Economie performance  21 from 50 concepts. 
35  Complexity  21  from 50 concepts. 
36  Degree of portfolio competitiveness  20 from 50 concepts. 
37  Increase positioning  20 from 47 concepts. 
38  Market share  20 from 48 concepts. 
39  Product time to market  19 from 50 concepts. 
40  Management control  19 from 45 concepts. 
41  R&D cost  19 from 46 concepts. 
42  Learning by doing  18  from 46 concepts. 
43  Increase monopoly  18  from 45 concepts. 
44  Operational synergies  18  from 48 concepts. 
45  Financial synergies  18  from 48 concepts. 
46  Platform leadership  17  from 42 concepts. 
47  Technological uncertainty  17 from 43 concepts. 
48  Empire bUilding  16  from 43 concepts. 
49  Technological performance  16 from 35 concepts. 
50  Absorptive capacity  16 from 40 concepts. 
51  Social capital  15  from 40 concepts. 
52  Risk  15 from 40 concepts. 
53  Target firm relative size  15  from 39 concepts. 
54  Incentives  15  from 39 concepts. 
55  Financial control  14 from 35 concepts. 
56  Rate of internai innovation  14 from 34 conce.r.ts. 180 
57  Strategie control  13 from 35 concepts. 
58  R&D intensity  13 from 36 concepts. 
59  Compatible organizational objectives/strategy  13 from 36 concepts. 
60  Compatible organizational culture  13 from 36 concepts. 
61  Substitute productltechnology  13  from 31  concepts. 
62  Proximity  13  from 36 concepts. 
63  Resource dependency  13  from 33 concepts. 
64  Degree of opportunism  13  from 34 concepts. 
65  Path dependency  l  12 from 33 concepts. 
66  Product uncertainty  11  from 32 concepts. 
67  Market uncertainty  l l from 32 concepts. 
68  Moral hazard  ll from 31 concepts. 
69  Danger of appropriation  li from 31 concepts. 
70  Supplementary product/technology 
1 
8 from 21  concepts. 
71  Complementary product/technology  8 from 21  concepts. 
72  Technical complexity  7 from  14 concepts. 
73  Tacit knowledge  1  5 from 9 concepts. 
74  Asset specificity  4 from 9 concepts. 
1 
5.4.3 Cluster Analysis 
The cluster analysis provided two cluster sets as shown in figures 5.2 and 5.3. In the first 
cluster  set  the  concept  of synergy  is  in  the  center  with  its  related  direct  and  indirect  links. 
Important concepts  present in  this  cluster set and  in  the domain  analysis are:  cast,  efficiency, 
degree of integration, acquisition intensity, the rate of internai innovation, management control, 
and  sustained  competitive  advantage.  The second cluster  set  has  in  its  center the  concept of 
acquisition formation  with  its  direct  and  indirect  links.  It  represents  a  smaller version  of the 
original cognitive map  with  the  most affecting  links,  as  in  a check list  before taking the final 
decision on the formation of an acquisition. 60 lncrease 
acqu isition & 
d e velopment 
market 
[  65 F inancial control  4- 63 Atquis ilion 
·---- ·  ..~  m lens;tl 
Figure 5.2 
Cluster analysis 
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39 Supplementar1 
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181 37 Technological 
p erformance 
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.... 
71  Degree of 
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competitiveness 
Figure 5.3 
Cluster analysis 
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5.5 Discussion 
Acquisition formation  is  the  central  concept as  it has  Il  causal and  18  consequential 
relationships. Synergy is a balanced concept as  it has as  many inputs as outputs: 5 causal and 6 
consequential relationships. The following concepts are especially important as  they have more 
inputs and few  if any outputs:  sustained competitive advantage, market power, strategie fit,  and 
rate of internai innovation. From the literature of strategie management, those concepts are key 
strategie  objectives  related  to  the  research on  acquisitions.  Their importance  should  highlight 
their critical inputs. 
The first ten most central (important) concepts are:  acquisition formation, market power, 
sustained competitive advantage, strategie fit,  and the degree of integration, increase economies 
of scope, acquisition intensity, growth, uncertainty, and resource endowment. 
Loop analysis run for more than two  hours and provided more than 3000 loop sets.  The 
analysis was stopped manually. The test was  run four times and it gave the same results.  Maybe 
the large number of loops in. the model ex plains the complexity of the researched subject, as its 
central concept is  related to  interrelated links  with a large number of feedback loops that either 
stabilize the model or destabilize it.  However, a large number of loops indicate that uncertainty 
and more specifically technological uncertainty is at the root cause of acquisition formation, as 
illustrated  in  figure  5.4.  This  suggests  that  the  large  number  of  acquisitions  in  the 
telecommunications industry and the intensity of acquisitions, emergence of new and disruptive 
technologies  and  entrepreneurial  activities,  are  all  motivated  by  a  high  level  of  technical 
uncertainty. Figure 5.4 
Technological uncertainty as a root cause for acquisition formation 
+1 Competitive Advantage 
may be explained by 
+1,61ncrease·Core competenci.es 
whichcan be explained by 
+17 Acquisition formation 
whichcan be explained by 
+23 Re source depende  ney 
whichcanbe explainedby 
+2'6 Tacit knowledge 
which can be explained by 
+27 "J:ec.hnica 1  C'Omple.xity 
whichcan be .explained by 
+30 Techn.ological uncertainty 
+1  Competi!iveAdvantage 
may be explainedby 
+2 Synergy 
whichcan be explained by 
+12 Integration 
whïc hcanbe elCplainedby 
+1  7 Acquisition f.ormation 
whichcan be expla.ined by 
+2'3 Re source depende  ney 
whichcan be expl.ained by 
+26 Tacit krlOw ledge 
Yhichcanbe explainedby 
f-+2LJechnic.a.l complexity 
whichcanbe expl.ained by 
+30 Technological uncertainty 
+1 Competitive Adv antage· 
may be explained by 
+16, +11 
whi<:hcan be explained by 
+29 U:ncertainty  · 
which<:an be explained by 
+30 Te<:hn.ological uncertainty 
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Furthermore,  the  cognitive  mapping  could  be  presented  with  the  illustration  of the 
different decision groups involved in the complex decision making of an acquisition formation. 
For  example,  figure  5.5  illustrates  the  different  decision  groups  such  as  marketing,  finance, 
strategy, governance, product development and technology management,  ail  of which are part of 
the decision of acquisition formation. n
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The  cognitive  mapping  technique  provided  the  scope  to  understand  a  complex and 
integrated issue, with roots in different disciplines and consequences combining econornizing and 
strategizing.  It  provided a  holistic and  integrated approach to  the  study of a complex research 
topic such as decision making. 
The limitation of this research is in its  inability to come up  with a theoretical model as 
different effects vary  based the case studied. The replication of sorne links and effects on  their 
respective concepts could produce contrasting results based on different case studies.  Also the 
research was based in the context of the information technology industry in North America and it 
is not clear to what point the results could be generalized on other industries, sectors, or countries. -.- ·- ·- ----------------
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ALLIANCES AND ACQUISITIONS 194 CHAPTER VI 
FACTORS RELATED TO R&D PERFORMANCE AND TECHNICAL 
COLLABORATION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTR  Y 
4 
This paper explores the factors related to technical collaboration 
in  research  and  development  (R&D)  among  firms  in  the 
telecommunications  industry.  Technical  collaboration  includes 
informai collaboration, strategie alliances and  acquisitions. The 
factors  are  divided  into  three  main  categories:  Causes  or 
motivations  for  establishing  su ch  tech ni cal  collaboration; 
consequences  or  impact  of the  technical  collaboration  on  the 
innovation rate,  R&D  intensity  and  the  firm  performance;  and 
finally critical success factors  for  achieving a positive outcome 
from  establishing  such  technical  collaboration  among  firms 
within the telecommunications industry. The overview from the 
literature results in  a total of 74 factors,  classified into the three 
categories. Furthermore, the paper shows that in the literature of 
strategie management, the impact of the technical collaboration 
on  the  performance  is  contradictory  and  incomplete.  A  more 
holistic approach is proposed. 
6.1 Introduction 
The telecommunications industry is  different than any other industry. Firms established 
in  this  knowledge intense sector of the  economy face turbulent environmental challenges. The 
telecommunications products  are technically complex and  the  embedded knowledge  is  tacit  in 
nature,  non  codified  and  non  transferable  as  a  public  good.  The  rate  of innovation  of new 
technologies and products is  high and the industry face continuous waves of new  technological 
generations and disruptive technologies, which render the product obsolete, possibly even before 
4  This  chapter was  presented  as  an  article,  with the  same  title,  at  the  administrative  sciences 
association of Canada (ASAC) annual conference 2009, strategy division. Niagara Falls, Canada, 
June 2009. 196 
being  launch  to  the  market  and  received  by  the  end  user  customers.  In  fact  the  rate  of 
obsolescence  is  higher  the  time  required  to  recover  the  skyrocketing  investment  needed  m 
research and development in order to produce new products and technologies that would built on 
the core competencies of the company and sustain competitive advantage. The complexity of the 
technology is coupled with a high leve! of uncertainty due to a Jack of dominant standards, a Jack 
of credible forecast for the potential new product and a lack of specifie requirements from  the 
customers' side. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Facing  those  environinental  challenges,  firms  established  in  the  telecommunications 
industry tend  to  use alliances,  acquisitions or both, to  survive, enhance their performance, and 
gu aran  tee  their  growth.  W orking  together  wou id  redu ce  the  leve!  of  uncertainty  and  risk 
imbedded in the required high investments in research and development. Moreover, it would give 
access to external resources of innovation, which are strategie assets that would complement or 
supplement  the  firm's  existing  assets.  Sharing  the  cost  of research  and  development  would 
produce economies of scale and scope and achieve synergetic opportunities, producing efficiency 
and  net gain.  The formation of an  alliance or acquisition  would give  access  to  new  products, 
reduce the  product !ife cycle and  penetrate new  markets  and  industry segments,  which  would 
increase the firm' s market position and power. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Research and development is  categorized historically as  a first,  second, third and fourth 
generations of the evolution of the management of R&D activities. In the third generation R&D, 
the strategie objectives of the firm are aligned to the R&D projects, which produce a coordinated 
portfolio  of products.  The  whole  company  collaborates  in  the  development  of a  joint  plan, 
including the research and development teams, the marketing and finance departments and the top 
management team, including the CEO. Therefore the strategie management dimension in the full 
integration of R&D projects, budget and objectives in the overall strategie plan of the firm. In the 
fourth generation R&D, the boundaries of the firm allow for the cooperation with other firms and 
the collaboration between it different operational  teams, including the research and  development 
human  assets.  Innovation is  not  based  only  on  the internai resources  of the organization,  but 
rather on the combination  of internai and  externat source of innovation,  including partnerships 
between  the  government  labs  and  the  universities'  research  centers,  the  government  and  the 
privately owned firms and among the private firms. In the later category, firms form alliances and 197 
acquisitions to collaborate on research level and the development of new products, white sharing 
risk and cost, and reducing uncertainty. (Sarkis, 2009) 
To fully  understand the factors related to the R&D collaboration among the firms in the 
technology industry, a holistic approach to  the study of strategie management would be not only 
useful  but  essential.  The issue  of alliance  and  acquisition  formation  is  a  complex  issue,  and 
fragmenting ali of its components would give sorne explanations, but stay short of describing the 
whole picture and prescribing valuable and pertinent recommendations. 
Therefore, this paper intends to  explore the factors  related to  the formation of alliances 
and  acquisitions,  within  the  context  of research  and  development  in  the  telecommunications 
industry. The holistic approached is used and the factors are classified and divided into three main 
categories. First are the  motivations of the formation of alliances and acquisitions.  Second, the 
consequences or impact of the formation of the alliance or acquisition on  the firm.  Finally, the 
critical success factors related to the successful  implementation of joint R&D projects within the 
formation of a new alliance or acquisition. 
The paper is  divided  into an introduction,  followed  by  three  parts  each  describing the 
motivations,  impact  and  critical  success  factors.  In  the  comments  section,  a  table  is  provided 
listing the factors covered and researched in  this paper and their classification between alliance 
and acquisition. The paper ends with a bibliographie list. 
This paper fills  a gap  in  the literature of the management of research and  development 
and it provides a valuable contribution to  the literature of strategie management and technology 
management. 
6.2 Causes and Motivations of Technical Collaboration 
Technical collaboration including alliances and acquisitions are motivated and triggered 
by  different  sources.  The  context  in  which  the  alliances  and  acquisitions  take  place  is  an 
important factor.  The  specifie  industry,  the  industrial  sector and  the  market  segment  may  aU 198 
influence whether firms in this sector rely more on alliances and acquisitions for developing their 
strategy, penetrating new markets or acquiring new technologies. Environmental challenges faced 
by firms in a specifie sector or industry, such as the high technology industries,  may force firms 
to  choose  alliances  or  acquisitions  or  a  combination  of both,  as  the  strategy  for  achieving 
sustained competitive advantage. 
In  a general term alliances and acquisitions may be motivated by the desire to  maintain 
growth (Feeser & Willard, 1990; Walter & Barney, 1990) over a certain period of time. If growth 
cannot be achieved internally based on an  increase in sales, penetrating new markets, developing 
new products or innovating new technologies, external sources of growth could be the alternative, 
by  using either alliances with other strategie partner or acquisitions of target firms. Technological 
firms could choose alliances or acquisitions for the purpose of empire building (Trautwein, 1990), 
by acquiring large firms in either related or unrelated diversification, which would have a positive 
impact  on  their  market  share,  global  coverage and  operations,  stock  performance  and  market 
value. In sorne instances, the desire for acquisitions is motivated by the external ties of the firm's 
leadership and the CEO's hubris (Hayward & Hambrick,  1997), which is defined as the desire for 
more power, control based on an exaggerated self-pride or self confidence. 
Market  failure  and  the  firm's  need  to  transition  towards  a  hybrid  form  or  hierarchy 
(vertical integration) is another motivation for using alliances and acquisitions. ln order to reduce 
the transaction costs (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Eisenhardt,  1989a; Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 
1984; Williamson,  1975; Williamson,  1986,  1999) in  dealing with the market, the firm may opt 
for forrning  a strategie alliances with a partner based on a preferential term, long term contract 
and shared risk and comrnitment. Also the firm could decide to vertically integrate its  supplier, 
which could produce other costs in  term of complexity and sunk costs. In both cases this would 
require more  management control, and  a specifie  governance regime.  For both cases,  resource 
endowment  (Gulati,  1999;  Hoff  man  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001)  is  essential  in  forrning  either 
alliances or acquisitions, as  without enough resources the firm  would not be in  a market power 
position to negotiate an alliance nor would not the economie power to acquire the target firm. The 
existence of those resources could  be the motivation behind alliance or acquisition  moves.  The 
external  ties  of the  firm's executives,  informai  technical  collaboration  of the  engineers,  the 
reputation of the R&D scientists and their collaboration with their peers in  standard bodies and 199 
professional  association,  their  persona!  frie11dships  with  other firms'  employees,  ail  form  the 
social capital (Geletkanycz &  Hambrick,  1997; Gulati,  1999; Hoffman &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
of the firm, which facilitate and may trigger the desire to form alliances or acquisitions, whether 
decided from top-down or bottom-up. This social capital exists and is facilitated specially among 
firms  located in an agglomeration of firms such as  industrial parks,  technological incubators or 
technology  free  zones,  where  links  and :persona!  relationships  are  closer  due  to  the  closer 
proximity (Ferrary, 2003; Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) of the firms with each others. 
In  the high technoJogy industries, including information technology, biotechnology and 
aerospace,  firms  face  a  challenging  environment  including  a  high  levet  of  uncertainty,  a 
continuous fast pace of change, the emergence of disruptive technologies, the shortening cycle of 
product deveJopment, the high rate of obsolescence of technologies and products, the intensity of 
the research and development required, the voJatility of the market and the extremely high cost of 
innovation.  In  this  challenging environment the  uncertainty  (Bettis  &  Hitt,  1995;  Hoffman & 
Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Quelin, 2000; Roberts & Liu, 2001) is a result of techno1ogical uncertainty 
(Quelin, 2000; Roberts & Liu, 2001; Robertson &  Gatignon,  1998; WaJker & Weber,  1984) due 
to the Jack of standards being still  under deve1opment, competing technologies without a clear 
potentia1  winner and  the  intensive emergence of disruptive technologies  which render existing 
products  obsoJete;  demand  and  market  uncertainty  (QueJin,  2000;  Roberts  &  Liu,  2001; 
Robertson  &  Gatignon,  1998)  due to  tbe  Jack  of credible demand forecast  for competing and 
under deveJoped technologies, the ignorance of the customers' perception of the potential new 
products;  and  product  uncertainty  (Quelin,  2000;  Roberts  &  Liu,  200 1)  due  to  the  Jack  of 
understanding of the potential customers'  preferences for the future products' specifications and 
requirements.  (Sarkis, 2009) 
This  uncertainty  is  amplified  because  of  the  limitations  facing  the  firm  in  this 
environment and in dealing with its challenges. One of those limitations is  the embedded nature 
of the technical knowledge  required to deal  with uncertainty. This technical  knowJedge is  not 
codified, and has a tacit nature.  It  is  L n the mind and experience of the technical engineers and 
scientists and cannot be transferred as a public good without a priee to pay and an effort to make. 
This tacit knowledge (Oliver,  1997)  could  be  in  the  technical expertise and  know-how of the 
technical  teams,  the  research  and  development  capabilities,  the  management  practice,  the 200 
entrepreneurial spirit or the innovation track record. This knowledge cannot be transferred to  the 
firm  simply  by  recruiting  or  by  the  free  mobility  of its  agents.  It  is  related  to  a  technical 
idiosyncrasy and specifie assets as part of the research, development, operations and maintenance 
phases.  The  asset  specificity  (Coff,  l997b;  Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  200 l;  Oliver,  1997; 
Robertson & Gatignon,  1998; Williamson,  1975; Williamson,  1999) owned by a firm determines 
the  potential  for  it  to  join  in  an  alliance  or  to  be  acquired  by  a  larger  firm.  Those  highly 
specialized assets could  be human,  physical, or material  and  would represent for  the potential 
partner or acquirer externat assets needed to  maintain a sustained competitive advantages. Those 
strategie assets (Hagedoom &  Duysters, 2002; Oliver,  1997; Peteraf,  1993) are characterized by 
being unique,  inimitable, difficult to  duplicate and part of the core competencies of the firm.  If 
the firm finds  those assets in  its environment, it  could either form an alliance to  have access to 
them or forman acquisition to acquire them intemally, as an  externat source of innovation. The 
objective for the acquirer or the allied firm  is to  build upon  the core competencies (Hitt et al., 
l99lb; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, 1994; Quelin, 2000; Singh & Montgomery, 1987) of the firmby 
relying on externat sources. 
When choosing alliances or acquisitions, the firm would evaluate and target the partner or 
the acquired firm's existing products line and portfolio of technologies. Those potential products 
for alliances and acquisitions could be supplementary or complementary products. Supplementary 
products (Shelton,  1988a; Wernerfelt,  1984) are similar in  nature to the firm's existing products 
portfolio and  complementary  products  (Mayer &  Kenney, 2004a; Shelton,  1988a;  Wemerfelt, 
1984) are different products that combine weil with the firm's existing products' !ines. The firm 
would choose to have access to  those resources through an  alliance or acquire them through an 
acquisition,  in  order  to  increase  its  core  competencies  and  improve  its  product  portfolio 
competitiveness (Ferrary, 2003), which would ensure a sustained competitive advantage (Oliver, 
1997; Porter, 1980a; Prahalad & Hamel,  1994). In  addition to supplementary and complementary 
products,  a  firm  could  choose  to  acquire  a  target  firm  because  of the  competitive  threat  of 
substitute products or technologies (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002), which could result in barriers to 
entry (Wernerfelt, 1984; Yip,  1982) for the acquirer firm. By acquiring those substitute products, 
the  firm  would  reduce  the  competitive  threat  and  produce  new  entry  barriers  to  other  firms 
developing similar technologies  and  products,  which  would  ensure  a  better  market positioning 201 
(Gulati,  1999;  Hopkins,  1987:  Walter &  Barney,  1990;  Yip,  1982) and a sustained competitive 
ad van tage. 
Firms also enter into  alliances or acquisitions with other firms in their related or unrelated 
technology  sectors,  to  reduce  the risk by sharing it  with their partners or acquired firms.  Risk 
(Roberts  &  Liu,  2001;  Walter  &  Barney,  1990)  is  inherent  in  this  challenging  and  turbulent 
environment which  is  characterized by uncertainty and fast pace of change, among others. The 
operation risk  could  include  the  skyrocketing research  and  development cost,  while  the  R&D 
intensity by  competitors, th.e  high rate of obsolescence, the ever shorter product cycle and the 
continuous  threat  of the  emergence  of disruptive  technologies,  could  prevent  the  firm  from 
recovering the R&D cost (Roberts & Liu, 200  1), before the product is replaced or cannibalized by 
another  from  the  same company  or a  competitor.  Sharing  the  research  and  development cost 
would be a  high priority for firms  in innovation and  knowledge intense industries such as  the 
information technology. 
Furthermore,  when  forrning  alliances  and  acquisitions,  information  asymmetry  (Coff, 
1997b; Eisenhardt,  1989a; Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) is  an  important factor in dealing 
with management control, technology and knowledge transfer, non-codified tacit knowledge and 
technical  expertise.  In  alliances,  information  asymmetry  could  prevent  the  allied  firms  from 
aligning the  ir strate  gy, objectives and product portfolios due to a gap in the inf9rmation exchange 
among  them.  However, information asymmetry  especially  technical  know-how  between firms 
regarding strategie assets and externat sources of innovation could be a motivation for forrning an 
alliance or acquiring a firm. Bounded rationality (Coff,  1997b; Eisenhardt,  1989a; Williamson, 
1975;  Williamson,  1999)  would  mean  that  the  firm  could  not  develop  its  internai  needed 
resources to sustain competitive advantage. Also, it means that in evaluating potential and target 
firms for alliances or acquisitions, the firm would be rationally bounded as it would not be able to 
process ali  the available information and would select from a lirnited number of choices. In this 
phase of evaluation  and  selection,  there  is  always  the  danger  of moral  hazard  (Coff,  1997b; 
Eisenhardt,  1989a;  Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001 ),  as  the  parties  could  misrepresent their 
respective  information,  based  on  the ir  persona!  or  corporate  self interest  and  opportunistic 
behavior.  The  degree of  opportunism  (Eisenhardt,  1989a;  Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001; 
Williamson,  1975; Williamson,  1999)  could  be  qualified  as  higher in  alliances'  pre and  post 202 
formation phases when compared to acquisitions respective phases. In the pre-alliance phase, the 
lack of access to  the potential partner internai information for evaluation could prevent a  solid 
evaluation  of  their  market  value,  potential  technologies,  internai  capabilities,  and  financial 
strength.  In  the post alliance phase, the governance structure within this  hybrid form,  may  not 
guarantee the flow of the information between the hierarchy and among the partners, which could 
create a greater potential for opportunism and agency problems. Furthermore, in alliances when 
dealing with  the evaluation of an alliance or in the post alliance phase, there  is  the danger of 
appropriation  (Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001)  of proprietary  technology,  know-how  and 
expertise. If  the danger of appropriation is significant and persistent, and if the related products or 
technologies are part of the core competencies of the firm, the later could have a preference for 
forming ac·quisitions rather than alliances.  In fact,  alliances could pave the way for  acquisition 
formation, as in the alliance phase the future acquirer and acquired would gather the need internai 
and critical information necessary for a solid evaluation with respect to an alliance formation. 
Two issues remain critical for the success of either the alliance or acquisition formation: 
Complexity (Bettis & Hitt, 1995) in its broad meaning and strategie fit (Jernison & Sitkin, 1986b; 
Mayer & Kenney, 2004a; Paine & Power, 1984; Shelton, 1988a; Wernerfelt, 1984) as defined by · 
the strategie management literature. There is a certain amount of complexity during the formation 
and post alliance or acquisition phases.  In  either contractual or non-contractual forms, alliances 
represent a  challenge in aligning the strategies of the  allied firms  and  in  producing synergetic 
operational objectives in  achieving the desired alliance' s goals.  After the decision to acquire a 
firm takes place, the following complex task would be to integrate the two companies including 
their physical locations, assets and capabilities, finances,  information systems, sales forces and 
product portfolio. Complexity is also inherited in the nature of the knowledge intensive and tacit 
nature of the technologies and products involved. This complexity makes it difficult to evaluate 
the products and the technologies in the pre alliance and acquisition phase and in  challenging in 
the  implementation  phase  when  taking  the  task  of  integrating  the  different  technological 
components in  a modular fashion.  Therefore, strategie  fit  between the potential partners for an 
alliance  or  acquisition,  must  include  the  complexity  of integrating  the  technologies  and  the 
product to  create a  unified portfolio. Moreover, the two companies  must  evaluate the fit  with 
respect  to  organizational  culture  (Datta,  1991 ;  Jemison  &  Sitkin,  1986b;  Mayer  &  Ken  ney, 
2004a;  Nahavandi  &  Malekzadeh,  1988),  management  style,  training  and  education,  etc ... 203 
Clashing or dissimilar cultures would  not integrate or work weil, thus  hindering the alliance or 
acquisition  objectives.  Finally,  the  two  or  more  firms  should  have  compatible,  or  better 
complementary, organizational and corporate objectives (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a). 
6.3 Consequences and Impact of Technical Collaboration 
One  of  the  mam  objectives  of  alliances  and  acquisitions  IS  to  increase  the  core 
competencies  (Hitt  et  al.,  l99lb;  Prahalad  &  Hamel,  1990,  1994;  Quelin,  2000;  Singh  & 
Montgomery, 1987) of the allied firms in the case of an alliance or of the acquired firmin case of 
an  acquisition.  This  is  done  by  accessing  or acquiring  key  resources  categorized  as  strategie 
assets  (Hagedoorn  & Duysters,  2002;  Oliver,  1997;  Peteraf,  1993)  required for  sustaining the 
competitive  advantage  of the  firm.  Those  resources  are  unique,  inimitable  and  difficult  to 
duplicate.  The  other  main  objective  in  the  formation  of  alliances  and  acquisitions  is  the 
improvemerit of economie performance  (Lubatkin,  1983;  Singh  &  Montgomery,  1987)  of the 
firm, otherwise, the alliance or acquisition would not serve the interest of the firm and its "raison 
d'être". This is  due and as  a consequence of the alliance or acquisition formation, to the increase 
of the  economy of scale and  scope.  The increase in  the economies of scale (Duysters & Man, 
2003b; Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Walter & Barney, 1990) 
is  due to  the access to new geographie market and  industry segment, the use of complementary 
manufacturing  facilities,  and  the  aggregation  of supplementary  and  complementary  research, 
development, and production capabilities. The increase in the economies of scope (Hoffman & 
Schaper-Rinkel, 200 l; Lubatkin, 1983; Singh & Montgomery,  1987) is due to the efficient use of 
combined resources such as R&D  labs,  marketing and publicity costs, sales forces, administrative 
structure,  integrated  information  system,  and  transportation,  warehousing  and  production 
facilities. 
Those economies of scope and scale would significantly reduce the operational expenses 
and cost (Walter & Barney,  1990), which would result in  a  net  gain (Trautwein,  1990) for the 
combined allied partners or the acquired firm in case of an acquisition. Alliances and acquisitions 
should, as  one of its objectives and a consequence toits formation, penetrate new market (Walter 
&  Barney,  1990) segments or geographie territory. This will be  facilitated by  the access to the 204 
new  assets  or  the  acquirement  of the  new  strategie  resources.  Those  new  resources  would 
improve the development cycle of new products, which could result in reducing the product time 
to  market or the  temporal  gap  between  the  initial  idea  and  the  product launch.  Reducing  the 
product life cycle and penetrating new markets would increase the alliance's joint venture or the 
acquirer's market share (Brush,  1996; Mayer &  Kenney, 2004a; Walter &  Barney,  1990) due to 
the attracti.veness  of the  new  combined portfolio or due  to  the  acquisition of acquires  market 
share. Furthermore, the combined resources whether supplementary or complementary products 
and technologies would create entry barriers (Wernerfelt,  1984; Yip,  1982) to competitive firms, 
resulting  in  an  increase in  monopoly  status  (Trautwein,  1990).  Ali  tho se  efforts  and  positive 
effects  of alliances  and  acquisitions  formation  would  improve  the  firm' s  position  within  its 
network. The firm  position (Gulati,  1999;  Hopkins,  1987;  Walter &  Barney,  1990;  Yip,  1982) 
could  be  based  on  its  economie  power,  bargaining  power,  influence,  reputation,  technical 
capabilities, market share, and product competitiveness and organization culture in a knowledge 
intense  industry.  The  firm  central  position  within  its  immediate  network  would  positively 
influence  its  acquisition  capabilities  and  influence  in  forming  more  alliances  with  strategie 
partners. Intensive alliances and acquisitions could lead the firm to  reach a platform leadership 
(Gawer &  Cusumano,  2002),  due  to  the  aggregation of the  combined  dominant  or promising 
technologies and the modularity (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) of the portfolio of products. 
On the less positive side, alliances and acquisitions could representa threat to the firm's 
key resource; the tacit knowledge (Oliver, 1997) that the firm holds and protects as part of its core 
competencies.  This  tacit  knowledge could  be  embedded  in  the  technical  know-how,  research 
techniques,  business  practices,  operation  processes  and  procedures,  marketing  skills  and 
innovative talents. When forming an alliance the danger is from the appropriation of proprietary 
non-codified  and  non-patented  technology  and  know-how,  by  one  or  the  two  firms.  In 
acquisitions, the danger of appropriation (Hoff  man &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) could result from 
the departure of key agents such as top executives or technical scientists and engineers. 
Furthermore,  increasing  the  alliances  and  acquisitions  intensity  (Hitt,  Hoskisson,  & 
lreland,  1990;  Hi tt  et  al. ,  1996)  whereby  the  firm  would  rely  strategically  on  alliances  or 
acquisitions for achieving its  objectives could result in  reducing the research and development 
intensity (Hi tt et al., 1991 b; Hi  tt et al., 1996) and th us affecting negative!  y the internai innovative 205 
capabilities of the firm. Such firms would opt for using a more adaptable and flexible "acquisition 
and  development"  (A&D)  (Mayer  &  Kenney,  2004a)  strategy  instead  of  a  research  and 
development  (R&D)  one.  This  could  be due  to  the  Jack  of internai  resources  for  continuous 
innovation, but could hinder those same resources if available. Internai research and development 
activities  is  petformed as  in  'learning-by-doing'  (Hoffman &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001;  Pennings, 
Barkema, & Douma,  1994b) and relying more on access to products through alliances or off the 
shelf acquisitions would not permit for the continuation of the process of learning which in volves 
trial  and  errors  and  constitutes  the  path  upon  which  technical  expertise,  know-how  practices, 
skills and talents are created. This path  is  time and resource dependent in  a cumulative fashion. 
Not  utilizing  those  resources  would  create an  irreversible path  dependent situation  and  would 
negatively impact the internai rate of innovation (Hitt,  Hoskisson,  &  Ireland,  1990;  Hitt et al., 
1991b; Hitt et al., 1996). 
It is important to highlight sorne of the critical success factors related to the consequences 
of alliances and acquisitions. First, the formation of alliances and acquisitions, would endow the 
firm  with  the  experience  gained  during  the  different  phases  including  the  scanning  of  the 
environment, the evaluation of potential firms, the decision making process,  the integration, and 
the post alliance or acquisition's phases. This alliance and acquisition's experience (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Jernison & Sitkin, 1986b; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994b) is critical for 
the  success  of an  intensive  alliance  or acquisition  strategy.  The best of class  criteria for  the 
selection of target firms, the speed  of the integration, the expertise in combining valuable assets, 
and the transparency of the process to the end-user customers, are ali sorne of the valuable skills 
gained  by  alliances  and  acquisitions  experience.  Second,  in  the  post  alliance  and  acquisition 
phase, creating  overall  efficiency  is  critical  to  the  success  of the  integration  process  and  the 
overall  performance  of  the  firm.  Efficiency  (Trautwein,  1990;  Walter  &  Barney,  1990; 
Williamson,  1999)  wou1d  result  from  the  better  use  of  the  combined  resources,  avoiding 
duplications and redundancies and  the better utilization of synergetic opportunities created by the 
new alliance or acquisition. Third,  achieving a superior technica1 or technological performance is 
critical  to  the  success  of any  alliance  and  acquisition. Technical or technologica1  performance 
(James, Georghiou, & Metcalfe, 1998) could resu1t from a better and more advanced technology, 
setting  new  standards,  achieving  a  grea  ter  leve!  of  modularity,  versatility  and  utilization, 206 
improving  technical  support,  reducing  time  to  market,  increasing  the  product  pmtfolio 
competitiveness (Ferrary, 2003) compared to rival firms. 
6.4 Critical Success Factors in Technical Collaboration 
Forrning alliances or acquisitions is mainly with the objective of sustaining competitive 
advantage  (Oliver,  1997;  Porter,  1980a;  Prahalad  &  Hamel,  1994)  with  ail  its  underlying 
conditions such the efficient management of strategie assets and building on core competencies, 
which remain one of the  critical  success  factors. In  a  pre alliance and  acquisition phase,  one 
critical success factor remains crucial to  the strength of the formation of a partnership between 
compatible  partners:  Trust  (Eisenhardt,  1989a;  Jernison_  &  Sitkin,  1986b;  Williamson,  1975; 
Williamson,  1999).  Without trust,  conflict of interest,  opportunistic behavior and  moral hazard 
could weaken the potential for a mutually beneficiai relationship.  During the scanning phase  to 
evaluate  potential  partners,  the  reputation  of the  target  firm  and  the  persona!  relationships 
between its agent and the acquirer would speed up the process of access internai information and 
would  reduce  the  lengthy  negotiations.  In  alliances,  trust  between  the partners  would  create 
synergetic opportunities  (Brush,  1996;  Chatterjee,  1980; James, Georghiou, &  Metcalfe,  1998; 
Lubatkin, 1983; Walter & Barney, 1990; Wernerfelt, 1984) and a healthy organizational culture. 
Compatible organizational  cultures  (Datta,  1991;  Jernison  &  Sitkin,  1986b;  Mayer  & 
Kenney, 2004a; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) between the partners, either in an alliance or an 
acquisition  are  another  critical  success  factor  to  guarantee  an  alignment  between  the  two 
organizations  and  produce  a  high  leve!  of synergy.  Culture  is  sometime termed  the  informai 
structure of the organization and a healthy structure produces a winning strategy. In  fact, a high 
leve!  of compatibility  between  the  two  organizations,  in  which  the  strategie  objectives  and 
missions of the two are aligned, would create a strategie fit.  Compatible organizational objectives 
(Mayer & Kenney, 2004a)  are a key success factor.  The success of an alliance and acquisition 
rely on the strategie choice made in the evaluation and selection process, in which one company 
among many is believed to be the best in complementing the resources of the principal firm and 
aggregating to it external strategie assets. In the post formation phase and during the integration 
phase  of an  acquisition  or the  implementation phase of an  alliance,  the  partners  should  work 207 
together  to  combine the  resources and  devise  a  plan  for  financial  synergy  (Chatterjee,  1986; 
Hoffman &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Trautwein,  1990).  Among the expectations of alliances and 
acquisitions are the  production of significant economies leading to  a net gain, while increasing 
the rate of growth and maintain the strategie objectives. This would not be achieved without the 
integration of the firms'  value chains and physical assets, producing significant improvement in 
the operation leve! and a high leve1 of operationa1 synergy (Chatterjee,  1986; James, Georghiou, 
& Metcalfe, 1998; Trautwein, 1990). A healthy organization culture that is  based on trust, the full 
integration  of  the  two  firms'  information  systems  infrastructure  resulting  in  reducing  the 
asymmetry of information, the integration of the acquired firm into the acquirer by establishing 
clear channel of communication and  command,  would  eventi.Jally  create  managerial  synergies 
(Trautwein, 1990). 
Moreover,  the  different components of synergy,  such  as  the financial,  operational and 
managerial  synergies,  depend  on  the  success  of  the  integration  process  and  the  degree  of 
integration (James, Georghiou, & Metcalfe,  1998; Jemison & Sitkin,  1986b; Mayer & Kenney, 
2004a; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Paine & Power, 1984); In other words, its scope, depth 
and  quality.  An  enormous  and  serious  effort  should  start  immediately  after  the  alliance  or 
acquisition's  decision  is  completed,  to  integrate  the  two  firms.  During  the  scanning  and 
evaluation process, the integration plan should be thought of and the complexity of the integration 
should be compared among the different choices of potential and target firms. Therefore, plans 
should be devised  in  an  early stage,  which would guarantee a  full  speed progress and project 
implementation after the decision.  As  the degree of integration is  a  critical success  factor,  the 
complexity of the integration and the length of the process would depend on related factors. The 
target finn relative size (Datta, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b; Kusewitt,  1985) would affect the 
scope of the  integration,  the  length  of the  integration  process  and  the  amount  of resources 
dedicated to complete the integration. Those  resources and ali the resources owned by the firm 
should be utilized in the production of goods and services, and borrowing from those resources 
would limit the firm from reachiug its full potential. 
The proximity (Ferrary, 2003; Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) of the two firms would facilitate 
the movement of the  personnel between  the  two entities and  the  exchange of information  in  a 
more persona! way  through  meeting and persona!  contacts. This would increase  the quality  of 208 
communication and collaboration, fomenting trust. The idea behind an alliance or acquisition is to 
access or acquire strategie resources from an  externat source,  which is  in  the high  technology 
industry highly technical expertise and know how that is  tacit in nature. When those resources are 
transferred to  the other firm  or absorbed  by  the partner firm  in  an  alliance,  a  new  process of 
learning and knowledge transfer begins. Teams from the two firms would work together, reaching 
a consensus on the way ahead and forging plans for the development of objectives, products and 
results.  The  leve!  of synergy  resulting  from  the  combined  effort  is  based  on  the  absorptive 
capacity (Hoffman &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) of the  teams  working together and  the degree of 
product relatedness  (Feeser &  Willard,  1990;  Hopkins,  1987;  James,  Georghiou,  &  Metca1fe, 
1998; Roberts &  Liu, 2001; Wemerfelt,  1984), in a related diversification  move. The more the 
products  are  related,  the  easiest  the  integration  between  them  and  the  creation  of levels  of 
modularity and versatility. The degree of modu1arity (Gawer &  Cusumano, 2002) is influenced 
mainly by the compatibility of the parts and their full  interoperability. The technical complexity 
(Hitt et al.,  1996) embedded in high technology products would make the integration process of 
modular parts a more difficult task. Dealing with this complexity would require lengthy planning, 
dedicating the best resources available from the two firms. 
In  the post alliance and acquisition formation,  management control (Eisenhardt,  l989a) 
and the governance structure is  a  key  to  success. The structure would follow  the strategy and 
ens  ure the achievement of both strategie control (Hi tt,  Hoskisson,  &  Ire! and,  1990;  Hi tt  et al., 
1996) in  term of allocating the valuable resources owned by the firm and the alignment of the 
strategie objectives with tho  se resources; and financial control (Hi  tt, Hoskisson, & Ire  land,  1990; 
Hi tt  et  al.,  1996)  to  produce  economies,  efficiencies  and  gain.  Guarding  and  protecting  the 
resources  is  critical to maintaining a  sustained competitive advantage.  In  sorne cases, after the 
formation of an  alliance or an  acquisition,  sorne  valuable human resources  such  as  experience 
managers,  talented engineers or skilled scientists  could depart the firm, because of a conflict of 
loyalty because they do not fully agree with the new formation or because their position or power 
is  affected  by  the  new  arrangements.  The  departure of those  human  assets  could  negatively 
impact the success of the alliance and the  acquisition and  prevent the firm from  achieving its 
desired  and  planned  objectives.  Talent  retention  (Cannella  &  Hambrick,  1993;  Coff,  J997b; 
Mayer &  Kenney,  2004a)  is  a  success  factor  in  ensuring  a  smooth  integration  and  cou1d  be 
achieved by both economie and non economie incentives (Paine & Power,  1984), such as equity 209 
share for the acquired management team, relative power for the team leader and project managers 
of the  acquired firmed,  and  the  maintenance of a certain degree of autonomy for  the creative 
teams acquired, to ensure the non disruption of the creative environment, procedures and routines. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Firms  establish  alliances  or  acquisitions  for  different  motivations.  There  are  cri ti cal 
success factors for the success of alliances or acquisitions. The paper explored those motivations 
and  described  the  consequences  or  impact  of  the  alliances  and  acquisitions  on  the  firm 
performance. It also listed key critical success factors. 
The following  table 6.1  is a  list  of the  motivations,  consequences and  critical  success 
factors  of the  formation  of alliances  and  acquisitions.  Each  variable  or  concept  is  given  its 
reference from the bibliographicallist. In addition, each concept is categorized as  belong more to 
alliance formation, the acquisition formation orto both. 2
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COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN 
ALLIANCES AND ACQUISITIONS RESEARCH 
5 
Research  and  practice  have  documented  that  alliances  and 
acquisitions  are frequent  in  high  velocity environments such as 
the high-tech, biotech and aerospace industries. There are causes 
that lead the firms in these sectors to use alliances or acquisitions 
and  effects that influence the  firms'  performance.  Alliance and 
acquisition are weil researched and documented. However, most 
researchers  specialize  on  either  alliances  or  acquisitions.  This 
research explores the commonalities and the differences between 
alliance and  acquisition research, with the objective of reducing 
the  gag between the  two  research streams  and  proposing for a 
cross fertilized research agenda. An overview of the literature on 
TCE, RBV, network theory, alliance, and acquisition explores a 
total of 74 factors. 
7.1 Introduction 
Alliance and  acquisition research streams are an integral part of research in the field of 
business policy and strategy. Most of the research on alliance and  acquisition is mainly focused 
on the  motivations  and  drivers  for  alliance  and  acquisition,  the  consequences of alliance  and 
acquisitions to  the  firm  and  the critical  success  factors for  alliances  and  acquisitions.  Ari.other 
type  of research  deals  with  petformance  measurement  and  competitive  ad van tage,  with  the 
objective of measuring the effect of alliance and acquisition on the performance of the firm and 
sustained  competitive  advantage. Alliance  and  acquisition  research  are  also  common  in  other 
5  This  chapter  was  published  as  an  article,  with  the  same  title,  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
administrative sciences association of Canada (ASAC) annual conference 2011, techno1ogy and 
innovation management division. Montreal, Canada, July 2011. Vol.  32, No 25. 222 
disciplines such as  technology and  innovation management, in  dealing with knowledge transfer, 
innovation  management,  and  contracting;  international  business,  in  dealing  with  international 
markets and the behavior and strategies of multi national corporations, etc. Sorne of the published 
alliance  and  acquisition  research  have  a  theoretical  orientation,  in  most  part  it  is  empirical 
research, using both qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry. 
Alliance and acquisition have been weil researched and documented over the years in the 
literature  of business  policy  and  strategy.  However,  the  research  is  mainly  focused  on  either 
alliances  or  acquisitions.  Consequently  researchers  in  the field  of business  policy and  strategy 
specialize  either  in  alliance  or  acquisition  research,  and  publish  the ir  findings  accordingl  y. 
Scientific publications and academie joumals often make this distinction between the two streams 
of research, alliance and acquisitions. Moreover, there are specialized publication venues for both 
alliance  and  acquisition.  Furthermore,  industry  oriented  research  and  publication  is  often 
motivated by  one stream of research  or the  other,  by  alliance or  acquisition.  For example,  the 
research  on  the  high  technology  industry  is  motivated  by  acquisitions,  while  the  research  on 
biotechnology industry is motivated by alliance. 
Consequently, researchers are divided between these two main streams. They either focus 
on alliance or on acquisition.  Rarely, one researcher would conduct his research on both streams. 
This means that the resources the researchers use are divided between the two camps. We mean 
by resources, the theoreticallenses, literature, methodological framework, methods of inquiry and 
analysis,  which  are  divided  between  the  two  streams  of research  and  are  not  shared  by  the 
researchers working on these streams. 
We believe that alliance and  acquisition research are two sub streams  of one stream of 
research, be  it  market organization or simply organizational research, whether it is  for  business 
po licy and strate  gy, technology and innovation management or international business. W  e believe 
that the two sub  streams are very close and that the commonalities between them are much more 
than the differences. We believe that the experience acquired by the researcher in doing research 
on  alliance for  example would  help  him if he  decides  to  do  research on  acquisition,  and  vice 
versa. Cumulative experience in one field, if shared with the other stream of research, would help 
advancing both streams of research on alliance and acquisition, and would have a positive effect 223 
on our understanding of the field of business policy and strategy in one of its critical component; 
using externat resources for competitive advantage. 
Therefore, this  research intends to  fill  this gap between the two  streams of research on 
alliance and acquisition and  in the literature of business policy and strategy. The objective is  to 
bring  both  alliance  and  acquisition  researchers  closer,  by  exploring  the  commonalities  and 
differences between what we believe are two sub-streams of research, under what could be called 
market organization or simply organizational research.  In doing so, this paper proposes the first 
steps  towards  a cross  fertilized  research agenda for  the  combined sub-streams  of alliance and 
acquisition research. 
This  research  was  motivated  by  a  scholarly  conversation  that  took  place  during  a 
professional development workshop at the Academy of Management annual meeting in 2009 in 
Chicago,  which  was  titled  "Alliances and acquisitions:  identifying commonalities and setting a 
new,  cross-fertilized  agenda".  The  panel  was  chaired  by  leading  scholars  on  alliance  and 
acquisition research. Therefore, this paper is a follow up on this scholarly conversation and a step 
further towards creating a cross-fertilized agenda for alliance and acquisition research. 
This  paper offers  a  quick  overview  of the  mam  aspects  of alliance  and  acquisitions 
research, using three different theoreticallenses from a literature review of top publications in the 
field of business policy  and  strategy:  Network theory,  Resource Based View,  and  Transaction 
Cost Economies. This is  followed by a review of these concepts and their applications on both, 
alliance and acquisition. Finally, we conducted an  overview of the literature and explored a total 
of 74 factors, which we classified into three categories: Sorne factors are found to be used mainly 
with either research stream only, while the others are used for both alliance and acquisition. 224 
7.2 Theoretical Background 
7.2.1 Network Theory 
Embeddedness. The issue of embeddedness is an important one in the network theory as 
it increases trust and  understanding, reduce opportunism as  a barrier to  resource exchange and 
mi ti gate search  cost in  obtaining res  ource information (Granovetter,  1985b  ).  One definition of 
embeddedness is "the fact that exchanges and discussions within a group typically have a his  tory, 
and that this history results in the routinization and stabilization of  linkages among members.  As 
elements  of ongoing  social  structures,  actors  do  not  respond  solely  to  individualistically 
determined interests,  a  structure of relations  affects  the  action taken  by  the  individual actors 
composing it.  ft  does so by constraining the set of  actions available to  the individual actors and 
by changing the dispositions of  those ac tors towards the actions they may take" (Marsden,  1981). 
Underlying embeddedness is the quest for information, to reduce uncertainty and how economie 
actions  influence  the  social  structure  of ties  within  which  they  are  embedded  (Granovetter, 
1985b  ).  The  social  context  in  which  the  firm  is  embedded  include  structural,  cognitive, 
institutional and cultural elements(Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990). The distinct social structure within 
markets  influence  the  flow  of information  (Baker,  1984; White,  1981 ),  which  in  addition  to 
understanding the nature and purpose of the network, reflects the importance of social networks 
(Stinchcombe,  1990). By  influencing the  access to  information about potential partners,  social 
networks  could  facilitate  or  restrain  the  firm' s  opportunity  to  identify  potential  and  viable 
alliances. 
Trust. An implication of the embeddedness of firms in social networks is the increase in 
trust, where partners  will  have the  confidence that exploitation will  not take place. This could 
take the form of knowledge based trust, which a strong cognitive and  emotional bases  (Gulati, 
1998). Trust is built on reputation, by persona! friendships and social bonds and is manifested by 
interdependence  (Thorelli,  1986).  Trust  has  a  positive  influence  on  resource  sharing,  which 
reduce  opportunism.  It  helps  to  reduce  technological  uncertainty  and  to  increase comrnitment 
(Perry,  Sengupta,  &  Krapfel,  2004).  Trust  is  enhanced  by  the  cooperation  and  negotiation 
between  partners  in  managing  alliances  and  networks  (Geringer  &  Herbert,  1989).  Trust 
relationships  constitute  the firm's social  capital,  beside  its  reputation  in  the  industry  and  the 225 
community  (Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001),  which  is  an  important  basis  for  competitive 
advantage (Gulati,  1999).  On the other hand opportunism and self-interest as being defined the 
motivators for economie activities (Williamson,  1986), could be  reduced by increased trust and 
commitment, the  history of cooperation and  through the administrative form of alliances  using 
government structure (Eisenhardt, 1989b  ). 
Power.  Power  (and  politics,  to  the  other extreme  of trust),  is  an  important  issue  in 
embeddedness.  It  is  usually seen as possessed unilaterally, but could also be of interdependence. 
The inter-organizational network could be conceived as  a political economy based on the flow of 
power and the distribution of information. The sources of power for a network participant include 
economie power, technology  base, expertise, trust and legitimacy. Sorne indicators of economie 
power are market share, size, and  centrality of the seller product to  the buyer core activity. The 
source of the buyer's power are the number of alternatives of supply sources, the less transaction 
costs for  switching,  relative  liquidity, ability to extend credit and  to  integrate  vertically.  Other 
sources  of  power  could  be  superior  technology,  product  and  process  innovation,  quality, 
flexibility,  expertise,  capabilities  in  R&D  and  engineering  and  pre  and  post  sales  services. 
(Thorelli, 1986). 
Governance.  The  network  theory  covers  the  areas  of  strategie  alliances  and  joint 
ventures.  Joint  ventures  are  temporary  forms  of organizations  categorized  as  hybrids,  which 
provide quick response in  real time.  They facilitate  timely entry as  timing is  critical in a  high 
velocity  environment  and  when  learning  by  doing  is  important  (Williams on,  1991 a).  As  in 
alliances, they are motivated by learning, technology development, market penetration, access to 
capital (Kogut,  1988), and they are prevailing in sorne industries (Osborn & Hagerdoorn, 1997). 
Regarding  the  governance structure, joint ventures  involved  partners creating  a  new  entity  in 
which  they  share equity  and  hierarchical  control,  white  alliances  are  formed  with  no  equity 
sharing  and  few  hierarchical  controls  (Gulati,  1998).  In  joint  ventures,  the  ability  to  share 
knowledge and implement may vary based on the administrative form and governance structure. 
The equity form  stresses issues of control, governance, setting  targets and measuring progress. 
The hierarchical form provides a structure to absorb tacit knowledge that is  not easily codifiable 
or transferable, to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989b), and the reduce 
and  control  the  danger  of  appropriation.  The  greater  the  appropriation  concerns,  the  more 226 
hierarchical  the  governance structures  (Gulati,  1998).  In  alliances,  non-equity  forms  provide a 
better way  to  discover  knowledge  and  day-to-day  cooperation.  This  is  important  early  in  the 
alliance, when it is difficult to evaluate the partner's information and the potential future value of 
the knowledge gained by the  alliance (Osborn & Hagerdoorn,  1997). Alliances between a large 
firm  and  a  start-up,  with  little  information  known  about  it,  allow  the  firm  to  evaluate  the 
information about its  partner technology,  hu man  and  financial  as sets,  in  order to  determine  if 
there is a strategie fit. 
7.2.2 The Resource-Based View 
Resources  and  heterogeneity.  Beside  the  isolating  mechanisms,  the  resource 
characteristics  are  whether  the  resources  are  scarce,  unique,  inimitable,  durable,  idiosyncratic, 
non-tradeable, intangible, non substitutable (Amit & Schoemaker,  1993;  Barney,  1991 ; Peteraf, 
1993), valuable and rare (Lippman & Rumelt,  1982). Resources that are rare, imitable and create 
value  are  categorized  as  strategie  resources  (Chi,  1994  ).  Also  strategie  resources  could  be  an 
experience top management team (Castanias & Helfat,  1991; Combs & David J.  Ketchen, 1999) 
or a group of R&D researchers, as  valuable idiosyncratic human assets,  who possess specialized 
knowledge,  which  can  help  in reducing  cost,  improve  quality,  and  innovate,  all  sources  of 
competitive advantage (Collis,  1994). Those non-tractable  assets  are difficult to  imitate because 
they have a tacit dimension, are socially complex (Dierick.x & Cool,  1989), time dependent and 
path  dependent,  which  give  the  firm  who  possess  them  an  informational  advantage  (Peteraf, 
1993) and should be identified and sustained (Barney, 1986). 
The resource-based view foc uses, as stated by 01 i  ver (1997) on "the characteristics of the 
resources  and  the  strategie  factor  markets  from  which  they  are  obtained  to  explain  firm 
heterogeneity  and  sustainable  ad v  an tage".  The  idiosyncratic  hu man,  physical  and  intangible 
assets  create  heterogeneity  (Mahoney  &  Pandian,  1992),  which  is  one  of the  conditions  for 
competitive  advantage,  and  if  preserved,  create  a  sustained  competitive  advantage  (Peteraf, 
1993).  The resource-based  view  assumes  that  the  resources  and  capabilities  across  firms  are 
heterogeneous,  and  sorne  that  are  superior  to  others  achieves  economie  efficiency  and  rent 
streams (Barney,  1991  ). Homogeneity, on  the  other hand,  could  result from  strategie alliances, 
regulatory  pressures, human  capital  transfer, social  and  professional  relations  and  competency 227 
blueprints (Oliver,  1997). So alliances could be a source of homogeneity, as it could be  a source 
of heterogeneity, if used  to  access superior resources not available internally. Acquisitions are a 
source  of  heterogeneity  as  they  allow  the  firm  to  acquire  resources  leading  to  competitive 
ad van tage. 
Resources  and  capabilities.  Sorne authors  make  a  distinction  between  resources  and 
capabilities: Capabilities are  skills based on human competencies and "capacities to  coordinate 
and  deploy  resources  to  perform  tasks",  while  resources  are  ali  other  assets  (Markides  & 
Williamson, 1996) and "input factors used by the firm to develop and implement their strategies" 
(Amit &  Schoemaker,  1993; Oliver,  1997). Capabilities could be dynarnic, referring to  the firm 
capacity  to  renew  competences  to  adapt  to  a  changing  environment.  They  require  timely 
response, rapid and flexible  innovation,  which is  essential when time to  market and timing are 
important,  especially  in  the  context  of  a  high  rate  of  technological  change  and  when  the 
uncertainty about markets and competition is high (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
As the firm is  p01trayed as a bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959), they comprise ali the 
firm assets  and capabilities  and  constitute the company' s  strength  and  advantage (Prahalad  & 
Hamel,  1994),  or its  weakness (Wernerfelt,  1984).  The firm's resources could be tangible and 
intangible  (Caves,  1980)  and  are  serni-permanently  tied  to  the  firm.  To give  sorne  examples; 
brand  names,  in-house  knowledge  and  technology,  employed  and  skilled  personnel,  tracte 
contract, machinery, efficient procedures, R&D expertise, capital, etc. (Wernerfelt,  1984). Those 
resources influence the firm' s growth and its rate, if they are used to expand into activities related 
to those resources (Combs &  David J.  Ketchen,  1999). Resource differences among firms could 
explain the performance differences and resource scarcity could lead the firm to engage in inter-
firm cooperation such as alliances or to acquire those needed resources in the market (Mahoney 
&  Pandian,  1992).  The  sustainability  of these  differences  depends  on  the  difficulty  faced  by 
competitors  in  accessing  similar resources  (Barney,  1991;  Dierickx  &  Cool,  1989).  Whether 
home grown  or acquired,  those  resources  that  lead  to  high  profits  could  be  called  "resource 
position  barriers"  as in analogy to entry barriers, since one competitor will  have an advantage 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Those entry barriers are isolation mechanisms. 228 
Because  the  history  of the  firm  engender  its  routines  based  on  which  strategies  are 
formulated and actions are taken, the organization's resources and capabilities could be a source 
of competitive advantage or a constraint (Madhok, 1997). The valued resources and capabilities 
that contribute to competitive advantage, are defined as  strategie assets, and they could be built 
up through cumulative experience and Jearning-by-doing or acquired from factor markets (Arnit 
&  Schoemaker,  1993),  with  the  probability  to  be  motivated  by  collaboration  more  than  by 
transaction cost econornizing (Madhok, 1997), and as in the case of alliances and acquisitions, for 
resources  that cannot be built  internally  with  acceptable cost,  risk and  within  acceptable time 
(Eisenhardt &  Schoonhoven,  1996).  In  addition,  built in  resources  are  subject to  difficulty  in 
measurement as  a determinant of governance performance, based on the principal-agent theory, 
due to moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989b  ). 
Competitive advantage.  The strategie assets  create a competitive advantage based on 
four  conditions:  heterogeneity,  ex-post  lirnits,  imperfect  mobility  and  ex-ante lirnits  (Peteraf, 
1993).  Ex-post  limit  could  be  lirnited  by  imperfect  irnitability  and  imperfect  substitutability 
(Peteraf &  Barney,  2003). Imperfect irnitability could  not  be achieved  if the innovation is  an 
assembly of available technologies, and which patent protection would not be a sufficient barrier. 
Imperfect mobility depends on the value of the innovation or resource which cannot be revealed 
because it  is  proprietary and for fear of appropriation (Peteraf,  1993). With all those conditions 
met,  the  strategie  assets  are  the  core  competencies  of the  firm  and  the  source  of sustained 
competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
When the firm needs additional assets, whether to complement existing ones or for reason 
of scarcity, alliances and acquisitions occur. Alliances are seen as a quick inexpensive external 
growth  method,  as  studies  show  that  financially  weak  firms  tend  to  use  alliances,  while 
financially  strong  firms  tend  to  acquire  (Hoff  man &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001)  and  as  "learning 
races"  favoring  the pmtner that  learn  more quickly (Hamel,  1991;  Khanna,  Gulati,  &  Nohria, 
1998). The issue of resource endowment has an influence on ail inter-organizational relationships, 
which  are  used  by  the firm to  access, control and share  resources externa1 resources needed to 
overcome  growth constraints (Hamel,  1991  ),  which  in  the  same ti me require internai resources 
such as capital,  management, experience (Hoffman &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001 ), and  the ability to 
1earn and a  da  pt known as absorpti ve capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990b  ). 229 
7.2.3 Transaction Cost Economies and Agency Theory 
Asset  specificity,  frequency  and  uncertainty.  The  transaction  cost  approach  to  the 
study of organizations covers issues ranging from varieties of organizational structure to franchise 
contracting (Armour &  Teece,  1978;  Williamson,  1986). The definition of a transaction is  "the 
transfer  of  goods  or  a  service  between  techno1ogically  separate  units  and  the  analysis  of 
transactions focuses on achieving efficiencies in  their administration" (Williamson,  1991 a). The 
critical dimensions or criteria of a transaction are the frequency with which it occurs, the degree 
of uncertainty  it  involves  and  the  degree  of asset  specificity  it  involves  (Williamson,  1986). 
Depending on the frequency of the transaction, the efficient governing structure for the efficient 
use  of resources  will  depend  on  the  degree  of  uncertainty  (which  is  high  in  high  velocity 
environments) and  the  specificity of the  assets  involved  in  the  transaction  (Walker &  Weber, 
1984; Williamson, 1986). Asset specificity has reference to "the degree to  which an asset can be 
redeployed to  alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value". It 
could be site specificity, stations located nearby to econornize on transportation and inventory; 
physical assets, specialized tools to produce a component; human asset specificity, learning by 
doing  and  know-how;  dedicated  assets,  investments;  brand  name  capital;  and  temporal 
specificity,  technological  non  separability in  which  time  response  is  critical.  Assets specificity 
increases the cost of governance, which cou1d be offset by cost savings and increased revenues. 
The ownership of assets is related to the property rights: the right to use the assets, appropriate the 
retums and to  change the form of the asset (Williamson,  1991 a).  Transaction costs are  assessed 
indirectly by  measuring the degree of asset specificity and uncertainty associated with the buyer 
supplier contract (Walker & Weber, 1984). 
Vertical  integration and  acquisitions is  a demonstration of market failure  (Wi11iamson, 
1986,  1991 a).  Wh en faced with market failure, the two  parties searching for complementary or 
supplementary resources would internalize their transaction by adopting alliance, joint venture or 
merger and acquisition. In case of an acquisition, this contribute to the transfer of specialized tacit 
knowledge to the acquirer and of access to capital to the acquired (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998). 
The  decision  to  use  alliances  or  acquisitions  depends  on  severa!  factors  among  them, 
opportunism, governance, and safeguards against appropriation. If the danger of opportunism and 230 
the  safeguards  to  protect  individual  interests  are  high  with  high  asset  specificity,  then 
internalization is  favored to reduce costs. If the cost of integrating the economie activities of the 
combined entities is  higher than the expected synergy potentially resulting from the integration, 
th en alliances are favored over acquisitions (Hoff  man & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001 ).  As  the sustained 
competitive  advantage  of the  firm  is  based  on  the  procession  of strategie  assets  and  core 
competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Wernerfelt, 1984  ), the boundaries of the firm determines 
the composition and possession of those resources (Poppo & Zenger, 1998). 
Governance. The choice of governance structure has an implication on the nature of the 
contract and the mechanism to resolve conflicts and disputes, which influence costs. Neo-classic 
contract  form  is  used  when  paities  maintain  certain  autonomy  and  they  remain  bilaterally 
dependent and engaged, such as in alliances and joint ventures. Bilateral monopoly uses relational 
contracting, and it is  when the two parties engaged with a commitment for long-term due to the 
nature of their respective large investments occurring over a  large period of time,  with  no  fast 
returns. This engagement limits their agreement or collaboration with others. 
Whether  the  transaction  is  based  on  make  or  buy,  internai  procurement  or  market 
procurement, will have an implication on the means of dispute resolutions, whether arbitration or 
litigation. In neoclassic contracting the mean for dispute resolution is through arbitration and not 
litigation, which in case of alliances and joint ventures, as bilateral monopolies, reduces the cost 
of litigation, the time of conflict resolution and increase the contracting flexibility  in  managing 
uncertainty (Williamson,  1986,  1991 a).  In the case of acquisitions, the implicit law of resolving 
conflict is that of forbearance and business judgment rule. This allows managing internai dispute 
without  going  to  court,  which  reduce  costs,  time  of conflict  resolution  and  increase  trust 
(Williamson, 1991 a). The internai organization of economie activities or acquisitions reduces the 
internai  incenti v  es  compared  to  market  incenti v  es  and  redu  ces  the  difficulty  in  measuring 
behavior.  However,  the  incentive  deficiency  and  measurement difficulty  could  be  reduced  by 
outcome based contract and equity sharing, which curb the opportunism, deal with moral hazard 
and  adverse selection,  and  transfer an amount of risk to the internai agent  which help align  its 
goals with that of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989b  ). 231 
7.3 Strategie Alliances 
Strategie alliances are defined as  "a voluntary arrangement between firms  involving the 
exchange,  sharing  or  co-development  of products,  technologies  and  services".  Sorne  of the 
decisions taken by  the firm  are the choice of the appropriate partner, the choice to  enter into an 
alliance, the choice of the alliance's structure and the dynamic evolution of the alliance. The unit 
of analysis  is  the firm  or  the  alliance  (Gulati,  1999). From an  economie  perspective strategie 
alliances capitalize on specifie advantages in firms, markets and industries.  Industries with high 
R&D rates have a higher proportion of alliances, which result in  higher savings. In  international 
business, they are temporary form or hybrids, for expansion, penetration, cast and  risk sharing. 
From a corporate strategy perspective, alliances are used for learning, techno1ogy deve1opment, 
and market penetration. Alliances are viewed as a leaming conduit and process. They support the 
firm to  improve its  know-how, capabilities and tacit knowledge. The process of learning within 
alliances is  more comp1ex  than in  hierarchies,  however,  alliances  provide  a t'aster  response  to 
R&D challenges when timing is critical specially in a high velocity environment, with a degree of 
uncertainty (Osborn & Hagerdoorn, 1997). 
From  a  transaction  cost  perspective,  alliances  are  placed  on  a  continuum  between 
hierarchies and markets (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998; Thorelli, 1986; Williamson, 1991 b)  with a 
hybrid form of governance (Eisenhardt,  1989b; Williamson,  1986). They help to  reduce the  net 
cost of conducting business, however one of the shortcomings of the transaction cost approach to 
alliance  analysis  is  the  focus  on  the  cost  minimization  by  one  party,  while  alliances  are  for 
exchanges between two or more partners. In fact alliances are not on1y  about cost minimization, 
but also joint value maximization (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). 
From inter-organizational and institutional approaches, alliances characterized collective 
patterns  of survival,  growth  and  sustainability .(Osborn  &  Hagerdoorn,  1997).  Environmental 
pressures  on  the  firm  could  lead  to  resource  dependency  (Pfeffer  &  Salancik,  1978).  The 
argument  is  that at  intermediate  leve!  of industry  concentration,  firms  cou1d  experience high 
levels  of  competitive  uncertainty  and  could  moderate  this  competitive  interdependence  by 
entering into alliances (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976). The resource consideration is  important as sorne 
firm  use alliances  to  buffer  and  explore  uncertainty  (Kogut,  1991 ). Firms  enter into  alliances 232 
wh  en  they  percei ve  a  criücal  strategie  interdependence  with  other  organizations  in  the 
environment, where one firm  possess capabilities not possessed by others (Aiken & Hage,  1968; 
Le  vine & White,  1961 ).  Because rapid changes in  the environment cou id  alter the needs of the 
firm, the later should identify their real needs and potential partners, otherwise it could be Iocked 
in  a  path  dependency  (Gulati,  1998).  Alliances  also  are  viewed  as  experiments  in  institution 
building  to  solve  strategie  problems  and  they  allow  the  emergence  of  trust  (Osborn  & 
Hagerdoorn, 1997). One driving force behind alliances could be isomorphism (Haveman, 1993). 
Alliances  are  used  when  the  firms  are  faced  with  daunting  technological  and 
environmental challenges, such as  the  convergence of technologies and  the  emergence of new 
government  regulations  (Osborn  &  Hagerdoom,  1997).  They  provide  an  external  source  of 
innovation  and  R&D,  and  buffer  from  uncertainty,  by  sharing  risks  and  adapt  to  change 
(Robertson  &  Gatignon,  1998),  reduce  time  to  market  by  shortening  the  cycle  of innovation 
(Williamson, 1991 a), and leverage resources by me ans of horizontal and vertical alliances,  which 
help to  expand strategie capabilities and reduce competition (Robertson & Gatignon,  1998). The 
Japanese  mode!  of  inter-organizational  collaboration,  alliances  and  joint  venture  is  a  good 
example. The issue of technological uncertainty is  critical as the emergence of new technologies 
could represent a technological paradigm shift, where in the area of high-tech industries, the rate 
of technology obsolescence is higher than other industries (Robertson & Gatignon,  1998). In their 
study,  Hoffman  and  Schaper-Rinkel  (2001)  found  that strategie  and  technological  uncertainty, 
disperse  knowledge  and converging  technologies,  and  high  leve!  of inter-organizational  trust, 
favor the formation  of alliances  in  high  velocity environment, which  allows.  for  the sharing of 
history dependent competencies (Oliver, 1997). 
Alliance formation depends on three motivation as transaction costs resulting from small 
number  bargaining,  enhancing  market  power  and  competitive  positioning,  and  the  quest  for 
organizational  knowledge  (Kogut,  1988).  The  quest  for  market  power  may  be  an  important 
motive  (Berg &  Friedman,  1978). The factors  influencing  alliance formation  are the extent of 
competition, the  stage  of development of the  market  and  demand  and  competitive  uncertainty 
(Gulati, 1998). Attributes such as size, age, competitive position, product diversity and finàncial 
resources are predictors of the firm propensity to enter an alliance (Barley, Freeman, & Hybels, 
1992;  Powell &  Brantley,  1992; Shan,  1990).  The condition of mutual  economie  advantage is 233 
necessary but not sufficient to enter into an alliance (Gulati,  1998). The extent of market overlap 
between the  partner,  or relative scope, could influence the likelihood of competitive dynarnics 
between the partners (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). The research on the relationship between 
the size of the firm  and  the decision to  enter into  an  alliance are contradictory (Robertson & 
Gatignon,  1998). 
During the  network phase, strategie  alliance or joint venture,  a  market adaptation  and 
coordination is  used to coordinate investments and alignments. This could create through time, a 
bilateral dependency that paves the way for internalization. This bilateral dependency is  a path 
dependency  that  leads  to  vertical  integration  through  acquisitions  (Williamson,  1991 a). 
Safeguards against opportunism and contracting hazards create a mutual dependency between the 
parties (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998). The danger of opportunism and the safeguard costs against 
appropriation, influence the decision to use alliances or acquisitions (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 
2001 ). The danger of appropriation cornes from the risk of one partner irnitating the technology or 
the  core  competencies of the other and  start competing  (Pisano,  Russo;  &  Teece,  1988). The 
argument of the  transaction  cost approach in  the case of alliances is  the  cost reduction,  white 
dealing  with  market  uncertainty  and  the  risk  of opportunism,  which  tend  to  increase  costs 
(Osborn & Hagerdoorn, 1997; Walker & Weber, 1984). 
7.4 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Alliances could be  seen  as  a first  step before or towards  acquisitions.  As  proposed  by 
Hoffman and Schaper-Rinkel (200 1), weak appropriability regimes, high expected synergies and 
high resource endowment (specially financially) favars acquisitions over alliances. High synergy 
require a strategie fit  between the acquired and acquirer's strategy, resources and organizational 
culture  (Wernerfelt,  1984).  To  achieve  this  fit,  the  acquisition  strategy  could  be  based  on 
resources that are related supplementary (more of what the firm has) or related complementary 
(resources  which combine effectively  with what the firm has)  (Salter &  Weinhold,  1980).  The 
combination  of supplementary  and  complementary  resources  produces  synergy  and  lead  to 
superior economie performance (Singh & Montgomery, 1987). 234 
Therefore,  acquisitions could  be defined  as  a  purchase of a  bundle of resources  in  an 
imperfect market and to trade otherwise non-marketable resources (Wernerfelt, 1984),  which are 
imperfectly imitable because of tacit knowledge and social complexity (Dierickx & Cool,  1989). 
Social complexity is considered a general asset for the firm (Coff,  1997a). The resources which 
support diversification could be  defined  as  quasi-fixed, yet inherently fungible (Peteraf,  1993), 
and  resulting from excess capacity,  multiple  use and  market failure  (Chatterjee  &  Wernerfelt, 
1991). This bidding of firms  based on strategically related acquisitions could  produce abnormal 
returns (Peteraf &  Barney, 2003), depending on the degree of relatedness among  products and 
coherence in  business  activities and  the scope  of the firm  including the  speed of leaming, the 
breadth  of path  dependencies,  the  degree  of asset  specificity  and  the  nature of the  selection 
environment  (Peteraf,  1993). Acquisitions achieve economies of scope such as sharing overhead 
costs,  adrninistrati ve  and  ad vertising costs, skills and resources su  ch as  inputs and technologies, 
relations such as  customers and  suppliers,  generic resources and  physical  assets  such as  office 
building and equipments,  risk, investments, knowledge and  know-how and it reduce the learning 
curve  (D'Aveni  &  Ravenscraft,  1994).  This economies of scope and  scale, achieve  high  gains 
through  acquisitions  in  high  velocity  and  high  uncertainty  environment  such  as  the  high  tech 
industry. 
Acquisitions and vertical integration are a demonstration of market failure (Williamson, 
1986,  199la).  The  problem  of evaluating  the  supplier  or  the  partner's (in  case  of alliances) 
performance,  combined  with  the  risk  of opportunism,  uncertainty  and  high  asset  specificity, 
favors the internalization of the transaction through acquisition. The coordination required in  the 
case of alliances,  between  the  in-house  engineering or  management  team  and  the  supplier  or 
partner, becomes  more  complex  under  volume  uncertainty,  as  fluctuation  in  demand and  non-
predictability and  technological uncertainty, which favors acquisitions (Walker &  Weber,  1984). 
When the  knowledge  cannot  be  protected  by  law  against  leakage,  then  acquisition  is  favored 
(Teece,  1986).  Hoffman and  Schaper-Rinkel (2001) found  that high behavioral uncertainty, risk 
of opportunism, moral hazards and adverse selection fa vors acquisitions over alliances. 
The  incentives  to  vertically  integrate  depends  on the  type  of production  involved,  the 
extent of the transaction costs, the amount of specialized assets,  the degree of market power, the 
separability  of activities  and  the  amount  of uncertainty  concerning  priee  and  cost.  However, 235 
vertical integration could raise costs due to the complexity of managing the integration,  which 
could  lead  to  managerial  inefficiencies.  Mobility  and  exit  barriers  may  increase  strategie 
inflexibility, which leads to path dependency. Cost may be reduced by reducing transaction costs, 
decreasing uncertainty or asymmetry of information and by  protecting proprietary technologies. 
Vertical  integration  could  increase  profits  through  higher  priees  by  creating  entry  barriers, 
reducing  service  and  advertising  externalities.  Acquisitions  result  in  economies  of scale  and 
scope,  such  as  sharing  R&D  expenses,  resources,  knowledge  and  relations.  Economies  are 
achieved by  coordinating and reducing production and inventory costs,  transportation costs by 
using  the  same  location,  and  by  the  opportunities  to  exploit  technological  interdependency 
(D'Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994). 
7.5 Discussion 
In  the analysis of alliances, acquisition and  make-or-buy decisions, the transaction cost 
approach focuses on the cost of the transaction, the resource based view focuses on the value of 
the  resources  and  the  network  theory  focuses  on  the  informational  flow,  and  the  risk  of 
appropriation. The strength of the firm in transaction cost is  based on economie efficiencies, in 
the resource-based view on core competencies and strategie assets and in the network theory on 
position within the network, trust,  and power. The unit of analysis is  the cost in  transaction cost; 
the firm or resource in  the resource based view and the link or position in  the network theory. 
Opportunism and uncertainty are reduced by  trust in  network theory, by  governance structure in 
transaction cost and by collaboration, fit and synergy in the resource based view. The distinction 
between cost and  value is  critical  since it causes a fundamental  shift in  the approach towards 
governance  and  the  analysis  of decisions  related  to  the  firm' s  boundaries.  Transaction  cost 
focuses  on  market  failure,  network theory on network failure  and  the resource based  view  on 
limits of the firm capabilities and hierarchical failure. Transaction cost focuses on the exploitation 
of the  firm' s  advantages,  network  theory  on  the  exploitation  and  development  of the  firm' s 
relations, and the resource based view looks at the development of such advantages. Transaction 
cost and network theory are driven by the assumption of opportunism and bounded rationality and 
resource based view by bounded rationality only. The choice of the firm boundaries has an impact 
on the transaction cost, the trans  fer and flow of knowledge and the firm' s internai and externat 236 
capabilities. The distinction between value and cost has  an  influence on the internalization and 
the collaboration decisions. The governance structure is  distinct and has different implications in 
transaction cost,  network theory and  the  resource-based  view. The mechanism used  in  dealing 
with  opportunism  is  distinct  in  each  case.  Transaction  cost,  the  resource  based  view  and  the 
network  theory,  explain  the  rational  behind  the  alliances  formation  and  the  acquisitions  of 
external  resources  for  sustained  competitive  advantage.  However,  when  applied  to  an 
environment characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and high velocity such as the high tech 
industry, it  seems  that the network theory is more suitable to explain the process of scanning the 
environment, forming alliances and joint ventures, while the resource based view is  more sui table 
for explaining the use of acquisitions, as  it conceptualizes the decision  making based on the Jack 
of critical resources and the need to access or acquire in a timely fashion tacit knowledge which is 
difficult  to  buy.  The  choice  of the  governance  structure  has  an  important effect on  the  firm 
performance. The choice between transaction cost, network theory and the resource-based view is 
a  choice  on  the  firm  boundaries,  as  the  choice  between  cost  and  value  would  determine  the 
boundaries of the firm.  The role that technological uncertainty has on governance performance 
and  optimal  boundaries  is  not  clear.  Increases  in  technological  uncertainty  have  no  effect  on 
performance, making it  unclear how the comparative performance of such activities affects the 
boundaries decisions. 
The field of strategy is a complex one. It includes ali the functions of the top executive, 
with the underlying divisional fields of marketing, finance, etc. It is also grounded in  behavioral 
science,  political  science,  anthropology,  sociology,  psychology,  economies  and  finance.  It 
combines  different  disciplines  such  as  business  policy  and  strategie  management,  industrial 
organization,  organizational  economies,  economies  sociology,  human  behavioral  science, 
organizational theory and others. It use different theories borrowed from distinct areas of social 
science to interpret and explain the issues under investigation, such as  transaction cost, resource-
based view, network theory, knowledge-based view and market-based view. 
However, the issues  under investigation are much  more complex than they seem when 
using one or another approach to  explore them.  As  Hafsi and Thomas (2005) noted, "collective 
action cannat be understood if  it is broken dawn into parts to be studied separately, As reality is 
complex,  it is  more appropriate to  study it  in  its  totality.  This  means not on/y studying  ali the 237 
parts together but also the ir inter-relationships, even if  the result is an incomplete and imperfect 
understanding".  Furthermore,  using  the  holistic  approach  alone  for  integrative  purposes  is 
considered to  be outdated and  not scientific and Jess  credible because of the  use  of qualitative 
methods, while using the analytical approach alone tend to fragment the reality into unrelated (or 
Jess  related  and  integrated)  pieces,  and  tend  to  see strategy  as  an  assemblage of theories  and 
methodologies;  " ... The  question of what  strate  gy  is.  ft  feels  like  a  vast  array of diverse  and 
uncoordinated  detailed  observations  that  are  scientifically  respectable,  yet  incoherent  in 
practice." (Hafsi & Thomas, 2005) 
Even before reading Hafsi  and  Thomas, and  in  the planning stage of this  paper, 1 was 
guided by my intuition to use a holistic approach to explore the issue of my interest, alliances and 
acquisitions in the high-tech industries, with the intention of integrating, if pertinent, the different 
theories into  a theoretical  mode!  that could be  used  to  explain the abject of my  investigation, 
acquisitions and alliances in high velocity environments, and most important!  y without neglecting 
the details and their implications to practice in reallife and corporate decisions making. 
My understanding  is  that,  in  studying alliances and  acquisitions,  more than one theory 
should  be  used  in  an  integrated approach  with a clear definition of its  theoretical foundations, 
assumptions  and boundaries,  within  the  scope  of the  investigated  abject.  After  exploring  the 
different theories included in this paper, the theoretical mode! represented in figure 7.1  emerged. 
It combined the network theory, the transaction cost and agency theory and finally the resource-
based  view,  with  a  temporal  assumption  reflecting  the  different  phases  of  alliances  and 
acquisitions:  Pre-acquisition,  acquisition  decision  making,  post-acquisition  and  performance 
measurement. 
In the context of the high-tech industry, the network theory is  more pertinent to the pre-
acquisition  phase,  where  the  firms  are  scanning the  environment based  on  their relations  and 
searching  for potential  partners for  informai  collaboration,  strategie  alliances  or joint venture. 
This is usually done in an exploratory and test mode, for future acquisitions. The boundaries for 
the use of the network theory are clear; before taking the decision for internalizing the activity 
through  acquisition.  The  transaction  cost  and  agency  theory  deal  with  organization  forms 
(alliances, joint  ventures,  or acquisitions/vertical  integration),  the  cost  involved  in  each  mode 238 
(market, hybrid or alliances/joint venture and vertical integration/acquisition), and the governing 
mechanism for each structure. Thus, those combined theories are pertinent at the boundaries of 
the  scanning  phase,  during  the  alliance/joint  venture  phase  and  the  acquisition  phase.  The 
theoretical boundaries of their application cover the three areas. Finally the resource-based view 
concerned with  the acquisition and accumulation of strategie  assets  and  core competencies for 
sustained  competitive  advantage,  is  more  pertinent  to  the  acquisition  and  integration  phase. 
However, in evaluating external complementary and supplementary resources, it also covers part 
of the alliance/joint venture phase. Therefore, its coverage area is  the acquisition phase and part 
of the optional alliance phase, and its boundaries are fixed on the acquisition phase and flexible in 
the  optional  alliance/joint  venture  phase.  In  the  context  of acquisitions,  alliances  with  their 
different contractual and non contractual forms are optional. Sorne cases would encourage the use 
of  transitory  alliances  (Duysters  &  Man,  2003a)  before  taking  the  acquisition  decision,  to 
evaluate closely the  pote11tial  acquisition target and  overcome information asymmetry.  In  other 
cases, the decision to acquire is  made without the need for any pre-acquisition formai or informai 
cooperation, such as alliances and joint-ventures. 
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Finally,  the  knowledge-based  view,  the  market-based  view  and  the stakeholder theory 
could be  integrated into the  theoretical mode!;  however they  were not part of the scope of this 
research. Their tentative position is planned for further exploration as shown in figure 7.1. 
7.6 Implications 
This  work  in  progress  has  severa!  implications  for  scholars  and  practitioners.  For 
practitioners, it  describes  the  environment and  the  context of acquisition decision  making  in  a 
high  velocity  environment,  and  the  phases  prior  to  making  the  decision  (scanning  and  due 
diligence)  and  the  subsequent  phase  of integration.  It  expiains  the  compiexity  of the  factors 
involved in each of these phases and categorizes them using three distinct Ienses: Transaction cost 
economies (and  agency theory), resource based view, and network theory. Those various factors 
with their underlying theoretical lenses are closely linked and, by using cognitive simplification, 
are  reduced  to  three  key  decision  areas:  Resources,  links,  and  cost.  Before contemplating  an 
acquisition, the key decision maker or the acquisition team, would have to evaluate their internai 
and  externai  resources,  by  identifying  their  needs,  their existing capabilities  and  the  potential 
resources in their firm's ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor, 2010a, 2010b; Kapoor & Lee, 2010). They 
would  have  to  use  their  existirig  relationships  within  their  ecosystem  or  establish  new 
reiationships,  to  link their  needs  with  the  external resources  (Grigoriou  &  Rothaermei,  20 10). 
Their needs could vary from assessing the external environment and evaluating potential targets, 
to informai or formai collaboration with competitors, through participating in standard bodies to 
enact the future direction of technologies and markets, or through venture capital, joint venturing 
or strategie alliances. In assessing the resources and establishing the links, the factor cost should 
be calculated. The cost and  resource endowment could be  influential  in  deciding  between the 
decision for acquisition or alliance. The cost of internai R&D and of acquiring an externat source 
of innovation could be decisive in a make or buy decision. The complexity of the integration in a 
post-acquisition phase could  have  serious implications on  the overall cost,  the  efficient use  of 
capabilities and the efficiency of the governance structure. The three factors together, resources, 
links  and  cost,  would  have  a  large  impact on the  organizational structure and  strategy,  which 
would  have  serious  implications  on  performance  and  the  firm' s  ability  to  sus  tain  competitive 
advantage. 240 
The complexity of the tasks involved in acquisitions' activities within the context of high 
velocity environment, such as the high technology industries, lead us to  believe that undertaking 
the  decision  to  go  for  acquisition  is  a  multi-level,  multi-function  and  involving  a  temporal 
dimension as  well. Those tasks cannot be  undertaken by  one key decision maker alone like the 
chief executive or by the executive team only. Cognitive simplification, bounded rationality, and 
asymmetry  of information,  would  not  yield  to  successful  acquisition  outcome. In  addition,  it 
would be highly impossible to  manage such intensive acquisition activities, as in the case of the 
high technology industries,  with this lirnited number of involvement. Instead, it would be highly 
probable,  that  different teams,  from  different department with  different skills, are  involved  in 
managing  the  different  phases  and  lifecycles  of  such  intensive  acquisitions'  activities.  The 
involvement of multi  departmental teams  would have an  impact on the organizational structure 
and  strategy  formation  within  the  organization  dealing  with  intensive  acquisitions  activities. 
Dynamic capabilities would be a key success factor in managing an organization structure of this 
nature.  This  structure  would  reinforce  the  tendency  to  believe  that  the  process  of strategy 
formulation in  such an organization is  not an emergent one, but rather deliberate with long range 
planning. The involvement in  intensive acquisitions'  activities, such  as  in  the case of the  high 
technology industries, would lead us  to believe that the firm has adopted deliberately acquisitions 
as a key strategy, if not the main strategy for growth and sustaining competitive advantage. 
7.7 Common Concepts, Constructs, and Variables 
A  revtew  of the  literature  was  based  on  journals  such  as  the  strategie  management 
journal,  academy  of  management  review,  academy  of management journal,  administrative 
science  quarter/y,  organization science,  R&D management, and others, explored factors  related 
to alliance and acquisitions and resulted in a total of 74 factors, for both alliance and acquisition. 
They were then classified into the three categories: Sorne factors are found to be used mainly with 
either research stream only,  while the others are used for both alliance and  acquisition research. 
Table 7.1  is  a list of factors  used  mainly  in alliance research. Table 7.2 is  a list of factors  used 
mainly in acquisitions research. Table 7.3 is a  list of common factors used in  both alliance and 
acquisition research. 241 
Table 7.1 
Selected list of constructs and variables used main! y for alliance research 
Constructs  used  main!  y  in  Research type  Cited by 
Alliances 
l  Market uncertainty  Motivates alliance  (Eisenhardt,  1989a)  (Williamson, 
1975)  (Jemison  &  Sitkin,  1986b) 
(Williainson, 1999) 
2  Product uncertainty  Motivates alliance  (Quelin,  2000)  (Roberts  &  Liu, 
2001 ) 
3  Danger of appropriation  To control for and affect  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
4  Economie performance  To measure as a result of  (Lubatkin,  1983)  (Singh  & 
Montgomery,  1987) 
5  Absorptive capacity  A  critical  success  factor  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
(CSF) 
6  Management control  A CSF, to control for  (Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
7  Trust  Precondition, CSF  (Eisenhardt,  1989a)  (Williamson, 
1975)  (Jemison  &  Sitkin,  1986b) 
(Williamson, 1999) 
8  R&D intensity  Shared by and distributed  (Hitt et al., 1991  b) (Hitt et al., 1996) 
9  Learning by doing  A motivation for  (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
(Pennings,  Barkema,  &  Douma, 
1994b) 
10  Penetrate new markets  An objectif for  (Walter & Barney,  1990) 
11  Compatible  organizational  ACSF  (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) 
objectives 1  strategy 
12  Strategie control  To control for  (Hitt  et al.,  1996)  (Hitt, Hoskisson, 
& Ireland, 1990) 
13  Risk  Motivation for  (Walter  &  Barney,  1990)  (Roberts 
& Liu, 2001 ) 
14  Social capi tai  A CSF, increase  success  (Hoffman  & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001 ) 
(Geletkanycz  &  Hambrick,  1997) 
(Gulati,  1999) 
15  Technological performance  To be measured  (James,  Georghiou,  &  Metcalfe, 
1998) 
16  Efficiency  To be measured  (Trautwein,  1990)  (Walter  & 
Barney, 1990) (Williamson, 1999) 
17  Degree  of  portfolio  Planned  for,  to  be  (Ferrary, 2003) 
competi  ti veness  measured 
18  Resource dependency  Created by  (Pfeffer, 1972) 
19  Degree of opportunism  To control for and affect  (Eisenhardt,  1989a)  (Williamson, 
1975) (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 
2001; Williamson, 1999) 
20  Moral hazard  To control for and affect  (Eisenhardt,  1989a)  (Hoff  man  & 
Schaper-Rinkel,  2001)  (Coff, 
1997b) 
21  Risk sharing  A motivation for  (Walter  &  Barney,  1990)  (Roberts 
& Liu, 2001) (Lubatkin, 1983) 242 
Table 7.2 
Selected list of constructs and variables used mainly for acquisition research 
Constructs  used  mainly  in  Research type  Cited by 
Acquisitions 
22  Firm's size  ACSF 
23  Synergy  A desired outcome  (Brush, 1996) (James, Georghiou, & 
Metcalfe,  1998)  (Walter &  Barney, 
1990)  (Chatterjee,  1986)  (Lubatkin, 
1983) (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
24  Market power  A desired outcome  (Galbraith & Stiles, 1984) 
25  Increase monopoly  A desired outcome  (Trautwein, 1990) 
26  Platform leadership  A motivation for  (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) 
27  Technological uncertainty  A driver for 
28  Talent retention  To  control  for  and  (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) (Cannella 
measure  & Hambrick, 1993) (Coff,  1997b) 
29  Degree of integration  To  control  for  and  (James,  Georghiou,  &  Metcalfe, 
measure  1998)  (Paine  &  Power,  1984) 
(Mayer &  Kenney, 2004a) (Jemison 
&  Sitkin,  1986b)  (Naha van  di  & 
Malekzadeh, 1988) 
30  Leve! of strategie asset  To analyze before, CSF  (Hagedoorn  &  Duysters,  2002) 
(Oliver,  1997) (Peteraf,  1993) 
31  Empire building  A desired outcome  (Trautwein, 1990) 
32  Suplementary  product  1  A motivation for  (Shelton, 1988a) (Wernerfelt,  1984) 
technology 
33  Substitute product 1 technology  A motivation for  (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) 
34  Rate of internai innovation  Increased by  (Hitt et al., 1991b) (Hitt et al.,  1996) 
(Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990) 
35  Increase  acquisition  &  A strategy based on  (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) 
development 
36  Operational synergies  A desired outcome  (Trautwein, 1990) (Chatterjee, 1986; 
James,  Georghiou,  &  Metcalfe, 
1998) 
37  Financial control  To control for  (Hitt et  al.,  1996)  (Hitt,  Hoskisson, 
& lreland, 1990) 
38  Managerial synergies  To  control  for,  a  desired  (Trautwein,  1990) 
outcome 
39  Acquisition intensity  To be increased by  (Hitt et  al.,  1996)  (Hitt,  Hoskisson, 
& Ireland,  1990) 243 
Table 7.3 
Selected list of constructs and variables used for alliance and acquisition research 
Common constructs used in  Cited by 
Alliance and Acquisition 
40  Tacit knowledge  (Oliver, 1997) 
41  Information asymmetry  (Eisenhardt,  1989a)  (Hoffman  & 
Schaper-Rinkel, 200 1) (Coff, 1997b) 
42  Uncertainty 
43  R&D cost  (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
44  Complementary  product  1  (Shelton,  1988a) (Mayer & Kenney, 
technology  2004a) (Wernerfelt,  1984) 
45  Asset specificity  (Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001) 
(Williamson,  1975)  (Williamson, 
1999)  (Oliver,  1997)  (Coff,  1997b) 
(Robertson & Gatignon, 1998) 
46  Increase economies of scale  (Duysters & Man, 2003b) (Walter & 
Barney, 1990) (Hoffman & Schaper-
Rinke1,  2001)  (Singh  & 
Montgomery, 1987) 
47  Increase economies of scope  (Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001) 
(Lubatkin,  1983)  (Singh  & 
Montgomery, 1987) 
48  Competitive Advantage  (Porter,  1980a)  (Prahalad  & Hamel, 
1994) (Oliver,  1997) 
49  Bounded rationa1ity  (Eisen hardt,  1989a)  (Williamson, 
1975)  (Williamson,  1999)  (Coff, 
1997b) 
50  Barriers to Entry  (Yip, 1982) (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
51  Cost  (Walter & Barney, 1990) 
52  Increase Core competencies  (Hitt  et  al.,  199lb)  (Prahalad  & 
Hamel,  1990)  (Prahalad  &  Hamel, 
1994)  (Quelin,  2000)  (Singh  & 
Montgomery, 1987) 
53  Incentives  (Paine & Power, 1984) 
54  Product time to  market 
55  Proximity  (Ferrary,  2003)  (Mayer  &  Kenney, 
2004a) 
56  Degree of modularity  (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) 
57  Growth  (Feeser & Willard,  1990) (Walter & 
Barney, 1990) 
58  CEO's hubris  (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) 
59  Market share  (Brush,  1996;  Walter  &  Barney, 
1990) (Mayer & Kenney, 2004a) 
60  Net gain  (Trautwein, 1990) 
61  Transaction cost  (Teece,  1982)  (Williamson,  1986) 
(Williamson,  1975)  (Borys  & 
Jemison,  1989)  (Eisenhardt,  1989a) 
(Williamson,  1999)  (Walker  & 
Weber, 1984) 244 
62  Increase positioning  (Hopkins,  1987) (Walter  & Barney, 
1990) (Yip, 1982) (Gulati, 1999) 
63  Degree of product relatedness  (Feeser & Willard,  1990)  (Hopkins, 
1987)  (James,  Georghiou,  & 
Metcalfe,  1998)  (Roberts  &  Liu, 
200 1) (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
64  Compatible  organizational  (Jemison  &  Sitkin,  1986b)  (Mayer 
culture  &  Ken ney,  2004a)  (Datta,  1991) 
(Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) 
65  Financial synergies  (Trautwein, 1990) (Chatterjee, 1986) 
(Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001) 
66  Resource endowment  (Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinke1,  200 1) 
(Gulati, 1999) 
67  Target firm relative size  (Kusewitt, 1985) (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986b) (Datta, 1991) 
68  Complexity  (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b) 
69  Strategie fit  (Shelton,  1988a)  (Paine  &  Power, 
1984)  (Mayer  &  Kenney,  2004a) 
(Jemison  &  Sitkin,  1986b) 
(Wernerfelt, 1984) 
70  Experience  in  Alliances  1  (Haleblian  &  Finkelstein,  1999) 
Acquisitions  (Jemison  &  Sitkin,  1986b) 
(Pennings,  Barkema,  &  Douma, 
1994b) 
71  Path dependency  (Oliver,  1997)  (Singh  & 
Montgomery, 1987) 
72  Technical complexity  (Bettis & Hitt, 1995) 
73  R&D investment  (Hittet al., 199lb) 
7.8 Conclusion 
This  paper  has  mainly  one  objective  that  is  of bridging  the  gap  between alliance and 
acquisition research, towards a cross-fertilized agenda,  which would  be beneficiai to  both sub-
streams of research, alliance and acquisition, and to  the field of business policy and  strategy at 
large.  Following the  literature review and  exploration through the  three main theoretical lenses 
widely used in business policy and strategy research,  we hope that our proposai is clear now,  and 
that we demonstrated that there are more commonalities in alliance and acquisition research, than 
differences. It is obvious that the list for common factors of alliance and acquisition research is 
larger than the two other lists of factors that are more focused on either alliance or acquisition. 245 
We suggest  that  the  next  step  in  bridging  the  gap  between  alliance  and  acquisition 
research  is  to  focus  a  good  deal  of effort  on  two  questions  linking  the  two  sub-streams  of 
research. The first is the critical success factors in  alliance and acquisition. The second is to rely 
on past and current research to answer the following important questions: To ally or to acquire?; 
under what conditions?, what are the prerequisites in each case?. And knowing that firms do both 
alliance and acquisition, how to measure them efficiently, in order to use cumulative performance 
measurement as  feedback to answer the first question, to ally or acquire? This question obviously 
has not on! y theoretical implications, but critical practical implications as well, as it will provide a 
guideline and a check list for firms and managers facing this dilemma, to ally orto acquire? 
7.8.1 Critical Success Factors in Alliance and Acquisition 
Forrning alliances or acquisitions is  mainly with the objective of sustaining competitive 
advantage  (Oliver,  1997;  Porter,  1980a;  Prahalad  &  Hamel,  1994)  with  all  its  underlying 
conditions such the efficient management of strategie assets and building on core competencies, 
which  remain one  of the  critical  success  factors. In  a  pre  alliance  and  acquisition  phase,  one 
critical success  factor remains crucial to  the strength of the formation of a partnership between 
compatible  pattners:  Trust  (Eisenhardt,  l989a;  Jernison  &  Sitkin,  l986b;  Williamson,  1975; 
Williamson,  1999). Without trust,  conflict of interest, opportunistic behavior and  moral hazard 
could weaken the potential for a mutually  beneficiai relationship. During the scanning phase to 
evaluate  potential  partners,  the  reputation  of the  target  firm  and  the  persona!  relationships 
between its agent and the acquirer would speed up the process of access internai information and 
would  reduce  the  lengthy  negotiations.  In  alliances,  trust  between  the  partners  would  create 
synergetic opportunities  (Brush,  1996;  Chatterjee,  1986;  James,  Georghiou,  &  Metcalfe,  1998; 
Lubatkin, 1983; Walter & Barney,  1990; Wemerfelt, 1984) and a healthy organizational culture. 
Compatible  organizational cultures  (Datta,  1991 ; Jernison  &  Sitkin,  1986b; Mayer  & 
Kenney, 2004a; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988) between the partners, either in an alliance or an 
acquisition  are  another  critical  success  factor  to  guarantee  an  alignment  between  the  two 
organizations  and  produce  a  high  leve! of synergy.  Culture  is  sometime  termed  the  informai 
structure of the organization and a healthy structure produces a winning strategy.  In  fact, a high 
leve!  of compatibility  between  the  two  organizations,  in  which  the  strategie  objectives  and 246 
missions of the two are aligned, would create a strategie fit. Compatible organizational objectives 
\ 
(Mayer &  Kenney, 2004a) are a key success factor.  The success of an alliance and acquisition 
rely on the strategie choice made in  the evaluation and selection process, in  which one company 
among many is believed to be the best in complementing the resources of the principal firm and 
aggregating to it external strategie assets. In the post formation phase and during the integration 
phase of an  acquisition or the implementation phase of an  alliance,  the  partners  should  work 
together  to  combine  the  resources  and  devise  a  plan  for  financial  synergy  (Chatterjee,  1986; 
Hoffman &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Trautwein,  1990).  Among the expectations of alliances and 
acquisitions are the production of significant economies leading to  a net gain, white increasing 
the rate of growth and maintain the strategie objectives. This would not be achieved without the 
integration of the  firms'  value chains and  physica1 assets, producing significant improvement in 
the operation leve1  and a high leve! of operational synergy (Chatterjee, 1986; James, Georghiou, 
& Metcalfe, 1998; Trautwein, 1990). A healthy organization culture that is based on trust, the full 
integration  of  the  two  firms'  information  systems  infrastructure  resulting  in  reducing  the 
asymmetry of information, the integration of the acquired firm  into the acquirer by establishing 
clear channel of communication and  command,  would  eventually create  manageria1  synergies 
(Trautwein, 1990). 
Moreover, the  different components of synergy,  such  as  the financial,  operational and 
managerial  synergies,  depend  on  the  success  of  the  integration  process  and  the  degree  of 
integration (James, Georghiou, & Metcalfe,  1998; Jemison &  Sitkin,  1986b; Mayer &  Kenney, 
2004a; Nahavandi &  Malekzadeh,  1988; Paine &  Power,  1984); In other words, its scope, depth 
and  quality.  An  enormous  and  serious  effort  should  start  immediately  after  the  alliance  or 
acquisition's  decision  is  completed,  to  integrate  the  two  firms.  During  the  scanning  and 
evaluation process, the integration plan should be thought of and the complexity of the integration 
should be compared among the different choices of potential and target firms.  Therefore, plans 
should be devised in an  early  stage,  which  would guarantee a  full  speed progress  and  project 
implementation after the  decision.  As  the  degree of integration is  a critical  success factor, the 
complexity of the integration and the length of the process would depend on related factors. The 
target firm relative size (Datta,  1991; Jemison & Sitkin,  1986b; Kusewitt, 1985) wou1d affect the 
scope  of the  integration,  the  length  of the  integration  process  and  the  amount  of  resources 
dedicated to complete the integration. Those resources and ali  the resources owned by  the firm 247 
should be  utilized in the production of goods and services, and borrowing from those resources 
would limit the firm from reaching its full potential. 
The proximity (Ferrary, 2003; Mayer &  Kenney, 2004a) of the two firms would facilitate 
the movement of the  personnel between the  two entities  and  the exchange of information in  a 
more persona!  way  through  meeting and  persona! contacts. This  would  increase the quality of 
communication and collaboration, fomenting trust. The idea behind an alliance or acquisition is to 
access or acquire strategie resources from an externat source,  which  is  in  the  high technology 
industry highly technical expertise and know how that is tacit in nature. When those resources are 
transferred to  the other firm or absorbed  by  the  partner firm  in  an  alliance, a  new  process of 
learning and knowledge transfer begins. Teams from the two firms would work together, reaching 
a consensus on the  way ahead and forging plans for the development of objectives, products and 
results.  The leve!  of synergy  resulting  from  the  combined  effort  is  based  on  the  absorptive 
capacity (Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel, 2001)  of the  teams  working together and  the  degree of 
product relatedness  (Feeser &  Willard,  1990;  Hopkins,  1987; James,  Georghiou,  &  Metcalfe, 
1998; Roberts &  Liu, 2001; Wernerfelt,  1984), in  a re1ated  diversification move. The more the 
products  are  related,  the  easiest  the  integration  between  them  and  the  creation  of levels  of 
modularity and  versatility. The degree of modularity (Gawer &  Cusumano, 2002) is  influenced 
mainly by the compatibility of the parts and their full interoperability._ The technical complexity 
(Hitt et al., 1996) embedded in high technology products would make the integration process of 
modular parts a more difficult task. Dealing with this complexity would require lengthy planning, 
dedicating the best resources available from the two firms. 
In  the post alliance and acquisition formation, management control (Eisenhardt,  1989a) 
and  the govemance structure  is  a key  to  success.  The structure  would follow  the strategy and 
en sure the achievement of both strategie control (Hi tt, Hoskisson,  & Ire land,  1990;  Hi tt  et al., 
1996)  in  term of allocating the  valuable resources owned by the firm and  the alignment of the 
strategie objectives with those resources;  and financial control (Hitt, Hoskisson, &  Ireland, 1990; 
Hi tt  et  al. ,  1996)  to  produce  economies,  efficiencies  and  gain.  Guarding  and  protecting  the 
resources  is critical to  maintaining a sustained competitive advantage.  In  sorne cases, after the 
formation of  an  alliance or  an acquisition, sorne  valuable human resources such  as  experience 
managers, talented engineers or skilled scientists could depart the firm,  because of a conflict of 248 
loyalty because they do not fully agree with the new formation or because their position or power 
is  affected  by  the  new  arrangements.  The  departure  of those  human  assets  could  negatively 
impact the  success of the  alliance and  the  acquisition  and prevent the firm  from  achieving  its 
desired  and  planned  objectives.  Talent  retention  (Cannella  &  Hambrick,  1993;  Coff,  1997b; 
Mayer &  Kenney,  2004a)  is  a  success factor  in  ensuring  a  smooth  integration  and  could  be 
achieved by both economie and non economie incentives (Paine &  Power,  1984), such as  equity 
share for the acquired management team, relative power for the team leader and project managers 
of the  acquired  firmed,  and  the  maintenance of a certain degree of autonomy for  the creative 
teams acquired, to ensure the non disruption of the creative environment, procedures and routines. 
7.8.2 To Ally orto Acquire? 
Although few researches were published to answer this question, we believe that it is stiJl 
vastly and open question. The contention between alliance and acquisition decision has not been 
resolved,  or  at  least  not  to  a  satisfactory  level.  Research  findings  and  prescriptions  are 
contradictory,  incoherent or  incomplete.  More research  is  needed  to  answer  what  we  believe 
should be the central question in alliance or acquisition research, and this would only happen if 
the gap between the two research sub-streams is  bridged, specially if the commonalities between 
the two sub-streams are much more than the differences. 249 
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ACQUISITIONS; ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
AND SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION 
6 
The high technology industry had  witnessed intensive activities 
of mergers  and  acquisitions  throughout  the  last  two  decades. 
Mergers  and  acquisitions'  motivations,  consequences,  and 
performance  had  been  weil  researched  and  documented  in  the 
literature  of  business  policy  and  strategy.  However,  the 
relationship  with entrepreneurship and  entrepreneurial activities 
has  not  been  clearly  established.  This  theoretical  research 
explores  the  relationship  between  the  intensive  activities  of 
mergers and acquisitions in the high technology industry and the 
entrepreneurial  activities  led  by  technology  entrepreneurs  and 
managers. Furthermore, the research explains and highlights the 
relationship  of  acqulSltwns  and  entrepreneurship  with 
innovation, the creation of new technologies and venture capital, 
in  the context of a national system of innovation, using insights 
from the high technology industry and Silicon Valley. 
8.1 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions have been used during the  1960s,  1970s and  1980s for vertical 
integration or diversification. Since the  1990s there has been a substantial increase in merger and 
acquisition activities in the different sectors of the economy, with a significant portion of those 
activities occurring in technology based companies. For example, Chaudhuri &  Tabrizi (1999a) 
stated that in the United States, more than 11,000 merger and acquisition deals were completed in 
1997, valued at over $900 billion and there were 5,000 su ch acquisition, totaling half a trillion 
6  This chapter was  published  as  an article, with  the  same title,  in  the  International Journal  of 
Small  Business  and  Entrepreneurship  in  2011,  and  in  the  proceedings  of the  administrative 
sciences  association  of Canada (AS AC)  annual  conference 2010,  entrepreneurship and  family 
business division. Regina, Canada, May 2010. Vol. 31, No 21. The article was recognized by the 
entrepreneurship and family business division as one of  the best papers in 2010. 260 
dollars, in  1998. Sorne of the well-known acquisitions during this period are the AOL and Time 
Warner;  MCI and  WorldCom;  Bell Atlantic  and  GTE;  Kmart and  Sears;  Cingular and  AT&T 
Wireless; and SBC and AT&T. (Sark..is, 2009) 
Most of these acquisitions, whether in  the entertainment, financial or retail sectors,  with 
the exception of the high-tech industries, took place in the form of a larger company acquiring a 
smaller company.  The acquisition  is  usually  a  one-to-one deal,  between  the  acquirer  and  the 
acquired.  In  most  cases,  the  acquisitions  take  place,  by  the  acquirer,  no  more than  few  times 
during  a  reasonable  period  of time  extending  for  severa!  years.  However,  in  the  high-tech 
industries  and  specifically  in  the  network..ing  equipment  manufacturers  industry,  we  have 
witnessed an explosion of acquisitions occurring over very  short periods of time and  with high 
frequency during the same  year.  For ex ample, Cisco Systems completed  107  acquisitions from 
the period between  1993  and April  2006, Norte!  Networks completed 21  acquisitions from the 
period between  1996 and 2006 and Lucent Technologies completed 41  acquisitions during the 
same  period. ln addition, Cisco Systems completed  18  acquisitions in  1999  with  an  average of 
one  and  half acquisitions  per  month, 23  acquisitions  in  2000  with  an  average  of almost  two 
acquisitions  per  month  (an  acquisition  every  two  weeks),  12  acquisitions  in  2004  and  12 
acquisitions in 2005 alone. (Sark..is, 2009) 
The equipment manufacturing firms  established  in this knowledge intense sector face a 
variety of turbulent environmental challenges (Bahrami  & Evans,  1989; Romanelli, 1989). Their 
products are technically complex (Bettis & Hitt,  1995; Jemison &  Sitk..in,  1986b),  in  which the 
embedded  knowledge is  tacit  in  nature  (Oliver, .1997),  non  codified and  non  transferable as  a 
public good (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Peteraf, 1993). The complexity of the technology is 
coup  led with a high leve! of uncertainty (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Quelin, 2000) due to 
the  lack  of dominant  standards  or standard  wars  (Besen  &  Farrell,  1994;  Shapiro  &  Varian, 
2003), the lack of credible forecast for the potential future new products and the lack of specifie 
requirements to respond to the customers' needs (Quelin, 2000; Roberts et al., 2001; Robertson & 
Gatignon,  1998;  Walker  &  Weber,  1984).  The  rate  of innovation  of new  technologies  and 
products is higher th an any  other industry  (Hi tt, Hosk..isson, & Ire land,  1990; Hi tt  et al. , 1991  a; 
Hitt et al.,  1996) and  the industry faces continuous waves of new technological generations and 
disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; Christensen & 261 
Raynor,  2003;  Utterback &  Acee,  2005b),  which  render the  products  obsolete,  possibly even 
before being launched to the market (Mayer &  Kenney, 2004b). The rate of obsolescence is such 
that products often become obsolete before their development costs can be recaptured (Roberts & 
Liu,  2001).  The  new  and  disruptive  technologies  emerge  either  inside  the  firm  or  in  the 
environmental  ecological  system,  following  a  pattern  of an  epidemie  technology  diffusion, 
mutation and permutation of characteristics. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Consequently,  many  companies  looking  for  potentially  interesting  new  products  have 
engaged in intensive acquisitions. Smart buyers keep their eyes on building the right long term 
capabilities. The acquisition  boom in  much  of the economy has  also  reached  high  technology 
industries  (Telecommunications,  computer  hardware,  computer  software,  biotechnology, 
aerospace and defense industries). Eager to stay ahead of fast changing markets, more and more 
high  tech  companies  are  going  outside  for  external  sources  of  innovation  and  sustained 
competitive advantage. 
Moreover, the motivations of acquisitions in the high tech industries are different than the 
motivations of acquisitions in  other industries. Many of the high technology acquisitions in  the 
1990s appeared to be motivated by the firms'  need to  obtain critical technologies or capabilities, 
in contrast to acquisitions in other industries, which are in most parts, motivated by economies of 
scale~ potential gains in  market share, geographie expansion, empire building (Mayer & Kenney, 
2004b) or CEO hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Many acquisitions are attempting to obtain 
highly developed technical expertise and skills of employees, high-functioning teams for product 
development or other functions, or specifie new technologies in fast-paced industries. Acquiring 
firms  may  not have the ability to  develop these valuable knowledge- based resources internally 
or, alternately; internai development may take too long (Ranft & Lord, 2000). (Sarkis, 2009) 
The intensive  activities  of mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  high  technology  industries 
have been weil researched and documented over the years in the literature of business policy and 
strategy.  However,  past and current research on entrepreneurship,  or  more specifically techno-
entrepreneurship, have not dealt satisfactorily with this phenomenon and the relationship between 
the acquisitions activities in the high technology industries and the entrepreneurial activities has 
not been full y explored. Most of the research on entrepreneurship in the high technology industry 262 
deals with the personality traits of entrepreneurs, the  motivations for establishing new  ventures 
and startups, the different phases of establishing a new venture and its business cycles, and farnily 
business  in  the high  tech industries,  etc.  Despite the fact  that behind ali  these acquisitions, are 
high  technology  startups built  by  entrepreneurial  activities  and  entrepreneurs,  the  relationship 
with acquisitions, new technologies and venture capital remain unclear and under researched. 
Therefore, this theoretical research intends to fill this gap, by exploring the relationship 
between  the  intensity  of acquisitions  in  the  high  technology  industry  and  the  entrepreneurial 
activities in the same industry. In doing so, the research will explain and highlight the relationship 
of acquisitions  and  entrepreneurship,  with  innovation,  the  creation  of new  technologies  and 
venture capital, in  the context of a  national system of innovation, using insights from the high 
technology industry and Silicon Valley. 
The  objectives  of  this  theoretical  research  are  to  (l)  explore  and  understand  the 
relationship  between  acquisitions  and  entrepreneurship  in  the  context of high  technology;  (2) 
explore and understand the  relationship of entrepreneurship and acquisitions, within the context 
of innovation, venture capital, and the national system of innovation; (3) construct a theoretical 
model that explains the relationship between entrepreneurship and acquisition in the context of a 
national  system  of  innovation,  using  testable  propositions  and  based  on  the  guidelines  for 
building theory. In the process,  the research will introduce and explain the building blocks of the 
proposed model, and will explain the causal relationships between these building blocks and the 
underlying logic that ex plain these causal relationships. 
Following the introduction, the next sections will provide a theoretical background on the 
intensive  acquisitions  in the  high  technology  industry,  the  nature  of the  new  technologies  as 
supplementary, complementary, sustaining and  disruptive, the  national system of  innovation  as 
the ecosystem for acquisitions and entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial activities in the high 
technology  industry.  Following  the  theoretical  background,  the  next section  will  introduce  the 
proposed theoretical mode! for entrepreneurship and acquisitions in the high technology, followed 
by an explanation of the rational behind its building blocks and their relationships, using a list of 
testable propositions for further empirical research. Finally, the discussion section will  provide a 
final  reflection  on  the  contribution  of  this  research  and  a  reorganization  of  the  proposed 263 
theoretical  mode!,  to  reflect  the  important  and  central  role  played  by  entrepreneurship  and 
entrepreneurs in the high technology industry. 
8.2 Intensive Acquisitions in the High Technology lndustry 
The  equipment  manufacturing  firms  established  in  the  high  technology  industry,  a 
knowledge intense sector of the economy, face a variety of turbulent environmental challenges 
(Bahrami  & Evans,  1989;  Romanelli,  1989).  Their products are technically complex (Bettis  & 
Hitt,  1995;  Jemison  &  Sitkin,  1986b),  in  which  the  embedded  knowledge  is  tacit  in  nature 
(Oliver, 1997), non codified and non transferable as a public good (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; 
Peteraf,  1993).  The complexity  of the  technology  is  coupled  with  a  high  level  of uncertainty 
(Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinke1,  2001;  Quelin,  2000)  due  to  the  lack  of dominant  standards  or 
standard wars (Besen & Farrell,  1994; Shapiro & V  arian, 2003), the lack of credible forecast for 
the  potentia1  future  new  products  and  the  lack  of specifie  requirements  to  respond  to  the 
customers'  needs (Quelin, 2000;  Roberts et al.,  2001;  Robertson & Gatignon,  1998;  Walker & 
Weber,  1984). The rate of innovation of new technologies and products is  higher than any other 
industry (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990; Hitt et al.,  1991a; Hitt et al.,  1996) and the industry 
faces  continuous  waves  of  new  technological  generations  and  disruptive  technologies 
(Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Utterback 
& Acee, 2005b), which render the products obsolete, possibly even before being launched to the 
market (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). The rate of obsolescence is  such that products often become 
obsolete before their development costs can be recaptured (Roberts & Liu, 200 1).  The new and 
disruptive technologies emerge either inside the firm or in the environmental ecological system, 
following  a  pattern  of  an  epidemie  technology  diffusion,  mutation  and  permutation  of 
characteristics. (Sarkis, 2009) 
In the context of the high technology industries characterized by turbulence, high velocity 
and high degree of uncertainty, no  one company could  possess ali  the required resources needed 
to compete and sustain competitive advantage. The cost of R&D is very high, the learning curve 
very steep and the technology and product life cycle are very  short (Duysters & Man, 2003b). 264 
This  makes  it difficult to  rely  only  on  internai  R&D  and  innovative capabilities for sustained 
competitive advantage. 
Therefore,  mergers  and  acquisitions  have  been  used  intensively  by  information 
technology,  networking  and  telecommunications firms  for  different reasons.  Beside traditional 
motivations  of economizing  and  empire  building,  firms  in  these  industries  used  acquisitions 
mainly to  acquire externat strategie resources, gain access to valuable human talents, reduce the 
cost of R&D, expand their portfolio of products, reduce product time to market and provide for an 
external source of continuous innovation. 
ln  the  high  technology  industries,  severa!  firms  have  used  acquisitions  as  their  main 
growth  strategy.  In  the  networking  industry,  for  example,  Cisco  Systems,  a  high  technology 
Silicon Valley based company working in the manufacturing of networking, telecommunications 
equipment and  software,  completed more than  107  companies during the  period from  1993  to 
2006.  In  the  year  1999  alone,  it  acquired  18  companies,  in  the  year  2000  it  acquired  23 
companies,  with  an  average of almost two  acquisitions  each month,  and  in 2004  and 2005  it 
completed  the  acquisitions  of  24  companies.  Simi1arly,  Norte!  Networks  completed  21 
acquisitions during the period between  1996 and 2006 and Lucent Technologies completed 41 
acquisitions during the same period. Figure 8.1 shows the timeline of Cisco Systems' completed 
acquisitions from the year 1993 till 2009. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Moreover, Cisco Systems developed a strategy called "Acquisition and Development" or 
A&D, which is a combination of acquisition activities for external sources of innovation, while 
maintaining  the  internai  innovative capacity  of the  firm  through  research  and  development or 
R&D (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). Therefore, we assume that the motivations for acquisitions in 
these  sec  tors  of the  high  technology  industry  are  different  th an  the  mo ti va ti ons  in  the  other 
industries and specially the more stable ones. (Sarkis, 2009) 
It  is  important  to  note  that  while  figure  8.1  shows  the  list of companies  and  startups 
acquired by  Cisco Systems from the year  1993  to  2009, it represents  as  weil  an  illustration of 
entrepreneurship  activities  and  a  map  of the  companies  and  startups  that  were  available  for 265 
acquisitions and eventually subject to  completed acquisitions by  a single  acquirer,  in  this case, 
Cisco Systems. 
8.3 Complementary, Supplementary, Sustaining and Disruptive Technologies 
The high technology products and their embedded technologies could be characterized as 
technically  complex  (Bettis  &  Hitt,  1995; Jernison  &  Sitkin,  l986b),  in  which  the  embedded 
knowledge is tacit in nature (Oliver,  1997),  non codified and non transferable as  a public good 
(Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). The complexity of the technology is coupled with a high leve! of 
uncertainty  (Hoffman  &  Schaper-Rinkel,  2001;  Quelin,  2000)  due  to  the  Jack  of dominant 
standards (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 2003). 
When choosing  or shopping  for  an  acquisition,  the  acquirer firm  would  evaluate  and 
target  the  potential  partner  or  the  acquired  firm' s  existing  products  li ne  and  portfolio  of 
technologies. Those potential products for acquisitions could be supplementary or complementary 
products.  Supplementary products (Shelton, 1988a; Wernerfelt, 1984) are sirnilar in nature to the 
firm's  existing  products  portfolio  and  complementary  products  (Mayer  &  Kenney,  2004a; 
Shelton,  1988a;  Wernerfelt,  1984)  are  different  products  that  combine  weil  with  the  firm's 
existing  product !ines.  The firm  would  choose  to  have  access  to  those  resources  through  an 
alliance or acquire them through an  acquisition, in arder to  increase its  core competencies and 
improve its product portfolio competitiveness (Ferrary, 2003),  which  would ensure a  sustained 
competitive advantage  (Oliver,  1997; Porter,  1980a;  Prahalad  &  Hamel,  1994).  ln addition to 
supplementary and complementary products, a firm could choose to acquire a target firm because 
of the  competitive  threat  of substitute  products  or  technologies  (Gawer &  Cusumano,  2002), 
which could result in  barriers to  entry (Wernerfelt,  1984; Yip,  1982) for the acquirer firm.  By 
acquiring those substitute  products, the firm  would  reduce the  competitive threat and  produce 
new  entry  barriers  to  other  firms  developing  sirnilar  technologies  and  products,  which  would 
ensure a better market positioning (Gulati,  1999;  Hopkins,  1987;  Walter &  Barney,  1990;  Yip, 
1982) and a sustained competitive advantage. 266 
Figure 8.1 
The ti meline of Ci seo System' s acquisitions from the year 1993 till 2009 
"'  0 
0 
"' 
00 
0 
0 
0 1 
.... 
01  0 
0 
0 1 
-o 
8 
~~ 
0)  •n 
8 
<"1 
.... 
('-)  0 
0 
"' 
......  ...  0 
0 
N 
"' 
tl 
0 
01 
"' 
0 
0 
""' 
0 
<")  0 
"'' 
0 
"" 
a-
00  a-
~ 
00 
0\  0\ 
~ 
..... 
""  ~ 
-o 
"'  "' 
•ro  ...  "'  ~ 
....  ,.,.  0\ 
~ 
""'  ""  0\ 267 
The supplementary and complementary technologies and product could be categorized as 
sustaining  technologies  as  they  represent  improvement  to  existing  technologies  and  do  not 
represent a radical change in technology or a threat of substitution. The improvement they present 
could be a better quality,  a  larger size,  specifie technical improvements, or a more economical 
variation of the same technology, etc. Alternatively, substitutive technologies and products could 
be categorized as disruptive technologies and innovations. These represent a radical change over 
existing  technologies  and  products  and  not just an  improvement in  quality,  specifications,  or 
priee.  They  represent  a  competitive  threat  to  existing  manufacturers  and  incumbent  service 
providers. They could catalyze a radical shift in  technology production or utilization and could 
provoke a revolutionary change in a specifie industry. 
This  revolutionary  change  in  an  industry  is  in  line  with  the  work  of the  Austrüm 
economist  Joseph  Schumpeter,  who  in  1950  coined  the  term  "perennial  gale  of creative 
destruction"  where  he  described  how  companies  and  monopo1ies  are  challenged  by  the 
competition,  not  based  on  pnce,  but  on  "competition  from  the  new  commodity,  the  new 
technology ... competition that strikes not at the margin  of the profit of the  existing jïrms but at 
the  ir foundations and the ir very lives" (Schumpeter, 1950: p. 84 ). 
Moreover, the  term  'disruptive technology'  was first  coined by Clayton Christensen  in 
his  book The  Innovator'  s Di/emma (Christensen,  1997)  and th en used in  the subsequent books 
The Innovator's Solution  (Christensen & Raynor, 2003)  and  Seeing  What's Next (Christensen, 
Anthony,  &  Roth,  2004).  The concept behind the new term  'disruptive technology'  and  more 
generally  'disruptive  innovation'  cou1d  be  traced  back  to  the  Austrian  scientist  Joseph 
Schumpeter who developed the theory of creative destruction in  his book "Capitalism, Socialism 
and  Democracy",  published  in  1950.  In  his  book  "The  Process  of  Creative  Destruction", 
Schumpeter wrote "The opening up of  new markets and the organizational development from the 
craft shop and factory ta  such concerns as US  Steel illustrate the process of indus  trial mutation 
that incessant/y revolutionizes the economie structure from within, incessant/y destroying the old 
one, incessant/y creating a new one ... [The process] must be seen in its role in the perennial gale 
of  creative destruction; it cannat be understood on the hypothesis that there is a perenniallull." 268 
Christensen  et  al.  (2004)  describe  the  disruptive  innovation  theory  in  such. situations 
where "new organizations and market entrants can use  relative/y simple,  convenient,  law cast 
innovations ta  create growth and win over powerful incumbents and that the  theory holds that 
existing companies have a high probability of  beating entrant attackers when the contest is about 
sustaining  innovations,  but established companies almost always lose  ta  attackers armed with 
disruptive innovations." (Introduction, XV) 
Christensen et al.  (2004) identify three types of innovations:  "(  1) Sustaining innovations, 
which move companies along established improvement characteristics, and are improvements ta 
existing  products  on  dimensions  historically  valued  by  customers.  Disruptive  innovations, 
introduce a  new value proposition,  and are either creating new markets or reshaping existing 
markets.  There are two types of disruptive innovations:  (2)  Law-end disruptive  innovations can 
occur when  existing products and services are  tao  good and hence  overpriced relative  ta  the 
value existing customers can use;  and (  3)  New  market disruptive  innovations,  can occur when 
characteristics of  existing products limit the number of  potential consumers or force consumption 
ta take place in inconvenient, centralized settings." 
lt is important to note that Schumpeter (1934) defined the deve1opment of new product or 
techno1ogy as new combination or innovation. He suggested that "new combinations do not arise 
out of  existing firms but in new jïrms that rise up along the existing ones" (Schumpeter, 1934: p. 
66). In exp1aining how these new combinations 1ead to the change of the competitive 1andscape or 
creative  destruction,  he  added:  " ... especially  in  the  competitive  economy,  in  which  new 
combinations mean the competitive elimination of  the old,  it exp lains on the one hand the process 
by which individuals rise and fall economically and socially and which is peculiar ta this form of 
organization." (Schumpeter, 1934: p. 67). 
Furthermore, Schumpeter suggested that the entrepreneurs are the ones who are creating 
these  new  products,  this  innovation  and  these  'new  combinations':  " ... the  individuals  whose 
function is ta carry them out (new combination) we cali 'entrepreneurs. "' (Schumpeter, 1934: p. 
74)  He  added  that  carrying  out  new  combinations  requires  the  entrepreneurs  to  take  existing 
products and redep1oy  them and  that the entrepreneurs are a force  in  the economie system that 
exp1ains qualitative change. 269 
8.4 National System of Innovation as the Ecosystem 
The 'national system of innovation' concept is  not new. Its origin could be traced back to 
the forefather of the German historical school of economies Friedrich List ( 1885), who published 
in  1841  his seminal work "The national system of poli  ti cal eco  nom  y", which was la  ter translated 
into the English language by Sampson S.  Lloyd, in  1885. Following Adam Smith's concept of the 
di vision of labor, but with no mention of innovation, List ( 1885) coined the term "national system 
of production  (and  learning)"  taking  into  account  a  variety  of national  institutions  including 
educational and training institutions, among others (Lundvall et al., 2002). (Sarkis, 20 12) 
Sin  ce th en,  the concept of national system of innovation (Lundvall,  1992)  has  evol ved 
into its current definition(s), with multiple variations such as  technological systems (Carlsson & 
Jacobsson,  1994),  innovation  systems  (Edquist,  1997,  2005;  Lundvall,  2006a),  techno1ogical 
infrastructure (Freeman, 2004; Lundvall, 2004), regional systems of innovation (Cooke, Gomez, 
&  Etxebarria,  1997), sectoral system of innovation (Breschi & Malerba,  1997) and  triple helix 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). Much of the literature highlights the importance of the national 
system of innovation as the driving force for the national economies of the industrialized nations, 
OECD nation  members,  as  well as  for  the emerging economies.  Multiple empirical researches 
were  conducted  on  various  North  American,  European,  Asian,  and  Latin  American  countries 
(Carlsson &Jacobsson, 1994; Freeman, 1987; Saxenian, 1994). (Sarkis, 2012) 
One of the earliest definitions of 'innovation'  was  presented by the Austrian economist 
Joseph  Schumpeter  in  1939,  who  proposed  that  innovation  is  " ...  the  setting  up  of a  new 
production function.  This covers the case of  a new commodity, as well as tho se of  a new form of 
organization  such  as  merger,  of the  opening  up  of new  markets  and  so  on ... Recalling  that 
production in the economie sense is  nothing but combining productive services, we may express 
the  same thing  by saying  that innovation combines factors  in a new  way, or that it consists in 
carrying out new combination " (Schumpeter, 1939: p. 87 -88). Sin  ce th en, this generic definition 
of  'innovation'  as  'new  combination'  was  adopted  widely  in  the  literature  of  strategie 
management, technology and innovation management, and entrepreneurship (Kline & Rosenberg, 
1986; Lundvall  & Johnson, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Pavitt, 2005; Stein, 1997; Von-Hippel, 270 
1988).  It  combines  two  contradictory  dimensions:  existing  elements  and  new  combinations 
(Lundvall et al., 2002). (Sarkis, 2012) 
Moreover,  one  definition  of  the  concept  of  'innovation  system'  is  based  on  the 
interactions  between  the  different  institutions  or  'knowledge  providers',  participating  in  this 
system (Edquist, 2005). These interactions and knowledge creation and sharing could take place 
within the firm, between the firms, between the firm and other organizations, within a sector, an 
industry, an economy, a nation or even a region. These organizations could be other firms such as 
the  suppliers,  the  producers,  the  customers,  the  competitors,  etc.  Therefore,  the  systems  of 
innovation could be defined  in institutional  terms.  For example, Carlsson  &  Jacobsson  (1994) 
define the innovation system in term of the sum and synergy of institutions like the entrepreneurs, 
the  universities,  the  academie  infrastructure,  the  research  and  development  (R&D)  labs,  the 
schools,  the patent system, the tabor organizations, the standard bodies,  the bank.ing  system, the 
government  agencies,  and  the  state  policies,  etc.  They  specifically  divide  the  'institutional 
infrastructure'  related  to  the  innovation  or technological  system  into four pmts:  the industrial 
research  and  development,  the  academie  infrastructure,  other  institutions,  state  policy.  The 
interactions between these interdependent and  interlinked  institutions constitute the dynamic of 
the innovation system. This innovation system could be on the national leve!, covering a whole 
geographie region, or it could be supranational or international as weil. (Sark.is, 20 12) 
Furthermore, national  systems of innovation could be  defined in  terms of technological 
systems combined with an institutional infrastructure as " ...  a network of  agents interacting in  a 
specifie  economic!industrial  area  under  a  particular  institutional  infrastructure  or  set  of 
infrastructures and involved in the generation, diffusion and utilization of  technology." (Carlsson 
&  Stank.iewicz,  1995:  p.  49;  Stankiewicz &  Carlsson,  1991).  This  means  that the  participating 
institutions  with  their  interconnections  and  interlinks  are  part  of  this  national  system  of 
innovation, which represents a national infrastructure composed of institutions that are engaged in 
a weil defined dynamic and  a process of interactive 1 earning, coordination, cooperation, with the 
main  and  core objective of using, diffusing,  sharing,  producing knowledge,  and  aiming at the 
transformation of this existing knowledge into new combinations or simply innovation, in term of 
innovati ve ideas, products, services, processes, and business models, etc. (Sark.is, 20 12) 271 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  entrepreneurial  activities  and  the  entrepreneurs  are  a 
critical part of this national system of innovation and play an important role in using, sharing, and 
diffusing  existing  knowledge,  and  in  transforming  it  through  collaboration  and  interactive 
learning with the other institutions, into 'new combination' or innovation, in terms of new ideas, 
new  technologies,  new  products,  new  business  models,  new  venture,  and  new  markets.  While 
figure  8.2  illustrates the critical  and  important role the entrepreneurs play as  part of the value 
chain  of the  national  system of innovation,  figure  8.3  represents  the  different configurational 
topologies for the type of collaboration, interaction and interactive learning that exist between the 
participating  members  of the  national  system of innovation,  in  which  the  entrepreneur  is  an 
important element and pla  ys a critica1 role. (Sarkis, 20 12) 
Figure 8.2 
The value chain of the national system of innovation (Sarkis, 2012) 
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8.5 Entrepreneurship Activities in the High Technology lndustry 
Entrepreneurs are the one carrying out new combination by starting up new ventures and 
creating new technologies, new  products, new  services, and new business models. Most of the 
entrepreneurs in  the high technology industry possess many exceptional traits. Besides initiating, 
maintaining and developing profit oriented new ventures; they have the ability to work hard and 
smart. They are driven by  the perception of opportunity, based on their expertise, alertness and 
cognition,  and  they  have  the  ability  to  anticipate  market  imperfections,  and  turn  them  into 
potential new ideas,  products, services, etc. Most importantly, they have a tolerance for ambiguity 
and can successfully work under uncertainty and within the context of a turbulent environment or 
industry. In fact, they thrive on uncertainty and see it as an opportunity to establish new standards 
(i.e. technical  standard)  and  consider the  turbulent environment as  a  temporary phase through 273 
which  they  can  propose,  induce  and  motivate  change.  For  entrepreneurs,  high  velocity  and 
turbulent  environments,  such  as  the  high  technology  industry,  motivate  technological  and 
demographie changes, involving incrementai change and technology breakthrough,  which they 
can  influence  the  outcome  through  heuristics  based  logic  and  effectuation.  Finally,  they  are 
opportunistic,  highly  adaptable  and  possess an  evangelistic-type of message,  with  high  energy 
and strong convictions in technology, technical culture, and the need for discovery and leading-
edge innovation. 
The key success factors for entrepreneurs in  the high technology industry are the ability 
to identify opportunity and transform it  into a significant economie value;  to  possess the  right 
combination  of  knowledge  and  know-how  necessary  to  carry  out  new  combination  and 
innovation; to have the necessary initial financial resources to start a new venture and seek more 
financial support and backing through formai financial institutions or through venture capital and 
angel investors; to  have the necessary social capital and be part of a social network within the 
industry, sector or region and be connected to key individuals who have the technical expertise, 
for  seeking  support  if necessary,  and  acquiring  tacit  knowledge  which  is  embedded  in  the 
complex social network;  and to  have the  skills  and charisma of leadership,  with  the  ability to 
inspire, mo ti va  te, build and manage working teams. 
According  to  Schumpeter,  there  are  five  types  of entrepreneurs  (or  strategies):  the 
pioneers, the adoptionists, the imitators, the complementors, and mixed strategy (Lundvall et al., 
2002). We believe that in the context of the high technology industry, this  list could be revised 
and we suggest the following additions and  extensions to the Schumpeter list of entrepreneur's 
types: 
The pioneer entrepreneur. The pioneer entrepreneur is the one who not only starts up, 
maintains and develops a new business venture, but also leads the way in an unprecedented venue 
while  instigating  a  revolutionary  change,  whether  it  is  in  technology,  demographie,  product, 
service, or market. A good example would be Herny Ford, Thomas Edison and Graham Bell, as 
the later had used and applied a new invention into a pioneering and revolutionary new service, 
the telephony. 274 
The inventor entrepreneur. The inventor entrepreneur is  the one who has the brilliance 
of inventing  new  technologies,  deviees,  machines,  etc.  and  later  turns  them  into  a  profitable 
business idea, business plan, and a new  venture, creating a significant economie value.  A good 
example  would  be  Graham  Bell,  and  Thomas  Edison.  In  the  high  tech  industry  and  Silicon 
Valley,  there  are sorne  good examples of young entrepreneurs, who  started  their own start-up 
based on their invention and creation, and later inspiring other like rninded people to join them. 
The bricoleur entrepreneur. The 'bricolage'  is  a French word, referring to  the  act of 
using existing materials and  tools to  create new  things.  The bricoleur entrepreneur is  a sort of 
handy-man, who creates a technology or product idea out of a perceived opportunity and  using 
available ingredients. A good example is Steve Job of Apple. 
The imitator entrepreneur.  The imitator entrepreneur is  the  one who  starts  his  new 
business by copying or modifying someone else's idea.  According to  Bhide (2000), most of the 
entrepreneurs are in  this category, as  isomorphism being the explanation for this behavior. This 
category applies also to  the high technology industry, as  lots of technologists and entrepreneurs 
embark on creating new venture, when they see an opportunity, in term of technology or market, 
concretizes with others. While the widely held perception is that ali startups in Silicon Valley and 
Route  128 are based mostly on new technology and product ideas, we  believe that a fair amount 
of ideas are isomorphic. 
The complementor entrepreneur. The complementor entrepeneur is the one who builds 
on an  existing idea,  product or service,  and sees an  opportunity in  providing a complementary 
product or service to the existing one. The opportunity is  defined by the potential to draw on the 
success of the existing product or service, to  capitalize on the market adopted trajectory and  to 
adapt  to  the  natural  selection  performed  by  the  ecology.  This  type  of product  or service  is 
especially important to  established firms,  who are  looking for external sources of innovation to 
complement  their  already  existing  and  successful  products.  Therefore,  these  complementary 
products and services are a high potential for acquisitions by larger and endowed firms. 
The  supplementor  entrepreneur.  The  supplementor  entrepreneur  is  similar  to  the 
complementor entrepreneur  in  adopting  existing idea, product  and  service  and  building  on it, 275 
except that he provides a supplementary attribute to the already existing product or service, such 
as  a bigger or smaller size, a larger coverage, etc. The opportunity is  defined by  the potential to 
draw on the success of the existing product and service, and to capitalize on the market adopted 
trajectory. This type of product or service is  especially important to  established firms,  who are 
looking for  externat sources of innovation to  supplement their already existing  and  successful 
products.  Therefore,  these  supplementary  products  and  services  are  a  high  potential  for 
acquisitions by larger and endowed firms. 
The accidentai entrepreneur. The entrepreneur by accident is  the one who falls  into a 
good idea for a technology or product, just by being in the right place and time, later to discover 
that it was a brilliant idea and an excellent opportunity to  establish a successful new venture.  It 
could  be  when  someone  develops  something  by  habit,  by  necessity  or  for  his  immediate 
environment and it turns later to be useful for other people, situations and environments. A good 
example is  the  discovery and development of the microwave oven out of the characteristics of 
microwave  transmitting  signais  for  microwave  telecommunications  applications.  This 
accidentally discovered technology could have  the  potential to  catalyze a  radical change or be 
disruptive in nature to existing technologies and products. 
The seriai entrepreneur. This type of entrepreneur is  the one who sees an opportunity 
and establishes, maintains and develops a new business venture to a certain point of stability and 
success in the organization !ife cycle and development stage, then moves on  to establish a new 
venture based on a new opportunity or an extended variation of the first opportunity. In doing so, 
this seriai entrepreneur is going from one venture to another, by hopping from one business stage 
of venture development in a  newly created venture,  be  it post startup, transitional or corporate 
phase, to another business stage of a new or another venture, such as  a new startup creation, or at 
the managerial and leadership stages of an existing new venture. This seriai entrepreneur could be 
motivated by either his  passion for venture creation with its  embedded excitement, risk taking, 
opportunity  development and  gratifying experience;  or by  financial  motivation,  as  he sees  no 
interest in staying with his own created venture till later stages of its !ife cycle and development 
stages, and prefers to  recover his initial investments multiplied by the establish market value of 
his created venture, based on its product and market potential. In doing so, he might be lacking 
the  necessary  managerial  skills  to  continue developing  his  own  created  venture,  as  he  might 276 
perce1ve  himself not  fitting  with  a  new  stage  of development of his  created  venture  and  its 
required hiring of external  managerial experience.  In  the  high technology  industry and  Silicon 
Valley Mory Ejabat is a good example of the seriai entrepreneur. 
The  incrementai  entrepreneur.  To  the  contrary  of  the  seriai  entrepreneur,  the 
incrementai entrepreneur seeks  to  move into  new  venture opportunities, while staying with  his 
own created first venture. His motivation might be empire building or entrepreneur hubris. 
The plateau entrepreneur. The plateau entrepreneur is the one who stays with his own 
created venture till later stages in the firm !ife and development cycles. 
The  corporate  entrepreneur.  The  entrepreneur  does  not  have  to  be  always  self-
employed.  The  corporate  entrepreneur,  is  the  one  who,  while  working  and  acting  as  a  high 
ranking corporate officer with his current employer, he acts and performs tasks that the traditional 
self-employed entrepreneur do, and  in  addition possesses  ail the characteristics and skills  of a 
'ideal' entrepreneur, such as  tolerance for ambiguity, alertness to  and the ability to perceive and 
identify  opportunity,  risk  taking,  passion  for  venture  creation,  high  energy,  leadership,  and 
building  teams  skills,  etc. His  executive functions  could  require  him  to  be  highly  visible  for 
networking, to invest in trials of new technologies, to support new ideas and prototypes as  angel 
investors, toscan the environmental ecosystem of his firm for new opportunities and to acquire or 
ally  with  potentially  successful  new  trends,  and  new  technology  providers,  etc.  One  good 
example is Michelangelo Vol pi, the chief strategy and acquisition officer at Cisco Systems. 
The entrepreneur leader. The leader entrepreneur is  the  one  who  leads  the  company 
after its startup and managerial stages, into a new corporate stage. 
The entrepreneur technologist. The technologist entrepreneur is  the one who acts like 
an  evangelist,  and  who  inspire  others  in  his  immediate team,  venture,  or community, of new 
venues and trajectories in technologies, applications, and products. 277 
The  entrepreneur-manager.  The entrepreneur-manager  is  the  one  who  is  hired  for 
managing the newly created venture, in its stage of opportunity consolidation and early corporate 
development. 
The  acquisition-driven  entrepreneur.  This  is  the  entrepreneur,  be  it  corporate, 
incrementai,  seriai,  complementor  or  supplementor,  who  uses  acquisitions  as  a  strategy  for 
developing  new  businesses  and  for  existing  businesses.  Moreover;  the  acquisition-driven 
entrepreneur could acquire new and established businesses, created by the pioneer, the bricoleur, 
the  inventor,  the  imitator,  the  accidentai  and  the  plateau  entrepreneurs.  Acquisition-driven 
entrepreneurship will be discussed in more details in the next section and part of the01·y building. 
8.5.1 Venture Capital 
Venture capital is  the other important aspect of the entrepreneurial activities in the high 
technology industry. Beside identifying the opportunity and having the motivation to take risk, in 
a  highly  uncertain and  turbulent environment,  the  non endowed entrepreneur has  to  secure  the 
financial  resources  necessary to  pursue  his  opportunity,  with  a reasonable  amount of risk  and 
interest.  Venture  capital  and  angels  investors  are  an  essential  and  critical  part  of the  high 
technology  industry.  They  not  only  provide  financial  support,  but  most  of  the  time,  they 
additionally provide technical backing,  managerial experience, access to  social capital and even 
moral encouragement. The madel of a startup that is backed by venture capital is widespread and 
dominates the high technology industry, such as  the information technology and biotechnologies. 
The startups  that  are  backed by  venture  capital are  widely  perceived  as  more  likely  to  adopt 
planning  rather  than  an  opportunistic  adaptation  behavior.  However,  in  the  high  technology 
industry, specifically the information technology, networking and telecommunications segments, 
we  believe to  the  contrary, that  venture capital  adapts  well to  entrepreneurs and  new  ventures 
using  either modes:  opportunistic  adaptation  or strategie  planning.  Their interactions  with  the 
entrepreneurial activities and entrepreneurs and their relationships with intensive acquisitions and 
the development of the acquisition and development madel will be discussed in the next section 
of theory building and propositions. 278 
8.6 Theory Building and General Propositions (Rough Hypotheses) 
Based  on  the  analysis  presented  in  the  previous  sections,  this  section  deals  with  the 
construction  of a  theoretical  mode!  and  suggests  some  propositions  or  rough  hypotheses  to 
explain  the  underlying  logic.  Figure  8.4,  illustrates  the  proposed  theoretical  mode!  with  its 
relationship and embedded ecosystem. 
Figure 8.4 
The proposed theoretical mode! of entrepreneurship and acquisitions 
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During periods of incrementai and revolutionary change in  the high technology industry, 
the emergence of new  technologies and new  innovation is  facilitated by  the entrepreneurs  who 
carry out new combinations. Entrepreneurs, transform existing knowledge into innovation. They 
acquire  this  knowledge  through  their  interactions,  collaborations,  interactive  leaming,  and 
participation  as  members  of a  national  system of innovation,  which  encompasses  universities, 
R&D  labs,  standard  bodies,  patent  offices,  and  government  agencies,  etc.  Based  on  this 
knowledge,  their cognition is enhanced and  their abilities to identify opportunity are improved. 
These  technologies  could  be  complementary,  supplementary  or  substitutive  technologies  to 279 
existing  orres.  Equally,  these  technologies  could  be  considered  sustaining  technologies,  as  to 
provide an improvement to existing technologies and product in term of quality and priee, or they 
could be potentially disruptive technologies, offering a radical change from established products 
and services. These disruptive technologies could potentially pose a threat to incumbent firms,  as 
they propose a change in the competitive landscape and a menace to their sustained competitive 
ad van tage. 
Proposition  1:  New  technologies  and  innovations,  including  sustaining  and  disruptive 
technologies  are facilitated  by  entrepreneurs  who  seek  to  challenge  the  existing  competitive 
landscape and to find an opportunity through a technology breakthrough; 
From  the  other  hand,  existing  firms  and  incumbent  service  providers  in  the  high 
technology  industry  opera  te  in  an  environment  which  is  characterized  by  high  uncertainty, 
turbulence  and  high  velocity.  The rising  cost and  risk  of internai  R&D and  the  threat  of the 
environmental and industrial shifts, coupled with the internai scarcity of strategie assets,  the tacit 
and embedded nature of knowledge,  and  the  threat of substitutive  technologies,  increment the 
difficulty  for  the  established  firms  to  rely  solely  on  internai  sources  of innovation  to  sustain 
competitive advantage. 
Proposition 2:  The  emergence of  new technologies,  either sustaining or disruptive,  motivates the 
established firms to acquire these new technologies,  through acquisitions and the integration of 
these technologies, as externat sources of  innovation; 
In  sorne industries, such as  the high technology industry, the rate of innovation is much 
higher and the frequency of emergence of new technology is  short-paced.  This is coupled with 
higher investment  risks in internai R&D, higher rates of technology  and  product obsolescence, 
and shorter time to market required for end-user products. Moreover, the emergence of the new 
technologies has an epidemie pattern of technology diffusion and the nature of the technologies is 
as such that they are part of a mosaic of technologies, which means that only one technology does 
not  constitute  a  product-transferable  opportunity.  Consequently,  and  facing  these  challenges, 280 
sorne firms  adopt a new model of strategie choice, based on intensive acquisitions, as the main 
strate  gy  for  growth  and  sustaining  competitive  advantage.  This  model  and  the  cumulative 
experience gained in implementation reinforce this strategy of acquisition for growth based on the 
Acquisition & Development model, and it becomes a dominant logic. 
Proposition  3:  Facing  environmental  challenges,  establish  firms  embark  on  programs  of 
intensive acquisitions,  and they develop  and adopt a new business madel called Acquisition & 
Development (A&D ),  instead of  R&D,  as the main strate  gy for growth and to sus  tain competitive 
advantage. Experience gained in acquisitions helps in reinforcing the madel, therefore creating a 
bidirectional relationship; 
The adoption of this model of acquisition called Acquisition & Development (A&D) by 
the established firms,  and consequently the  rise of corporate acquisition programs,  foment and 
foster  the  development of the  venture capital  market,  based  on  the demand  and  supply  logic. 
More  acquisitions  require  more  venture  capital  firms,  more  experience,  and  more  financial 
resources. The intensity of the acquisition program in one firm creates the cumulative expertise in 
the  venture capital  industry  and  more  importantly,  it  creates  a  dominant logic  that  is  equally 
profitable to  venture capital firms,  by which acquisitions become the  main  strategy for  growth 
and  encourages  the  replication  and  adoption  by  others.  This  dominant  logic  and  its  dynamic, 
encourages other hesitant firms to adopt this new strategy of acquisition for growth, based on the 
Acquisition and Development model, and the positive returns. 
Proposition 4:  The  relationship between the intensive acquisition programs and the development 
of the  Acquisition  & Development madel from  one  side,  and the  development of the  venture 
capital market,  is  a bidirectional relationship. More  acquisitions foster the  development of the 
venture  capital  market.  More  cumulative  expertise  in  the  venture  capital  market  creates  a 
dominant logic that encourages more acquisitions; 
Furthermore,  the  development  of  the  venture  capital  market  and  the  cumulative 
experience it creates, coupled with the availability of more venture capital financial resources for 281 
entrepreneurial ventures, encourage more entrepreneurs and would-be-entrepreneurs, to stay alert 
to opp.ortunity and to help in using, sharing, producing and diffusing interactive learning, that is 
essential  to  new  combination  and  innovation,  within  the  context  of  a  national  system  of 
innovation,  in  which  venture capital  and  entrepreneurs are  participating  members.  Equally,  as 
venture capital development encourages more entrepreneurial activities, the increased number of 
entrepreneurs encourages  the  creation and development of more venture capital  firms  and  put 
them in high demand. 
Proposition  5:  The  relationship  betrveen  the  development  of the  venture  capital  market  or 
industry and the increase in  the  entrepreneurial activities and the  number of entrepreneurs  is 
bidirectional.  The  more  venture  capital  is  developed,  the  more  entrepreneurial  activities  are 
encouraged.  The more the  number of entrepreneurs  is  increased,  the more the  venture capital 
firms and their activities are in high demand; 
Moreover,  the  development  of  the  venture  capital  industry,  as  it  encourages  the 
entrepreneurial activities; it induces, instigates and fosters the development of new technologies. 
While the venture capital firms represent the incubating environment, the new technologies are 
the final  products  and  the  entrepreneurs  are  the  messengers.  It  is  important to  observe  in  the 
proposed  theoretical  model,  that new  technologies  are  encouraged,  motivated  and  fostered  by 
both, the entrepreneurs and the venture capital firms. 
Proposition 6:  The  relationship betrveen venture capital and the development of  new technologies 
is  unidirectional,  as  venture capital encourages and fosters  the  emergence and development of 
new technologies.  The  more  venture  capital  is  developed,  the  more  is  the  emergence of new 
technologies. This  relationship is moderated by the entrepreneurial activity and the efficiency of 
the national system of  innovation; 
Finally, and most importantly,  the entrepreneurs and their entrepreneurial activities play a 
critical role in  the  increased number of acquisitions, the intensity  of acquisitions'  activities and 
the development and adoption of the  Acquisition & Development mode!  (A&D).  For example, 282 
the incrementa! entrepreneur and the acquisition-driven entrepreneur, use acquisition for empire 
building,  economies of scope  and  scale,  and  as  a strategy for shorter time  to  market, reduced 
R&D  activities  with  the  incorporated  risk  and  mainly  for  rapid  growth  versus  internai 
development  based  on  learning-by-doing.  On  the  other  hand,  the  corporate  entrepreneur 
encourages  the  acquisitions  of new  startups  and  small  ventures,  by  continuously  scanning  the 
firm's environmental ecosystem and  national  system of innovation; by  looking and  identifying 
opportunities; by investing in venture capital firms or acting as  an angel investor; by backing up 
new  technology  initiatives,  technology  and  product trials  and  prototypes;  and by  adopting  the 
mode! of Acquisition & Development as the main strategy of growth for his established firm and 
as the mean to  overcome and compensate for the Jack of internai sources of innovation that are 
impossible  to  have them  all  in  one company.  He  also  could  be  interested  in  complementary, 
supplementary and substitutive technologies, the later being a mean to  increase the entry barrier 
for competition and for avoiding disruption and consequently the destruction of value for his own 
firm.  Finally, and contrary to the widely held belief, new startups in the high technology industry 
are not motivated only by  the desire of the entrepreneur to create new combinations, innovation, 
and  new  products  and  services.  They  are  also  motivated  basically  and  instinctively  by  the 
opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur and his desire for profit and rent. This legitimate desire 
includes  the  potential  that  his  newly  created  firm,  if successful  and  competitive,  would  be 
potentially acquired by  a larger firm.  This potential of being acquired by a larger firm could be 
deterrniriistic in  nature  and  intentional at the planning or developing phase of the  new  venture 
creation.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  rational  of the  acquisition-driven  entrepreneur would  be  to 
provide  for  complementary,  supplementary  or substitutive  technologies  or products.  In  other 
words, this acquisition-driven entrepreneur would start a new venture creation with the objective 
of, or at !east to hope for,  being potentially acquired by a larger firm, with all the financial and 
reputational  consequences  that  this  position  would  entai!,  which  matches  the  legitimate 
opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur. 
Proposition  7:  Entrepreneurs  and their entrepreneurial activities  encourage  and motivate  the 
intensity  of acquisitions  activities  in  the  high  technology  industry  and  the  adoption  of the 
Acquisition  &  Development  madel,  whether  it  is  through  the  incrementa!  entrepreneur,  the 
corporate entrepreneur, the complementor and supplementor entrepreneurs and the acquisition-
driven entrepreneur. 283 
8. 7 Discussion 
This  theoretical  research  paper  was  motivated  partially  by  the  proposition  of linking 
entrepreneurship research with the research on the national system of innovation, suggested by 
leading  scholars  on  the  concept of innovation  system,  Lundvall  et  al.  (2007:  p.  Il  0):  " ... An 
interesting challenge is  to  link entrepreneurship, seen as the classic driver of innovation,  to  the 
concept of innovation system".  The other main  motivation  was  to  explore and  understand  the 
relationship, if any, between the intensive activities of acquisitions and entrepreneurial activities 
in  the  high  technology  industry,  an  area  of research  that  remain  unclear,  blurry  and  under 
researched. 
The research paper proposes a theoretical mode! and few propositions (rough hypotheses) 
that  could  be  converted  into  testable  hypotheses,  using  the  case  study  approach  for  building 
theory. Although the findings of the case study do not constitute a part in the framework of this 
theoretical research, mainly for functional and practical reason, such as  the limited page number 
assigned for conference papers, further research is planned and potentially more manuscripts are 
envisaged in order to cover all the aspects of this proposed mode!. 
The proposed theoretical mode) and its rational that explains the underlying logic of the 
relationship  between  the  different  composing  blocks,  suggest  that  entrepreneurship  and  the 
entrepreneurs play an important, critical and central role in the development of new technologies, · 
products  and  services,  through  their  interactions  with  existing  firms,  venture  capital,  R&D 
research,  government  agencies,  standard  bodies,  and  research  universities,  etc.,  within  the 
boundaries of the ecosystem of a  national  system of innovation. An  attempt to  reorganize the 
proposed theoretical mode!  around the same relationships between its different building blocks, 
without  affecting  the  underlying  logic  and  theoretical  interpretation,  would  suggest  that 
entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurs play a central role, as illustrated by figure 8.5 284 
Figure 8.5 
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NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION: INTEGRA  TING THE 
INNOVATION VALUE CHAIN AND THE MESH TOPOLOGY 
7 
The  national  systems  of  innovation  are  well  researched  and 
empirically  documented  in  the  literature  of  technology  and 
innovation management. However, the issues of the organization 
and the structure of the national system of innovation are under 
researched,  despite  the  importance  of  structure  in  strategy 
development and the alignment of strategie objectives. The lack 
of such research and a consensus on the organization of national 
system  of  innovation,  leads  to  contradictory,  incoherent  and 
incomplete  results.  This  theoretical  paper  reopens  the 
conversation  on  the  evolution  of  the  national  system  of 
innovation concept, by  introducing two modes  of organization: 
The value chain and the mesh topology. Furthermore, it explores, 
with respect to these two modes, a large list of variables/factors 
that  could  be  used  to  further  enhance  the  qualitative  and 
quantitative research on national system of innovation. This is a 
multidisciplinary  research,  in  the  traditions  of business  policy 
and strategy, and technology and innovation management, and is 
intended to both scholars and practitioners. 
9.1 Introduction 
The national system of innovation concept is not new.  Its origin could be traced back to 
the forefather of the German historical school of economies Friedrich List ( 1885),  who in  1841 
published  his  seminal  work  "The  national  system  of  political  economy",  which  was  later 
translated into the  English language by  Sampson S.  Lloyd, in  1885.  Following Adam Smith's 
concept of the division of labor, but with no  mention of innovation, List (1 885) coined the term 
7  This  chapter  was  published  as  an  article,  with  the  same  title,  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
adrninistrati ve sciences association of Canada (AS AC) annual conference 20 12,  technology and 
innovation  management division. St.  John's, Canada,  June 2012. Vol.  33,  No  25.  The article 
recei ved the honourable mention paper a ward from the strate  gy di vision at ASAC 2012. 292 
"national system of production" taking into account a  variety of national institutions including 
educational and training institutions, among others (Lundvall et al., 2002). 
Since then, the concept of national system of innovation (Lundvall,  1992) has evolved 
into its current definition(s), with multiple variations such as  technological systems (Carlsson & 
Jacobsson,  1994),  innovation  systems  (Edquist,  1997,  2005;  Lundvall,  2006a),  technological 
infrastructure (Freeman, 2004; Lundvall, 2004), regional systems of innovation (Cooke, Gomez, 
&  Etxebarria,  1997), sectoral system of innovation (Breschi  &  Malerba,  1997) and triple helix 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). Much of the literature highlights the importance of the national 
system of innovation as the driving force for the national economies of the industrialized nations, 
OECD nation members,  as  weil as  for the emerging economies. Multiple empirical researches 
were conducted  on  various  North  American,  European,  Asian,  and  Latin  American countries 
(Carlsson & Jacobsson,  1994; Freeman, 1987; Saxenian, 1994). 
However, most of the research does not explore the central issue of the organization and 
the structure of these national systems of innovation. Whether using a quantitative or qualitative 
analysis, the research tend to measure the performance of these national systems of innovation or 
provide  a  descriptive  analysis  of the  components  of these  systems  and  their  roles  (research 
centers, educational institutions, financial institutions and venture capital, government agencies, 
public  policies,  private  firms  and  entrepreneurs,  etc.),  strengths  and  weaknesses,  inputs  and 
outputs and comparative studies. Moreover, most the research evolves around important and key 
concepts directly  linked to the efficiency of these  national systems  of innovation,  such as  the 
knowledge management, the  nature of knowledge and knowledge spillover from,  to  and  within 
these  systems;  the  learning  and  interacting  between  the  different  components  or  agents;  the 
dynamic capabilities of the single participant or the combined synergies;  the boundaries of the 
systems  and  whether flexible,  fixed,  predetermined,  or subject to  restructuring;  the  historical 
trajectories, path dependencies and locked-in effects, and cumulativeness, etc. 
Although  these  dimensions  are  important in  understanding and exploring  the  national 
systems of innovation,  we believe that the structure and the organization of these systems are 
equally important and in  fact they are at the core of these systems and represent a central issue 
based on which our understanding of the other dimensions would be greatly enhanced. Therefore 293 
further in-depth research is needed on the structure and organization at the core center of research 
on national system of innovation (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Moreover, the research on national systems of innovation in  the literature of technology 
and  innovation  management could be  categorized as  contradictory,  incoherent and  incomplete. 
First, it is contradictory because the findings present contradictory performance outcome related 
to  these systems, even in  the same cluster of industrial nations or the same geographical region. 
Second, it is incoherent because sorne research focus on measuring the performance of the these 
systems  based  on economie  and  financial  indicators,  in  an  evaluation  mode,  while  the  others 
focus  on exploring and  understanding the  composition and  components of these  systems, their 
roles  and  characteristics, their interactions, their processes of learning,  sharing knowledge,  and 
decision making, in  a  prescriptive  mode. Each approach  neglects  the  other,  which  leads  to  an 
incoherent picture of the factors involved. Third it is incomplete because while the central issues 
of structure and  organization of these  national  systems  of innovation  are  neglected  and  under 
researched,  the  factors,  concepts,  construct  and  variables  used  are  lirnited  and  insufficient in 
providing a comprehensive, thorough and parsimonious understanding of a holistic picture of the 
phenomenon. 
Structure  is  intrinsically  related  to  strategy  content  and  process,  and  the  industry 
structure. While strategy is defined as the "pattern of  decisions in a company (or institution) that 
determines  and reveals  its  objectives, purposes and goals,  produces the principle policies and 
plans for achieving tho se goals, and define the range of  business the company (or institution) is to 
pur  sue,  the kind of  economie and human organization it is or intends to be,  and the nature of  the 
economie  and  non-economie  contribution  it  intends  to  make  to  shareholders,  employees, 
customers and communities" (Andrews,  1971 ),  Chandler (l962a) proposed that structure follows 
strategy and other scholars proposed that  strategy follows  structure (Burgelman,  1983;  Hall  & 
Saias,  1980). Therefore is  the importance of structure at the central core of national systems of 
innovation research.  Equally,  the research on  research and development (R&D), as  in  the third 
generation R&D (Roussel, Saad, & Erickson,  1991 ), highlights the importance of linking R&D 
and the innovation process  with the other components of the institution through an  institutional 
(or corporate) strategy leading to strategy alignment and synergetic objectives, in which structure 
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The motivation for  this theoretical research was inspired by one of the leading scholars 
on innovation system, B.  A.  Lundvall (2007), who posed the following question and offered this 
proposai: "How to organize empirical studies of  innovation systems? When it cornes to empirical 
work,  two parallel efforts to  analyze innovation systems seem to  dominate the picture currently. 
One is focused on the peiformance of  national innovation systems,  white the other is focused on 
comparing systems in  more  qualitative terms.  Sometimes  the first tends  to  neglect the  systems 
aspect and degenerates to  loo king for "general best practices ", white the other emphasizes the 
unique systemic features of each single system.  Research that bridges the gap between the two 
approaches may be empirically important." (Lundvall, 2007: p.  lll) 
Therefore, this theoretical research provides a contribution by filling this gap.  Although 
national  system of innovation  is  not  a  theory,  but  rather a  focusing  tool  or a  combination  of 
concept relying on established theories,  this  paper will  use  a conceptual approach to introduce 
two  models of national systems  of innovation:  the  value chain  model  and the  mesh topology, 
emphasizing on the importa'nce of structure (and the implied strategy) as  a core and central issue 
in national system of innovation research. Moreover, the paper will explore factors and constructs 
borrowed  from  the  Iiterature  of business  policy  and  strategy  and  technology  and  innovation 
management, to further examine the two proposed models and to provide for a comprehensive list 
of constructs  that  could  be  used  to  qualitati v  ely  or quanti  tati v  ely  examine  and  measure  the 
efficiency and performance of national systems of innovation. 
This  multidisciplinary  research  is  a  contribution to  the  research on national  system of 
innovation, based on the  tradition of business policy and strategy and technology  management 
and  innovation,  and  is  intended  to  both  scholars  and  practitioners.  The  research  has  three 
objectives:  (l) to  introduce two models for the  national systems of innovation: the  value chain 
and  the  mesh  topology;  (2)  to  examine  these  two  models  or  structure  of national  systems  of 
innovation,  using  a  list  of constructs,  factors  and  variables,  borrowed  from  tne  literature  of 
business policy and  strategy  and technology and innovation management; (3) to propose sorne of 
these  constructs, factors and  variables, as  formai tools for  enhancing  the  research  on  national 
systems of innovation and for further research. 295 
Following the introduction, the next sections will provide for a theoretical background on 
the literature of the national systems of innovation. Following the literature review, the next two 
sections will introduce the two proposed models for the national systems of innovation, followed 
by  an  exploration  of these  two  models,  using  a  list  of variables  and  constructs,  for  further 
examination and  understanding. Finally, the discussion section will  provide for final reflections, 
comments on limitations, and further research. 
9.2 Theoretical Background 
9.2.1 Systems, Innovation and Knowledge 
The national system of innovation concept is  not new. Its origin could be traced back to 
the forefather of the German historical school of economies Friedrich List ( 1885), who published 
in  1841  his seminal work "The national system of political economy". Following Adam Smith's 
concept of the di vision of labor, but with no  mention of innovation, List (1885) coined the term 
"national system of production" taking into account a variety  of national  institutions including 
educational  and  training  institutions,  among  others  (Lundvall  et  al.,  2002).  Therefore  the 
educational  and  training  institutions  were  part of a system,  in  which  they  were  involved  in  a 
process of learning, sharing knowledge and contributing to the advancement of the overall system 
of production  and  the  technology  involved.  This  would  have  enormous  implications  on  the 
competitiveness of this industry, this sector, or of the nation as a whole (Porter, 1990). 
Systems. National systems of innovation are obviously systems engaged in  the process, 
content and product of innovation, on the  nationallevel, within a technology or industrial sector 
or a specifie geographie region. Here the term 'system'  refers to  more than one component or a 
group  of separate or independent components that  are  interlinked  among  each other,  forming 
interdependence  within  this  group  and  interacting  with  each  other,  to  form  one  whole  with 
specifie  boundaries.  This  "system"  could  be described  by  the  composition  of  its  independent 
components or elements, the structure that bind them together, the  links that connect them,  the 
flow of their interconnections,  the process embedded within these interconnections, the resources 
specified as  inputs  to the system and outputs  of the whole group  of components,  its  boundaries, 296 
and  its  connections  with  the  external environment of the  group.  Moreover,  systems  could  be 
characterized  as  simple or complex, open or closed,  independent or integrated,  unidirectional, 
bidirectional or with feedback loops. They usually reflect a systernic approach or the notion of 
flowing  from  one  direction  to  the  other,  processing  from  start  to  finish  and  through  the 
interactions of their interdependent components, which explains the dynarnics of the system and 
how  the  input,  including  knowledge,  with  its  original  nature  or form  is  transformed  into  the 
output product, in this case innovation. 
Thus,  the  use  of  the  term  'system'  in  national  system  of  innovation  refers  to  the 
integration of all the important economie, social, political, organizational, institutional elements 
or entities, and ali the factors that positively contribute and enhance the development, production, 
diffusion  and  the  use  of  innovation  (Edquist,  1997;  Fagerberg,  Mowery,  &  Nelson,  2005; 
Lundvall,  1992).  While,  the  word  'system'  refers  to  the  dynarnic  and  the  process,  the  term 
"innovation"  refers  to  the  content,  or the  material  input  that  will  be  transformed  into  a  new 
product,  or a "new  combination"  (Schumpeter,  1939),  as  a  product  of its  course  through  the 
process' dynamics of the interlinked components of the system. 
Innovation. Innovation is the creation of 'new'  with a measurable amount of economie 
value. This transformation from the original input going through the system, to the 'new creation' 
is  not  linear.  The  transformation  of the  basic  research  or  science  to  the  applied  research  or 
technology is  not the product of going through a simple linear path. Instead, the transformation is 
done,  through  a  complex  system  of feedback  mechanisms  and  a  combinations of interactions 
(Edquist,  1997).  Moreover,  through  this  complex  process  of  interactions  and  feedbacks, 
innovation is the product of a cumulative process based on "innovation avenues"  (Sahal,  1985) 
and  "technological  trajectories"  (Dosi,  1982).  This  constitutes  the  cumulativeness  of  the 
interactive learning process (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Dodgson, 1993; Fiol & Lyles,  1985; Jensen 
et al., 2007; Lundvall, 1985). 
In  fact,  one  of  the  earliest  definitions  of 'innovation'  was  presented  by  the  Austrian 
economist Joseph Schumpeter in  1939, who proposed that innovation is " ...  the setting  up of a 
new productionfunction.  This covers the case of  a new commodity,  as well as those of a new form 
of  organization  such as  merger, of the opening  up  of new markets  and so on  ... Recalling  that 297 
production in the economie sense is  nothing but combining productive services,  we  may express 
the same  thing  by saying that innovation combines factors  in  a new way,  or that it consists in 
carrying out new combination" (Schumpeter,  1939: p. 87 -88). Sin  ce th en, this generic definition 
of innovation as  'new combination' was adopted widely in the 1iterature of strategie management, 
technology  and  innovation  management,  and  entrepreneurship  (Kline  &  Rosenberg,  1986; 
Lundvall  &  Johnson,  1994;  Nelson  &  Winter,  1977;  Pavitt,  2005;  Stein,  1997;  Von-Hippel, 
1988).  It  combines  two  contradictory  dimensions:  existing  elements  and  new  combinations 
(Lundvall et al., 2002). 
Knowledge. The innovation or new combination, is  the product of the transformation of 
existing  elements,  such  as  materials,  tools,  financial  resources,  human  capital  and  talent, 
managerial  experience,  entrepreneurial  skills,  social  capital,  research  and  development 
capabilities,  production  facilities,  business  and  industrial  processes,  basic  scientific  research, 
including  the  know-how  and  knowledge.  This  component of 'knowledge'  and  the  embedded 
lem·ning, is one of the most important dimensions in the process of innovation, and is intrinsically 
related to  the innovation process and content. As innovation is ubiquitous, we are witnessing the 
diffusion of knowledge in the modern economy;  'the learning  economy'  (Lundvall &  Johnson, 
1994),  through  the  continuous  process  of exploration,  discovery,  learning,  sharing,  using  and 
producing the new  knowledge, which gives birth to  new  ideas,  new designs,  new  models,  new 
products, new systems, new applications, new techniques, new forms of organizations and new 
markets (Lundvall, 1992). 
This  knowledge  is  produced,  acquired,  shared,  used  and  diffused  in  a  process  of 
interactive learning which takes place between the different components, entities or institutions of 
the  national  system  of innovation  (Johnson,  1992;  Lundvall,  2006b;  Murmann,  2003).  This 
process of learning could face sorne environmental challenges, in which the process of learning 
and the  content of the knowledge itself is  not always  a  simple  one.  The knowledge  could  be 
complex (Bettis &  Hitt,  1995; Jernison &  Sitkin,  1986b), tacit in  nature (Oliver,  1997; Polanyi, 
1966) and embedded in the social network of interactive entities (Granovetter,  l985a). The tacit 
knowledge is not codified and is non transferable as a public good (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; 
Peteraf,  1993).  Moreover, the nature of knowledge could be generic or specifie,  with  a certain 
degree of tacitness, complexity and independence (Jensen et al., 2007). This complex and specifie 298 
or specialized  knowledge  could  be  coupled  with  uncertainty  conditions,  such  as  technology 
uncertainty,  product  uncertainty,  and  market  uncertainty  (Shapiro  &  Varian,  2003).  The 
knowledge could have a changeable nature,  as  the technological environment surrounding it is 
also changes, is being revolutionized (Tushman &  O'Reiily,  1996), or is  being reshaped, due to 
disruptive new knowledge (Christensen,  1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Utterback & Acee, 
2005b). 
The  sharing,  using  and  diffusing  of  'knowledge',  is  moderated  by  the  cognition  of 
humans in the interacting institutions (Weick, 1995a) and in the same time, is limited by bounded 
rationality (Simon,  1991 ; Taylor,  1975; Tversky  &  Kahneman,  1974),  hence the importance of 
structure  which  facilitates  collaboration and  sharing.  In  addition,  the  sharing of knowledge  is 
affected  by  issues  of  power,  position,  influence,  and  trust,  all  affected  by  structure  and 
organization. For example, an established structure, could favor the density and strength of ties 
between the different interdependent institutions. Dense and strong ties would enhance trust and 
reduce  power,  which  in  turn  would  favor  the  exchange  and  sharing  of knowledge.  But  the 
advantage of having a  structure over not  having one or having an  informai one,  could be lost 
when knowledge is be subject to appropriability, due to moral hazard and opportunism. 
Therefore,  a  formai  structure,  a  defined  organization,  a  clear  process,  well  designed 
functions, in addition to factors such as trust, coordination, collaboration and strong ties,  would 
favor  the  positive  effects  of  knowledge  spillover  (Breschi  &  Lissoni,  2001)  instead  of  the 
negative effeet of knowledge appropriability conditions (Audretsch & Lehmann, 2004). A formai 
structure would also prepare all the participating entities by increasing their absorptive capacity 
(Cohen &  Levinthal,  1990a). In  the context of trust, collaboration, sharing and interacting, the 
participating institutions would lead a trajectory towards new combinations and through learning 
by  doing (Arrow,  1962; Shri vastava,  1983). These institutions, in their knowledge sharing and 
learning mode, become 'knowledge providers'. 
9.2.2 Innovation System 
One definition of the concept of 'innovation system' is based on the interactions between 
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These interactions, knowledge creation and sharing could take place within the firm, between the 
firms, between the firm and other organizations, with a sector, an industry, an economy, a nation 
or even a region. These organizations could be other firms such as  the suppliers, the producers, 
the customers,  the  competitors, etc.  Therefore,  the  systems  of innovation  could  be defined in 
institutional terms.  For example, Carlsson & Jacobsson (1994) define the innovation system in 
term of the sum and synergy of institutions like the universities, the academie infrastructure, the 
research and development (R&D) labs, the schools, the patent system, the labor organizations, the 
standard  bodies,  the  banking  system,  the  government  agencies,  the  state  policies,  etc.  More 
specifically, they di vide the 'institutional infrastructure' related to the innovation or technological 
system into four parts: the industrial research and development, the academie infrastructure, other 
institutions,  and  state  policy.  The  interactions  between  these  interdependent  and  interlinked 
institutions constitute the dynamic of the innovation system. This innovation system could be on 
the  national  leve!,  covering  a  whole  geographie  region,  or  it  could  be  supranational  or 
international. 
According to  Freeman (2004  ),  the basic characteristics of technical innovation between 
the different institutions and within the system of innovation are:  coupling, creating, clustering, 
comprehending and coping. Furthermore, sorne of the common characteristics of the system of 
innovation approach are: ( 1) at the core of the system is learning and innovation; (2) it is us ua! to 
use  a  historical  perspective;  (3)  there  are  sorne  varieties  among  the  systems  and  differences 
between the systems and non-optimality; (4) they include product technologies and organizational 
innovations;  and  (5)  they  are  based  on  a  conceptual  framework,  rather  than  formai  theories. 
(Edquist, 2005) 
Most scholars widely agree that the origins of the system of innovation concept is large! y 
based on  interactive  learning between the  various  institutions constituting  the system,  or more 
formally the theory of interactive learning; and technological transformation or more formally the 
evolutionary theory of technical change (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1995; Lundvall, 2006a; Nelson 
& Nelson, 2002). 
Institutions.  Institutions  were  part  of the  original  definition  of  'national  system'  in 
Friedrich List's (1885) seminal work "national system of production". Accordingly, it took into 300 
account a  variety  of national  institutions  including  those engaged in  educational  and  training 
institutions. By definition, institutions are "sets of  common habits, routines, established practices, 
rules,  or  law  that  regulate  the  relations  and  interactions  between  individuals  and  groups." 
(Edquist, 1997; Hodgson, 2006) 
In  the  context  of an  innovation  system,  institutions  could  play  an  important  rote  in 
managing  the  potential  conflict  that  could  arise  between  the  different  interacting  and 
interdependent participants of the system; in reducing uncertainty by collaborating and sharing 
available asymmetrical knowledge; in reducing risk;  in  exchanging knowledge and participating 
in interactive learning; and in providing a governance structure and incentives for the successful 
management of the process of innovation and hopefully the product of innovation, as weil. 
Therefore, institutions, as they were earlier defined as  'norms', 'habits', and 'rules', are 
embedded  in  the  society and  their  role is  of great importance in  defining  how  people relate, 
coordinate, cooperate, share,  interact, and  learn. The role institutions play is  very important for 
the  process  of innovation and dynarnics  of interactive  learning  (Johnson,  1992).  Hence,  their 
impact in shaping the future and the economie performance of a nation (Nelson & Nelson, 2002; 
Nelson  &  Sampat,  2001 ).  Combining  the  process  of  interactive  learning  and  the  national 
boundaries of a country, would suggest the important role of institutions on the national leve!, or 
'national systems of innovation'. 
9.2.3 National System of Innovation 
For example, Freeman conducted an important study on Japan, in which he described the 
important  role  of the  ministry  of international  trade  and  industry,  the  role  of the firm  R&D 
capabilities, the  role of training  and education,  and fin ally  the conglomerate 'structure'  of the 
industry (Freeman,  1987: p 4). Therefore the 'national system of innovation' is defined as being 
" ...  al! parts and aspects of the economie structure and the institutional set-up  affecting learning 
as well as searching and exploring the production system,  the marketing system, and the system 
of  finance, present themselves as subsystems in which learning takes place. Determining in detail 
which subsystems and social institutions should be included,  or excluded in  the analysis of the 
system is  a task involving historical analysis , as  well as  theoretical consideration  ...  a definition 301 
of the  subsystem of innovation must be kept open and flexible re garding which subsystems and 
which processes should be included. " (  Lundvall, 1992:.p 11-12) 
Moreover,  national  systems  of innovation  could  be  defined  in  terms  of technological 
systems combined  with  an  institutional infrastructure as  "a network of agents interacting  in  a 
specifie  economic!industrial  area,  under  a  particular  institutional  infrastructure  or  set  of 
infrastructures and involved in the generation, diffusion and utilization of  technology. " (Carlsson 
& Stankiewicz,  1995: p. 49;  Stankiewicz &  Carlsson,  1991). This means that the participating 
institutions, with their interconnections, interlinks and interdependencies, are part of this national 
system of innovation, which represents a national infrastructure composed of institutions that are 
engaged  in  a  well  defined  dynarnic  and  a  process  of  interactive  learning,  coordination, 
cooperation, in  which the main and core objective is of using, diffusing,  sharing, and producing 
knowledge, and aiming at the transformation of this existing knowledge into new combinations or 
simply innovation, in term of innovative idea, products, services, processes, business models, etc. 
Sorne of the most common characteristics of the national systems of innovation are that: 
(1) they vary in their specializations in production, tracte, services, and knowledge; (2) they rely 
on components of knowledge that are fundamental for their economie performance and  which 
could be found in one place and difficult to  move to another location; (3) they mainly focus on 
knowledge sharing and diffusion through a process of interactive learning; and (4) they speed up 
the diffusion of knowledge among the participants and enhance the quality and content of the 
diffused knowledge, through synergy and scope (Johnson, Edquist, & Lundvall, 2003). 
Variations of innovation systems and examples of empirical research. The concept of 
national system of innovation, as  described above, could be applied in  a  vast array of context, 
locations,  economie  sectors  and  industries.  In  addition,  its  boundaries  could  encoinpass 
interlinked institutions on the national leve! within one country, or could extend to include severa! 
countries in the same geographie region, or on the international leve!. For the latter, sorne good 
examples are in the aerospace industry, such as the case of the European EADS conglomerate and 
its  Airbus  subsidiary,  which employs  around  57,000 people at  sixteen sites  in four  European 
Union countries:  Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, with assembly production 
facilities  in  Toulouse (France),  Hamburg  (Germany),  Seville  (Spain),  and Tianjin  (China),  in 302 
addition to subsidiaries in the United States, Japan and China (Niosi & Zhegu, 2005; Wik.ipedia, 
2010). 
Therefore, the term 'national system of innovation'  could vary depending on the context 
and the application, while le main concept remains the same. For example, and as a variation of 
the  national system of innovation concept,  we  can find  (1)  technological systems  (Carlsson  & 
Jacobsson,  1994); (2) technological infrastructure (Freeman, 2004; Lundvall, 2004); (3)  sectoral 
innovation systems (Breschi & Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2002); (4) industrial cluster (Niosi, 2002, 
20lla, 20llb; Niosi  &  Zhegu,  2005);  (5)  regional  systems  of innovation  (Cooke,  Gomez,  & 
Etxebarria, 1997); and (6) the triple helix mode! (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). 
One good example of empirical research conducted using (or based on) the concept of the 
national  system  of innovation  and  its  variations,  is  the  major  research  conducted  by  Nelson 
(1993) on a comparative study of national systems of innovation, in which he studied larger high-
income countries such as  the United States, Japan, Germany, the United  Kingdom, France  and 
Italy;  smaller  high-income  countries,  such  as  Denmark,  Sweden,  Canada,  and  Australia;  and 
lower income countries, such as Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, and Israel. Another example is 
the regional study done by Saxenian (1994) on the-culture and competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128. On the national leve!, for example, Niosi et al. (2000) studied the national system of 
innovation in Canada. 
9.2.4 Innovation System's Organization and Structure 
The origins. The concept of national system of innovation could be traced back to Adam 
Srnith's division  of labor.  However,  he  did  not  specify  whether it  is  for  a  tradition  task (i.e. 
production  or  assembly  tine),  or  an  innovation  task,  such as  the  creation  of new  knowledge 
through interactive learning.  As mentioned be  fore, Friedrich List (1885) was the first to coin the 
term 'national system of production', with its national, system and production dimensions, with 
its implied institutions that are engaged in education and training. Moreover, it was not until the 
1970s,  when Freeman pursued  severa! studies and  concluded that the success  in the innovation 
process  lies on strong  formai  ties  and  long-term interactions  between the firm  and sorne other 
external institutions, such as education centers, universities,  government agencies, etc. (Freeman, 303 
1974). However, there was  no  mention of how these entities or institutions, external to the firm, 
would be organized and structured within the system and around the firm. 
The chain-linked model. lt  was widely held that the innovation is the product of a linear 
madel,  in  which  it  is  created  and  produced  based  solely  on  the  scientific  research  (and 
development), as it is shown in figure 9 .1.  It  was Kline &  Rosenberg (1986) who introduced and 
proposed an  alternative mode! to  the widely adopted linear mode!: The chain-linked madel. This 
mode!  introduced a  more elaborate  structure,  which could be adopted and  adapted  to  suit and 
encompass  external  institutions,  as  mentioned  above  in  Freeman's early  research.  The chain-
linked  mode!,  as  shawn  in  the  original  illustration  in  figure  9.2,  integrated  the  function  of 
marketing  with  the  before  research  and  after  research  phases,  and  the  market  distribution 
function, in term of pricing, publicity and sales supervision. 
Figure 9.1 
The linear mode! (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986) 
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Figure 9.2 
The  chain-linked  mode!  (Kline  & 
Rosenberg, 1986) 
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The  chain-linked  mode!  had  two  maJor  contributions.  First,  the  integration  of  a 
knowledge function and  a research  activity, with what it seems to be a supervisory role, with an 
interactive dynarnic  over  a  large  span  covering  the  marketing,  the  design  and  the  production 304 
functions. It is clear that the functions of knowledge and research in the model are not limited to 
the within-the-firm activities, but rather the model suggests that these functions, and others, could 
be  interlinked  with externat  institutions  to  the  firm,  thus  the  potential  of creating a  system of 
interconnected but still  independent entities  or institutions.  Lundvall (2002)  suggested that  the 
idea of interaction (or transaction)  based only on quality and priee was not enough and  that a 
'non-price-relationship'  is  more  realistic  and  needed,  to  govern  the  interactions  between  the 
functions and their entities (divisions), therefore reinforcing the concept of institutions interacting 
from the externat of the firm. Moreover, the suggestion that markets would be transformed into 
hierarchies, as proposed by Williamson (1986) in the transaction cost economies theory, did not 
materialized,  hence  highlighting  the  important  of  interactive  collaboration  with  external 
institutions, in market or hybrid conditions. The other major contribution introduced by the Kline 
and Rosenberg ( 1986) model, is the proposed feedback flows between the different functions and 
entities. This suggests the notion of process, more detailed functional descriptions, directions for 
the process, order and priority, and most importantly, deliverables and indicators. Although, these 
were not specified in the Kline's model, they could be inspired from it. 
The triple helix model. Etzkowitz H, Leydesdorff (2000) presented a model called triple 
helix with three different evolutionary stages that suggest three modes of interaction density, three 
types of interdependence ties and two (or three) governance mechanisms, as shown in figure 9.3. 
In  mode one,  the "statal"  model,  the  industry  and  academia exist within  the  ecosystem of the 
state. The relationships,  if any,  between neither the  industry and  the academia, or both and the 
state, are clear. In mode two, "laissez-faire" model, which represents a progress in the direction 
of the strength of ties,  the three entities (the industry,  the academia and  the state) are on equal 
footing, and they are all linked by doted lines in a triangular shape, suggesting that the ties are not 
strong enough, weak, or blurry, due to  the lack of a formai structure.  In  mode three, the "triple 
helix"  model,  the  three  entities  are  much  closer  in  distance,  in  such  a  way  that  creates  an 
intersection  suggesting  more  formai  interaction,  more  collaboration,  sharing  and  learning, 
stronger level of trust, scope and synergy and a uni fied set of objectives. 305 
Figure 9.3 
The triple helix mode! (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) 
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However, no process, fluidity or dynamics could be inspired from the proposed models. 
The  weakness  or  non  existence  of the  ties  in  the  second  mode!,  laissez faire,  suggests  the 
difficulty  of  establishing  any  formai  mode!,  institutions  in  terms  of  routines,  habits,  and 
procedures,  and  the  problem  of the  lack  of trust could  not  be  overcome  due  to  the  distance 
between the independent entities. In  the third  model,  triple helix, although the distance between 
the entities  is  reduced,  the existence of a  formai  process  is  not  clear and far  from  evident.  In 
addition, the closeness of the entities and the shortening of the distances between them in  this 
manner,  suggest that the intersection  area could create  overlaps in terms  of the resources  and 
slack, the underutilization of dynarnic capabilities (Teece & Pisano, 1998), the lack of strategie fit 
and alignment, the duplication and replication. Eventually, these factors would potentially reduce 
the critical element of trust, increase the danger of  moral hazard and appropriability, increment 
power and influence, and consequently discourage  collaboration and interaction. This could be 
amplified  by  the lack  of incentives,  information  asymmetry  and  the  weakness  of the  hybrid 
governance  structure,  if  any.  Therefore,  the  need  for  a  better  mode!  that  would  enhance 
knowledge  collaboration  and  trust-based  interactive  learning,  with  the  aim  of using,  sharing, 
producing,  transforrning  and  diffusing  knowledge, and  finally  creating  'new  combinations'  or 
innovation. 306 
9.3 Introducing the Innovation Value Chain Model and the Mesh Topology 
ln his earl  y definition of 'innovation', Joseph Schumpeter ( 1939) pointed out to system of 
innovation, through the process of innovation, the dynarnic of transformation and the importance 
of the form or 'structure' in creating 'new combination' or in another word, simply 'innovation': 
" ...  define  innovation  more  rigorously  by  means  of the  production  function ... this  function 
describes  the way in  which quality of  products  varies if  quantities of  factors  vary. If instead of 
quantifies of  factors, we vary the form of  the function, we have innovation. " (Schumpeter,  1939: 
p.  87) 
Structure  is  intrinsically  related  to  strategy  content  and  process,  and  the  industry 
structure. In  the definition of Mintzberg's ten schools of thoughts,  the prescriptive or normative 
group consists of the design school or conceptual process (Andrews,  1971 ), the planning school 
or formai process (Ansoff, 1965), and the positioning school or analytical process (Porter, l980a). 
These  three  schools  support  an  analytical  and  logical  approach  to  strategy  formulation.  For 
Andrews (1971) strategy is "a pattern of  decisions in a company (or institution) that determines 
and reveals  its  objectives, purposes and goals, produces  the  principle policies  and plans for 
achieving those goals,  and define the range of  business the company (or institution) is to pursue, 
the  kind  of economie  and human  organization  it  is  or intends  to  be,  and  the  nature  of the 
economie  and  non-economie  contribution  it  intends  to  make  to  shareholders,  employees, 
customers and communities".  For Porter (1980a), strategy is "how the  company  (or institution) 
will  distinguish  itself in  its  competitive  environment to  earn  superior profitability"  and  "the 
essence of  strate  gy is to  identify a different position from those ri vals". Ansoff (1965), considers 
th at  strate  gy  is  linked  to  the  institution' s  environment: "strategie decisions  are not related to 
internat  problems  rather.to  externat problems  of  the  firm  (or institution)  and specifically  the 
product mix which afirm will produce and markets in which it will sel! them". While Porter drew 
on Chandler'  s work on strate  gy and structure (1962a), where he suggested th at structure follows 
strate gy, other scholars suggested th at strate gy follows structure (B urgelman,  1983; Hall & Sai as, 
1980). Hence is the importance of structure for strategy alignment, for defining a set of objectives 
for the national systems of innovation, and for sustaining competitive advantage. 307 
Competitive advantage is achieved through competing in 'distinctive' and 'unique' ways 
and  could  be  sustained  by  continuous  innovation.  The competitive  advantage  is  achieved  by 
doing the company's activities efficiently.  According  to  Porter (l980a), "the activities are the 
ultimate source of competitive advantage,  and the  way  to  achieve cost leadership or non-priee 
buyer value; dif.ferentiation". Therefore is the importance of activities, which constitute the 'value 
chain', or a configuration of internai activities in a way different than the ri vals. As Porter puts it: 
" ... the  value  chain provides a  systematic framework for identifying activities and the  ir role  in 
cost positioning  and dif.ferentiation"  (Porter,  1980a).  On  the  national  leve!,  the  'diamond  of 
national advantage'  which defines the competitiveness of nations  consists of factor conditions, 
such as talents and skills  in  the local market, the demand condition, or the local demand for the 
industry  products,  the  related  and  supporting  industry,  or the  existence  of local  competitive 
suppliers in other related industries and finally the firm strategy, structure and rivalry, or in other 
words, the way companies are created, organized and managed and the nature of domestic rivalry 
(Porter, 1990). It is obvious that combining these factors with other institutions would provide for 
an efficient and competitive national system of innovation. 
Therefore, the concept of the value chain is not new. It emerged within the boundaries of 
the firm  and for  the  purpose of transforming the illitial resources into  the new  combination of 
end-user  products,  increasing  the  efficiency  of the  firm's  internai  activities,  and  sustaining 
competitive advantage. It  is  worth to note that the concept of value chain in the case of one firm 
applies when these activities are contained in one localized area or when they are spanning over 
different  locations.  Equally,  the  same  concept  applies  when  all  the  activities  are  handled 
internally  by  the  firm,  or alternatively,  when  sorne  of them  are  carefully  passed  to  external 
entities or institutions, whether through a  market mode (transactions based on quality and priee 
relationships) or a hybrid mode (quality and priee, in  addition to non-price-relationship), in which 
outsourcing and subcontracting are few good examples. 
Under these assumptions, if the concept of the value chain could apply to firms that have 
interactions with externat institutions, therefore, it is only natural that the same concept, using the 
same analogy could be adopted to  propose an  enhanced structural framework for the concept of 
the  national  system  of innovation.  In  fact,  adopting  the  same concept  and  applying  it  to  the 
national systems of innovation, be it "the value chain of the nation system of innovation", would 308 
create the conditions  for  further structuring,  better measuring,  and  creating and sustaining  the 
competitive advantage of nations,  as  proposed in the diamond of national advantage  by  Porter 
(1990). 
It  is  important to  remember that the composition of the  national  system of innovation 
should  not be  restricted or lirnited.  As  suggested  by  Lundvall ( 1992) earlier in  the article,  the 
inclusion or exclusion of institutions in the national system of innovation should be based on a 
historical  perspective and on theoretical, as  weil  as  practical considerations. Consequently,  the 
proposed value chain of the national system of innovation is  not concerned with the inclusion or 
exclusion of participating institutions. This is  done based on historical analysis,  theoretical and 
practical considerations. Rather, the adoption of the value chain concept to the national system of 
innovation, gives it a better structure, a more formai process  and a defined dynarnic, regardless of 
the  selected  participating  members.  Moreover,  the  order,  sequence,  and  composition  of the 
participating members are not part of the mode! and are rendered insignificant. As defined above 
by  Porter (1980a), the value chain provides  'a systemic approach for identifying activities and 
the  ir rote', in other words a structural framework for the national system of innovation.  Figure 
9.4,  introduces  the  proposed  mode!  of the  innovation  value  chain  of the  national  system  of 
innovation. 
Furthermore, the  proposed  mesh  topology for  the  national system of innovation  is  the 
ideal  and  perfect  configuration  for  the  network of interlinked  and  interdependent institutions 
forming the national system of innovation, in  which each institution is linked to almost,  if not to 
all  the  others,  with  strong  and  dense  ties.  Therefore,  it  could  be  a  partially  connected  mesh 
topology or a potentially fully connected mesh topology. In terms of network configuration of the 
interlinked institutions pa1ticipating in the national system of innovation, the mesh topology has a 
superior formation over the other topologies,  such as the line, the star, and the ring, as shown in 
figure 9.5.  The mesh topology encourages, facilitates and enforces the interactive collaboration 
and learning in the dynarnic of the national system of innovation, by using, sharing,  and diffusing 
existing knowledge, and by producing new combinations and innovation. ---------------
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Figure 9.4 
The proposed innovation value chain model of the national system of innovation 
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It  is  important to  reflect on  the differences between the proposed value chain and mesh 
topology for the national system of  innovation, and how they represent complementary, and not 
contradictory roles. The proposed value chain suggests a systernic approach for organizing and 
structuring the acti viti es encompassed in  the dynarnic collaboration and interaction between the 
participating members of the national system of innovation. It suggests a process perspective for 
the organization of these activities. It  helps to define for each member institution in  the national 
system  of innovation,  its  respective  functions,  responsibilities,  receivables  (inputs)  and  their 
specifications, deliverables (outputs) and their specifications, the task ownership and time frame, 
. the  planned  benchmark quality, etc.  Moreover,  while  the  proposed  value  chain  is  a  'virtual' 
structure for organizing and  processing  the activities and  tasks,  the proposed  mesh topology is 
more of a physical depiction of the  organizational structure of the participating members in the 
national system of innovation.  It  suggests  and  reflects the type of interconnection between the 
member institutions, whether existent or non-existent, and the nature and characteristics of these 
interconnections, in term of strong and week ties, and dense and loose ties. Figure 9.5 
The different configurational topologies and the proposed mesh topology for innovation 
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Furthermore, the integration of both proposed organizational structures, the  value chain 
and the mesh topology for the national system of innovation concept, enhances the core issue of 
structure for the national system of innovation, increases its  efficiency and sus  tain competitive 
advantage and facilitates  further qualitative and quantitative research on the  national  system of 
innovation concept, by providing more measurement tools, as described later. It is suggested that 
the  adoption  of the  proposed  integrated  value  chain  and  mesh  topology  organizational  and 
configurational structures would have the following characteristics and advantages: 
•  Integrating:  The  participating  institutions  are  better  integrated  m  the  national  system  of 
innovation; 
•  Structuring: It enhances the structure of the national system of innovation; 311 
•  Optimizing: It optimizes the process of sharing, interactive learning and the use of resources; 
•  Transforming:  It facilitates the transformation of basic and existing knowledge into innovation; 
•  Planning:  It  provides  a  better  framework  for  the  planning  of activities,  deliverables,  and 
indicators; 
•  Managing: It fosters the ability to manage the whole process of the national innovation system; 
•  Interacting:  It  facilitates  the  interaction  between  the  institutions  engaged  in  knowledge 
sharing; 
•  Learning: It motivates for a better learning and knowledge sharing environment; 
•  Processing: It enforces a process perspective to the national system of innovation; 
•  Dividing: It improves the division of labor and tasks; 
•  Defining:  It  increases  the  ability  to  better  define  the  institutional'  tasks,  time  frames  and 
ownership; 
•  Measuring:  It  provides  for  a  new  set  of measurement  tools  for  evaluating  the  innovation 
system; 
•  Delivering: It improves the delivery mechanism of inputs and outputs of the institutions; 
•  Aligning: It encourages the alignment of a unified set of strategie objectives; 
•  Transferring: It foments the transferring of knowledge from one institution to the other; 
•  Diffusing: It stimulates the diffusion of knowledge across the national system of innovation; 
•  lnstitutionalizing:  It  provokes  the  institutionalization  of  the  activities  in  the  system  of 
innovation; 
•  Rationalizing: It helps the rationalization of the dynamics of the national system of innovation; 
•  Economizing:  It  enforces  the  economy  of scope,  the  rational  use  of resources,  and  avoids 
duplication; 
•  Strategizing:  It catalyzes the ability to analyze, plan, strategize and measure. 
9.4 Exploring potential constructs and variables for measuring the proposed models 
As  suggested before,  the adoption and  integration  of the  proposed two  models for  the 
national systems of innovation, the  value chain model  and  the mesh topology,  would facilitate 
further qualitative  and quantitative  research  on  the  national  system of innovation concept,  by 312 
providing  more  measurement  tools.  Here,  is  a  comprehensive  list  of concepts, constructs  and 
variables,  borrowed  mostly  from  the  literature of business policy and  strategy,  and technology 
and innovation management. Table 9.1 provides a description of these factors with respect to the 
proposed value chain and mesh topology respectively, and the expected characteristics of the two 
proposed models when using these measurement tools. 
Table 9.1 
Potential constructs and variables for the proposed models: Value chain and mesh topology 
Concept/Construct  NSI  NSI  Concept cited by 
1 Variable  Value Chain Structure  Mesh Topology 
1  Strategy alignment  Improve planning, 
vision, objectives 
2  Strategy process  Enhanced due to 
interaction dynamic 
3  Innovation  Enhanced across 
diffusion  industry structure 
4  Knowledge  Encouraged due to  Increased due to strong 
diffusion  better process  ti es 
5  Learning process  More efficient due to 
structure 
6  Interactive lem·ning  Facilitated due to  Increased due to dense 
systematic approach  ti es 
7  Absorptive capacity  Increased due to  Improved to closeness  (Cohen & Levinthal, 
planning and process  of ties  1990a) 
8  Learning by doing  Enhanced due to 
absorptive capacity 
9  Knowledge  Increased due to  Increased to network 
spillover  structure and process  effects 
10  Ti es  Integration favors  Favors strong and dense 
strong ties  ti es 
li  Cenlralizalion  Nol favored due lo  Enlilies are on equal 
division of tasks  footing 
12  Governance  Improved  Enhanced due to 
closeness 
13  Reorganization  Open to it due to 
flexibility 
14  Development  Progressive and  Chaotic? 
evolutionary 
15  Innovation.  Facilitated  Improved through ties 
management 
16  Systemic approach  Enforced 313 
Concept/Construct  NSI  NSI  Concept cited by 
1 Variable  Value Chain Structure  Mesh Topology 
17  Social capital  Impact on network  (Geletkanycz & 
configuration  Hambrick,  1997) 
(Gulati,  1999) 
18  Facilitating  Improved to systemic  Facilitated due to strong 
communication  approach  ti es 
19  Embeddedness  In the process and  In the network 
dynamic  configuration 
20  Compatibility  Important for process  Configuration formation  (Jemison & Sitkin, 
integration  1986b) 
21  Strategie fit  Critical in culture and  Critical in culture  (Shelton,  1988a) 
strate gy 
22  Coordination  Facilitated and enforced  Encouraged 
23  Proximity  Important/not essentia1  (Mayer & Kenney, 
2004a) 
24  Boundaries  Structured but flexible 
25  Dynamic capability  Fostered 
26  Trajectories  Create historical 
perspective 
27  Path dependency  Creates positive Jock-in  (Oliver, 1997) (Singh & 
effects  Montgomery, 1987) 
28  Cognition  Creates organizational 
me mory 
29  Ambiguity  Reduced  Managed 
30  Uncertainty  Reduced through  Reduced through  (Quelin, 2000) 
cooperation  collaboration 
31  Techno uncertainty  (Robertson & Gat(gnon, 
1998; Walker & Weber, 
1984) 
32  Market uncertainty  (Robertson & Gatignon, 
1998) 
33  Product uncertainty  (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
34  Appropriability  Managed and reduced  Reduced by trust  (Hoffman & Schaper-
buy structure  Rinkel, 2001) 
35  Opportunism  Reduced by incentives  (Williamson, 1975) 
and governance 
36  Moral hazard  Reduced due common  (Hoffman & Schaper-
objectives  Rinkel, 2001)) 
37  Trust  Increased due to  Increased due to strong  (Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
interaction, sharing  ti es  (Williamson, 1975) 
(Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986b) 
38  Power  Reduced due to trust  Increased by network 
and interaction  position 
39  Complexity  Reduced and managed  (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986b) 314 
Concept/Construct  NSI  NSI  Concept cited by 
1  Variable  Value Chain Structure  Mesh Topology 
40  Technical  (Bettis & Hitt, 1995) 
complexity 
41  Degree of  Increased  (James, Georghiou, &·· 
integration  Metcalfe, 1998) (Paine 
& Power, 1984) (Mayer 
& Kenney, 2004a) 
42  Degree of  Implication on division  (Gawer & Cusumano, 
modularity  of labor  2002) 
43  Economy of scope  Adopted and increased  (Duysters & Man, 
due to sharing  2003b) (Walter & 
Barney,  1990) (Hoffman 
& Schaper-Rinkel, 
2001) 
44  Core competencies  lncreased due to  (Hi tt et al., 1991  b) 
specialization  (Prahalad &  Hamel, 
1990) (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1994) 
45  Bounded rationality  Improved by tasks  (Williamson, 1999) 
division & process  (Coff,  1997b) 
46  Resource  Create positive lock-in  (Pfeffer, 1972) 
dependency  effects 
47  Tacit knowledge  Transferred through  Transferred through  (Oliver,  1997) 
collaboration  relations 
48  Degree of tacitness  Reduced due to 
interactive leaming 
49  Leadership  Created through  Emerges due to  position, 
consensus  influence 
50  Synergy  Increased  (Brush, 1996), 
(Lubatkin, 1983) 
51  Financial synergies  Increased  (Trautwein, 1990) 
52  Cost  Reduced and shared  (Walter & Barney, 
1990) 
53  R&D cost  Shared, Economy of  (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
sc  ope 
54  Firm's size  Relative 
55  Talent retention  Highlighted and  (Mayer & Kenney, 
managed  2004a) (Coff,  1997b) 
56  Management  Facilitated  (Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
control 
57  Information  Reduced by sharing and  (Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
asymmetry  enforced  (Hoffman & Schaper-
Rinkel, 2001) (Coff, 
1997b) 
58  Techno  (James, Georghiou, & 
performance  Metcalfe, 1998) 
59  Complementary  (Shelton, 1988a) (Mayer 
product 1  & Ken ney, 2004a) 
technology  (Wernerfelt, 1984) 315 
Concept/Construct  NSI  NSI  Concept cited by 
1 Variable  Value Chain Structure  Mesh Topology 
60  Supplementary  (Shelton, 1988a) 
product 1  (W  emerfelt, 1984) 
technology 
61  Degree ofproduct  (Feeser & Willard, 
relatedness  1990) (Hopkins, 1987) 
(James, Georghiou, & 
Metca1fe,  1998) 
62  Product time to  Reduced 
market 
63  Efficiency  Improved  (Trautwein, 1990) 
(Walter & Barney, 
1990) (Williamson, 
1999) 
64  R&D intensity  Increased  (Hi tt et al., 1991 b) 
65  R&D investment  Increased  Increased  (Hi tt et al.,  1991 b) 
66  Financia1 control  Improved  (Hitt et al., 1996) 
67  Transaction cost  Reduced  (Teece, 1982) 
(Williamson, 1986) 
68  Risk sharing  Increased  (Walter & Barney, 
1990) (Roberts & Liu, 
200 1) (Lubatkin,  1983) 
69  Risk  Reduced  (Roberts & Liu, 2001) 
70  Learning by doing  Encouraged  (Hoffman & Schaper-
Rinkel, 2001 ) 
(Pennings, Barkema, & 
Douma,  1994b) 
9.5 Discussion 
In this theoretical research on the concept of national system of innovation, we proposed 
two  conceptual  framework  and  organizational  structure  for  increasing  the  efficiency  through 
interactive  learning  and  knowledge  transfer:  The  value  chain  model  and  the  mesh  topology 
configuration. The motivation of the research was the need for more structure and organization in 
national system of innovation research and  the need for  more and better measuring tools. These 
two  proposed  structures  improve  the  issue  of structure  at  the  core of the  national  system of 
innovation research.  Moreover, we  explored  an extensive and  comprehensive list of constructs, 
variables  and  factors  to  better  measure  quanti  tati v  ely  the  performance  of national  system of 316 
innovation.  Furthermore,  these  measures  provide  qualitative  tools  for  a  better  and  in-depth 
understanding of 'how' national systems of innovation work and 'what' dimensions are the most 
important. Using these tools could provide the basis for a better referenced and equally weighted 
comparative analysis between systems of innovation, on the  national,  regional or international 
levels. 
Further research is  needed in  order to adjust these measurements on the national system 
of innovation research, followed by empirical research to  test the internai and construct validity 
of these measures. Although, the national system of innovation is not a formai theory, but rather a 
focusing tool for studying different things, such as  innovation management, policies, knowledge 
management, etc., these proposed constructs would enhance the research on the national systems 
of innovation, as they cross the boundaries of many disciplines and provide for a more integrative 
and  holistic  approach to  the  study of the  national  systems of innovation.  Although  the  picture 
could still be blurry, having a perspective of the whole is  better than the fragmented picture we 
usually get from the literature. 317 
References 
Andrews KR. (1971). The concept of  corporate strategy. Dow Jones-Irwin: Homewood 
Ansoff I.  ( 1965).  Corporate  strategy: An analytic approach to  business policy for growth and 
expansion. McGraw-Hill: New York 
Arrow  KJ.  (1962).  The  Economie-Implications  of  Learning  by  Doing.  Review  of Economie 
Studies 29(80):  155-173 
Audretsch DB,  Lehmann EE.  (2004).  University spillovers:  Does  the  kind  of science  matter? 
Industry and Innovation Il  (3): p.  193 
Bettis RA, Hitt MA. (1995). The new competitive landscape. Strategie Management Journal  16: 
7-19 
Breschi  S,  Lissoni  F.  (200 1  ).  Knowledge  spillovers  and  local  innovation  systems- A  cri  ti cal 
survey. Industrial and Corporate change 10(4): p. 975 
Breschi S, Malerba F.  (1997). Sectoral Innovation Systems: technological regimes, schumpeterian 
dynamics,  and  spatial  boundaries.  In  C  Edquist  (Ed.),  Systems  of innovation  :  technologies, 
institutions, and organizations, Vol. xiv:  432 p. 
Brown JS,  Duguid P.  (1991).  Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practice: Toward a 
Unified View ofWorking, Learning, and Innovation. Organization Science 2(1): 40-57 
Brush TH. (1996).  Predicted change in  operational synergy and post acquisition performance of 
acquired businesses. Strategie Management Journa/17:  1-24 
Burgelman R.  ( 1983). A model of the interaction of the strategie behavior, corporate context, and 
the concept of strategy. Academy of  Management Review 8(000001): pg. 61 
Carlsson B, Jacobsson S.  (1994). Technological Systems and Economic-Policy - the Diffusion of 
Factory Automation in Sweden. Research Policy 23(3): 235-248 
Carlsson  B,  Stankiewicz R. ( 1995). On the  nature,  function  and  composition of technological 
systems. In B Carlsson (Ed.),  Technological Systems  and Economie Performance:  The  Case of 
Factory Automation. Kluwer Academie Publishers 
Chandler AD. (1962). Strategy and structure: chapters in the history of  the industrial enterprise. 
M.I.T. Press: Cambridge 
Christensen CM. (1997). The innovator's dilemma - When  new technologies cause great firms to 
fail. Harvard Business School Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts 318 
Christensen  CM,  Raynor  ME.  (2003).  The  innovator's  solution  - Creating  and  sustaining 
successful growth. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, Massachusetts 
Coff RW. (1997). Human assets and management dilemmas: Coping with hazards on the road to 
resource based theory. Academy of  Management Review 22(2): 374-402 
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA.  (1990).  Absorptive-Capacity - a New  Perspective on  Learning and 
Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35( 1  ):  128-152 
Cooke  P,  Gomez  M,  Etxebarria  G.  (1997).  Regional  innovation  systems:  Institutional  and 
organisational dimensions. Research Policy 26(4-5): 475-491 
Dodgson  M.  ( 1993).  Organizational  Learning:  A  Review  of Sorne  Literatures.  Organization 
Studies 14(3): 375-394 
Dosi  G.  (1982).  Technological  Paradigms  and  Technological  Trajectories  - a  Suggested 
Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change. Research Policy  11 (3): 
147-162 
Duysters  G,  Man  A-Pd.  (2003).  Transitory  alliances:  an  instrument  for  surviving  turbulent 
industries? R&D Management 33(1): 49-58 (10 pp.) 
Edquist C.  (1997). Systems of innovation : technologies,  institutions,  and organizations.  Pinter: 
London; Washington 
Edquist  C.  (2005).  Systems  of Innovation:  Perspectives  and  Challenges.  In  J  Fagerberg,  DC 
Mowery,  RR  Nelson  (Eds.),  The  Oxford handbook of innovation,  Vol.  xviii:  656  p.  Oxford 
University Press: New York 
Eisenhardt KM. ( 1989).  Agency  theory: An  assessment and  review. Academy of Management 
Review 14(1): 57-74 
Etzkowitz H,  Leydesdorff L.  (2000). The dynamics of innovation:  from National Systems  and 
"Mode 2"  to  a Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations.  Research Policy 29(2): 
109-123 
Fagerberg  J,  Mowery  DC,  Nelson  RR.  (2005).  The  Oxford  handbook  of innovation.  Oxford 
University Press:  Oxford; New York 
Feeser HR, Willard GE. ( 1  990). Founding strate  gy  and  performance: A comparison of high and 
low growth high tech firms. Strategie Management Journal 11: 87-98 
Fiol CM, Lyles MA.  ( 1985).  Organizational Learning.  Academy of  Management Review  10(4): 
803-813 
Freeman  C.  (1974).  The  economies  of industrial  innovation.  Penguin:  Harmondsworth 
Baltimore 319 
Freeman C.  (1987). Technology, policy,  and economie performance: !essons from lapan. Pinter 
Publishers: London ; New York 
Freeman  C.  (2004).  Technological  infrastructure  and  international  competitiveness.  !nd  Corp 
Change 13(3): 541-569 
Gawer A,  Cusumano MA.  (2002). Platform Leadership: How Intel,  Microsoft, and Cisco Drive 
lndustry Innovation. Harvard Business School Press 
Geletkanycz MA, Hambrick DC.  (1997).  The externat ties  of top  executives:  Implications for 
strategie choice and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(4): 654-681 
Granovetter M.  (1985). Economie Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. 
American Journal of  Sociology 91(3): 481-510 
Gulati  R.  (1999).  Network location  and learning: The influence of network resources and firm 
capabilities on alliance formation. Strategie Management Journal20: 397-420 
Hagedoorn J,  Duysters G.  (2002). External sources of innovative capabilities: The preference for 
strategie alliances or mergers and acquisitions. Journal of  Management Studies 39(2) 
Hall DJ, Saias M.  (1980). Strategy  Follows Structure! Strategie Management Journal  1(2):  pg. 
149 
Hi tt MA, Hoskisson RE, Ireland RD,  Harrison JS. ( 1991 ).  Effects of acquisitions on R&D inputs 
and outputs. Academy of  Management Journal34(3): 693-706 
Ritt MA, Hoskisson RE, Johnson RA,  Moesel DD. (1996). The market for corporate control and 
firm innovation. Academy of  Management Journal 39(5):  1084-1119 
Hodgson GM. (2006). What Are Institutions? Journal of  Economie Issues 40( 1):  1-25 
Hoffman WH, Schaper-Rinkel W. (2001). Acquire or ally?- A strategy framework for deciding 
between acquisition and cooperation. Management International Review 41 (2):  131 -159 
Hopkins HD.  (1987).  Acquisition strategy and the market position of acquiring firms. Strategie 
Management Journal 8: 535-547 
James AD, Georghiou L, Metcalfe JS. (1998). Integrating technology into merger and acquisition 
decision making. Technovation 18(8/9) 
Jemison  DB,  Sitkin  SB.  ( 1986). Corporate  acquisitions:  A  process  perspective.  Academy of 
Management Review 11(1):  145-L 63 
Jensen  MB,  Johnson  B,  Lorenz E, Lundvall BA.  (2007).  Forms  of knowledge  and  modes of 
innovation. Research Policy 36(5): 680-693 320 
Johnson B. (1992). Institutional Learning. In BÂ Lundvall  (Ed.), National systems of  innovation: 
towards  a  theory of innovation  and interactive  learning,  Vol.  xiii:  342 p.  Pinter Publishers: 
London 
Johnson B,  Edquist C, Lundvall BA.  2003. Economie Development and the National System of 
Innovation Approach, Globelics Academy 2004: Lisbon, Portugal 
Kline SJ, Rosenberg N. ( 1986). An Overview of Innovation. In  R Landau, N Rosenberg (Eds.), 
The  Positive  sum  strategy  :  harnessing  technology  for  economie  growth,  Vol.  xiv:  640  p. 
National Academy Press: Washington, D.C. 
List  F.  (1885).  The  National  system  of political  economy  (MP  Sampson  Lloyd,  Trans.). 
Longmans, Green and Co.:  London 
Lubatk.in  M.  (1983).  Mergers  and  the  performance  of  the  acquiring  firm.  Academy  of 
Management Review 8(2): 218-225 
Lundvall BA. (1985). Product innovation and user-producer interaction. lndustrial Development 
Research Series 31 
Lund  vaU  BA.  (2004  ).  Introduction  to  'Technological  infrastructure  and  international 
competiti  veness' by Christopher Freeman. lnd Corp Change  13(3): 531-539 
Lundvall  BA.  2006a.  Innovation  Systems  between  Policy  and  Research,  Innovation  Pressure 
Conference: Tampere, Finland 
Lundvall  BA. (2006b).  Interactive Learning,  Social  Capital  and  Economie Performance.  In  B 
Kahin, D Foray (Eds.), Advancing knowledge and the knowledge economy,  Vol.  x:  503 p. MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Mass. 
Lund  v  ali  BÂ.  ( 1992).  National  systems  of innovation  :  towards  a  the  ory  of innovation  and 
interactive  learning.  Pinter Publishers;  Distributed exclusively  in  the  USA  and  Canada by  St. 
Martin's Press: London, New York 
Lundvall BÂ. (2007). National Innovation Systems - Analytical Concept and Development Tool. 
Industry & Innovation 14(1): 95-119 
Lundvall BA, Johnson B. ( 1994). The learning economy. Journal of  Industry Studies 1  (2): 23-42 
Lundvall  BÂ,  Johnson  B,  Andersen  ES,  Dalum  B.  (2002).  National  systems  of production, 
innovation and competence building. Research Po licy 31 (2): 213-23 1 
Malerba F.  (2002). Sectoral systems of innovation  and  production. Research Policy 31(2): 247-
264 
Mayer D, Kenney M.  (2004). Economie action does not take place in  a Vacuum:  Understanding 
Cisco's acquisition and development strategy. Industry and Innovation Il (4): 299 321 
Mintzberg  H.  (1979).  The  structuring of organizations : a  synthesis of the  research.  Prentice-
Hall: Eng1ewood Cliffs, N.J. 
Murmann JP. (2003). Knowledge and competitive advantage the coevolution offirms, technology, 
and national institutions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK; New York 
Nelson  RR.  (1993).  National  innovation  systems  : a  comparative  analysis.  Oxford University 
Press: New York 
Nelson RR, Nelson K.  (2002). Teclmology, institutions, and innovation systems. Research Policy 
31 (2): 265-272 
Nelson  RR,  Sampat  BN.  (2001).  Making  sense  of institutions  as  a  factor  shaping  economie 
performance. Journal of  Economie Behavior & Organization 44(1 ):  31 -54 
Nelson RR1  Winter SG.  (1977). In search of useful theory of innovation. Research Policy 6(1): 
36-76 
Niosi J,  Godin B,  Manseau A.  (2000). Canada's national system of innovation. McGill-Queen's 
University Press: Montreal ; Ithaca 
Niosi J, Zhegu M.  (2005). Aerospace Clusters: Local or Global Know1edge Spillovers? lndustry 
and Innovation 12(1): p. 5 
Oliver C. (1997). Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutiona1 and resource based 
views. Strategie Management Journal 18(9): 697-713 
Paine  Fr,  Power  DJ.  (1984).  Merger  strategy:  An  exarnination  of  Druker's  five  rules  for 
successful acquisitions. Strategie Management Journal 5: 99-110 
Pavitt K.  (2005).  Innovation  Proœsses.  In  J  Fagerberg,  DC  Mowery,  RR  Nelson  (Eds.),  The 
Oxford handbook of  innovation, Vol. xviii:  656 p. Oxford University Press: Oxford ; New York 
Pennings  JM,  Barkema  H,  Douma  S.  (1994).  Organizationa1  leaming  and  diversification. 
Academy of  Management Journal 37(3): 608-640 
Peteraf  MA.  (1993).  The  comerstones  of  competitive  advantage:  A  resource-based  vtew. 
Strategie Management Journal 14: 179-191 
Pfeffer J.  (1972). Mer  ger as a response to organizational interdependence. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 17: 382-394 
Polanyi M. ( 1966). The tacit dime11sion (lst ed.).  Doubleday: Garden City, N.Y. 
Porter M. ( 1980). Competitive Strategy. Free Press 
Porter ME. (1990). The competitive  advantage of  nations. Free Press: New York 322 
Prahalad  CK,  Hamel  G.  ( 1990).  The core competence of the  corporation.  Harvard  business 
review:  79-91 
Prahalad  CK,  Hamel  G.  (1994).  Competitng for  the future.  Harvard  Business  School  Press: 
Boston 
Quelin  B.  (2000).  Core  competencies,  R&D  management  and  partnerships.  European 
Management Journal 18(5): 476-487 
Roberts EB, Liu WK. (2001). Ally or acquire? MIT Sloan Management Review 
Robertson  TS,  Gatignon  H.  ( 1998).  Technology  development  mode:  A  transaction  cost 
conceptualization. Strategie Management Journal 19:  515-531 
Roussel  PA,  Saad  KN,  Erickson  TJ.  (1991).  Third  Generation  Research  and  Development: 
Managing the link to corporate strategy. Harvard Business School Press: Boston 
Sahal D.  (1985). Technological guideposts and innovation avenues.  Research Policy  14(1985): 
61 -82 
Saxenian  A.  ( 1994).  Regional advantage:  culture  and competition  in Silicon  Valley and Route 
128. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 
Schumpeter JA.  ( 1939). Business cycles; a theoretical,  historical, and statistical analysis of the 
capitalist process.  (lst ed.). McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.: New York, London 
Shapiro  C,  Varian HR.  (2003).  The Art  of Standards  Wars,  Managing  in  the  Modular  Age: 
Architectures,  Networks and Organizations: 424. Blackwell Publishing 
Shelton  LM.  ( 1988).  Strategie  business  fits  and  corporate  acquisition:  Empirical  evidence. 
Strategie Management Journal 9: 279-287 
Shrivastava P. (1983).  A Typology of Organizational Learning-Systems. Journal of  Management 
Studies 20(1):  8-28 
Simon HA. (1991 ).  Bounded rationality and organizational learning. Organization Science 2(1 ): 
125-134 
Singh H, Montgomery  C.  ( 1987).  Corporate  acquisition  strategies  and  economie performance. 
Strategie Management Journal 8: 377-386 
Stankiewicz  R,  Carlsson  B.  ( 1991  ).  On the  nature,  function  and  composition of technological 
systems. Journal of  Evolutionary Economies 1  (2): 93 
Stein J.  (1997). Waves of creative destruction- Firm specifie learning by doing and dynamics of 
innovation. The Review of  Economie Studies 64(219 ):  265 p. 
Taylor RN.  (1975). Psychological determinants of bounded rationa)ity: Implications for decision 
making.  Decision Sciences 6: 409-429 323 
Teece DJ.  (1982). Towards an economie theory  of the  multiproduct firm.  Journal of Economie 
Behavior and Organization 3:  39-63 
Teece DJ, Pisano  G. (1998). The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms. In G Dosi, DJ Teece, J Chytry 
(Eds.), Technology,  organization and competitiveness: perspectives on industrial and corporate 
change, Vol. ix:  345p. Oxford University: Oxford 
Trautwein F. ( 1990).  Merger motives and merger prescriptions.  Strategie Management Journal 
11: 283-295 
Tushman  ML,  O'Reilly  CA.  ( 1996).  Ambidextrous  organizations: Managing  evolutionary  and 
revolutionary change. California Management Review 38(4) 
Tversky  A, Kahneman D. (1974).  Judgment  under  uncertainty:  Heuristics and  biases.  Science 
185:  1124-1131 
Utterback JM,  Acee  HJ.  (2005).  Disruptive  Technologies:  An  Expanded  View.  International 
Journal of  Innovation Management 9(1): 1-17 
Von-Hippel E.  (1988). The sources of  innovation. Oxford University Press 
Walker  G,  Weber  D.  (1984).  A  transaction  cost  approach  to  make-or-buy  decisions. 
Administrative Science Quarter/y 29(3): 373-391 
Walter GA, Barney m·. (1990).  Management  objectives  in  mergers and  acquisitions. Strategie 
Management Journal II: 79-86 
Weick KE. (1995). Sensemaking in organi?.ations . . Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks 
Wernerfelt B.  (1984). A resource-based view of the firm.  Strategie Management Journal 5:  171-
180 
Wikipedia. 201 O. Airbus, Wikipedia: http://en.  wikipedia.org/wiki/  Airbus 
Williamson OE. (1975). Markets and Hierarcies, analysis and antitrust applications: A study in 
the economies of  in te mal organizations. Pree Press:  New York 
Williamson OE. ( 1986). Transaction-cast economies: The governance of contractual relations. In 
JB Barney, WG Ouchi (Eds.), Organizational Economies:  98-129. Jossey Bass 
Williamson OE. (1999).  Strategy  research: Governance and competence perspectives. Strategie 
Management Journa/20: 1087-1108 324 PART V 
THEORY BUILDING 326 CHAPTERX 
UNRAVELING THE PROCESS OF CREATIVE CONSTRUCTION: 
THE SYNTHESIS AND CONSTRUCTION OF A THEORETICAL MODEL 
8 
The term  creative destruction  was  coined in  the  1950s  by  the 
Austrian  economist  Joseph  Schumpeter,  to  suggest  that  sorne 
established  companies  would  Jose  their  market  position  (and 
competitive advantage) due to  competition emerging from new 
technologies. Since then, the term and its concept have evolved 
and  sorne  scholars  have  suggested that  disruptive  technologies 
would substitute existing technologies, causing a disadvantage to 
incumbent firms  and providers. However, no  one has suggested 
how  this  happens? This theoretical research  paper explores the 
process  by  which  creative  construction,  as  suggested  by 
Schumpeter,  would have  an  impact on an  industry, and  how it 
would change the corporate strategy of the firms and the industry 
structure,  in  this  industry.  The paper  uses  grounded  theory  to 
construct and  propose a theoretical  mode!  and its  propositions, 
using insights from the high technology industry. 
10.1 Introduction 
The  information  technology  and  telecommunication  industries  are  different  than  any 
other industry. Firms established in this knowledge intense sector of the economy face turbulent 
environmental  challenges.  The  information  technology  and  telecommunications  products  are 
technically  complex  and  the  embedded  knowledge  is  tacit  in  nature,  non  codified  and  non 
transferable as a public good. The rates of innovation of new technologies and products are high 
and  the  industry  face  continuous  waves  of  new  technological  generations  and  disruptive 
8  This chapter  was  published  as  an  article,  with  the  title  "Unraveling  the  process  of creative 
destruction and its impact on corporate strategy and industry structure", in the proceedings of the 
administrative sciences association of Canada (AS AC) an nuai conference 20 10, strate  gy di vision. 
Regina,  Canada, May 2010. Vol.  31 , No 6.  The article received the best student paper award 
from the strategy division at ASAC 2010. 328 
technologies, which render the products obsolete, possibly even before being launch to the market 
and  received  by  the  end  user  customers.  In  fact  the  rate  of obsolescence  is  higher  the  time 
required to recover the skyrocketing investment needed in  research and development in order to 
produce new products and technologies that would be built on the core competencies of the firm 
and sustain competitive advantage. The complexity of the technology is coupled with a high leve! 
of uncertainty due to the Jack of dominant standards, the Jack of credible forecast for the potential 
new  product  and  the  Jack  of  specifie  requirements  from  the  customers.  Moreover,  the 
telecommunication  industry  has  witnessed  a  continuous  and  intense  wave  of innovation  and 
disruptive  technologies  (Christensen,  Anthony,  &  Roth,  2004;  Christensen  &  Raynor,  2003), 
which represents an  illustration of the pattern that affected many high  technology sectors from 
1997  to  2003.  Researching this  pattern,  gives an explanation to  the real  reasons  of why sorne 
companies survive, while others fail, in the face of such environmental challenges. (Sarkis, 2009) 
The telecommunications industry has been going since the  1990s through a quiet major 
shift. New technologies, products, services and innovations are continuously emerging, with their 
impact changing every aspect of our lives and the way business is  conducted. Sorne of them are 
well known to the end-user customers such as Wi-Fi, Wi-Max, Skype, Vonage and mobile video. 
Others are  not transparent to  the end-user customers and  are  Jess  known due to  their complex 
technical  nature,  such  as  voice  over  internet  protocol  (VoiP),  MPLS  (Multiprotocol  label 
switching),  optical  switching,  IPTV  (Internet  protocol  television),  broadband,  triple  and 
quadruple play. Sorne of them represent improvements to existing technologies and services, not 
radical change, and are categorized as sustaining innovations. Others represent a radical change 
with the potential of destroying value for existing technologies and services and creating value by 
introducing  new  technologies  and  services  (Christensen,  1997). These disruptive  technologies 
and innovations are substituting existing technologies and  services, posing a great challenge to 
locked-in incumbent service providers by eroding competency, market share and boundaries, and 
facilitating the entry of new and smaller dependence-free service providers, by reducing barriers, 
and  providing  more  competitive  advantage  based  on  new  services  and  business  models 
(Christensen, Anthony, &  Roth,  2004). This  major shift is  happening  at different  levels  and  is 
causing a major change in the industry structure of the telecommunications industry.  It is creating 
a  new  'digital  ecosystem'  in  which  data,  voice,  and  video,  wireline  and  wireless,  traditional 
telephony and TV broadcasting, are ail converging, in addition to the entry of new players such as 329 
the  application (i.e.  Google,  MSN, Facebook, Skype), content (i.e.  YouTube) and entertainment 
service providers (i.e. Fox, NBC, Turner). (Sarkis, 2009) 
The telecommunications  industry  major  shift  is  in  line  with  the  work of the  Austrian 
econornist  Joseph  Schumpeter,  who  in  1950  coined  the  term  "perennial  gale  of creative 
destruction"  where  he  described  how  companies  and  monopolies  are  challenged  by  the 
competition,  not  based  on  priee,  but  on  "competition  from  the  new  commodity,  the  new 
technology ... competition that strikes not at the margin of the  profit of the  existing firms but at 
the ir foundations and the ir very lives" (Schumpeter,  1950 p.  84).  This creative destruction and 
the emergence of the disruptive technologies do  not start in the service provider segment of the 
telecommunications  industry  or  by  just  being  introduced  to  the  end-user  customer.  It  is 
transferred to  the  service provider segment, as  new services and business  models,  through the 
buyer-supplier  relationship  that  exists  between  the  service  providers  and  the  equipment 
manufacturers  in  the  telecommunication industry.  Therefore,  this  convergence of services  and 
business  models,  are  the  end  products  delivered  to  the  service  providers  by  the  equipments 
manufacturers. (Sarkis, 2009) 
The term disruptive technology was first coined by Clayton Christensen in his book The 
lnnovator's Di/emma (Christensen,  1997) and then used in the subsequent books The lnnovator's 
Solution (Christensen &  Raynor, 2003) and Seeing  What's  Next (Christensen, Anthony, &  Roth, 
2004). The concept behind the new term  'disruptive technology'  and  more generally  'disruptive 
innovation'  cou1d  be  traced back to  the Austrian econornist Joseph Schumpeter who developed 
the theory of creative destruction in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, published in 
1950. In  his book,  Schumpeter wrote  "The opening up  of new markets and the  organizational 
development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as US Steel illustrate the process of 
industrial  mutation  that  incessantly  revolutionizes  the  economie  structure  from  within, 
incessantly destroying the old one,  incessantly creating a new one ...  [The process] must be seen 
in its role in the perennial gale of  creative destruction; it cannat be understood on the hypothesis 
that the re is a perenniallull." (Sarkis, 2009) 
It is important to. note that Schumpeter ( 1934) defined the deve1opment of new product or 
techno1ogy as new combination or innovation. He suggested that "new combinations do not arise 330 
out of  existing firms but in new firms that rise up along the existing ones" (Schumpeter, 1934: p. 
66). In explaining how these new combinations lead to the change of the competitive landscape or 
creative  destruction,  he  added:  " ... especially  in  the  competitive  economy,  in  which  new 
combinat  ions mean the competitive elimination of  the old,  it exp lains on the one hand the process 
by which individuals rise and fall economically and socially and which is peculiar to this form of 
organization." (Schumpeter, 1934: p. 67). 
However, only few  studies explained to  us  how  this  'new combination'  or innovation, 
when  it  takes  place,  would  eventually  replace the old  technology  and consequently provoke a 
creative destruction as suggested by Schumpeter. In fact, the later did suggest that such a creative 
destruction  would  take  place,  but  he  did  not  elaborate  on  the  process,  by  which  the  new 
technologies are created, and through which stages, they would replace the old ones. In fact, the 
termprocess was not part of Schumpeter's definition of creative destruction. As for Christensen's 
disruptive technologies,  his  research could be categorized  mainly  into  three contributions:  the 
description  of the  dilemma of existing  companies  facing  the  disruptive  technologies;  how  to 
predict  disruptive  technologies;  and  how  sorne  disruptive  technologies  would  threaten  sorne 
industries, the telecommunication industry included (by giving sorne examples of final  products 
such as  Voice over IP). But Christensen did not explain how these disruptive technologies would 
impact the telecommunication industry, and  to  what extent, to  what effect and  through  which 
process, stages or phases? In fact, our understanding of the concept of creative destruction and its 
relationship with the disruptive technologies remain unclear, vague, and ambiguous. At its best, it 
is a simplified construction of a more complex reality. This is partly due to the Jack of a process 
perspective to the study of the concept of creative destruction and  for  the  lack of a qualitative 
study (or a quantitative for that matter) that explores in depth the effect of creative destruction on 
an industry. So we believe that this area is under researched and there is a gap in the literature of 
business policy and strategy and technology and innovation management. 
Therefore, this theoretical research intends to  fill  this  gap, by  unraveling and exploring 
the creative destruction and its process in the high technology industry. In  doing so, the research 
will  explain  and  highlight the relationship  of the disruptive  technologies  and  innovations,  the 
intensive  acquisitions  activities  and  the  integration  of technologies  and  the  convergence  of 
services, with the process of creative destruction, in the context of the high technology industry, 331 
usmg  insights  from  the  telecommunications  industry  in  North  America,  and  specifically  the 
equipment  manufacturers  in  Silicon  Valley  and  the  service  providers  in  North  America. 
Furthermore, the impact of the process of creative destruction on the corporate strategy and on the 
industry structure of the telecommunications industry will be examined. 
The objectives of this theoretical research are to  (1) explore and understand the creative 
destruction  and  its  process  in  the  high  technology  industry;  (2)  explore  and  understand  the 
relationship of the  disruptive technologies  and  innovations, the  intensive acquisitions activities 
and the integration of technologies and the convergence of services, with the process of creative 
destruction; (3) to explore the impact of the process of creative destruction on corporate strategy 
and  the  industry  structure of the telecommunications  industry,  as  an  example; and  (4)  to  use 
testable propositions  and  the  guidelines  for  building  theory,  in introducing and  explaining the 
building blocks of the proposed model, the relationships between these building blocks and  the 
underlying logic that explairis the causal relationships. 
Following the introduction, the next section will provide for a theoretical background on 
the  telecommunications  industry;  the  disruptive  technologies  and  innovations;  the  intensive 
acquisition activities and the development of the Acquisition & Development business model; the 
entrepreneurial  activities  in  the  high  technology  industry;  and  the  convergence  of services. 
Following the theoretical background, the next two sections will  discuss  the methodology used 
for data collection and analysis, and  will introduce the proposed theoretical model for the process 
of creative destruction, followed by an explanation of the rational behind its building blocks and 
their relationships, using a list of cestable propositions for further empirical research. Finally, the 
discussion  section  will  provide  a  final  reflection  on  the  impact  of the  process  of creative 
destruction on the corporate strategy  and industry structure, and the contribution of this research. 
10.2 Theoretical Background 
The telecommunications  industry  is composed of two  major industry segments:  (1) the 
equipment manufacturers segment, where companies conduct research and development (R&D), 
design,  manufacture,  commission  telecommunications  equipments  and  distribute  them  to 332 
consumers, corporate customers (banks, hospitals, education institutions, etc.), government (civil 
and  defense),  utilities  and  service  providers  (telephony,  mobile,  cable  operators);  and  (2)  the 
service providers  segment,  where  companies  (public  and  private)  provide  telecommunications 
services,  such  as  residential  telephony,  mobile  communications,  satellite  services,  video 
conferencing,  cable  TV  programrning,  Internet  and  email  access,  to  consumers,  corporate 
customers and government. 
The  telecommunications  equipment  manufacturers  segment  is  subdivided  into  sub-
categories  such  as  transmission  equipment,  satellite,  microwave,  mobile,  internet,  cabling, 
submarine  cabling,  local  area  networks, wide  area networks,  wireless,  etc.  Until recent  years, 
each  of these  sub-categories  was  a  specifie  area  of expertise  and  companies  were  lirnited  to 
working  in  one  or  few  areas  of  those  sub-categories.  However,  due  to  the  intensive  and 
continuous  emergence  of  disruptive  technologies  and  innovations,  we  are  witnessing  the 
integration, merging, and convergence of these sub categories into fewer technical platforms and 
systems or into a single platform. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Moreover,  the  telecommunications  serv1ce  providers  segment,  until  recently,  was 
subdivided into sub-categories such as  residential telephony, mobile or cellular communication, 
cable  television,  and  Internet  access.  Recently,  and  due  to  the  emergence  of  disruptive 
technologies and innovations and to the integration and convergence of these technologies taking 
place in the telecommunications manufacturer segment, many of these sub-categories of services 
are merging and converging into bundled and packaged services and are being offered to the end 
user customer in a variety of modules, bundles and priees. As  an example, traditional incumbent 
residential telephony providers (i.e. Bell Canada) now offer mobile telephony and data (i.e.  Bell 
Mobility), variable speed dialup and ADSL internet and email access (i.e.  Sympatico) and cable 
television programrning through satellite transmission  services (i.e. ExpressView). On the other 
hand, traditional cable television service providers (i.e. Videotron) offer very high speed internet 
access through cable internet, residential and mobile telephony, besides television programming. 
(Sarkis, 2009) 333 
10.2.1 Disruptive Technologies and Innovations 
Christensen  et  al.  (2004)  describe  the  disruptive  innovation  theory  in  such  situations 
where "new organizations and market entrants can use relatively simple, law cast innovations ta 
create  growth  and  win  over  poweiful  incumbents  and  that  the  theory  holds  that  existing 
companies  have  a  high  probability  of beating  entrant  attackers  when  the  contest  is  about 
sustaining innovations,  but established companies almost always lose  ta attackers armed with 
disruptive  innovations."  (Introduction,  XV).  Christensen  et  al.  (2004)  identify  three  types  of 
innovations: "(1) Sustaining innovations, which move companies along established improvement 
characteristics, and  are  improvemerrts  to existing products on dimensions historically valued by 
customers. Disruptive innovations. introduce a new value proposition, and are either creating new 
markets or reshaping existing markets.  There are two types of disruptive innovations:  (2)  Low-
end disruptive innovations can occur when existing products are too good and hence overpriced 
relative to the value existing custo1ners can use; and (3)  New market disruptive innovations, can 
occur when characteristics of existing products limit the number of potential consumers or force 
consumption to take place in inconvenient, centralized settings." (Sarkis, 2009) 
The theory  is  related  to  the  Resource  Based  View,  as  it takes  into  consideration  the 
resources,  "which are assets the  company can build or destroy,  the  processes,  which  establish 
patterns of work  to  transform  inputs  into  outputs,  and values,  which  determine  the  criteria  by 
which the companies allocate the re sources. " Christensen states th at "incumbent firms fail in the 
face of  disruptive innovations because the ir values will not prioritize disruptive innovations, and 
the  firm 's  existing  processes  do  not  help  them  get  do ne  what  they  need ta  get do ne." The 
disruptive innovation theory is  also related to the value chain evolution theory as the companies 
have a choiçe:  "They can choose to integrale, executing most of  the activities themselves, or they 
can  choose  ta  specialize  and focus  on a  narrow  range  of activities,  relying  on  suppliers and 
partners ta provide other elements of  value added." Christensen et al. (2004) (Sarkis, 2009) 
In  general, the process of disruptive technologies and innovations can be associated with 
the  destruction  of value  and  the  creation  of value,  for  both  the  providers  and  the  end-user 
customers.  For example, the  destruction of value  could  be in  the  loss of previously estimated 334 
revenues  from  the  voice telephony  by  the  incumbent telephony  service provider, for  the  new 
cable operator providing the same service to end-user customer. This new cable telephony service 
offering represents a creation of value for the cable operator in  term of revenue streams, and for 
the  end-user,  who  is  offered  an  alternative  service  for  a  better  priee,  and  dirninishing  the 
monopoly  of  incumbent  operators.  Here  is  a  partial  list  of  disrupted  technologies  in  the 
telecommunications industry: 
l.  Telephony replacing telegraph 
2.  Packet switching networks replacing circuit switching networks 
3.  Virtual private networks replacing leased !ines 
4.  VoiP using Skype application replacing incumbent international calls service providers 
5.  WiMax Microwave technologies replacing incumbent service providers' infrastructure 
6.  Mobile telephony replacing paging services 
7.  Mobile telephony replacing tenestrial fixed line services 
8.  Routers replacing time and wave division multiplexing transmission 
9.  High bandwidth fiber optics replacing copper wire 
10.  DSL (Digital subscriber tine) high-speed Internet access replacing dialup modems 
10.2.2 The Ecology of Disruption 
One technology does not necessarily constitute a product in itself. It could be a computer 
algorithm,  a  network protocol,  an  encryption code,  a  specifie  technique,  a  process,  a  class  of 
fiber, a processing chip, etc. The product is created by  assembling and integrating this mosaic of 
technological ecology. Each of these technologies emerges in  the environmental ecology of the 
firm, in different temporal brackets, and not in a sequential pattern that would eventually lead to 
the creation of one stand atone product. In addition, these technologies are created and developed 
independently,  although  their  innovation  teams  collaborate  informally  through  persona! 
networking and  the participation in  technical forums, presentation  , and  tandards  bodies. The 
technologies  are  then  selected  through  the  natural  selection  process  by  the  ecology  of the 
ecosystem. 335 
10.2.3 Intensive Acquisition Activities 
The equipment manufacturing firms established in  this knowledge intense sector face  a 
variety of turbulent environmental challenges (Bahrami & Evans, 1989; Romanelli,  1989). Their 
products are technically complex (Bettis & Hitt,  1995; Jemison & Sitkin,  1986b),  in  which the 
embedded  knowledge is  tacit in  nature (Oliver,  1997),  non  codified  and  non  transferable as  a 
public good (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Peteraf,  1993). The complexity of the technology  is 
coup  led with a high leve! of uncertainty (Hoffman & Schaper-Rinkel, 2001; Quelin, 2000) due to 
the  lack of dominant  standards  or  standard  wars  (Besen  &  Farrell,  1994;  Shapiro  &  Varian, 
2003), the lack of credible forecast for the potential future new products and the lack of specifie 
requirements to res  pond to the customers' needs (Quelin, 2000; Roberts et al., 2001; Robertson & 
Gatignon,  1998;  Walker  &  Weber,  1984).  The  rate  of innovation  of new  technologies  and 
products is higher than any other ir1dustry  (Hitt, Hoskisson,  & Ireland,  1990; Hitt et al.,  199la; 
Hitt et al., 1996) and the industry faces  continuous waves of new techiwlogical generations and 
disruptive technologies (Christensen,  1997; Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003;  Utterback  &  Acee, 2005b),  which  render the  products  obsolete,  possibly  even 
before being launched to the market (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). The rate of obsolescence is such 
that products often become obsolete before their development costs can be recaptured (Roberts & 
Liu,  2001).  The  new  and  disruptive  technologies  emerge  either  inside  the  firm  or  in  the 
environmental  ecological  system,  following  a  pattern  of  an  epidemie  technology  diffusion, 
mutation and permutation of characteristics. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Therefore, it  is  difficult for  one company  to  rely  on  internai innovation  through  R&D 
capabilities and existing strategie assets atone. Besides,  the integration of technologies and  the 
convergence  of services  that  we  are  witnessing  in  the  service  providers  segment  are  not  the 
results of the system integration, conducted by the service providers, of separate and independent 
products that were transferred from  the equipment manufacturers. It is achieved by the equipment 
manufacturers,  through  a  deliberate  strategy  of  an  intensive  wave  of acquisitions  with  the 
objective of achieving platform leadership among competitors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). This 
imageneering of the future and the enactment of the industry structure and directions, leads to the 
strategically  reengineering of the core  competencies  of sorne  manufacturing firms,  to  create a 
dominant logic and a sustained competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). Thus is the link 336 
between  the  emergence  of the  disruptive  technologies  m  the  ecosystem,  to  the  acquisitions 
intensity in the manufacturers segment. (Sarkis, 2009) 
Consequently,  since  the  1990,  there  was  a  substantial  increase  in  mergers  and 
acquisitions  activities  in  the  high  technology  industry.  More  than  11,000  acquisitions  were 
completed in 1997 for a value estimated at over US$ 900 billion (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi,  1999a). 
This  intensity  of acquisition's  activities  Hitt  et  al.,  1990;  Hitt  et  al.,  199lb)  is  motivated  by 
different reasons. Beside traditional motivations of econornizing and  empire building, high-tech 
firms  used acquisitions  mainly  to  acquire external strategie  resources,  gain  access  to  valuable 
human  talents,  reduce  the  cost  and  risk  of R&D,  expand  their  portfolio  of products,  reduce 
product ti me to market and pro  vide for an external source of innovation. (Sarkis, 2009) 
The development of the Acquisition and  Development Mode!  (A&D). The strategy, 
termed  "acquisition  and  development"  or "A&D",  combines  acquisition  activities  for  external 
sources of innovation, while maintaining the internai innovative capacities Of the firm (Mayer & 
Kenney, 2004b).  It  starts  by  identifying the firm's  internai needs (resources)  and  assessing the 
potential  players  for  acquisitions  in  the  strategie  group  within  the  industry,  by  means  of 
continuous scanning of the competitive environment (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi,  1999a). Duting this 
scanning of the environment, informai relations (i.e. links)  are established with the objective of 
identifying and evaluating potential emergent new technologies and innovation, assessing human 
assets  (i.e.  resources) involved  in  those  activities  and  estimating the  real  economie  value  (i.e. 
cost) of these resources, in terms of technologies and human capital. (Sarkis, 2009) 
The  evolution  of acquisitions  in  Cisco  Systems.  The  networking  segment  of  the 
telecommunications  industry  was  created  by  the  fusion  of  information  technologies  and 
traditional telephony technologies, to  connect computers to each other using computer networks 
and protocols through public telephone networks. In  the networking segment, severa! firms have 
used acquisitions as their main strategy for growth. For example, Cisco Systems,  a Silicon Valley 
based company  working in  the manufacturing of networking and  telecommunications equipment 
and software, acquired more than 107 companies during the period from 1993 to 2006. In the year 
1999  alone  it  acquired  18  companies  and  in  the  year 2000 it  acquired 23  companies, with  an 
average of almost two acquisitions a month, or in other words, an acquisition every two weeks. It 337 
completed 12 acquisitions in 2004 and another 12 in 2005. Moreover, Norte! Networks completed 
21  acquisitions  in  the period between  1996 and 2006 and  Lucent Technologies completed 41 
acquisitions  during  the  same period.  Lucent was  later acquired  by  Alcatel in  December 2006. 
Today, Cisco Systems stands as  tbe  leader in  the telecommunications industry and as  the  firm 
who created this  trend of using a  successful aggressive acquisition strategy as  its  main growth 
engine (Sarkis, 2009). Figure 10.1  shows the evolution of Cisco's intensive acquisition strategy 
from 1993 to 2009 (Sarkis, 2011). 
10.2.4 Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital 
Venture capital is  an important aspect  of the  entrepreneurial activities  in  the  high technology 
industry. Beside identifying the opportunity and having the motivation to  take risk, in a highly 
uncertain and  turbulent environment, the non  endowed entrepreneur has to  secure the financial 
resources  necessary  to  pursue  his opportunity,  with  a  reasonable  amount of risk  and  interest. 
Venture capital  and  angels  investors  are  an  essential  and  critical  part of the  high  technology 
industry. They not only provide fimncial support, but most of the time, they additionally provide 
technical backing, managerial experience, access to social capital and even moral encouragement. 
The mode! of startups that are backed by venture capital is  widespread and dorninates the high 
technology industry, such as  the information technology and biotechnologies. The startups that 
are  backed by  venture capital  are widely perceived as  more  likely  to  adopt strategie planning 
rather  than  an  opportunistic  adaptation  behavior.  However,  in  the  high  technology  industry, 
specifically  the  information  technology,  networking  and  telecommunications  segments,  we 
believe to the contrary, that venture capital adapts well to entrepreneurs and new ventures using 
either mode: opportunistic adaptation or strategie planning. Their interaction with entrepreneurial 
activities and entrepreneurs and their relationship with intensive acquisitions and the development 
of the acquisition and development mode! will be discussed in the next section on theory building 
and propositions. Here are sorne of the roles played by different types of entrepreneurs: (Sarkis, 
20 11) 338 
Figure 10.1 
The time1ine ofCisco System's acquisitions from the year 1993 till2009 (Sarkis, 2011) 
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The inventor entrepreneur. The inventor entrepreneur is the one who has the brilliance 
of inventing  new  technologies,  deviees,  machines,  etc.  and  later  turns  them  into  a  profitable 
business idea,  business  plan, and a 11ew venture, creating a significant economie value. A good 
example would be Graham Bell, and Thomas Edison.  In  the high tech industry, the  re are sorne 
good examples of young entrepreneurs,  who started  their own startup  based on their invention 
and creation; and later inspiring other like-rninded people to jo  in them. (Sarkis, 2011) 
The bricoleur entreprene11r.  The 'bricolage'  is  a French  word, referring to  the act of 
using existing materials and  tools to  create new things.  The bricoleur entrepreneur is  a sort of 
handy-man, who creates a technology  or product idea out of a perceived opportunity and  using 
available ingredients. A good example is Steve Job of Apple. (Sarkis, 2011) 
The imitator entrepreneur.  The irnitator  entrepreneur is  the  one  who  starts  his  new 
business by copying or modifying someone else's idea. According to Bhide (2000),  most of the 
entrepreneurs are in this category, as  isomorphism being the explanation for this behavior. This 
category a  pp  lies also to the high techno1ogy  industry, as  lots of techno1ogists and  entrepreneurs 
embark  on  creating  new  ventures,  when  they  see  an  opportunity,  in  terms  of technology  or 
market, concretizes  with others. While the wide1y  held perception is  that ail  startups in  Silicon 
Valley and Route 128 are based mostly on new technologies and product ideas,  we believe that a 
fair amount of ideas are isomorphic. (Sarkis, 2011) 
The seriai entrepreneur. This type of entrepreneur is  the one who sees an opportunity 
and establishes,  maintains and develops a new business venture to  a certain point of stability and 
success in the organization life cycle and development stage, then moves on to  establish a new 
venture based on a new opportunity or an extended variation of the first opportunity. In doing so, 
this  seriai entrepreneur is going from one venture to  the  other,  by  hopping from  one  business 
stage  of venture  development  in  a  newly  created  venture,  be it  post  start  up,  transitional  or 
corporate phase,  to  another business  stage of a new or another venture,  such  as  a  new  startup 
creation,  or  at  the  managerial  and  leadership  stages  of an  existing  new  venture.  This  seriai 
entrepreneur could be motivated by  either his passion for  venture creation  with  its  embedded 
excitement,  risk  taking,  opportunity  development  and  gratifying  experience;  or  by  financial 340 
motivation, as he sees no interest in staying with his own created venture tilllater stages of its !ife 
cycle and development stages,  and  prefers  to  recover his  initial  investments multiplied by  the 
establish market value of his created venture, based on its product and market potential. In doing 
so, he might be lacking the necessary managerial skills to continue developing his  own created 
venture,  as  he  rnight  perceive himself as  not  fitting  with  a  new  stage  of development  of his 
created venture and its required hiring of external managerial experience. In Silicon Valley Mory 
Ejabat is a good example of the seriai entrepreneur. (Sarkis, 2011) 
The  corporate  entrepreneur.  The  entrepreneur  does  not  have  to  be  always  self 
employed.  The  corporate  entrepreneur,  is  the  one  who,  while  working  and  acting  as  a  high 
ranking corporate officer with his  current employer, he acts  and  performs tasks  that traditional 
self employed entrepreneurs do,  and in addition possesses ali  the characteristics and  skills of a 
regular entrepreneur, such as tolerance for ambiguity, alertness to  and the ability to perceive and 
identify opportunity, risk taking, passion for venture creation, high energy, leadership, and teams 
building, etc. Their executive functions could require them to be highly visible for networking, to 
invest in trials of new technologies, to  support new  ideas  and  prototypes as  angel investors,  to 
scan the environmental ecosystem of their firm for new opportunities and to  acquire or ally with 
potentially  successful  new  trends,  and  new  technology  providers,  etc.  One  good  example  1s 
Michel  angelo Vol pi, the chief strate  gy and acquisition officer at Cisco Systems. (Sarkis, 20 Il) 
The  acquisition-driven  entrepreneur.  This  is  the  entrepreneur,  be  it  corporate, 
incrementai,  seriai,  complementor  or  supplementor,  who  uses  acquisitions  as  a  strategy  for 
developing  new  businesses  and  for  existing  businesses.  Moreover,  the  acquisition  driven 
entrepreneur could acquire new and established businesses created by the pioneer, the bricoleur, 
the  inventor,  the  irnitator,  the  accidentai  and  the  plateau  entrepreneurs.  Acquisition-driven 
entrepreneurship  will  be discussed  in  more  details  in  the  next  section  and  as  part  of theory 
building. (Sarkis, 20 Il) 
10.2.5 Integration of technologies and services 
The acquired  technologies  are then integrated to  be part of the  product platform.  The 
main objective of the integration of technologies is  to  guarantee internetworking, which  means 341 
that ali the technologies, modules, deviees and products are capable of working properly together 
and are capable when connected to transport the communication content smoothly from its source 
to  destination, whether its voice, data or video, and over whatever acceptable length as prescribed 
by  the appropriate standards.  The objective of internetworking,  as  illustrated  in  figure  1  0.2,  is 
achieved through interoperability by means of compatible standards, interconnection by means of 
compatible interfaces, and compatibility by means of modularity. 
Figure 10.2 
Internetworking as a key objective for system design and integration 
The objectives and advantages of modularity span from the system design to  the system 
operation and finally to the business management, as illustrated in figure 10.3. In the design phase 
of the  system,  the design  is  in  most  cases, based on  open sources,  open system and  with  the 
respect  to  current interfaces  and  standards.  In  the  operation  phase,  the  system  design  should 
guarantee interoperability, scalability,  versatility, integration and multi-services. In  the business 
management phase, the system design should provide for cost reduction, better performance, and 
therefore competitive advantage, both technical and econornical.  The firm's adherence to  these 
criteria, coup  led  with  the intensive acquisition activites, ai ms  at  achieving the strategie goal of 
platform leadership. This translates into creating and sustaining a competitive advantage and a 
superior market positioning, through  the capability of offering to  the  service providers  a  wide 342 
variety  of  technologies,  servtces,  applications ·and  across  different  market  segments,  while 
guaranteeing intemetworking, cost reduction, better performance and user friendly management. 
This leads to a dominant market position and the ability to  influence and enact future standards 
and interfaces, and therefore reducing uncertainty. 
Figure 10.3 
Objectives and advantages of modularity 
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In  the  service  providers  segment  of  the  telecommunications  industry,  the  integrated 
technologies  provided  by  the  manufacturers,  give  rise  to  new  disruptive  innovations  and  the 
convergence  of  services  and  business  models.  This  ts  creating  a  new  landscape  for  the 
telecommunications industry and changing the rules of the game that were established decades 
ego, leading to a change in the industry structure of the telecommunications industry. The change 
in the industry structure refers to the change in the competitive dynarnics and  market forces,  the 343 
change of the firms'  competitive advantage, the changing and blurring of market boundaries, the 
erosion of market shares, the destruction of competencies, the lack and need for a new regulatory 
environment, the cannibalization of services and the  subsequent loss  of revenues  in  traditional 
markets (Evans & Schmalensee, Forthcorning; Parker & Alstyne, 2005; Porter,  1980a). 
For example,  the  ability  to have an overseas  voice conversation on the internet with  a 
reasonable  quality  of service  (QoS)  using  embedded  software  such  as  Microsoft  Messenger 
(MSN)  or unbundled  software sucb.  as  Skype,  is  sharply  reducing  the  traditional  international 
calls'  revenues for the telephony operators. New telecommunications alternative providers, such 
as  Vonage and others, offering service providers-like's quality of service with a fraction of the 
cost,  are  challenging the  traditional telephony  operators  locked-in  with  long  term  investments 
based on  old technologies and  infrastructure,  in  the  local and  international business  segments. 
Enterprise  voice  over  internet  protocol  equipments,  or  simply  VoiP,  sold  by  the  equipment 
manufacturers  directly  to  the  end-user  customers,  are  bypassing  the  telephony  operators  and 
sharply reducing their private autoinatic branch exchange traditional business. (Sarkis, 2009) 
On  a  larger  scale,  the  Wi-Max  Microwave  disruptive  technology  is  decreasing  the 
barriers for new investors to enter the service providers market and provides city-wide coverage 
of wireless-fixed broadband services, including data, voice, and video, with a fraction of the costs 
and a lower technical expertise. Traditional cable TV operators are offering residential telephony 
and  broadband Internet access,  competing directly with  traditional  telephony operators in  their 
core business.  Telephony  operators  would  be  able  to  offer TV  programming  services  using  a 
technology called IPTV (Internet Protocol Television), competing directly with cable operators in 
their core business. The last two examples are  based on  the  convergence new  business  madel 
called "triple-play".  Moreover,  the  convergence of fixed  and  wireless broadband,  adds  another 
emerging  business  model,  the  quadruple  play.  Finally,  the  entrance  of  new  nontraditional 
telecommunications players, such as  content and entertainment providers (i.e.  YouTube, Google, 
AOL, Microsoft, NBC, FOX, Turner and  Virgin),  gives  rise  to  new  business  models.  In  these 
innovative  business  models,  the  industry  change  refers  to  the  market  boundaries  and  the 
ownership  of the  network.  lt is already  contemplated  that  the  ownership  of the  network  and 
services could be transferred to the media giants who would provide the content in addition to the 
traditional  telecommunications  services,  white  the  network  infrastructure  and · service  would 344 
become just a conduit. Ali this is  happening white the regulatory environment is  lagging behind, 
with large variations and differences between countries  in  industrial markets,  OECD countries, 
emerging economies, highly and less competitive markets and geographie areas. (Sarkis, 2009) 
10.3 Theory Building and General Propositions (Hypotheses) 
Based on the theoretical background presented in the previous sections, this section deals 
with the construction of a theoretical mode! and suggests sorne propositions or rough hypotheses 
to  explain  the  underlying  logic.  First,  attempting  to  link  the  different  blocks,  previously 
described, in  a process perspective, figure  10.4 shows an  initial conceptual mode! of the process 
of creative destruction linking disruptive technologies, with acquisitions, technology integration, 
service  convergence  and  the  change  in  industry  structure,  in  the  context  of  the 
telecommunications industry. (Sarkis, 2009) 
During periods of incrementai and revolutionary change in the high technology industry, 
the emergence of new technologies and new innovations is facilitated  by  the entrepreneurs who 
carry out new combinations. Entrepreneurs, transform existing knowledge into innovation. They 
acquire  this  knowledge  through  the  ir  interactions,  collaboration,  interactive  learning,  and 
participation  as  members  of a  national  system of innovation,  which encompasses  universities, 
R&D  labs,  standard  bodies,  patent  offices,  and  government  agencies,  etc.  Based  on  this 
knowledge,  their cognition  is  enhanced  and  their  ability  to  identify  opportunity  is  improved. 
These  technologies  could  be  complementary,  supplementary  or  substitutive  technologies  to 
existing  ones.  Equally,  these  technologies  could  be  considered  sustaining  technologies,  as  to 
provide an improvement to existing technologies and product in term of quality and priee, or they 
could be potentially disruptive technologies,  offering a radical change from established products 
and services. These disruptive technologies could potentially pose a threat to incumbent firms, as 
they propose a change in  the competitive landscape and a menace to  their sustained competitive 
advantage.  Figure  1  0.5,  illustrates  a  section  of  the  proposed  theoretical  model  with  its 
relationship, while taking  into consideration that the final proposed  theoretical  mode! does  not 
include the entrepreneurship  and  venture capital aspects of the  process of creative construction 
for a simplification purpose. This is the reason they appear in dotted !ines. (Sarkis, 20 11) 345 
Figure 10.4 
Conceptual madel: A process perspective of the relationship between disruptive technologies, 
acquisitions, convergence and the industry structure (Sarkis, 2009) 
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Proposition  1:  New  technologies and innovations,  including sustaining  and disruptive 
technologies  are facilitated  by  entrepreneurs  who  seek  to  challenge  the  existing  competitive 
landscape andfind an opportunity through a technology breakthrough; 
From  the  other  hand,  existing  firms  and  incumbent  service  providers  in  the  high 
technology  industry  operate  in  an  environment  which  is  characterized  by  high  uncertainty, 
turbulence  and  high  velocity.  The rising  cost and  risk of internai  R&D  and  the  threat  of the 
environmentai and industriai shifts, coupied with the internai scarcity of strategie assets, the tacit 
and embedded  nature of knowiedge,  and  the  threat of substitutive technologies,  increment the 
difficulty  for  the  established firms  to  rely  soieiy  on  internai  sources  of innovation  to  sustain 
competitive advantage. 
Proposition  2:  The  emergence  of  new  technologies,  either  sustaining  or  disruptive, 
motivates the established firms to  acquire these new technologies, through acquisitions and the 
integration of  these technologies, as externat sources of  innovation; 
In sorne industries, such as the high technology industry, the rate of innovation is much 
higher and the frequency of emergence of new technology is  short-paced. This is  coupled with 
higher investment risks  in internai R&D,  higher rates of technology and product obsolescence, 
and shorter time to  market required for end-user products. Moreover, the emergence of the new 
technologies has an epidemie pattern of technology diffusion and the nature of the technologies is 
as such that they are part of a mosaic of technologies, which means that only one technology does 
not  constitute  a  product-transferable  opportunity.  Consequently,  and  facing  these  challenges, 
sorne firms  adopt a new  mode! of strategie choice, based on intensive acquisitions, as the  main 
strategy  for  growth  and  sustaining  competitive  advantage.  This  mode!  and  the  cumulative 
experience gained in implementation reinforce this strategy of acquisition for growth based on the 
Acquisition & Development model, and it becomes a dominant logic. 
Proposition 3:  Facing environmental challenges, establish firms embark on programs of 
intensive acquisitions,  and they develop and adopt a new  business madel called Acquisition  & 
Development (A &D), instead of R&D, as the main strategy for growth and ta  sustain competitive 347 
advantage. Experience gained in acquisitions helps in reinforcing the mode!, therefore creating a 
bidirectional relationship; 
The adoption of this model of acquisition called Acquisition & Development (A&D) by 
the  established firms, and consequently the rise of corporate acquisition programs, foment and 
foster  the  development of the  venture capital  market,  based  on the demand  and  supply  logic. 
More  acquisitions  require  more  venture  capital  firms,  more  experience,  and  more  financial 
resources. The intensity of the acquisition program in one firm creates the cumulative expertise in 
the  venture  capital  industry  and  more  importantly,  it  creates  a  dominant  logic  that  is  equally 
profitable to  venture capital firms, by which acquisitions become the  main strategy for growth 
and  encourages  the  replication  and  adoption  by  others.  This  dominant logic  and  its  dynamic, 
encourages other hesitant firms to adopt this new strategy of acquisition for growth, based on the 
Acquisition and Development model, and the positive returns. 
Proposition  4:  The  relationship  between  the  intensive  acquisition  programs  and  the 
development of  the Acquisition & Development madel from one side,  and the development of the 
venture capital market,  is a bidirectional relationship. More acquisitions foster the development 
of  the  venture capital market. More cumulative expertise in the venture capital market creates a 
dominant logic that encourages more acquisitions; 
Furthermore,  the  devei<Jpment  of  the  venture  capital  market  and  the  cumulative 
experience it creates, coupled with  the availability of more venture capital financial resources for 
entrepreneurial ventures, encourage more entrepreneurs and would-be-entrepreneurs, to stay alert 
to opportunity and to help in  using, sharing, producing and diffusing interactive learning, that is 
essential  to  new  combination  and  innovation,  within  the  context  of  a  national  system  of 
innovation,  in  which  venture capital  and entrepreneurs  are  participating  members.  Equally,  as 
venture capital development encourages more entrepreneurial activities, the increased number of 
entrepreneurs  encourages the  creation  and development of more venture capital firms  and put 
them in high demand. 
Proposition 5: The  relationship between the development of  the venture capital market or 
industry  and the increase  in  the  entrepreneurial activities  and the number of  entrepreneurs  is 348 
bidirectional.  The  more  venture  capital  is  developed,  the  more  entrepreneurial  activities  are 
encouraged.  The  more the  number of entrepreneurs is  increased,  the  more the  venture  capital 
firms and their activities are in high demand; 
Moreover,  the  development  of  the  venture  capital  industry,  as  it  encourages  the 
entrepreneurial activities; it induces, instigates and fosters the development of new technologies. 
While the venture capital firms  represent the incubating environment, the new technologies are 
the final  products  and  the  entrepreneurs  are  the  messengers.  It  is  important to  observe  in  the 
proposed theoretical  mode!,  that  new  technologies  are  encouraged,  motivated and  fostered  by 
both, the entrepreneurs and the venture capital firms. 
Proposition  6:  The  relationship  between  venture  capital  and the  development  of new 
technologies  is  unidirectional,  as  venture  capital  encourages  and fosters  the  emergence  and 
development  of new  technologies.  The  more  venture  capital  is  developed,  the  more  is  the 
emergence of new  technologies.  This  relationship  is  moderated by  the  entrepreneurial activity 
and the efficiency of  the national system of  innovation; 
The entrepreneurs and their entrepreneurial activities play a criticaLrole in the increased 
number of acquisitions, the intensity of acquisitions' activities and the development and adoption 
of the Acquisition & Development mode! (A&D). For example, the incrementai entrepreneur and 
the acquisition-driven entrepreneur, use acquisition for empire building, economies of scope and 
scale, and as  a strategy for shorter time to market, reduced R&D activities with the incorporated 
risk and mainly for rapid growth versus internai development based on learning-by-doing. On the 
other hand,  the  corporate entrepreneur encourages the  acquisitions  of new  startups  and  small 
ventures,  by  continuously scanning the firm's environmental ecosystem and  national system of 
innovation; by  looking  and  identifying  opportunities;  by  investing  in  venture  capital  firms  or 
acting as  an  angel investor;  by  backing up  new  technology initiatives, technology and  product 
trials  and  prototypes;  and  by  adopting  the  model  of Acquisition  &  Development  as  the  main 
strategy of growth for his established firm and as the mean to overcome and compensate for the 
Jack of interna! sources of innovation that are impossible to have them ali  in one company. He 
also could be interested in complementary, supplementary and substitutive technologies, the later 
being  a  mean  to  increase  the  entry  barrier for  competition  and  for  avoiding  disruption  and 349 
consequently the destruction of value for his  own firm.  Finally, and contrary to the widely held 
belief, new startups in  the high technology industry are not  moti vated only by the desire of the 
entrepreneur to  create new combinations, innovation, and new products and  services. They are 
also  motivated basically and instinctively by the opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur and 
his desire for profit and rent. This legitimate desire includes the potential that his newly created 
firm,  if successful and competitive, would be potentially acquired by a larger firm. This potential 
of being acquired by a larger firm could be deterministic in nature and intentional at the planning 
or developing phase of the new venture creation. If this is the case, the rational of the acquisition-
driven  entrepreneur  would  be  to  provide  for  complementary,  supplementary  or  substitutive 
technologies or products. In other words,  this  acquisition-driven entrepreneur would start a new 
venture creation with  the  objective  of,  or at !east to  hope for,  being potentially acquired by a 
larger firm,  with ali  the financial  and  reputational consequences that this position would entai!, 
which matches the legitimate oppottunistic behavior of the entrepreneur. 
Proposition  7:  Entrepreneurs  and  their  entrepreneurial  activities  encourage  and 
motivate the intensity of  acquisitions activities in the high technology industry and the adoption of 
the Acquisition & Development mode!,  whether it  is  through the  incrementa! entrepreneur,  the 
corporate entrepreneur,  the complementor and supplementor entrepreneurs and the acquisition-
driven entrepreneur. 
Following the acquisition decision and successful completion of the acquisition process, 
the acquired firms are integrated into the equipment manufacturing firms. The acquired disruptive 
technologies by  the equipment manufacturers in the manufacturing segment are then integrated 
into  the  existing  products  portfolio,  which  leads  to  the  creation  of new  products,  based  on 
technology  type,  application  category,  service  protocol,  modularity,  platform,  sizing,  service 
coverage, market segment, packaging and pricing. These new  products, with their acquired and 
integrated  technologies,  are  then  transferred  to  the  service  providers  in  the  service  providers 
segment through the buyer and seller relationship. These new products encourage and force the 
service  providers  to  rethink  their  service  plans  and  to  restructure  their  services  towards  the 
integration of services. 350 
Proposition 8:  The integration of  disruptive technologies by companies in the equipment 
manufacturers  segment  of the  telecommunications  industry,  coupled  by  the  emergence  of 
disruptive  innovations,  lead  companies  in  the  service  providers  segment  to  integrate  their 
services, based on integrated and converged technologies; 
Proposition  9:  The  integration  of  services  by  the  service  providers  in  the 
telecommunication  industry,  lead  to  the  convergence  of services,  hundling  and packaging  of 
services, and the emergence of  new business models; 
Proposition  JO:  The  convergence  of services  poses  a  threat  to  incumbent  service 
providers in  the telecommunications industry.  ft  has the potential to  reduce the effect of  historie 
monopoly,  to  reduce  the  barriers  to  new entry,  to  reduce  the  switching  cast,  to  change  and 
reshape the market boundaries,  to  give rise to  new business models and to  invite new entrants 
from outside the industry. 
Figure  10.6  illustrates  the  constructed  proposed  theoretical  mode!  of the  process  of 
creative destruction in the high technology industry and its impact on corporate strategy and the 
industry structure, specifically in the telecommunication sector. The model was modified from its 
initial state presented in chapter 3 (Sarkis, 2009). 
10.4 Discussion 
This  theoretical  paper suggests a process perspective for  understanding the concept of 
creative destruction (and construction) coined in the  1950s by Joseph Schumpeter. In doing so, it 
explains how new wave of technologies, sustaining and disruptive, would change the structure of 
both segments of the telecommunication industry, as  an example of a high technology industry. 
The  manufacturers  segment  would  be  forced  to  adopt  a  corporate  strategy  of  intensive 
acquisitions, as the main strategy for growth and for sustaining competitive advantage. This will 
eventually lead to the emergence of a new business model in this segment based on acquisitions: 
the  Acquisition  &  Development  mode!  (A&D).  In  the  service  providers  segment,  the  newly 
acquired  and  integrated  technologies,  transferred  through  the  buyer seller relationship,  would 351 
encourage and force  the service providers  to  adopt a strategy of integration of services, which 
would eventually lead to  the convergence of services, based on bundled and packaged services. 
For example, the convergence of basic  services such as  voice, data and video, would enable the 
traditional cable operators to  offer voice telephony (residential or mobile) and internet access, in 
addition  to  cable  services  and  TV  programming,  all  bundled  in  one  package  with  one  bill. 
Moreover, the traditional incumbent telephony service providers would be able to offer television 
programming through high  speed DSL Internet service, in  addition to the traditional telephony 
and Internet access. 
Figure 10.6 
The proposed theoretical madel for  the process of creative construction in the high-tech industry 
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This wave of creative destruction would have a major impact on the industry structure of 
the  telecommunication industry.  It  would  change  the  competitive  landscape  for  both  existing 352 
providers and new entrants. It  would reduce the barriers for new entrants and invite new players 
from  outside the  industry,  such  as  media providers  (i.e.  Warner,  Paramount, etc.)  and content 
providers  (i.e.  Google,  Yahoo,  and  MSN,  etc.).  This  would  have  an  impact  on  the  market 
boundaries  of both  the  firms  and  the  industry.  While  sorne  competencies  are  destroyed,  new 
competencies  are  created  and  new  economie  value  is  identified.  This  would  give  rise  to  new 
business models and the reshaping of an industry, such as the telecommunication industry, which 
witnessed a large period of stable growth and  incrementa! development. AU  this highlights and 
explains  the  process  of  creative  destruction,  its  components,  stages,  implications  and 
consequences.  The  model  could  be  generalized  to  other  industries,  specifically  in  the  high 
technology industries. 353 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The telecommunications industry  has been going since the  1990s through a quiet major 
shift. New technologies, products, services and innovations are continuously emerging, with their 
impact changing every aspect of our lives and the way business  is  conducted. Sorne of them are 
weil known to the end-user customers such as Wi-Fi, Wi-Max, Skype, Vonage and mobile video. 
Others are not transparent  to  the end-user customers and  are Jess  known due to  their technical 
nature, such as  voice over internet protocol (VoiP), MPLS, optical switching,  IPTV, broadband, 
triple and quadruple play.  Sorne of them represent  improvements  to  existing technologies and 
services, not radical change, and are categorized as  "sustaining innovations".  Others represent a 
radical change with the potential of destroying value for existing technologies  and services and 
creating  value  by  introducing  new  technologies  and  services  (Christensen,  1997).  Those 
"disruptive  technologies  and  innovations"  are  substituting  existing  technologies  and  services, 
posing a great challenge to locked-in incumbent service providers by eroding competency, market 
share  and  boundaries,  and  facilitating  the  entry  of new  and  smaller  dependence-free  service 
providers,  by  reducing  barriers,  and  providing  more  competitive  advantages  based  on  new 
services  and  business  models  (Christensen,  Anthony,  &  Roth,  2004).  This  major  shift  is 
happening  at  different  levels  and  causing  a  major  change  in  the  industry  structure  of the 
telecommunications industry.  It  is  creating a new "digital ecosystem" in  which data, voice, and 
video,  wireline and  wireless,  traditional  telephony and TV broadcasting,  are ali  converging,  in 
addition to  the entry of new  players  such as  the application,  content and entertainment service 
providers. 
The telecommunications  industry  major shift  is  in  line  with  the  work of the  Austrian 
econornist  Joseph  Schumpeter,  who  in  1950  coined  the  term  "perennial  gale  of creative 
destruction"  where  he  described  how  companies  and  monopolies  are  challenged  by  the 
competition,  not  based  on  pnce,  but  on  "competition  from  the  new  commodity,  the  new 358 
technology  ... competition that strikes not at the margin of the profit of the  existing firms but at 
the ir foundations and the ir very lives" (Schumpeter, 1950 p.  84  ).  This "creative destruction" and 
the emergence of the disruptive technologies do  not start in the service pro vider segment of the 
telecommunications  industry  or  by  just  being  introduced  to  the  end-user  customer.  It  is 
transferred to  the  service provider segment,  as  new services and business  models, through  the 
buyer-supplier  relationship  that  exists  between  the  service  providers  and  the  equipment 
manufacturers  in  the  telecommunication industry.  Therefore,  this  convergence of services  and 
business  models,  are  the  end  products  delivered  to  the  service  providers  by  the  equipments 
manufacturers. 
However,  the products  delivered by  the  equipment manufacturers  are the  result  of the 
system  integration,  and  assembly  of a  variety  of technologies,  which  are  then  produced  in 
modules or a single platform, theo packaged and bundled to offer a variety of options and priees. 
Those  technologies  are  either  the  product  of  internai  innovation  through  internai  R&D 
capabilities and strategie assets or externat innovation through strategie alliances, joint ventures, 
or acquisitions. Sorne of the technologies are the combination of lower leve! technologies, or the 
permutation of various technologies. Due to  the  high velocity and  intensive emergence of new 
and disruptive technologies in the manufacturers'  ecosystem, it is difficult for the manufacturers 
to  only  rely  on  internai  R&D  capabilities  and  strategie  assets  that  are  built  on  the  core 
competencies of the firm. 
Furthermore, the  equipment manufacturing firms  established in  this  knowledge intense 
sector face a variety of turbulent environmental challenges (Bahrami & Evans, 1989; Romanelli, 
1989). Their products are technically complex (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Jemison & Sitkin,  l986b), in 
which  the  embedded  knowledge  is  tacit  in  nature  (Oliver,  1997),  non  codified  and  non 
transferable as  a public good (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Peteraf,  1993). The complexity of 
the technology is  coup  led with  a high  level of uncertainty  (Hoff  man  &  Schaper-Rinkel, 200 l; 
Quelin, 2000) due to the  Jack of dominant standards or standard  wars  (Besen & Farrell,  1994; 
Shapiro & Varian, 2003), the Jack of credible forecast for the potential future new products and 
the Jack of specifie requirements to respond to the customers' needs (Quelin, 2000; Roberts et al., 
2001;  Robertson  &  Gatignon,  1998; Walker  &  Weber,  1984).  The rate  of innovation  of new 
technologies  and  products is higher than  any  other industry (Hitt,  Hoskisson,  & Ireland,  1990; 359 
Hi tt et al.,  1991 a;  Hi tt et al.,  1996) and the industry faces continuous waves of new technological 
generations and disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; 
Christensen  &  Raynor,  2003;  Utterback  &  Acee,  2005b),  which render the  products  obsolete, 
possibly  even  before  being  launched  to  the  market  (Mayer &  Kenney,  2004b).  The  rate  of 
obsolescence is  such that products often become obsolete before their development costs can be 
recaptured (Roberts & Liu, 200 1). The new and disruptive technologies emerge either inside the 
firm or in  the environmental ecological  system, following a  pattern of an epidemie technology 
diffusion,  mutation  and  permutati<Jn  of characteristics.  In  the  literature  we  could  not  find  any 
research linking these environmental challenges to the disruptive technologies, in a cause/effect 
relationship. 
Moreover, one technology does not necessarily constitute a product in itself. It could be a 
computer algorithm, a  network protocol,  an  encryption code, a specifie technique,  a process, a 
class of fiber,  a  processing chip, etc.  The product is  created by assembling and  integrating this 
mosaic  of technological  ecology.  Each  of these  technologies  emerges  in  the  environmental 
ecology of the  firm,  in  different temporal  brackets,  and  not in a sequential pattern that would 
eventually lead  to  the  creation of  one stand  alone product.  In  addition, these technologies  are 
created  and  developed  independently,  although  their  innovation  teams  collaborate  informally 
through  persona!  networking  and  the  participation  in  technical  forums,  presentations,  and 
standards bodies. 
Therefore,  it  is  difficult for  one company to  rely  on  internai innovation through R&D 
capabilities and existing strategie  assets  alone.  Besides, the integration of technologies and the 
convergence of services we are witnessing in the service providers segment are not the results of 
the system integration, conducted by  the service providers, of separate and independent products 
that  were  transferred  from  the  equipment  manufacturers.  It  is  achieved  by  the  equipment 
manufacturers,  through  a  deliberate  strategy  of an  intensive  wave  of acquisitions  with  the 
objective of achieving platform leadership among competitors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). This 
imageneering of the future and the enactment of the industry structure and directions, leads to the 
strategically  reengineering of the  core competencies of sorne  manufacturing  firms  to  create a 
dominant logic and a sustained competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). Thus, the link 360 
between the emergence of disruptive technologies in the ecosystem to the acquisitions intensity in 
the manufacturer segment, which is not documented in the literature. 
Since the  1990 there was  a substantial increase in  mergers and acquisitions activities in 
the high technology industry. More than Il  ,000 acquisitions were completed in  1997 for a value 
estimated at over US$ 900 billion (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi,  1999a). This intensity of acquisition' s 
ac ti viti es Hi  tt et al.,  1990; Ritt et al.,  1991 b)  is motivated by different reasons. Beside traditional 
motivations  of econornizing  and  empire building,  high-tech  firms  used  acquisitions  mainly  to 
acquire extemal strategie resources, gain access to  valuable human talents, reduce the cost and 
risk of R&D, expand their portfolio of products, reduce product time to market and provide for an 
external source of continuous innovation. 
The networking segment of the telecommunications industry was created by the fusion of 
information  technologies  and  traditional  telephony  technologies  to  connect computers to  each 
others  using  computer  networks  and  protocols  through  public  telephone  networks.  In  the 
networking segment,  se  veral  firms  have  used  acquisitions  as  their  main  growth  strate  gy.  For 
example,  Cisco  Systems,  a  Silicon  Valley  based  company  working  in  the  manufacturing  of 
networking and telecommunications equipment and software, acquired more than  107 companies 
during the period from 1993 to 2006. In the year 1999 alone it acquired 18 companies and in the 
year 2000 it acquireçl 23 companies, with an average of almost two acquisitions each month, or in 
other words, an acquisition every two weeks. It completed 12 acquisitions in 2004 and another 12 
in  2005. Moreover, Norte!  Networks completed 21  acquisitions in the period between  1996 and 
2006 and  Lucent Technologies completed 41  acquisitions during the same  period. Lucent was 
later acquired by  Alcatel  in  December 2006. Today, Cisco Systems  stands as  the  leader in  the 
telecommunications  industry  and  as  the company who  created this  trend of using a  successful 
aggressive acquisition strategy as its main growth engine. 
This  strate  gy,  termed  "acquisition  and  development" or "A&D", combines acquisition 
activities for external sources of innovation, while maintaining the internai innovative capacities 
of the finn (Mayer & Kenney, 2004b). It starts by identifying the firm's internai needs (resources) 
and assessing the potential players for acquisitions in the strategie group  within the industry, by 
means  of continuous  scanning of the competitive environment (Chaudhuri  & Tabrizi,  1999a). 361 
During  this  scannmg  of  the  envir011ment,  informa!  relations  (links)  are  established  with  the 
objective  of identifying  and  evaluating  potential  emergent  new  technologies  and  innovation, 
assessing human assets  (resources) involved in  those activities and estimating the real economie 
value (cost) of these resources, in tenns of technologies and human capital. 
When deciding on an acquisition, the firm would evaluate the potential target's existing 
portfolio of technologies. Those  potential  technologies could  be sustaining  or disruptive. They 
could  be  supplementary  or  complementary  technologies  and  products.  Supplementary 
technologies  are sirnilar in  nature to  the firm' s  existing products portfolio and  complementary 
technologies are different products that strategically fit with the firm' s existing products' map. In 
addition to supplementary and cornplementary products,  a firm could choose to acquire a target 
firm  because  of the  competitive threat  of substitute  products  or  disruptive  technologies.  By 
acquiring those  substitute  products,  the firm  would  reduce the competitive threat and  produce 
new  entry  barriers  to  other  firms developing similar technologies  and  products,  which  would 
ensure a better market positioning and a sustained competitive advantage. In  the post acquisition 
phase,  the  acquired  technologies and  products  are  system  integrated  into  the  existing  product 
portfolio to  create synergy.  The integrated technologies are redesigned  based  on  modularity or 
single platforms (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Mayer & Kenney, 2004b; Olleros, 2006), to provide 
bundles and solution packages with a variety of priees and options to meet the potential needs of 
future customers (Stremersch & Tellis, 2002). The  integration process is critical, as  it  provides 
the technical basis for the convergence of services, later used by the services providers, when the 
products  are  transferred  to  the  service  providers  through  the  buyer-seller  relationship.  For a 
successful  post  acquisition  integration  of  the  acquired  company  and  its  technologies,  the 
integration complexity, strategie fit, and  potential synergy, must al!  be anticipated and evaluated 
in the pre-acquisition phase and prior to the acquisition decision. 
In  most  of the  research  on  corporate  mergers  and  acquisitions,  they  are  viewed  as 
strategies for corporate control and empire building, and  they are dealt with using financial and 
economie  perspectives,  while  neglecting  their  social,  strategie  and  organizational  dimensions. 
The  motivations  of  acquisitions  in  the  high  tech  industries,  and  specifically  the 
telecommunications industry, are different than the motivations of acquisitions in other industries. 
Many of the high tech acquisitions in the  l990s appeared to  be motivated by the firms'  need to 362 
obtain critical technologies or capabilities, in  contrast to  acquisitions in  other industries, which 
are  mo ti vated  by  economies  of scale,  gains  in  market  share,  geographical  expansion,  empire 
building or CEO hubris.  Despite  the  importance  of the  intensive acquisition  trend  within  the 
context  of the  telecommunications  industry,  the  research  on  acquisitions  in  the  literature  of 
strategie  management  could  be  categorized  as  contradictory,  incoherent  and  incomplete.  It is 
contradictory  because  the  findings  present  contradictory  performance  outcome  related  to 
acquisitions, even in the same industry sector.  It  is  incoherent, because most of the researches 
focus  on  the economie  aspect of acquisitions  including  performance,  economies of scope and 
scale, market penetration, growth, position, net gain, etc., white the others focus on the strategie 
aspect of acquisition including human talent, tacit knowledge,  strategie resources,  strategie fit, 
organizational culture and core competencies. Each approach neglects the other, which leads to 
an  incoherent picture of the factors  involved. Each approach gives a perspective to  the study of 
acquisitions, however the whole picture remain fragmented and unclear. Third, it  is  incomplete 
because the literature has not shed enough light on the factors, criteria, conditions, motivations, 
causes  and  consequences  related  to  the  acquisition  formation  in  high  velocity  and  turbulent 
environments.  Wh  en  companies  su ch  as  Ci seo  Systems  and  others  pm1icipate  in  intensive 
acquisition activities during a small period of time, the critical success factors and the process of 
decision making for the acquisition formation has not been fully researched, under those extreme 
and intense environmental conditions. 
In  the  serv1ce  providers  segment  of  the  telecommunications  industry,  the  integrated 
technologies  provided  by  the  manufacturers,  give  rise  to  new  disruptive  innovations  and  the 
convergen~e  of  services  and  business  models.  This  is  creating  a  new  landscape  for  the 
telecommunications industry and changing the rules of the game  that were established decades 
ego, leading to a change in the industry structure of the telecommunications industry. The change 
in the industry structure refers to the change in  the competitive dynamics and  market forces, the 
change of the firms'  competitive advantage, the changing and blurring of market, the erosion of 
market share, the destruction of competency, the lack and need for a new regulatory environment, 
the cannibalization of services and the subsequent loss of revenues in traditional markets (Evans 
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For example, the  ability to  have an overseas  voice conversation on the  internet with a 
reasonable quality of service (QoS) using embedded software such as  Microsoft Messenger or 
unbundled  software  such  as  Skype,  is  sharply  reducing  the  traditional  international  calls' 
revenues  for  the  telephony  operators.  New  telecommunications  alternative  providers,  such  as 
Vonage and others, offering service providers-like's quality of service with a fraction of the cost, 
are challenging the traditional telephony operators locked-in with long tenn investment based on 
old technologies and infrastructure, in the local and  international business  segments.  Enterprise 
voice over internet protocol equipments, or simply VoiP, sold  by the equipment manufacturers 
directly  to  the end-user customers, are bypassing the  telephone operators  and  sharply  reducing 
their PABX (private automatic branch exchange) traditional business. 
On a larger scale,  the Wt-Max  disruptive technology is decreasing  the barriers for  new 
investors to enter the service provider market and  provide city-wide coverage of wireless-fixed 
broadband  services,  including  data,  voice,  and  video,  with  a  fraction  of the  cost  and  lower 
technical  expertise.  Traditional  cable  TV  operators  are  offering  residential  telephony  and 
broadband Internet access, competing directly  with traditional telephony operators in their core 
business.  Telephony  operators  1vould  be  able  to  offer  TV  programrning  services  using  a 
technology called IPTV, competirrg directly with cable operators in their core business. The last 
two  examples  are  based  on  the  convergence  new  business  mode!  called  "triple-play".  The 
convergence  of  fixed  and  wireless  broadband,  adds  another  emerging  business  mode!,  the 
quadruple play.  Finally, the entrance of new nontraditional telecommunications players, such as 
content  and  entertainment  providers  such  as  YouTube,  Google,  AOL,  Microsoft,  NBC  and 
Virgin,  gives  rise  to  a  new  business  mode!.  In  this  mode!,  the  industry  change  concerns  the 
market  boundaries  and  the  O\Nnership  of  the  network.  lt  is  already  contemplated  that  the 
ownership  of the  network  and services  could  be  transferred  to  the  media  giants  who  would · 
provide the content in addition to the traditional telecommunications services, while the network 
would become just a conduit. AJI  this is  happening while the regulatory environment is lagging 
behind, with  large variations and  differences between countries in  industrial markets, emerging 
economies, highly and less competitive markets and geographie areas. 364 
11.1 Methodological Overview 
Using a naturalistic qualitative method of inquiry allowed the  research to  be conducted 
with  the  main  objective of in-depth  understanding  the  phenomena  under  study,  in  a  holistic 
fashion and without neglecting the details, the context, and the intricacies of the interrelationships 
that  exist between  the  various  actors  that  constitute  the· ecosystem.  Re  garding  the  scope  and 
breadth  of the  inquiry,  the  research  covered both  the  manufacturing segment  and  the  service 
provider segment of the telecommunications industry, in order to understand in-depth the impact 
of the disruptive technologies and innovations on the telecommunications industry.  Sacrificing 
one segment would  have  lirnited  the ability  to  deeply  understand  the  phenomenon and  would 
have rendered the findings incomplete. 
This  naturalistic  qualitative  inquiry  is  based  on  the  constructivist  paradigm  and  the 
inductive approach. It started by an exploratory study of the telecommunications industry, using 
the analytic induction  method of research. The findings  were translated into  'rough and general 
approximation hypotheses' that were  used  as  a  walking stick in  the start of the fieldwork,  and 
were revised after the fieldwork was completed. The exploratory study helped in identifying four 
non-exclusive levels and units of analysis (Creswell, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Golden-Biddle, K., 
&  Locke,  1997; Langley,  1999; Yin,  1989):  ( 1)  the telecommunications industry  with a special 
focus on the networking segment for the equipment manufacturers (industry/holistic); (2) the time 
period  between  1993  and  2009  (time  periodlholistic);  (3)  disruptive  technologies 
(event/individual); (4) acquisitions (event/individual). Moreover, the exploratory study ended by 
the construction and the proposition of an  initial conceptual mode!, with a variation, allowing for 
flexibility, variation, emergence, open rnindedness,  ambiguity and creativity, and it was revised 
after the  fieldwork  was  completed.  A  review  of the  academie  literature  and  a  comprehensive 
strategie framework for the research design and implementation were completed before the start 
of the fieldwork. However, the review of the literature continued in iteration with the next phase 
of field work and the fiQal phase of the validation of the results and theorization. 
The main  qualitative  method  of inquiry  grounded theory  was  used  at  the  start  of the 
fieldwork for data collection, through  the data analysis/interpretation phase,  the theorizing and 
final reporting on the research major findings.  During the fieldwork, primary sources of data were 365 
open-ended  and  interviews-like  conversations,  m  addition  to  field  notes  and  observations. 
Cognitive  and  causal  mapping  were  used  as  an  interviewing  tool  in  order  to  limit  cognitive 
simplification, bounded rationality,  uncertainty and  ambiguity.  Secondary sources of data were 
formai  company  documents  and  presentations,  reports  (plans,  financial  statements,  sales 
forecasts,  and  market research),  brochures,  product prototypes, sales  materials,  and documents 
from  industrial  organizations,  professional  groups,  standard  bodies,  workers'  unions  and 
collaborative networks in fhe telecommunications industry. 
During the fieldwork,  the data collection process  was  organized  using  a multiple case 
study  approach  with  embedded  units  of  analysis,  to  facilitate  the  collection,  organization, 
categorization and  analysis  of the  massive  data.  In qualitative inquiries,  there are no  rules  on 
sampling size, rather purposeful sampling and reaching redundancy and saturation. Therefore, the 
sampling  size  was  inttially  defined  by  three  case  studies  in  each  segment  of  the 
telecommunications  industry;  however more  cases  were  added  for  triangulation.  White giving 
high importance to context sensitivity, multiple non-exclusive sampling strategies were used to 
identify and target information-rich cases for the case studies in both segments. In the reporting 
phase, the mini-case approache was used to document the specifie case studies' findings. 
11.2 Contribution of the Research 
The  disruptive  technologies  and  innovations  and  their  impact  on  the  change  of the 
industry structure of the telecommunication industry, were not fully researched in the literature of 
strategie  management  and  technology  and  innovation  management.  Therefore,  this  research 
suggests  an  association  between  the  emergence  of disruptive  technologies  and  a  subsequent 
change in the industry structure of both segments of the industry. The research fills the gaps in the 
literature by: 
Exploring  and  understanding  the  impact  of  the  disruptive  technologies  on  the 
telecommunications  industry,  and  tracking  them  from  their  origins  in  the  equipment 
manufacturers' ecosystem; 366 
Exploring and understanding the forces and dynarnics of the intensive acquisition activities in 
the manufacturer segement of the telecommunications industry; 
Exploring  and  understanding  the  role  of entrepreneurship  as  a  moderating  factor  in  the 
intensive acquisition activities, in the emergence of the acquisition and development mode! 
and in the rise of venture capital; 
Exploring  the  ecosystem  of  the  telecommunications  industry  as  a  national  system  of 
innovation,  where  ali  the  entities  and  institutions  are  interlinked  for  collaboration  and 
knowledge transfer; 
Understanding  how  the  acquired  technologies,  are  integrated  and  bundled  on  modular  or 
single platforms by the equipment manufacturers and theo transferred to the service providers 
through the buyer-seller relationship; 
Exploring  and  understanding  the  essence  of  platform  leadership  in  the  equipment 
manufacturer segment which  leads to  the convergence of services in  the service  providers 
segment; 
Understanding the challenges facing  incumbent service providers due  to  the emergence of 
new players, disruptive innovations and new business models; 
Understanding the change in the industry structure of the telecommunications industry. 
The  research  question  is:  What  is  the  impact  of  the  disruptive  technologies  and 
innovations  on  the  telecommunications  industry  and  how  this  impact  is  manifested  in  the 
manufacturers'  segment and the service providers' segment and on the industry structure of the 
telecommunications  industry.  The  research  explored  this  relationship,  by  firstly  linking  the 
intensity  of the  disruptive  technologies  and  innovations in this  industry to  the intensity  of the 
mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  equipment  manufacturer  segment,  and  theo  by  linking  the 
integration  of technologies,  to  convergence of service  in  the  service  provider segment of the 
telecommunications  industry.  The  research  identified  and  explained  various  disruptive 
technologies  in  the  telecommunications  industry  and  their  impacts  on  both  segments  of the 
telecommunications industry by clearly defining the difference between sustaining and disruptive 
technologies and innovations using examples of past and current technologies. It  described the 
environmental  context  and  the  challenges  facing  the  firms  operating  in  each  segment  of the 
telecommunications  industry.  It  explained how  the disruptive technologies  led  to  the  intensive 
acquisition activities in the manufacturer segment and to  the development of the acquisition and 367 
development  business  mode!  by  sorne  firms.  Moreover,  it  explained  how  the  disruptive 
technologies  led  to  the  integration and  convergence of services  and  the  development of new 
business  models  in  the  service  pr<Jvider  segment.  Furthermore,  it  highlighted  the  impact  the 
disruptive technologies and innovations have on the structure of the telecommunications industry. 
By  answenng  the  what  and  how,  the  research  unraveled  the  process  of  creative 
construction  (or  destruction)  in  the  telecommunications  industry  and  more  specifically,  the 
process  through  which  sorne  firms  create  value  and  sustain  competitive  advantage,  while  the 
other  firms  destroy  value  and  !ose  their  long  established  competitive  positioning.  This  is  an 
important  contribution  in  understanding  the  notion  or  concept  of creative  destruction.  The 
research  suggests  that  the  process  is  temporally  long  and  it  consists  of  various  phases  as 
illustrated in the theoretical model. The process is the result of the interaction of different entities 
and institutions,  and therefore this interaction consistitutes the links of these entities which form 
the national system of innovation in this industry. Moreover, the process of creative construction 
happens on  different levels: the illdividuals  (entrepreneurs),  the firms, the industry, and on  the 
national  leve!  as  weil.  Underscanding  the  forces  and  dynarnics  of  the  process  of  creative 
construction  and  destruction,  helps  in  understanding  how  to  create  and  sustain  competitive 
advantage in  the face of turbulence,  uncertainty and in a high  velocity environment such as the 
telecommunications industry. 
In  deterrnining  how  solid,  coherent  and  consistent  is  the  evidence  in  support  of the 
findings, triangulation of methods,  sources,  and theories were used, and suggested very positive 
results. Moreover, the findings increase and deepen our understanding of key areas of research in 
the three disciplines of business policy and  strategy, technology and innovation management and 
entrepreneurship. These key  areas  of reseach  are mergers and  acquisitions,  strategie  alliances, 
disruptive  technology,  strategy formulation,  technology  entrepreneurship,  platform  leadership, 
convergence,  new  business  models,  competitive  advantage,  national  system  of  innovation, 
industry structure, high technology industries and  the process of creative destruction. While the 
findings  in  these  research  areas  are  of a  contribution  to  the  body  of  knowledge,  they  are 
consistent  and  complementory  with  the  existing  knowledge.  Furthemore,  the research  and  its 
findings  provide  to  sorne. extent  a  holistic  and  integrative  approach  to  sorne  of the existing 
knowledge, and increase our sense-making of the phenomena in a specifie industry under extreme 368 
environmental challenges,  such as the telecommunications industry. In addition, the research and 
the findings provide useful insight on the telecommunications industry, with implactions for both 
scholars and practitioners. 
11.2.1 Methodological Contributions 
This research presents a novel  application of the grounded theory method of inquiry, in 
the spirit of methodological appropriateness rather than methodological purity. While respecting 
the  strict  guidelines  of  the  grounded  theory  prescriptions,  it  combined  and  integrated  the 
grounded theory  as  the  main  research  tool,  with  the  methods of analytical  induction and case 
study research, all  towards the  process of building and construction a theoretical model.  In  my 
opinion, this did not affect the integrity of any of the three methods, but rather, it added a more 
powerful  and  extended  research  tool.  For example,  while  the  traditional  prescription  for  the 
application  of  the  grounded  theory  method  calls  for  the  start  of  the  field  work  without 
preconceived ideas or k.nowledge about the research in the field, whether practical or theoretical, 
the analytical induction method was used at the exploratory stage of the research prior to the field 
work,  to  provide  a  walking  stick  and  initial  insights  before  starting  the field  work  using  the 
grounded theory method. This insight was paramount in  structuring the researcher thoughts, and 
provided a leve! of comfort in going into the unk.nown terrain of the fieldwork with its expected 
massive amount of information to be collected. 
Furthermore,  the  use  of the  case  study  method  and  its  integration  into  the  grounded 
theory method provided a more structured process in collecting and analyzing the data from the 
field work. While the case study method was used as a process to collect data, it was not used to 
report the collected data into the traditional form of case studies. 
Moreover, in the final validation stage of the grounded theory method, the validation was 
based on the  theoretical  sensitivity  in  one  hand  and  in  a  larger  part  on the publication of the 
different chapters of the dissertation, as  presented in the form of articles. The effort in publishing 
these papers or  dissertation  chapters yielded a lot of valuable feedback from peer reviewers at 
various  academie  journals,  consortia,  serninars,  academie  and  professional  conference 
proceedings  and  presentations.  Undoubtedly,  ali  this  feedback  from  various  sources  and  at 369 
different stages of the dissertation research, helped to provide additional insight and to enhance to 
a great extent the quality of th.e research and its product, the dissertation. 
Finally, the application of the process methodology in the field of strategy is  not widely 
used.  In  this  dissertation,  the  use  of the  process  methodology  in  the  attempt  to  explore  and 
understand  the  research  question,  provided  a  temporal  dimension  to  the  findings  and  in  the 
construction of the theoretical  model as  the research findings. It provided a better understanding 
of the how question in the context of this research. 
11.2.2 Theoretical Contributions 
As  Schumpeter described  it,  the  creative destruction  is  when  established firms  fail  to 
sustain competitive advantage and their market positioning due to the arrivai of new technologies, 
or in  other words  disruptive  technologies.  Clearly, in  his  definition of creative destruction,  he 
predicted that established firms lose their advantage to  new entrants due to  the emergence of the 
new technologies; however, he did not define the process through which this creative destruction 
takes  place.  From  this  definition,  obviously,  the  Joss  of sustained  competitive  advantage  by 
established firms  is  simultaneous  to  the gaining of market power by  newly  established firms, 
based on new technology. 
Therefore, this dissertation contributes to the literature by enhancing our understanding of 
how  these  newly  established  firms  succeed  in  starting,  growing,  gaining  market  power  and 
sustaining competitive advantage. Alternatively, using the term Creative Construction gives us an 
insight into the process by which these new firms overcome entrant barriers and establish a strong 
and  competitive  market  positioning,  while  stripping  the  incumbent  firms  from  their  long 
established positions.  By understanding the Process of Creative Construction and  the corporate 
strategies used by these new firms, we provide a prescription to incumbent firms on how to avoid 
strategie myopia and how  to enact the future to their advantage. 
Finally,  this  dissertation  contributes  to  the  literature  on  acquisitions,  alliances  and 
collaboration  in  the  high  technology  industries.  Also,  a  minor contribution  was  made  on  the 
concept of the convergence of technologies, applications, products and services. 370 
11.2.3 Managerial Contributions 
By  presenting a  prescription of the  Process of Creative  Construction,  this  dissertation 
provides lots of insight into the revolutionary change that took place in  the telecommunications 
and information technology industries over the last twenty years. It explains the nature, dangers 
and  potentials  of  the  disruptive  technologies  and  innovations.  It  invites  managers  at  the 
marketing,  planning  and  research  and  development,  to  look  for  these  technologies  and 
innovations in their immediate environment, by continuously scanning their adjacent environment 
and beyond. Having the ability to adapt to new emerging technologies, would reduce the risk of 
stagnation and losing competitive advantage to  newly established firms  and emerging startups. 
Avoiding strategie myopia and preparing new executive plans to enact the future of their industry 
would help guarantying potential growth. 
For merger and acquisition managers, this dissertation presents an  internai look into the 
complex  process  of  intensive  acquisitions  in  a  high  velocity,  uncertainty  and  a  turbulent 
environment,  such  as  the  high  technology  industries.  It  provides  insight  into  the  causes, 
consequences and critical success factors of the acquisition and alliance formations. It provides a 
prescription  for  the  collaboration  and  integration  of multi  task  teams  in  the  pre-acquisition, 
acquisition decision and post-acquisition stages. As  seen in  this  research, complex acquisitions 
would  require  the  collaboration  of  teams  integrating  the  marketing,  product  development, 
strategie  planning,  finance,  and  research  and  development departments.  Complex  acquisitions 
involve different factors and dimensions that were described in the dissertation. 
For entrepreneurs, this dissertation enhances our understanding of their potential role in 
starting, growing and sustaining technology firms in the face of incumbent firms. It explains how 
entrepreneurs are instrumental in the ecology of new technology and how they could maximize 
their return on investments by  allying  with established  firms  and inviting acquisitions through 
complementary, supplementary, or substitutive technologies, products, and services. 
For technology and research and development managers, this dissertation gives an insight 
into the complexity of integrating newly acquired acquisitions, and the creation of new products 371 
and  services into the firm product roadmap and portfolio. It enhances our understanding of the 
interplay between two different business  models that yield to sustaining competitive advantage: 
The traditional research and development madel and the innovative acquisition and development 
madel. Combining both business models requires due diligence and managing the complexity in 
the  post  integration  phase,  while  continuously  recruiting  and  retaining  talent  and  technical 
expertise, to support this challenging venture. It also explains how the integration of technologies 
and  services,  and  the  convergence of technologies,  applications,  products,  and  services  could 
have a great potential in changing the industry structure and the competitive landscape. 
For policy makers  and government agencies,  this  dissertation gives an insight into  the 
efficiency  of the  national  or clustural  systems of innovation.  It  explains  how  the  technology 
innovation  took  place  in  the  telecommunications  and  information  industries  through  the 
strengthening of the  links  between the  university,  the  entrepreneur,  the  venture  capitalist,  the 
private firms, the regulatory bodies,  and specifie project task forces. It prescribes a structure for 
comparing  national  systems  of Îllnovation  and  a  topology  as  an  objective  to  be  reached  for 
strengthening the links between tbe institutions on the national or the regionallevels. 
11.3 Generalization and Transferability of the Research 
As this research provides a useful insight on the telecommunications industry, this insight 
could be transferred and generalized to other high technology industries such as bio technologies, 
aeronautic technologies and nano technologies, for example. The key elements of this research's 
theoretical  madel could be fou11d,  with  variations, in  these  industries.  For example, disruptive 
technology, creative destruction, acquisition, alliance, integration and convergence, are present in 
all  of these industries  with  different  degrees.  Moreover,  while  the context and  the  process of 
creative destruction is  these industries  are different than the process in the telecommunications 
industries,  it  is  still  present.  For  example,  as  illustrated  in  figure  11.1,  the  convergence  of 
different industries, technologies and sciences, gi ve ri se to the emergence of new industries and 
technologies. The convergence of biotechnologies and information technologies give rise to the 
genornics,  bioinformatics,  and  proteomics.  The  convergence  of  nana  technologies  and 
information technologies,  give  rise to  the  nano deviees, nana sensors and nano electronics. The 372 
convergence  of  biotechnologies  and  nano  technologies,  give  nse  to  the  bioelectronics, 
. microfluidics, and nano biotechnologies (Zahra, Bhawe, & Gupta, 2009). 
Biotechnology: In the biotechnology industries, we witness creative destruction and disruption in 
the pharmatheutical industry, in  addition to  a series of strategie  alliances. Therefore, instead of 
acquisition programs  as  in  the  telecommunications  industry,  we  find  alliance portfolios  in  the 
biotechnology industries. 
Aeronautics: In  the aeronautic industry, we witness creative destruction and disruption as  weil. 
This  is  present  in  the  different  segments  of  the  industry  from  avionics,  and  fuselage,  to 
instrumentation  and  composite  materials.  In  this  industry,  we  witness  a  hybrid  of alliances, 
acquisitions and joint ventures as weil. 
Figure 11.1 
The convergence of industries and the emergence of new industries 
(Zahra, Bhawe, & Gupta, 2009) 
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Nanotechnology: In the nano technology field,  we a combination and convergence of different 
sciences,  technologies, tools,  techniques, and processes and the result is  the  emergence of new 
nana applications  and  sciences.  This is  done through  multiple  modes  of cooperation  including 
alliance, acquisition, technical collaboration, joint venture, joint field and !ab research, etc. 
Therefore, a conceptual model could be generalized for other high technology industries 
such as the biotechnology, aeronautics and nano technologies, as illustrated in figure 11.2. 
Figure 11.2 
Generalized mode! of creative destruction or construction 
11.4 Limitations of the Research 
As  any  research,  this  dissertation  has  severa!  limitations.  The  first  limitation  is  the 
methodological complexity in dealing with the announced research question. The scope and the 
depth of the research question required the use of mixed methodology by the integration of three 
methods:  Grounded theory,  analytic  induction and case study  research. This was  designed and 
applied in the spirit of the methodological appropriateness rather than the methodological purity. 
While  this  novelty  is  considered  a  methodological  contribution,  it  required  a  good  level  of 374 
knowledge of the three, more time for applying the different stages of the research, the openness 
and flexibility in applying the methods while respecting the strict guidelines of each. 
The second limitation is the potential researcher bias, also known as reactivity. Although 
1 have a professional experience in the context and the specifie industry covered in the research, 1 
tried to lirnit the persona!  bias by staying objective, using different triangulation methods for the 
data sources, methodology, and validation and by seeking external validation through the process 
of publishing my  research  findings  through  the different stages  of the  research  and  analyzing 
carefully and objectively the feedback received from peer reviewer evaluations. However, on a 
positive note, my experience with the research question provided me with a walking stick into the 
field  work,  a comfort level in conducting the research and in  addition, it provided me  with the 
initial hunches and assumptions during the exploratory stage of the  research,  prior to  the field 
work.  As  Maxwell  (1996  p.  92)  stated,  it  is  impossible  to  elirninate  reactivity  in  qualitative 
research,  but rather it  is expected to  identify. its  potential  influence and  interaction  and  try  to 
control  it:  "The  influence  of the  researcher on  the  setting  or individuals  studied,  a  problem 
generally know as  reactivity,  is  a ...  problem that is often raised about qualitative studies.  The 
approach  to  reactivity of most quantitative  research,  of trying  to  control for the  effect of the 
researcher,  is  appropriate  to  a  variance  theory  perspective,  in  which  the  goal  is  to  prevent 
researcher  variability from  being an  unwanted cause of variability  in  the  outcome  variables. 
However, eliminating the actual influence of the  researcher is impossible ... , and the goal in a 
qualitative study is not to eliminate this influence but to understand it and to use it productive/y." 
The third limitation is  the generalization of the research or the external validity and the 
transferability.  The  research  in  this  dissertation  with  its  context,  variables  and  findings  are 
potentially not applicable to all other industries. lt is  clear that the research is not transferable to 
non  technology  industries  and  also  possibly  not  transferable  to  low  technology  industries. 
Moreover, within the high technology industries, it is possible that this research is not transferable 
into  more  stable  industries,  where the  level  of uncertainty  and  change are  Jess  prorninent,  or 
where the change takes place over a longer temporal bracket. Furthermore, while this longitudinal 
research is over the period from 1993 to 2009, it is possible that this research is not transferable in 
the  same  high  technology  industry,  the  telecommunications  and  information  technology 
industries, over a different longitudinal time period. However, as stated by Maxwell ( 1996 p. 97), 375 
the generalization of this qualitative research is an analytical and conceptual generalization that 
leads to the development of a theor)' that could potentially be ex  tend to other cases:  " ... , externat 
generalizability  is  often  not  a  crucial  issue  for  qualitative  studies.  lndeed,  the  value  of a 
qualitative  study  may  depend  on  its  lack  of externat  generalizability,  in  the  sense  of being 
representative of  a larger population; it may provide an account of  a setting or population that is 
illuminating  as  an  extreme  case  or  ideal  type ....  ,  the  generalizability  of qualitative  studies 
usually is based, not on explicit salllpling of  sorne defined population to  which the results can be 
extended,  but on the development Qj a theory that can be extended to other cases." 
11.5 Further Research 
This  research  provides  a first  step  towards  a  research  program.  The elements  of this 
research  could  be  further  investigated  using  deductive  analysis  and  statistical  inference. 
Furthermore,  more interesting questions could be asked.  It  would be interesting to  explore the 
impact of the  epidemie emergeoce  and  diffusion  of disruptive  technologies  on  the  erosion of 
market  shares,  boundaries  and  competencies;  the  forces  and  dynarnics  of creative  destruction: 
Implications  on  the  firm,  industry,  and  national  levels;  the  disruptive  business  models  in  the 
telecommunication,  biotechnology  and  aerospace  industries;  and  the  innovation  models  in 
turbulent ecosystems. Therefore, the research in this dissertation could be extended by following 
multiple research  streams, to  increase our understanding of the process  of creative construction 
and technological disruption. 
By  researching  the  categories,  typologies  and  nature  of disruptive  technologies  and 
innovation,  we  could  identify  th.e ecology  of disruption and  the forces  and  dynarnics  that take 
place during the waves of radical change. By studying this ecology, using case studies from high 
technology firms over longitudinal periods, we could identify and explain why specifie new and 
disruptive  technologies  succeed  in  making  a  long  term  presence  while  other fail  to  survive. 
Researching  technological  djsruption  spanning  different  industries  could  identify  not  only 
disruptive technologies, but also  disruptive products, services  and  business  models. This could 
explain why  disruptive business  models could have a greater impact on the industry  structure, 
beyond the effect of a single or few disruptive technologies. 376 
As  the research in this  dissertation was focused  mainly on the telecommunications and 
information  technology  industries,  further  research  is  suggested  into  other  high  technology 
industries, such as  the bio technology, aeronautics, nano and green technologies. How disruptive 
technologies, innovations and business models, are compared in these different industries and if 
there  is  any  pattern  that  exists  across  these  industries.  For example,  while  seeking  externat 
sources  of innovation,  why  the  acquisition  mode!  is  dominant in  the  telecommunications  and 
information technology industries (acquisition programs), while in the biotechnology, the alliance 
mode!  is  more prorninent (alliance portfolios). Moreover, the effect of creative destruction and 
technology disruption could be researched on the finn leve!, as well as on the cluster, national and 
regionallevels. For example, on the international context, how the governmental regulations and 
deregulations could have either a catalyst or damper effects on the emergence and diffusion of 
disruptive  technologies  and  services.  How  the  incumbent  firms  are  resisting  these  waves  of 
technology disruption and if this resistance is structured and justified oris it a strategie choice. 
On the acquisition and alliance research stream, further research is needed to  understand 
the  complex  work  of acquisitions  in  the  high  technology  industries.  For  example  how  the 
potential acquisitions are evaluated and what are the factors that are having more weight in the 
decision making process of acquisition formulation.  It  would be interesting to  explore how the 
process of acquisition formulation is  collaborated between the multi task teams  involved in  the 
decision,  and  how  the  decision  is  reached.  For  example  how  the  multi  task  team,  with  its 
divergent objectives, would decide on whether to  ally, acquire or internally develop this  needed 
technology. On the performance leve!, how the performance of an  acquisition is  really measured 
in  high technology firms, and  whether it  is  measured  by the increase in  market  value,  market 
share,  technological  efficiency,  or  a  combination  of  the  three.  On  performance,  how  the 
performance of multiple acquisitions could be measured over a fiscal year and how to identify the 
individual performance contribution of each acquisition over the same fiscal year period. In the 
post acquisition decision, how the acquired firm is  integrated and the nature of this integration: Is 
it a full integration,  full autonomy within the acquiring firm or a hybrid form of integration and 
autonomy, and on which areas of the business and on what levels. --------------------------
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On  the  technological  integration  and  convergence  research  stream,  more  research  rs 
needed  in  this  emerging  area.  What  is  the  nature  and  definition  of convergence  and  if it  rs 
different from consolidation  and  integration.  Using case studies,  it  would  be  interesting to  see 
how convergence took place in different industries and how it affected the competitive landscape 
and the industry structure. flow  new entrants are taking advantage of the convergence and how 
incumbent  firms  could  Sllrvive  the  challenge  of  convergence  in  their  industries.  Does 
convergence  lead  to  new  business  models  or  it  is  new  business  models  that  lead  to  the 
convergence of products and services. How the convergence of products and services lead to the 
establishment of new firms and new industries. 
On the  systems  of  innovation,  furthering  the  research  on  the structure of the  national 
systems  of innovation  would  enhance  our  understanding  on  how  to  compare  these  national 
systems across clusters, indllstries and nations.  Using a structured mode! and a typology for the 
national system of innovation would help us  to  measure the efficiency of these national systems 
and  prescribe  ways  to  increase  their  performance.  For  example,  continuing  to  explore  the 
telecommunications  industry  as  an  ecosystem  for  the  system  of innovation,  would  helps  us 
understand  how  the  collaboration  is  maxirnized  across  the  interlinks  between  the  various 
institutions being  part of  the  national system of innovation.  In  this ecosystem, is  collaboration 
deterministic or voluntaristic, and if the governance of these systems centralized or distributed, 
with respect to national projects or project management task forces. 378 ------- - - -----
APPENDIXA 
A SAMPLE OF A DIRECTED INTERVIEWING GUIDE 
o  What was the competitive situation before reaching a decision togo for an acquisition 
o  How do you rate the technological and financial performance of the company at that time 
o  Were there any available strategie alterna  ti v  es 
o  Wh at was the strategie importance of the acquisition for the company at that time 
o  At this time do you still agree that it was the right strategie decision 
o  How the decision was taken and who took it 
o  How did you evaluate the companies for potential acquisitions 
o  Was there a previous expertise in forrning acquisitions 
o  What were the goals of the acquisition formation 
o  What were the expectations after the acquisition formation 
o  Did the company outsourced external consultants with expertise on acquisition formation, 
and what was their role. 
o  What was the time frame set for the acquisition formation and implementation 
o  What were the challenges anticipated in this phase before the implementation 
o  What were the challenges faced during the implementation 
o  What was the structural c<Jntrol  mechanism that was put in place to manage the process 
o  Was there any contractual goals and were they met 
o  How did you anticipated th.e effect the acquisition would have on 
•  Technology integrati<Jn, 
•  Complexity, 
•  Retention of talent, 
•  Financial management, 
•  Customer satisfaction, 
•  Corporate culture 
•  Product development 
•  Stock value 
•  Competitive positiorùng 
•  Overall performance 
o  How do you rate the acquisition effect after the implementation phase and on the short 
medium and long term, on the following: 
•  Technology integration, 
•  Complexity, 
•  Retention of talent, 
•  Financial management, 
•  Customer satisfacüon, 
•  Corporate culture 
•  Product development 
•  Stock value 
•  Competitive positioning 
•  Overall performance 380 APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE OF A DIRECTED INTERVIEWING QUESTIONAIRE 
M.  A.,  the following  is the directed interview. l'LI be as  king you kindly sorne questions for you to 
elaborate on  your experience either in  implementing an acquisition or in  the  rote of a 
consultant in an acquisition. 
Q  1:  what  was  the  competitive  situation  before  reaching  the  decision  to  go  ahead  with  an 
acquisition? 
A:  We have to specify the type of acquisition we are talking about. Perhaps the largest and most 
recent one I  was  involved in,  negotiating directly,  was B.'s acquisition of Adtranz, the 
German holding-stock manufacturers, purchased in 2000 and being integrated from 2000 
onward.  The  reason  this  acquisition  is  important  is  that  it  helped  to  consolidate  the 
industry; th.ere are now three major players, Alstom, B.-Adtranz and Siemens. At the time 
B.  was  weak  in  certain  areas  of  technology,  specifically  B.  did  not  manufacture 
propulsion. Therefore, on any of the transit cars, be they for a subway or others, B. had to 
buy the propulsion from others, and because the propulsion sector had been consolidated, 
we had  t<J  buy from Adtranz, Alstom or Siemens, who are actually our competitors. This 
made  B. vulnerable  and our choices  were  to  go  out of the  business,  sell,  or become 
competent  in  propulsion. The only way to achieve that was to make a major acquisition. 
Adtranz is  a  small part of Daimler Chrysler Co.  (DC);  they  wanted to  sell  so  we  got 
together and eventually made a deal to acquire it.  Adtranz was a large company, it more 
than  doubled  B's  transportation  sector,  and  brought  locomotives,  signalling  for  sorne 
important  technology,  and pr-opulsion for all  kinds of rolling stock from subway cars to 
tramways to high-speed ... 
Q: and they are manufactured by Alstom  ... 
A: No, by Adtranz, Alstom, and Siemens, they all had propulsion, we bought Adtranz. That was 
the driver, a very important driver for this acquisition. 
Q: why go with this decision with this specifie company? 
A:  Basically, we had discussions with Siemens. Alstom was not for sale, to  buy it it has to be for 
sale. We looked  at  an  alliance with  Siemens,  we  looked at  an  alliance with  a  (sca .... 
position,)  we  went  quite  a  ways  with  them,  eventually  it  didn't  work.  Adtranz  was 
available, at  !east Adtranz was on the selling block by  D  C  who  clearly indicated that 
they  wanted  to  sell  as  that  part  of their  business  only  amounted  to  five  %  of their 
revenues, (they didn't even know they were doing that business.) So, they were interested 
in selling. We had an interested sel.ler and an interested buyer. This did not require a long 
consideration among the  three.  (that would be B+DC+A) What was  more delicate was 
whether we could build the technology internally or make an other smaller acquisition to 
build  the  capability  in  the propulsion sector without buying out Adtranz or any  of the 
others. We looked at this very thoroughly but came to  the conclusion that it would take 
too long to acquire the full range in propulsion, from high-speed trains to tramways,  this 
is  a  very  wide  range.  Before  we  could  develop  the capacity  to  do  this  it  would  take 382 
severa! years and the game would be over. We could not wait severa! years, so the way to 
go was with the acquisition. 
Q:  was this a strate  gy? 
A:  it was a strategy, an opportunity we pursued because it met a very clear strategie challenge and 
issue identified by the transportation group. 
Q 2: how do you read the technological and financial peiformance of  the company at that time? 
We are referring to B.  before this acquisition. 
A:  the performance was  great but there  was  a  technological  weakness due to  a  change in  the 
dynamics of the market and the industry. It used to be that you had severa! holding stock 
manufacturers and you had severa! propulsion makers and they were not integrated. So 
before 1994 Siemens, Alstom and Adtranz, which didn't exist then but was a subsidiary 
of that(didn't say who), they  were a propulsion maker but they did not manufacture the 
bodies of the cars. So, the car makers could ask for bids from these three companies and 
decide which offered the best bid  before subrnitting theirs  to  an  auth01ity,  a  buyer,  In 
time they started buying companies. Eventually they integrated themselves vertically. At 
that  point  was  not  integrated  vertically  and  was  facing  three  vertically  integrated 
companies  who  were  essentially  the  suppliers  of  propulsion.  So,  technologically 
something had to be clone at that point. 
Q: can we say this created a certain strategie vulnerability for B. in the transportation sector? 
A:  Yes,  there  were  only  two  choices,  either to  sell  transportation  to  one  of them,  or acquire 
propulsion. 
Q:  were the  re any available strategie alternatives? 
A: Y  es, I mentioned the possibility of a joint-venture with Siemens which was exploration land, 
and  secondly  the  possibility  of doing  it  through  a  smaller  acquisition  and  internai 
development  which  would  have  been  too  slow.  The  first  one,  the  Siemens  alliance 
eventually did not work out and the small acquisition and internai development route was 
too slow. 
Q:  why didn't you decide to sel! those assets? 
A: No,  because  we  felt  that  it was  an  interesting  market and  was  very  important to  B.  as  a 
diversified company. Transportation has always been a substantial cash producer, which 
was  very  helpful  as  aerospace  was  investing  heavily  in  new  products,  new  aircraft 
programs. It was  a  very  compelling case  the  fact  that transportation provided a  lot  of 
cash. The transportation business  is  a negative asset business, advances are greater than 
your  assets.  We  have  client-advances  which  bring  cash  up  front  and  that  was  an 
important  part  in  developing  the  aerospace  and  in  having  a  balance  of  diversified 
companies. If we had sold, B.  would have basically become an aerospace company and 
we didn't want that. 
Q: so this was the strategie importance for the acquisition. At this time do you still agree that it 
was the right decision? 
A:  1 think it  was  the  right decision. Now  there were  many problems between B.  and Daimler 
Chrysler around the actual financial and accounting adjustments which had to be made. 383 
The transaction was  made on the basis that B.  could do  very  little due diligence, for 2 
reasons:  1.  for two direct competitors, the European Competition Commission would not 
let you probe into a competitor's costs, as  you would go away after having acquired all 
this  information  on  their  costs,  they  won't let  you  do  that.  Secondly,  DC  was  very 
worried, the people were doing a good job turning around the company, and if we came 
in, did the due diligence then decided not to buy, then it would totally demotivate them. 
So  what they  did  was  guarantee a  certain  amount of equity.  After ail  the  accounting 
would  be completed, all  adjustments  for contracts and  adequate provisions  made,  they 
guaranteed that a œrtain amount of equity would  b~ there.  If it  wasn't there,  then they 
would adjust the equity, reduce the priee to  adjust the equity. Obviously when the time 
came to  do  this,  0  C didn't  want to.  The investment was  quite large and  they started 
contesting. All this took a long time, it went all  the way to the International Chamber of 
Commerce  and  Arbitration.  B.  won,  though  Jess  than  it  wanted,  175  million  Euro  as 
compensation from DC. (The reason D C didn't want it, it was plausible but turned into a 
very messy situation afterwards.) 
Q 6:  how was the decision taken and by whom,  how did you come about making the decision. 
A: at some point this goes before the Board. Y ou make a presentation on wh y the decision makes 
sense,  and  it  cornes  back with  a  recommendation from  the  Chairman  and  CEO,  Jean 
Beaudoin  (Bob  Brown  at  the  time),  and  whether  the  Board  agrees  or  it  doesn't. 
Eventually there was  a whole series of negotiations and at many points we almost walked 
away from the transaction. It is a very sinuous process and until the very end, close to the 
end,  we thought  we  had  reached  the end,  we  were  in  Berlin  and  we  on  the  point of 
leaving our rooms and returning. Then D C gave in on key elements so we came back to 
the board and said: here's the deal we have agreed upon, do you agree on it. 
Q:  how many pers  ons were  involved in this process, and how was the rest of  the Board and the 
Company invoived in shaping the decision,  was it tak,en by consensus, how? 
A: well you have to understand B. At the time, J Beaudoin and the rest of the Family had control 
of the  votes,  sorne  60% of the  votes  then,  they  have  a  lot of weight,  they  control the 
votes. The Chairman, CEO & 1 were the three most involved. Then once certain terms 
were  set  and  agreed  upon  between  the  Chairman,  CEO  &  DC,  1 took  over because 
Mergers & Acquisitions was one of my many  responsibilities, strategies etc., there was a 
VP Mergers Acquisitions, VP Legal and under my  direction; they started negotiating ail 
the details of a purchase agreement. This took severa! months of negotiation, in which 1 
participated. At some point there was a meeting at the top with two senior men from DC 
to  come to  terms  on  various  issues  which  were pending,  not only the  priee,  but  many 
other issues. At various times during this process  there were presentations made to  the 
Board as to where we were, and an agreement from the Board. They never count the vote 
as  such, you present the project and the Board agrees on the terms,  where things are at. 
Of course as thlngs change we go back to the Board for approval, until the final approval 
for the deal about to be signed. 
Q:  you had formai scheduled meetings,  weekly,  monthly, formai,  informai ? or the  whoie was a 
process of  interventions? 
A:  this was fulltime, on-going. In  a corporate office everything is formai,  not necessarily in the 
way  of someone taking minutes,  but thls  is  a corporate office, it is  very formai  in  the 
sense that  you know  you  are  about  to  make  big  decisions.  The players  are there  and 384 
whoever has authority is  there and ali the elements are on the table and we decide to go 
ahead, which means going to the Board with the proposai. 
Q:  you mentioned the VP Legal and VP Mergers and Acquisitions who reported to you.  1 was 
wondering about the VP  Technology, VP Finance,  were they involved in any part of  the 
process even for consultation, evaluation? 
A:  They were very  much involved when we were presenting the financials of Adtranz but they 
were not involved in the  negotiations as  at that point, there was  no  comrnitment. They 
became very involved. Once we were involved in the process, so were the people from B. 
Transportation as they know the technology, know the contracts; a whole team of them, 
sorne  15  came to Berlin to  look at the contract. Once that was completed, a  mammoth 
operation via the transportation people took place as they are the experts, in the sense of 
looking at the technology from the information we have, and looking at the contracts. It 
was a consultation process by the operations people who will actually be managing it. 
Q: and marketing people were involved? 
A: ali the transportation people were involved; contract people, finance, legal, marketing in sorne 
sense, technology people of transportation, ali of them. 
Q 7:  how were the companies evaluated as for potential alliances? 
A:  Alstom,  we  didn't discuss this  with.  With Siemens there was a long process of discussions, 
negotiations,  how would the company be organized, a lot of organizational structure, how 
we  should structure an  alliance, what would be  the corporate structure, how  we  would 
share, who would own what, who would have control of what, this is  why eventually it 
tripped on these issues of conflict. 
Q 8: was the re former experience within B. re  garding acquisitions and  forming alliances? 
A;  huge, here are two things you have to read for tomorrow, chapter 6, 6.6.1: Diversification and 
governance at  B, ali of what we believe and how;  B.  comme acquéreur des  principes, 
l'importance  du  prix,  l'importance  des  vérifications,  le  style,  la  valeur  de  gestion, 
1' acquisition de Canadair en details. The first  acquisition from  which  we drew a lot of 
!essons for the future was in  1986 with the Canadair acquisition. It was a huge acquisition 
then, and it was to become the mode!  applied for ali acquisitions. The team in place at B. 
at that time stayed in place for almost 15 years. 
Q:  what were B 's expectations after the acquisition, what did you expect? 
A:  We expected what we were looking for, to be the largest transportation company in the world, 
which B. is.  It is part of a small group of three large players, Europeans, capable now of a 
full  range of technologies, full  range of products and a presence essentially worldwide, 
such as our doing a joint-venture in China. 
Q:  what exactly was your role before, during and after the acquisition. 
A:  I  was  Executive  VP  of  B,  and  had  reporting  to  me  the  VP Acquisitions,  Treasurer,  VP 
Finance, VP Human Resources, the structured finance people, legal, etc. 
Q 11: your role stayed the same before,  during and afterward? 
A: yes. 385 
Q 12: what was the lime frame set for the acquisition? 
A:  no  timeframe was  set as  such.  Basically we had decided during the Board' s strategie review 
held for 3 da ys every year, I think it was the Board of February 1998 when transportation 
was  a big issue, because of the consolidation of the propulsion makers, and we decided 
we  had  to  resolve  this  issue.  From  that  point  on  we  started  investigating,  started 
negotiating with Siemens, evaluating whether we could do it internally with a task force, 
what that would mean, what small acquisition could be made, how could we develop that, 
etc. In 1999  we met in Washington for a first ti me with Karl... ( cldn' t get the name .. .  ), 
who just L eft Mercedes-Benz, he was the one in charge of ali  these strategies at xxx?. I 
met  him in  Washington in  the fall  of 1999  and we started  the  process  of discussions. 
From that time on there were hard discussions which concluded in July 2000 in Berlin. 
Q:  but you didn't have a timeframefor the implementation? 
A:  Implementation  is another thing.  The problem is you  have a deal  in  July, but you  can't do 
anything until the Commission approves it,  that's the difficult part. They can decide that 
it  is  such an  important merger that they will go through a lengthy process of evaluation 
which  can  take  from  1 to  2  years,  and  you  can't do  anything.  I  was  in  charge  and 
managed to  get the approval in April.2nd, 2001. Until then all you can do  is  prepare on 
paper, we could not get into the company. It was finally signed on April 30th in Berlin on 
the lst of May there was a whole operation of integration put into motion on that day. 
Q 13:  can we say that those are the challenges that you anticipated in  the phase preceding the 
impleme1 1tation? The acceptance of  the EU? 
A:  we always knew we had to go before the EU, and that they had blocked a GE purchase  ... 
Implementation  is  always a challenge because  you  are taking over a  group,  a lot of Germans, 
Swedes, operations people, full of companies, major. 
Q: during the actual implementation, what real challenges were present? 
A:  I  don't  think  there  were  any  surprises.  The  only  problem  resulted  from  the  tension  and 
animosity  between DC &  ourselves based on the priee adjustment that led to  arbitration. 
This contarninated the relatioriship at the operating leve!  so it  was  very difficult to deal 
with the DC people. That was different than  anticipated. There were sorne  people that 
counted, who worked for us, but who were stillloyal to sorne extent to DC. 
Q: did youface any challenges on the levet of  complexity of integration, on the levet of  cultures of 
the companies? 
A: not that we did not anticipate. We had made an acquisition in Germany before, we knew it was 
tricky, What is  always tricky and you can never do as fast as  you want is plant closures. 
Part of the rationalization was to close sorne plants, that took more time than anticipated. 
Q:  what was tlze structure of  the control mechanism that was put in place to manage the process. 
A:  Very  detailed, it's  called  integration  governance,  a  whole  architecture  was  put  into  place, 
reporüng, reviewing, etc. 
Q: what was the  key element. 
A:  it  was  to :have  a  clear demarcation  of  past  force,  a  focus  on  the  right  thing,  with  a  weil 
estabJjshed  calendar  to  achieve  the  goal  and  very  close  monitoring  of the  progress 
according to the calendar. Q 16: were the  re any contractual goals in the acquisition agreements? 
A:  what do you mean? 
Q: any goals in the contractas such? 
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A: the fundamental contractual element which was the source of restriction was the fact that there 
was a liquidity guarantee on the part of the seller, and when the adjustments came in they 
were such that they didn't want to live with this agreement. That was a huge problem. 
Q:  those were contractual (boards), were they met? 
A:  that went to arbitration so it was not met. 
Q 17: How did you anticipate the effect of  the acquisition on the technology integration of  the two 
companies? Complexity, challenge? 
A:  basically we were acquiring technology B.  Transportation did  not have,  so  in  that sense we 
were  adding  technology  so  there  was  not  much  integration.  Complexity,  yes,  huge 
amount of complexity. Challenge, yes because during the period when it was public that 
we  had acquired,  we  could  not  make  any commitment to  anyone because we  had  this 
approval from the EU to obtain and therefore there was a period of uncertainty. With ali 
these B. people coming and going, thinking they would lose their jobs, it  was easy for 
competitors to come and  pick the best people and  make them offers. We tried to cope 
with  that  issue.  Financial  management was  certainly  a  lot  more complicated, a  larger 
company  but  we're  used  to  that,  I  don't  think  it  was  a  big  issue  here.  Customer 
satisfaction  .. . Corporate culture well 1 would have to  ex plain  that Adtranz itself was  a 
new entity created by  merging severa! companies back in the la te  1990' s. It' s not like it 
was  a  100-year old  company. So 1 wouldn't  say  iLhad one corporate culture  and  B. 
another  one.  I  think  it  had  the  diverse  culture  which  tended  to  reflect  the  particular 
company the people were coming from and also the particular region. The Swedes are 
different from the Germans and we had Potes Czechs, facilities in France and England. 
That's  the  complexity  of a  real  multinational  operation  so  it  wasn't  unanticipated, 
certainly. Product development? 
Q:  was itfast enough, slow enough? 
A: 1 don't know, I left in 2001  while it was still in the process. I left without the approval and the 
secondary approval, I le  ft  on  June 30th 2001  but I  worked  with  Lortie who  was  the re 
afterwards,  and 1 don't see any  influence one way  or the other. Stock value? Well the 
stock responded well at the ti me but of course on Sept 11 th everything went down. 
Q:  so the stock'  s losing value wasn 't be  cause of the acquisition. 
A:  not really, although indirectly, because first you pay one billion dollars for the acquisition. At 
the time B. was  generating enough cash flow that the finance people thought we didn't 
need  to  issue  shares because  we  had enough cash flow  to do  it,  so  they  didn't go  and 
finance the deal.  And because of this disagreement with Adtranz there was a lot of cash 
to pay on these contracts which we can sue them for, but still  you have to do it.  So that 
was  ali  right, except  that Sept  Il  th  happened at the  same  ti me, so obviously  when the 
stock goes down it's not time to  issue anymore, and you have this one billion that you 
pay in cash, and the stock went down tremendously. So, in that sense ... Q:  can we say that the ac']uisition had a positive impact? 
A:  Y  es, B. is in a much better position now, yes. 
Q:  and on the overall pedormance? 
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A:  weil, the overall performance of Transportation, 1 think they are still struggling because they 
are  finding it  very  difficult  to  rationalize the  facilities.  There are facilities  in  different 
countries, sorne Vlhere B. was already established so B. Transportation has to close sorne 
and it's a very difficult process. We knew that but it's turning out to be very difficult so 
the margin is not improved enough at this point to satisfy the shareholders. 
Q: how do you measure the combined theoretical and practical interests, how do you measure the 
peiformance,  do you measure it only  economically  or technologically or socially,  in a 
few words. 
A:  clearly the first responsibility of a private listed company when carrying out an acquisition is 
to  demonstrate  and  prove eventually that it  has  turned out to  be beneficiai to  the  long 
term interests  of  the  company.  And  the long tern  interests  of the  company obviously 
means  the  shareholders'  long  term interests,  but not in  the  strict sense of maxirnizing 
every cent of tlle shareholders' but you also increase the imperviousness of the company, 
the  ability  to  resist  unfavourable  conditions,  y  ou' ve  increased  the  durability  of the 
company, its  longevity,  these are elements which  are  in  the long term interests  of the 
shareholders but also of the company as a whole. 
Q: so you don't take into consideration the short term? 
A: you don't take int() consideration the  short term but you don't say these are social benefits 
either, that would be a false statement to make. 
M r.  A., thank y ou very much for the interview. Would you like to add anything? 
A: no, that's it. 
Ok Sir,  thank you very 1nuch 
A:  Thank you. Good. 388 References 
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